Topic: 8. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN FORCE THEORY
GWF Hegel defines "civil society" (Buergerlichegesellschaft [check]) as a series of agreements that stretch virtually around the human world. But association through mere agreement, without an additional contractual provision, is not society properly speaking. Human beings always did have agreements--understandings among men in hunting situations--but have not always had society. These agreements, as I have already said, are not so much about what to do as simply not to fight in doing what they do. The agreement is sealed by a "mere" handshake, a gesture which determines that this or that party does not conceal a weapon. Humans can and always have had agreements because they had language. When they added to their agreements the element of contract, on the other hand, they passed from what Rousseau would call a state of nature into a state of man, or society, properly speaking. We cannot understand what society is without considering the role of contract in human relations. Rousseau's begins his theory of society with a look at agreements as central to understanding human society. For the moment, however, and to rectify a long-standing deficiency in this blog, I will raise the issue of "contract." It is not too much to say that any contract is "the" social contract talked about by Rousseau. Humans evoke the social contract in every contract they enter. Society itself is simply the sum of all contracts in everyday life.
The question addressed here is: what happens to an agreement when it is turned into a contract. This is a critical issue as we try to understand how small units--associations through mere agreement--that are typical of very small groupings, say of hunters and horticulturalists become, on the other hand, relationships through contract. A contract is more than an agreement. In a contract two or more persons have of course agreed to have an enterprise in common; but they also have agreed to submit disputes that arise within this agreement to be settled by some outside, impartial person who is not party to the original agreement. The word im-partial obviously means "without party." Or, not party to... Now, within the agreement per se there is no provision for the use of force to settle disagreements. All that parties to an agreement say is that they will not themselves, as original parties to the agreement, use force to settle any dispute that may arise. Force may be used to settle these disputes, but it must be used by an impartial third party. This point I have stated frequently. The entire feeling within a contract is different than it is in a mere agreement, aside from the formal provisions of the contract. In the mentality of a contract force is allowed to settle disputes; but, as I say, this force may not be used by the principals themselves. To understand not only a contractual agreement, but to understand society as a whole, attention must be focused on the so-called third party, the enforcing party (government?), of the agreement. Humans call this party into existence, not by voting or some other method of appointing a ruler, but in the simple act of coming together in an agreement, with no provision in the agreement as to how to settle disputes.
Principals settle the disputes that they may have by first appealing to a so-called third party. The triadal relationship between the principal parties themselves and between these two parties and the third party constitutes, essentially, the basic structure of what we call "formal society." I will go so far as to say that all there is to society, insofar as this is a human group and not an aggregation, which itself may be structured, is this triadal relationship. All that we know about society may be exhausted, I am suggesting, in the word "contract." An agreement strictly speaking is something else. An agreement in this context is primarily a "negative" relationship. An agreement excludes everything there is to the previous relationship of dominance and submission, or baboon fascism as I have called the structure. An agreement allows none of these primal forces to determine group structure. The structure of an agreement excludes all primal elements, but includes (and in this sense we may speak of the positive side of an agreement) those provisions that specify respective roles in the parties' main enterprise. We may consider an example. Hunters agree not to fight among themselves over the spoils of the hunt; but they agree to, on the other hand, divide the spoils equally or according to some pre-arranged formula. These kinds of "positive" things we spoke of earlier [cite]. I may appear to repetitively belabor these same issues; such repetition is necessary to gain a clear idea of what we are talking about. When we compare the simple agreement, finally, and the contract we find that agreement and contract are opposite in the matter of the willingness to include force in settling disputes. The agreement does not allow force to settle disputes; the contract does allow force.
The issue now raised, in logical order, is the issue of the relationship between the principals as a group, who have already entered into an agreement, and the third party. All force that originally inhered in the relationship between the two principals, in a State of Nature and before the agreement was instituted, is extracted from that primal or natural relationship and transfered, rather, to a third party who now has all the force that there was in his own possession. This--the role of mediator holding power--is all there is to government. However, the "right" to initiate a "proceeding" [word still not defined] still resides with the principals. In other words, without some voluntary act by one or the other principals, no action--use of force--is "allowed." The will to invoke force in the relationship is left with the principals, one or the other of them; the pure capacity to use force now resides with the governing force (king, prince, politician, dictator, bureaucracy, or whatever). The leader or mediator, as the third party, has no "right" to use force except to resolve a dispute between the principals. We cannot consider the issues of society and government resolved at this point, however.
The triadal relationship between the principal parties themselves and between these two parties and the third party constitutes, essentially, the basic structure of what we call "formal society." The principals may argue. The leadership, or third party, may for its part "listen" [word to define?] to the arguments of the principals. The leadership "weighs" the argument; then "decides" the issue; and accordingly the leadership implements force to en-force what are ascertained to be the provisions of the contract. I believe this is all there is to a contractual relationship; but it may be, too, all there is to society as understood as a contract. Rousseau's expression "The Social Contract" is helpful. Democracy, such as the West has allegedly, does take its basic concepts from the civil laws of contract. Of course it can be readily seen that, in this triadal structure, even strictly interpreted through precident, the third party ultimately has all the descretionary power--to decide between arguments and to implement force--while the principals in the agreement have no descretionary power. The sole recourse of a princpal is argue in such a way that the third party will decide in his favor. So what power the principal is left with is the so-called "power of words." This is no great power, as this professor has learned from his own experience. We have, however, sketched the outline of society. What we still must learn, however, is where nature--here called race--stands in relation to the structure of society.
Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-08-26 16:07:52)