Father-right preceeded mother-right in the evolution of culture.  What caused father-right to decline was nothing in the technics of male hunting, I am saying, but in the complex agreements male hunters had among themselves.  Males left arbitration of their disputes to women, who rose in prominance as mediators.  Thus male culture passed beyond itself into female culture.  This will be my basic position.  We still have to discuss, too, more evolved culture, such as slavery, feudalism, capitalism and so forth.  My view will be that each transition is caused by a rise and then failure of the agreement appropriate to a given age.  This failure is the result in each case of the fact that no agreement provides for settlement of disagreement, which must pass for settlement to an impartial party.  In the case of hunters, men passed their otherwise unresolvable disagreements to women to settle; these women became their leaders.  In horticulture, later, these same kinds of disagreements were passed to outsiders and foreigners, even to enemies, ad infinitum.

Two hunters (say) in an agreement do not constitute, by themselves, a "society."  Society as we are thinking of the word here is triadal, between parties to an agreement and, on the other hand, the (previously discussed) third party.  At issue now is the contract, which in effect is an "agreement about an agreement."  We may think of the third party as "government."  Simply the fact that there is an agreement does not necessarily imply that society and government are present.    Society does not exist through agreements alone;  society exists insofar as agreements are added to remedy the impotence of other agreements.    Society in essence is, regardless of how society is distorted or perverted, the third party to a contract.    No multitude of humans is required for there to be a full society, rather only a few, so long as the triadal relationship is present.  There need be only two persons as principals, plus a third person as "government."   Society as we presently understand the term, in its multitude of human members and its infinitely complex structures, is only an extrapolation from the primary and primal relationship between three persons.  I have suggested this point earlier, in my section Philosophical Anthropology.    Paleolithic hunters could have society; but they would need a chief, albeit simply the third member of a hunting party, who would arbitrate disagreements between the other two hunters.  There is nothing more complex than this to the issue of what constitutes society.  Where, even in preliterate culture, there is a contract there is society.  A contract is present when two hunters (say) admit, or agree as part of their agreement, that they may disagree; and they cede all force to the third man among them, which man then constitutes "government."  This triadal relation between principals and third party, even where there are only three parties to the relationship, is all that is meant by society. 

What the relationship is--one which suspends all force--between principals in an agreement we have already discussed.  We should be clear on this point.   Where we still lack clear understanding is in the relationship between principals  as a group and, on the other hand, the third party.  The principals have a contract when as part of their agreement they allow that disputes among them be settled--by force if necessary--by a third party.  I suggest that to understand even in very basic terms the relation between principals and third party is to complete our vision of society.  We will know not only the static structure of society but the dynamic structure of society.  Every agreement negates itself, essentially, by contractually allowing force through a third party.   The contract requires a second agreement on top of the first one; this is an agreement, namely, between principals and a third party.  This is only one more agreement.  In other words, the (first) principals do not have, yet, a contract with the third party, only a simple agreement that allows the third party to use force to settle disagreements between the (first) principals.  Every agreement that raises the possibility of dis-agreement among principals passes, as contract, into a new agreement between principals and third party.  The agreement with the third party is that the third party will use force to settle disagreements among principals.  But this agreement between principals and third party is, qua mere agreeement, has no provision in the event (really eventuality) of a dis-agreement.  It is obvious that if these principals disagree with the arbitor of disagreements, there is no force available to them which would settle this disagreement.  The agreement between principals and third party, in order to be enforced in its provisions, would itself have to be subject to a third agreement.   Every agreement passes by virtue of its impotence in disagreements into another agreement ad infinitum.  In these terms we see that society itself, as a series of agreements and disagreements always requiring arbitration, is engaged in a self-contradiction. Society in effect negates itself.  There is more.  Without its ongoing effort to restore its inbalance, by addressing the impotence of agreements by inventing new agreements, society would pass out of existence.  Society is always threatening passing out of existence, to be replaced by a State of Nature.   This conclusion is inescapable.  We are left with the conclusion, unavoidably, that American democracy is simply agreement piled upon agreement, contract upon contract.  This--the accumulation of agreements and contracts--is all there is to "enlightened" society.  Dictatorship, in these terms, and raw slavery, have the advantage not that they are advanced--when advancement is simply muliplication of the same--but that they are simple and straightforward. 

