Topic: 49. THREE PRINCIPLES OF FORCE THEORY: A SUMMARY

1. We can now put Force Theory in the broad context of a familiar debate.  In the conflict between Liberalism and Conservatism--focus of the American news media--Liberalism has prevailed because its positions have been internally consistent, and above all consistent on the issue of race.  We assume that race is the America's most central and critical issue.   Liberalism has been consistently anti-racist.   Conservatism, on the other hand, as Liberalism's alleged adversary, has been only inconsistently and ambiguously racist.  We want to change this.  We agree that there is consciously or unconciously  a thread of racism running throughout rightist thinking.  The indecisiveness of rightist racial theory, and the internal incongruity among its own elements, consigns the whole Conservative movement to failure.  We can count this so-called movement a pathetic failure.  For one thing, Conservatives do not have the sinecures in universities and churches.  This--the mere question of jobs and money for our own people--is a question that must be addressed.   Force Theory emerges out of defeated Conservatism.  As developed in the present blog, Force Theory attempts not so much to lay down a doctrine as to sort out inconsistencies in older doctrines.  The problem, we are saying, has long been Conservatism's wanting to say too much about too many issues.  Conservatism, which has indeed seen no need to understand its own positions--to understand such concepts as nation and God and race--is intellectually incompetent to take a consistent ideological stand.  Therefore it is defeated by contradictions among its own notions.  The need to include nation and race in the same ideology has put Conservatism at a disadvantage in relation to the consistently anti-racist stand of Liberalism.  Nation and race as concepts are entirely different and incompatible.  This lack of understanding of the two concepts has mired Conservatism in a fatal self-contradiction.  Our prescription under auspices of Force Theory is to eject Nationalism and religion from the Conservative agenda, leaving only racialism. We propose finally to build a social theory around the idea of race.
 
2.  Since Duehring, and his admittedly embarassing defeat at the hands of his formidable communist, ultra-liberal adversary Friedrich Engels, Force Theory has languished from inattention.  In this blog Duehring's theory--which makes force the central issue in human relations--is re-examined and, hopefully, revitalized.  Ideas taken from German Philosophical Anthropology are brought to bear on the issues--the nature of man and technology--that are raised by Force Theory.  The modus operendi here is simple.  The strategy is followed of showing that human culture as itself internally contradictory, must end in something consistent and permanent.  The confusion in Duehring's theory, we are saying, is in his subject matter itself.  Culture, contrary to Duhring's idea, is nothing internally or logically consistent but is an ongoing process of reconciling oppositional and adversarial elements.  Engels' theory was closer to the mark.  Duehring misunderstood the nature of culture and therefore failed to grasp man's contradictory relation to culture.  To understand culture is no easy task.  Updated Force Theory turns to the material of paleo-anthropology (depiction of early or primal man) for some idea this relationship.  Contradictions in human culture are the result (we are saying) of what we call the "notness" of culture:  the fact that culture is not itself an organic or biological feature of man, and in the sense that culture is external or other than the human, it is, or can be, actively opposed to the human being. We see the human being as a creature logical oppositions (Homo contradictio [CHECK]).  The contradictions that there are in human life begin in the primal stage of first tool use, as the tool itself in effect "contradicts" the human user.  The tool is and is not the human himself.  There is nothing "straightforward" in human life.   In this the human being stands apart from all other creatures. But there is more, finally we will see that the highest aspiration of the human being--love--is never pure love but only complex love.  Human love (of the kind Kant talked about) is always bought at the expense of self-hatred.  This is the fate of the human speices and explains, we are saying the anti-racist stand of white people themselves:  love of humanity is simply the reverse side of white self-hatred.  But there is nothing strange about this so long as we are talking about human beings.  The human being is always in a situation of self-contradiction; that is what he is by virtue of the basic--technological--conditions of his success as a species.  Love of others and hatred of one's owns self is the condition of, above all others, sthe white race.  We say this at the risk of entering not only a highly sensitive but also a very obscure side of human existence.  This is the side of morality and ethics, where practical life transitions to the great collective life of whole peoples--in this realm nothing is clear.  We are admittedly at an early stage of presenting much of this material.   Much of writing in the area of Force Theory is a tortuous and unappologetically dull and laborious depiction of the evolution of human culture.  Force Theory has taken on the task to understand how, in his long evolution, the human being has come to become possessed by ideas that are contradictory. To depict such a history is a laborious task.   The largest part of this blog is to attempt to follow this thread of technological and cultural evolution.   Since this part of Force Theory is still work in progress, some order and coherence may presently be brought to the subject matter.