We owe a great debt to Friedrich Engels, first in suggesting an application of Hegelian dialectic to the issue of society; secondly in raising the possibility that identifiable social and cultural entities--feudalism, capitalism etc.-- of society could be explained in their succession by the Hegelian formula.  In my Philtalk blog I talked extensively about Engels.  Some of the minor points of this blog, which I forget, may finally some day surface if, as was suggested by one Philtalk member (see "The Story of My Life" on this blog), the contents thereof are ever released by Philtalk's moderator Uwe.  I wait for this to happen.  In the meantime I want to suggest the possibility that, contrary to current ideas, the stages of society--hunting, agriculture, feudalism and so forth--may be simply phases whereupon agreements pass into contracts and again into further agreements.  This will be the angle I am working with for the next period of time.    We understand, for instance, how the agreement between two or three hunters of a hunting party is simply that, an agreement, but is not a contract.  The reason for this is simple.  The hunting party is so small it cannot effectively bifurcate into an arrangement between principals and leader/mediator.  As will be seen however, the fact that the agreement is impotent to enforce provisions in agreements leads, or tends to lead, to the dissolution of the hunting party.  That is, if provisions of the agreement cannot be enforced, a breech of the agreement would lead to the agreement's dissolution.  We can be confident that that would happen.  In these terms it would not be surprising if a hunting party did dissolve itself simply on account of its lack of authority. 

The common wisdom, promoted by university and marxist scholars, is that the superiority of agriculture over hunting would  itself be sufficient to cause human beings to change from one to the other.  The reasons for change would be technological.  I would prefer to say that the reasons for the change from hunting to agriculture were "legal."  Males could not solve, in other words, the purely legal problems--the formal relations among themselves--in the complex technical and human context of hunting.    I will go on to speak of the failure of agreements in "male culture" and the rise of women as mediators--and leaders--in these agreements.  Women's culture and the Mutterrecht supplanted the father-right.  The entire human culture and way of life came to be biased, with this new leadership, toward female interests and abilities.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-08-08 15:55:49)



Made possible by language, agreements first appear with hunters.    Hunting and gathering divides work between males and females:  human beings are unique in this division.  No other species divides labor--and society--as do human beings. Hunting in the human way entails agreements which, essentially, are the same in structure as the agreements building society.  But we are now talking about contracts, which are agreements about agreements.  The same basic contradiction that inheres in agreements in modern society--that they contain no provision for enforcement of terms--applies to agreements between paleolithic hunters.  These hunters were male, always.  Women for their part collected plant food.  The activity of male hunters was complex, entailing planning, preparation and maintanence of hunting technology, and movement over wide areas.  As hunting was more complex than gathering, the nature of hunting agreements--and disagreements--was complex.  Yet, still, hunting agreements contained, as I say, no real provision for settling disputes among members of a hunting party.  We may assume that disagreements did exist and were, or tended to be, disruptive of the most basic enterprise of paleolithic peoples.    Hunting, and the agreements which bound hunters in bands, was and were necessary to survival.   There was a need, not easily fulfilled--bands were small and sparsely distributed throughout the land--for arbitration.   Precisely the value of the agreement, that it suspends violence within a group engaged in important collaboration, is also the defect of the agreement:  that there is no mechanism or provision for settling disputes between members.  The issue of "partiality" is raised.  Members of such a group are partial to their own cause.  There is a natural inclination within agreements to seek arbitration of disputes outside the group.   Outsiders, it is thought, will be impartial.  In this way and for this reason every group defined by an agreement sets its sights outside of the group, to a "foreigner."  The groups attention extends, in this way, from a point within the agreement--often this point is one of disagreement--to a point outside the group.  We may say that the group thereby passes beyond itself.  Agreements consciously or unconsciously pass into new agreements.  New agreements "have to do" with old ones.  The new agreements provide the required (assuming disagreement) settlement of disagreements within the old agreement.  Hunters then, naturally, looked for arbitration to whatever was "outside" their hunting party.  These arbitors could be another hunting party, although these outsiders were also likely enemies and partial to themselves.  Women then came to be mediators in disputes among men of the hunting party.

The common wisdom, promoted by university and marxist scholars, is that simply the pure technical superiority of agriculture over hunting would in itself be sufficient to motivate human beings to change from one to the other.  This is understandably the prevailing idea; the burden of proof would be upon anyone wanting to show anything else.  However it is evident, too, on the basis of what we have now established regarding agreements as such, the necessities of agreements to human life, yet their impotency in settling dis-agreements, that hunting and gathering would be caught, by virtue of its reliance on agreements, in a veritable self-contradiction which it could not settle or resolve on its own.   

A great deal of attention has been given in anthropology, especially in Germany, to the attention to male and female roles in culture.  J. Bachofen talked of Mutterrecht.  In the 19th centruy scholars assumed that the beginnings of human culture, in the paleolithic, were dominated by a "female" principle:  the leaders of society were women; the structure of society was matriarchal, reflecting female interests.  At some point in history, it was said, males overthrew female culture to establish themselves and their interests as focal to culture.  The Vaterrecht was established, and persists to this day. Here, in Force Theory, we reverse this order. We are saying here that male culture preceded female culture; only males had agreements, originally, which are the basis of human culture as such.  What failed in this "male culture," on the other hand, were precisely these agreements.  Hunting itself became a complex of technics and strategies; these all required agreements.  Human culture at this point was not merely technics of hunting but agreements about hunting.   Male interests, in the stressful occupation of hunting, were prior to female interests that had been inherited from the even more prolonged period of animal-like gleaning and plant collecting. Also men defended the tribal territory.  Women continued in the gathering and gleaning mode of life that had been inherited over millions of years.   What allowed the female revolution, we aver, and the sinking of male culture in favor of the female principle, wwould have to be the failure of male agreements.  I want to be more precise on this point.  It was not so much that male agreements failed as that they demanded arbitration, which existed nowhere except among women.  Women were the outsiders to agreements to whom the males appealed for arbitration of their own disagreements.  Women were now in an advantageous position.  In their role as mediators, women became leaders.  But there is more.  The entire bias or leaning of culture, under female leadership, was in favor of plant collecting and gleaning; hunting dwindled as a way of life.


Jim (Jim is a friend of mine):  Hunting is an entire complex of behavior, even a virtual way of life for groups that depend on it.   Hunting males take it so seriously that they socialize only among themselves, not daily with women.   Your mushroom hunting you talk about is, it is true, difficult--especially when one's life hangs in the balance depending on what mushroom you pick.   But most gathering is a bovine thing women are capable lof.   I am sorry I refused to eat the mushroom at camp you offered me.  Do I really have to apologize?    yours, richard


The free(ly) entered agreement becomes an agency of (contractual) force:

Agreements become contracts.  But in allowing an agreement to become a contract, parties to the agreement must be willing to place themselves in the hands of an agency previously identified by the original parties as an enemy.  This is because only an enemy can be impartial in the capacity of arbitrators of disagreements.  The enemy does not know the parties, personally, and does not care about the outcome of the agreement.  Any "friend" would be partial.  Hence the agreement itself is transformed in one important sense to what it originally was not and never meant itself to be.  The agreement continues "at the descretion" of the aritrator, exactly the person or party who was enemy to the agreement.  This state of affairs can only be called a paradox.  Through the contract the agreement passes beyond itself to precisely what opposed the agreement.  This paradox is easily explained.  Such a transfer of authority does not violate the terms of the agreement; it simply subjects parties to the agreement to an "alien" force.  The agreement now exists "at the descretion" of the arbitrator of the agreement. 