3. Force Theory can be counted as a so-called "back to nature" philosophy of the type popularized by Rousseau.   I say this at the risk of consigning our ideology to a discredited, old-fashioned philosophical backwater.  Yet, finally, out of the confused and contradictory  course of civilization emerges race as something permanent.  Culture ends in race simply because culture ends.  What is left when the contradictory elements of culture finally elude all resolution is race.  That is because race is reality.  And reality is race.   Upon this reality we may build a complete (gesamt) conception of the society of the future.   Race--an entire process wherein the human being transcends himself as a new and higher biological species--is the constant in human effort; and is the reality which will replace the confusion of culture.  In race--which Heidegger calls "heavy with Being-- there is certainty.   Force Theory proposes to defend "race" as a philosophical idea.  (Who, anyway, said anything about science?)  Having restricted our agenda and focus, we free ourselves to talk of concepts that are simply not scientific; they are moral, or in the realm of "should be" as opposed to "is."  This is a great vague mission but, then, that is what philosophy always is.  Our first point is that, as a being of contradictions--not of illogic so much as logical oppositions--the human being's moral code is likewise interally contradictory.  Love of one's fellow human being is bought, we are saying, only at the expense of self-disdain.  This principle--that of humanitarian love--is impossible without corresponding doubt and dislike of oneself.  In the animal realm this is not the case.  Animal love passes from simple love to simple hate--and back again.  We are left in Force Theory in a predicament.  We are faced with a hard choice between simple hate and, on the other hand, complex love.  The latter is calculating.  Simple hate, on the contrary, is pure and innocent--like everything else in nature.  Kant made the point that higher morality must be intellectual or cateogorical.  That is true.  We are saying, on the other hand, that within nature--and within humans themselves as a being finally grounded in nature--there is no such distinction.  Simple love does not contradict simple hate.  The conditio humana is of self-contradiction wherein love, if it is higher love, cannot exist without its corresponding hatred by the individual of himself.  This is not only a logical self-contradiction that the human "entertains," it is a self-defeating "essence" of the human being.  In these terms, "race" is a return to nature.  Within race are the concepts of simple love and simple hate together.  What is pure and innocent, as these feelings are, cannot contradict one another.  In these terms race is the final resolution to the categorical opposition of so-called higher love and its categorical opposite, higher hate.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-11-10 13:49:02)

Re: 49. THREE PRINCIPLES OF FORCE THEORY: A SUMMARY

Kant stands vaguely midway between religion and science. (See below for qualification of the word "midway.")   Western civilization itself erratically and oportunistically waffles between the two; that is why Western civilization so loves Kant.  At this time we are taking up the question of values and morality.   Kant expresses values consistent with Liberal Democracy; but tries to ground these values in something like factual science.  Kant took up the age old question posed by Plato, how do we get from fact to value?  Kant better perhaps than anyone else understood the issue of fact and value.  But inasmuch as his fixation was on value, he was essentially religious to the core of his personality.   Kant lived in the awkward and adolescent age of transition from religion to science; in this time both leaders and laypeople were uncertain and lacked clear ideas of their identities.  Kant had in this period a rather convincing formula to make this transition. For one thing, Kant appeals to the West's idea that discretion is the better part of value when confronting science.   This is only to say that religion did not so much repent of its radical value-orientation so much as fear science.   Kant's philosophy is a lot of hide and seek; that is what we are saying.  Kant also reflects a new perspective that might be called "religion of nature."  This is a vague concept that, again oportunistically and politically, waffles between fact and value.     Naturalism is essentially a philosophy rather than a pracice of science.  Force Theory is essentially "natualistic," while it attempts to qualify its own conception of value.  Force Theory however borrows little or nothing from Kant.  Kant's "cateogories of thinking" are factual insofar as the human mind is a fact.  But we are saying here, in opposition to Kant, that a value cannot anymore be deduced from a fact of the mind than from a stone or tree as fact.   Kant proceeds thusly; but his whole point of view falls apart when he transitions from mind as fact to the values produced by mind. 