To secure for the principals the product of the agreement there must be still a further agreement with this arbitrator, who still may be "arbitrary" and self-serving.  This is precisely how the work of men came to be the consumer object of the women.  Such a transfer of power is documentable through the archeological record.  We may go on to talk further about the agreement.  The agreement between the principals is no longer voluntary; it is enforced.  I talked earlier about the "equality" of the principals.  Parties to the agreement are still equals to one another and they still share an enterprise.  Originally the product of the agreement--"said product"--was for the principals.  Now this product is for the principles "as per a new agreement with an arbitor of disagreements--and at the descretion of the arbitor.  Precisely the thing, however, that would oppose the agreement--say, the way women oppose male agreements--now comes to dominate the agreement.  The agreement is transformed in one movement in its original intention:   the final product of the agreement is taken out of the hands of the principals and is consigned to the discretion of the "alien other."   I talked earlier of men, to whom women were "other" and "alien," who nonetheless submitted themselves to the discretion and even mercy of women. 

This is how women rose to power--by settling the disagreements among men.  Otherwise women today would have no authority at all.  Women are alien and "other than" men; the two genders might as well have been separate species.  Women oppose men and trive, by gender instinct, to take from men what men have.  When men disagree among themselves they fall into this trap.  Agreements do not terminate themselves simply because the their parties disagree.  Parties to an agreement can argue and disagree; still their relationship, if this relationship is a true agreement, will often continue.    The formal relationship, established through language and understanding, has this sort of durability.  The durability of an agreement in the face of disagreement consists not so much of a principle within the agreement as what is around and opposing the agreement.   Precisely through the contract they agreement now exists "at the descretion" of the mediating third party.  This state of affairs can be brought about through any simple disagreement among the principals.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-08-09 14:52:17)


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Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-08-12 16:07:40)



There is not one single evolution of the the human species, simply, but two evolutions--male and female.  I said earlier that women rose to power, and their way of life absorbed the male way of life, through the role women had as mediators in disputes between men.  To be arbitrator meant for women that they held the reins of power.  Male agreements existed "at the descretion of" (to use a legal term applying to court power) women mediators.  How this state of culture came about is explained through the archeological record, which points unequivocally toward an entirely different set of evolutionary circumstances for men and women.  This division of labor, and therefore division of genders, is suggested in the term "hunting and gathering."  Hunting and gathering require radically different abilities and points of view.  This--their three million years of separate evolution--explain why men and women are so different.  Culture, in fact, because of the different cultures that men and women had--and the effect of culture to exaggerate biological differences that already exist--has the effect of making the male-female divergence more extreme.  There is clear archeological evidence, as I have already said, for the existence of this divergence.  Women became themselves plant-like in conformity to the plants they collected; men, on the other hand, followed a roaming way of life.  The life of men imparted itself to male genetics.  Our concern here, however, is not the issues of hunting strategies nor the uniquely human technology.  We have been focused here more narrowly on the question of agreements.  It is in the phenomenon of agreements, as derived from the hunting-and-technical way of life, that socially separates men and women.