A value is not a fact.   R.Carnap said that values cannot be derived from facts.  We concur on this, and say that this reality--the neutrality of fact regarding value--is the problem that Kant saw but could not solve.  Our own views of Kant may be limited by our lack of diligent scholarship; the quotes and paraphrases entered here are from Google sources.  Kant is consistently the consumate self-righteous Liberal type in his ethical viewpoint; he is a "hmanitarian."  There should be no objection to our assessment here.  Having said these things about Kant--and that Kant is a moral philosopher whose real roots are in religion rather than science--we can define his relation to the naturalism of racialism.  Force Theory is a racialistic--naturalistic--philosophy and would oppose Kant on certain points.  But there is more.  Kant indeed, in his basic mentality, has given us insight into the so-called Liberal and anti-racist point of view.  It is simply true that value in the so-called "higher" human sense is cateogorical.  That is to say, if love is a categorical value, then love excludes hate as love's categorical opposite.  I quote from a Google source:

"The class of actions in accordance with duty must be distinguished from the class of actions performed for the sake of duty. ...Kant believes only actions performed for the sake of duty have moral worth. He seems to suggest that the greater one's disinclination to act for the sake of duty, the greater the moral worth of the action. ...If one performs an action by inclination, then that action, on Kant's view, has no moral worth. Thus, morality necessarily involves a struggle against our emotional inclinations. The natural love of a parent for a son or daughter has no moral worth in the Kantian sense of the term.  The choices necessary to live a good life could involve actions which entail results incompatible with happiness... "

Kant clearly states his ideas on the family--he called these speculations "philosophical anthropology"--and it is here we have a good shot at him.  Kant states that the love of a parent for a child is nothing (his kind) of a higher or transcendental moral order; in fact such parental love is for his purposes nothing at all.  We don't think it is anything either--except inevitable.  In Force Theory we respond to Kant's idea of transcendental love with the consideration that there is also a lower love.  That is the love we affirm here.   And with this lower love there comes a lower hate which, right or wrong, is ineivtalbe and "natural."  I repeat the idea that Force Theory is a version reminiscent of "nature philosophy" of the 18th century.    This--on the point of the family-- is where we can see Kant to be anti-naturalistic.  For the parent to love a child, we are saying, is simple love.  To this love Kant contrasts his love of a higher--categorical--kind.  This is the Categorical Imperative of Kant:  to love in the higher sense is an absolute, undeniable command that will not permit any other love, not to mention hate.  Where does this command to love in a moral or value-oriented sense eminate?  It derives from mind.  But this forgets that mind is a mere, homely fact among other facts; the Categorical Imperative might as well be a command of God.  As an absolute command, this call to duty excludes any call to do the opposite.  Force Theory is clear on this point.  There is something that Force Theory identifies as simple hate which is innocent and pure and is an expression of nature in all its ebbs and flows.  We are forced into the situation where we must choose, in other words, between Kant's Cateogorical love and our own simple, innocent hate.  Force Theory has made its choice.  We are saying that simple love and simple hate can co-exist spontaneously in the same person without contradicting one another.  This is "natural" in our sense of the word.  And simple love and simple hate are also inevitable.