Agreements are the sole domain of male humans,  it now appears.  There are several important paradoxes in human hunting that agreements resolve.  The human being, running but mainly just walking, is a slow-moving creature.  He is surpassed in speed by all the other animal hunters that there are.  So, the human hunter alone of animals must use his cunning to outdistance his prey.  There is the further consideration that the human being is less powerful than other preditors, without strong anatomy and without powerful jaws and claws.  The human hunter could not succeed without his strategies and technology.  The deficits entailed in human physical weakness and lack of speed, combined with new assets of strategy and technics, made agreements a poweful new tool in hunting. The male human brain itself, divided into left and right sides--the left, or communication, side specialized for agreements and the general male mode of interaction. In other words, men now discussed among themselves how a given hunt was to proceed.  We have no record of the words used; we know only, from the coordinated activites of the men, that these agreements were in place by at least the Upper Paleolithic and probably long before, at the advent of language.  Anthropology supports all these conclusions.  In other words, males of early hunting party did not just have strategy and tools, they had to agree to have these things.  Here we see the first agreements whatsoever--to manage and relegate weapons.  Such agreements have been imprinted in the male brain since the beginning of time.  The mind of the male human being did not change in the short period of female, matristic domination.   The male social orientation was through agreements, of which females, with their ungulate gathering mentality, did not have agreements.

Women can and obviously do argue; they do not agree or disagree.  For there to be a disagreement there must first be an agreement; of agreement women do not, except through their exposure to men, have real knowledge.  Thus we may conclude, since women "ruled" the matrist, gathering-and-farming economy, this economy was not properly a society.  A society, as we have already established, is constituted through agreements; but in early agriculture there was no strong male presence to forge such agreements.  The economy and means of life at that early period of human economy--the stage of agriculture following hunting--could be described as a rather sophisticated ungulate, gleaning mode of life.  Baboons in their material life are simply at a lower level, but not essentially different, than early agriculturalists.  But there is more.  Within the early agricultural economy there began to emerge what had been submerged:  the male mentality of technological predation and, correspondingly, the human male reliance on agreements as social relations.  Women cohered and interacted in social groups; men conspired in social groups.  Conspiracies, of which men are highly capable but women are not, allowed the re-emergence of men as leaders and the overthrow of the female or matristic order.  Out of bovine agricutural communities there arose cities, which are in effect simply the physical expression of the agreements that there are.*  When cities arose--even though the old agricultural goddesses may have lingered for awhile--men dominated the high offices of those cities.  A word is in order on the subject of trade.

Trade as a simple transaction--say, a barter, or even when money is used--is a way human beings can interact "materially" without, however, having an agreement among themselves.  The point about trade is that it is an interaction that is initiated and fulfilled in the same moment.  A thing for trade is offered; another thing is offered; the two change hands.  There is nothing more to a commercial transation than this.  Trade is a higher level of interaction than animals, with the possible exception of gorillas and chimpanzees, are capable.  This is shown from animal behavioral studies.  On the other hand, trade does not entail an agreement because it is carried out in one instance.  Women are natural traders.  Their desire even in present day life to be in a market place buying and selling points to this fact.  An agreement, on the other hand, is more than a trade.  Agreements place trade relations in the context of past and present; they involve promises; above all agreements secure a peaceful environment for trades to take place.  Male humans excel in agreements to trade.  Throughout the history of early agricultural communities, trade flourished as it does today in Africa and New Guinea.  The mentality of these places however is of a very low order and does not rise to the level of agreements.  Cities as I say are simply materialized agreements.  Cities provide permanent market places for people to meet; they provide a "market" for a kind of abstract trading that humans finally do.  In these midst of this civilizing effort, meanwhile, there was an enduring preoccupation with physical territory, rights of ingress and egress to facilitate trade, and so forth.  These concerns were an extension of the early preoccupation of hunters to maintain the descreetness of their hunting territories.  To civilize in these terms means simply to make agreements--legal ties--which is the domain of the male but not the female human being.

We may review what we said earlier.   Once the sole domain of women, gathering engaged men while male culture was absorbed by female interests.  Women had been peacemakers between the men; the religion that survived the transformation of hunters into gatherers was a matristic religion.  The Magna Mater appeared as goddess over all the people.  There probably was, in the earliest phase of collecting and agriculture, a protracted period of peace.  As males asserted themselves after a period of agricultural slumber, cities emerged.  The timing of these cities in history has been documented by archeologists.  But there is more.  Once again, because of the very nature of agreements themselves--to lack provision for self-settlement or self-resolution--these agreements began pathetically to fail. Cities failed partially, perhaps, because of material conditions such as eroded or salted soil.  We are saying, however, that whole civilizations may have failed, finally, because of the failure of the agreements which were at the heart of their social relations.   While men, makers of agreements, once turned to women as mediators, this was no longer an option:  women had been now absorbed into male culture.  Only an enemy could now serve as mediator or arbitor in the disputes and disagreements that were beginning to dominate the life of cities.  Barbarians, as they were referred to, were called upon to enter into the city--where previously they would have been repelled as enemies--to mediate in these disputes.  It was not through military invasion that barbarians gained the upper hand; rather they gained power in the same way women had once come into power--as mediating kings. 

(*Thought of the moment:  the Incas built a civilized community through pure force;  it, the civilization, had no agreements holding it together. The smaller communites within the region were forcibly located, made to change their languages, and so forth at command of the Inca army.   Inca culture was simply too big a structure to be held together by force alone, without agreements.    The civilization came undone in the relative few moments Pizzaro assaulted it.)



My purpose now is to understand first how the person (THE PERSON) does, through the agreement (THE AGREEMENT), come to oppose himself and become, in effect, his "own worst enemy."   An Hegelian format for discussing the issue of man and society is suggested.   The discussion at this point will focus on the function of an enemy as mediator in disputes between "friends" in an agreement.   

Secondly, I want to document events wherein, throughout the course of world history, but accelerating in white culture, agreements contradict their original purpose.  This purpose is to fulfill the wishes of the person (THE PERSON) on his own behalf.  Selfish relations are turned, through the agreement as the agreement passes into arbitration, into "fair" relationships.  This redefinition of relations is itself a breech of trust that exists in a small community.  I want to be clear on this point.    Paradoxically, the relationship with a "friend" in an agreement turns out to be an alliance, in effect, with an enemy.  Through the agreement, friends or partners become enemies, in effect, while enemies become arbitors, potentially, of one's own point of view.

Through the agreement, as the agreement ceases to be agreeable and passes into contractual arbitration,  there is an entirely reversed configuration of relationships. Originally parties to the agreement were "friends" in a relation of "trust."  This situation can reverse itself in acrimony exacerbated by the close confines of the original agreement.  The agreement, first closed, "opens" itself to whatever is outside and arround the agreement which first, paradoxically, menaced the partners and their enterprise.   The person finally, having fallen into disagreement, is carrying out his first, selfish plan through an alliance--and agreement added to the first agreement--with the person, here called "enemy," who originally opposed him.    In the course of initiating and carrying out the agreement one's original purpose--essentially, the original contracting person himself--is lost and becomes a contraction of this purpose.  Such agreeements in primitive society are fleeting; as societies "advance," on the other hand, the inherent contradiction within the agreement, multiplied millions of time, becomes the permenant human relationship.  Society does not affirm the individual purpose, it opposes and defeats this purpose.

At first there has to be an intention.  An intention as we now construe the word is a state of mind of THE PERSON wherein a desire is combined with a plan.  To carry out this plan the person looks for help to "another."  This "other" is usually an OTHER-PERSON who is close by, an acquaintance or relative, and one who can be "trusted" more than a stranger.  So, having essentially selfish, self-serving motive in the first place, the original PERSON enters an agreement with this OTHER-PERSON.  An agreement is most likely to be successful, and free of discord and dis-agreement, where persons already "trust" one another.  As I said earlier, where men can observe one another and predict one another's behavior, there exists a good setting for a successful agreement.  It is quite understood by both parties to the agreement is essentially selfish and self-serving.  That is the point of life in a small community: selfishness is accepted by human beings who know each other well. 