I said earlier that Kant stands between religion and science.  This was a rather casual statement.  The word "between" contains, in the present context, a possibility for great confusion.  This must be cleared up.  Religion, we are saying, is based on value; science is based on fact.  Value and fact do not exist together on the same spectrum; each has its own spectrum.   Thus it would be impossible to be simply "between" value and fact, or, that is, between religion and science.  Kant is simply playing both sides of the fence.   Kant has to be, in other words, somewhere in the realm of value while also in the realm of fact.  He is back and forth.  This is a neat trick.  We have already exposed this trick by saying, simply, that value cannot be derived from fact even where the fact is the human mind.  The so-called categories of thinking--a concept that is refined and superceded by modern psychology--are mental facts, but no less factual on that account.  Kant lives on today as an academic philosopher amenable to the Liberal (and here I have narrowly defined this word) point of view--anti-naturalistic, anti-racialistic--of the churches and universities.   He is the core of their esoteric, as opposed to exoteric, ideology. He is the St.Thomas Aquinas of the so-called "secular" movement, the authority of last resorts on all inherently unanswerable questions; we can call him the place the proverbial political buck stops--in total confusion--where there is urgent challenge in ethical issues.   As the Liberal Acquinas, Kant constitutes a dark realm but also one of refuge when the priest or professor is challenged on the subject of the basis of value.  The universities, which exist through value rather than through fact, are themselves churches or temples of The Good.  The word "secular" is meaningless.   For the reason academia and formal religion both are based on value, any argument between them is friendly and mutually supportive.  They will never destroy one another but only re-enforce one another on the basic issues that confront them both.  The equality of all humans is a value, not a fact.  Force Theory is grounded in naturalism, a point of view that arose in England, France and Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries.  These philosophies, whether of Hegel or Rousseau or many others, unconsciously lapsed from time to time into value judgements.  The State of Nature was proclaimed "good"; this would be a departure from hard fact.  Where Force Theory enters the discussion much later, ideas such as "simple love" and "simple hate" are advanced.  That is, we admit the existence of value but place such value in its original setting, that of the family and, as an extension of the family, the race.  Finally we return to the statement by R.Carnap that a value cannot be derived from a fact.  If that is true, it is logically impossible to derive any so-called higher moral value from the categories of the mind, which themselves are fact.  We have already stated that simple value is real, but only in the context of what is natural, the family and race, or nature-in-general.  We have said that the seemingly opposite values of love and hate can exist, alternately, within the same person.  Categorical love, on the other hand, precludes hate of any kind, whether simple or complex.  Therefore categorical love (Kant's kind of love) exists alone in some so-called transcendental or other-worldly realm which not only is not of nature (or race) but contrary and contradictory to the real or natural world that people in fact live in. 

New terms may be useful to give the full impact of Kant's great mistake. The problem of deriving an idea of God from facts has no interest for us in Force Theory.   We are comfortable with the idea that God as a fact might be inferred or induced from some fact of reality--so there may be a real God after all.  Such a consideration is only scientific speculation, not religion.  Because to infer a God from existing facts does not mean that we pass necessarily from fact to value.   What we deny, however, that a factual God can Himself (or Herself) produce, somehow, any value whatsoever.  God may exist, we are saying, but He exists in a valueless world.  Jesus Christ might have come to the world, but He came here as a fact descending from another fact.  Because value cannot come from mere fact, Jesus' factual coming brought no value to the world.   From a factual God can come only other facts. The miracles of Jesus are alluded to solely to proclaim that The Good or new value came to the world; but if Jesus is only a fact, then what comes from him to the world can only be other fact.  Jesus's miracles would be only fact following other facts.  There is no real "good" or value in them.  We are speaking hypothetically, since Force Theory is rigorously agnostic.   God may have produced nature, we are saying, but this is still a nature with no inherent value.  (Except the value of mutual usefulness of things and beings, as we said earlier.)   The entire matter can be summarized briefly.  If I say that a thing is, I mean that it necessarily is.  The statement that a thing is means nothing more or less than that thing is.  If I say a thing is, I am also saying that it could be.  It has shown itself that it could be by actually being.  If I say a thing could be, I do not necessarily mean that it is. But I have not logically contradicted the "is-ness" of the thing by saying that it only could be.    Only I'm saying that it could be.  If, on the other hand, I say a thing should be, I do not mean that it necessarily is.  Of course, a thing that should be could, also, be. The should-ness of the thing is simply another quality that co-exists with the thing.  The fact that a thing should be does not exclude the idea that it also could be or even that it is.  What is morally right can actually exist.  This is all we are saying.  But there is more.  What should be might also not be.  And what is need not necessarily also be what should be.  There is no such logical connection between should be and could be.  By these and other games of logic we might demonstrate that the realms of should-be and could-be (and is) are entirely separate domains of reality.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-11-12 14:18:21)