Selfishness only becomes an issue as agreements pass into arbitrated contracts, while, too, contracts turn into a permanent social order.  Yet, where groups are small and permanent, where persons know each other as individuals, each respects the selfishness of the other-person.  There is no difficulty in understanding this principle.  On the other hand, it is within the context of the agreement, where the agreement devolves into disagreement, that the two friends--now we may assume former friends--begin to look for relationships outside the agreement that could favor themselves individually and move the agreement to their own advantage.  We are talking here not merely about selfishness as such, as a basic human instinct, but about selfishness in the context of an agreement.  The effect of an agreement, as a sort of small space in which persons are essentially trapped--even if confined by their own free will--is to exaccerbate disagreements.   An agreement offers hope of a reward; it also frustrates individual intentions and creates new enemies. 

Parties to an agreement will not usually simply declare the agreement terminated, so long as it holds hope of this promised reward.  Persons continue to believe in the agreement, even if they distrust their partners.  This is the mentality of relationships that came about in the earliest period of human culture, perhaps in the Paleolithic.  We have no written records of this early period, of course.  In any case, when an agreement flounders on disagreements the usual course of all parties is to look outside the agreement, to the general surroundings in which the agreement exists, for recourse; for some way, in other words, to support what the individual person, or both persons, expected from the agreement.  The terms of the agreement, which were accepted first on trust, now have to be enforced.  The persons or original parties look for an arbitor of the agreement.  Of course, in this seach for an arbitrator they have already widened their sphere of relationships, beyond, in other words, the original principals.  But there is more.  If these parties in dispute seach for an arbitor in their immediate community there is no guarantee of impartiality. 

That is, this arbitor, found close by, would be the cousin or friend of one of the parties to the dispute--and would thereby be partial to him.  Thus what began as trust in the small community, now turns into distrust in the small community.  My assumption at this point is that, within the small community (gemeinschaft--Toennies), people do not so much trust one another (I have already discussed the issue of "trust") so much as they can predict one another. ( Small towns are not always tight and friendly places, I have found myself through living in them.)   An enemy--one who has opposed the community in general, has shown armed hostility and territorial intrusion toward this community, is precisely the one, paradoxically, who is most apt to be a mediator.  These mediators could be barbarian raiders, like the charioteers surrounding Babolonia or the Vikings raiding feudal Europe. 

My position regarding the gemeinschaft--the tight little community envisioned by Toennies--is that people there are not really compatible, friendly or helpful to one another, particularly and in general, except in very specific cases of need. (And one finds this helpfulness even in large cities.)  My view--or Force Theory--does not suggest that the small community stands above the large community in "friendliness"--where agreements are concerned.  Outside of agreements, small communities do have more internal cohesion, like a pack of predatory animals on the savannah.  That has been established.  Confined by agreements, on the other hand--and immediate community members tend to like to forge their agreements among these members--human beings abstract their selfish motives--an create, in the process of disagreement, new friends.  These new friends are created, essentially, out of old enemies.  The person entering society--here construing society as a mere agreement or contract--has an expectation of personal success and reward.  It is precisely in disagreeing with a friend that the agreement turns into the agency wherein personal reward is opposed.  Society itself, designed to thwart original friends from opposing one another, finally opposes the original parties in the agreement themselves.

Large societies and civilizations fell into the hands of barbarians, who were essentially anyone defined as "enemy."  This is the paradox of human society in general--that, through the "logic of agreements," an original personal human intension is transformed into an expression of opposition to the person.  The person began as one who serves himself; society forces him to be "fair."  The individual is instinctively selfish, and his immediate community accepts him as such.  Society--and everything in the ideology and religion of society--demands impartiality.  Society in this sense is anti-person.  By the same token, however, society as a nexus of agreements--all of which fail and pass into other, or arbitrated, agreements--is likewise a process of self-destruction.  Society in the end itself fails, to be replaced by an essential relationship of nature, which we here call race.


barbarians take control as mediators in failed agreements.

agreement between barbarians and city people.

agreements and failure of agreements.

jews as mediators between barbarians and city people


Jim:  Your writing is quite good, you know.  I want to carry on this discussion.  I have been accused of deriding women.  All I want to do is is point out the differences between men and women.  Men, through my most recent research, are dominated by agreements.  Agreements are something between men and about them.  I do not think women are capable of agreements, that is all.  We could still say women are intelligent and wise and understanding.  They are loyal.  I am so glad to know and have known them.  I don't particularly like men, personally, and would rather talk to women.  BUT...  The main thing about men, as I say, is not that they are technological or violent or smart, simply that- they have been forging agreements as hunters.  Men are hunters, women are not.   Hunting is more complex and planned than gathering and requires agreements.  That's why men have aquired, even genetically, agreements through evolution  As for your charge, Jim, that I am derogatory--like water off a duck's back, old chap.  I have been accused in my life of being racist, gay, whatever.   I am not gay.  (I may be racist, tho.)


Jim:  good, good, good!!!!  Well, one of my objectives has been met since leaving (verschoben, verbannt) Philtalk.  That is of having a serious discussion about something.    I see us now as ahead of the Germans, as though we are keeping score!  Since you were an anthropology major at U Illinois, you see what I am talking about and offer constructive criticism.  What I have been saying is that agreements are about this or that thing, depending, they have one thing  in common: the human parties are agreeable to the agreement.  That is why we call an agreement and agreement.  ...Because people agree to it.    And what an agreement is, I suggest, is simply a relationship within which parties agree to "just get along." Peace, not what these people are going to be doing, is the most important part of an agreement.   This stipulation, formal or informal--completed at the showing and touching of hands to prove "no weapon"--is all there, too, to any religion.  Religions say simply:  let's all get along.

Men as opposed to women have to be fastidious about this.  Men are simply more violent.  They are highly right-side brain--calculating--oriented.  Women are nothing like this.  I liked your talk of the market place as being a lot of haggling--that's what women are like!  In the market place you talk about, if there is haggling by men they are simply imitating the women.  In short, men are the way they are by virtue of the hunt.  And no, they don't plan a hunt while hunting, but the day or week beforehand.  Men are much more future-oriented than women. 

Sorry I didn't get to say goodby at camp.  Well, you surprise me a bit, old chap, by your comprehension of basic anthropology and social philosophy.  Here we stick to that subject, preferably.  --richard


Jim:  first part of what you said, about agreements and about women, was right on topic.  second part, not.  i'm going to have to re-read and respond to your section on agreements, because that is what this blog is about.  I don't get what you say about Paul and spacefaring, etc. In fact, sooner or later I'll begin cutting out--censoring--what you say about outer space.  I have myself been censored; that is why I started this blog in the first place.  And I'll do it--censor--to others.  Anyway, I like what you say generally so far, as being a legitimate (in this blog) criticism of what I say.  You express yourself in writing very well:  you get an A from "the professor."  You may be seriously right on some parts.


jim:  actually, it is true:  i do try to radically simplify this material i am working with, and bring phenomena together with one broad stroke of the brush.  that is what philosophy does.  i do oversimplify at times.  your point about agreements not being altogether simple is well taken.  i'm working on it.

i try to get from, on one end of a spectrum, a generalization about "man" to a generalization about what we must do about society.  there are going to be a lot of other generalizations between.

i like your anecdote about the british and the monks.  it is right to the point.  unfortunately, however, following Force Theory we are going to have to take extreme action against those monks.  we must remove them altogether so that they won't come back.  that is, not withstanding the Spanish saying:  the night and the Jesuits always return.   these monks and their ilk are the worst obstacles to what is to be accomplished.  there's nothing worse, in the way of true advance of mankind, than a so-called intelllectual or priestly establishment.  see The Man who would be King, a movie based on Kipling.  you'll know what i'm talking about. 

no news from camp.  my friends the samers have left for fla.; i believe it'll be bleak in indiana.  richard