Relations between human beings in a "state of nature" would always be coercive.   We have already said, and affirm here, that humans as such never were in a state of nature; that as soon as they had technics and tools they were already human in the full sense and lived in society in the full sense of that word.  In  (again hypothetical) Rousseaus state of nature, the condition of animals, the biggest baboon in the group would get what he wants.  That is nature's way.  But then, as Rousseau has described, man left the state of nature and entered the state of man.  The human being thus gave up a certain freedom, that is to bully to get what he wants; but he also gained a new freedom to create, through intelligence, basic institutions and protections.  This according to the Natural Law theorists was the turning point in human life.   Thus, for example, unlike a biggest baboon the human being does not need to be a bully to get somethng, but can assert a "right" to that thing.  Freedom would consist in these terms the assertion of "rights."  Whereas the ape gets a thing by bullying several individuals, the human being asserts himself through the entire group as manifested in the laws and institutions of the group.  But we are left with one final consideration.  In passing from a state of nature and into a state of man have we not simply substituted one form of coercion for another.  Laws and institutions are coercive.  Arnold Gehlen, who has been at the center of the Philosophical Anthropology movement, points to the lack of capacity of the human being to live by the laws of nature, according to proverbial rules of tooth and claw, as the reason why humans instituted laws   Freedom is what the human has only by virtue of his genetic deficiency, the fact, for instance, that a man has no special physical brute force or personality to coerce anyone to do or give up anything.  Humans assert themselves through institutions.  The freedom that humans have is the lack of constraint by "nature"; and the oportunity that they have to conceive institutions to replace what nature has deprived them of.  The condition of freedom talked about by the Social Contract thinkers is the freedom to create institutions that paradoxically take away freedom.  Gehlen says that such a lack of coercion by nature is essentially an empty freedom; it is a freedom from roots and orientation.  The human being according to Gehlen is adrift.  Gehlen suggests that humans therefore instituted rituals and social form which, even though these forms are often pointless, whereby they find form in life.  We could point even to the seemingly empty rituals of religion as ways humans have of coming into relationships that are predictable and fulfilling.  Gehlen may have affirmed the rituals of Catholicism and high church--only to reveal their lack of substative truth.  The justification of religion by his pragmatic or expedient value is the real critique of religion, to paraphrase Bruno Bauer.   We have rid human life of coercion by nature; but only to institute coercion by society.  [this section will be for the time under constant revision]

Fascism corrects the fallacy of democracy, which is that the highly hypothetical entity the "voter" is in charge of anything.   A good part of government is placing the blame in the event of failure.  Under democracy, credit for success falls to the elected leaders; in the event of failure, blame falls upon the people who elected these leaders.  But failure is as natural as success.  Democracy is not anarchy so much as a state of mental confusion.  Whenever we talk of institutions and ideologies we always must place our discussion in the context of modern industrial society.  Engels understood communism solely as an outcome of Western civilization; within the context of African culture, on the other hand, any proposal for communism, fascism or democracy, either one, would be meaningless.  We search for a general philosophical background for our discussion.  Philosophical Anthropology would provide a basis for such a discussion, asserting as it does that thIe key consideration of social philosophy is technology.  Insofar as humans use tools they have institutions and these modes of relationship bear discussion in terms of the ideological views we have identified.  All the ideologies--communism, fascism and democracy--are ways of articulating the relations between human beings and their own technology-mediated cultures.  I have said that the basic human drive, assuming technology, is for identity.  Thus communism, fascism and democracy are all philosophies of human identity.  But the basic relationship of man to man has already been set by the terms of technology, and more generally by the economy and terms of exchange.  Engels was right as far as he went.  Communism is not bad economics, necessarily, so much as it provides a false or only partial sense of identity.  We are talking of the human being's conception of himself:  we are talking, in other words, not of a fascist as opposed to a communist economy so much as we speak of a communist verus fascist conception of man.  But the humans for who such theory is relevant are those who are already closest to the technics of their lives.  Thus the European man can aspire to the highest philosophy of life, which is Fascist, precisely because he has long been most subjected to the impersonal and depersonalizing technics of his existence.   Understanding that fact we may craft good coercive institutions rather than bad ones.   

Fascism is not a philosophy that would deprive human beings of freedom so much as it relegates to freedom its proper place in history.  The real role of freedom was in the remote past of human beings at the transition between the human being as a grazer and ungulate and, on the other hand, a tool user and technician.  At this point in history humans had a wherein they had a choice regarding their own relationships.  They could decide, we are saying, that it was "right" according to some formula of quid pro quo that this man should have this and that man should have that.  This mentality endures today.  But these same institutions, like nature, are inherently coercive.  Fascism counters democracy by saying that the best laws are coercive but nevertheless are clearly stated. The best order of society is one is where there is no confusion as to the chain of authority.   We know a man is a dictator under the Fascist form of society; we also understand how he came to be dictator; and we also understand the rationale for the coercion that he exerts.  Simply knowing that coercion is the basis of orderly human relationships allows, or would allow, humans to adjust their own behavior to these laws and institutions.  In short, Fascism is simply honest government.  There is nothing that humans understand better than brute oppression; and there is nothing humans understand less that "freedom."  There remains the obvious fact that a Fascist state can be run well or poorly.  In any case, in the event of failure we know where to put blame.

Fascism has to be understood as an ideology unique to Western civilization and meaningful only within that context.  Fascism, communism and democracy are all points of view that grow out an industrial system where chains of authority and relations of purpose are confused and mutually contradictory.  Engels has stated this case well for communism; our purpose is not to decry communist theory but to follow its lead.  Fascist theory grows out of communist ideology, in good part, just as  communism is an inevitable reflex of life within industrial civilization.  As Philosophical Anthropologists we are drawing the issue of industrial civilization into the broader question of human existence.  This--"alienation"-- is not a modern condition but a primal and perennial condition of man. This is our philosophical-anthropological point of view.   To begin with, and of basic importance, there is the fact that there is a confusion of purpose within the industrial society.  I showed earlier how this same confusion developed early in human life in the relation between a man and the tools upon which he depended.  The tool may be an extension of the man or, finally, the man may be an extension of the tool.   Correspondingly, the individual in modern times may serve the society or the society may serve the individual.     What we are saying is, simply, institutions have about them a certain authoritarian purpose.   Communism as stated by Engels in his book Socialism aspires to define the chain of purpose and authority, putting humans as a species "in command" of its own technology.  Earlier, we may suppose, under conditions of hunting and gathering, the "stick" asserted itself not only to enhance the man but to control the man.  This confusion, which has extended itself into modern times in the oppression by the industrial civilization--quite aside from the issue of legal ownership--is rectified or reversed, in the view of Engels, by a socialistic system.  We concur:  Force Theory supports this view that humans must control the system rather than vice versa.  Where Fascism departs from communism is not in the determination as to what should happen, but by whom and for whom it should happen.  Fascism affirms the progressive principle in life--the aspiration for higher forms--while this ideology denies that the human species has an enduring place in nature; the species [see section] is decadent.  Technology and society are made finally to serve not humanity as a whole but a special race of humans who affirm in nature what nature is, a "becoming" what is beyond the species.

Philosophical Anthropology, as the word suggests, is a union of science and philosophy.  This is not a blend;  rather, on the contrary,  philosophy and science have their discrete respective roles.  It is crucial in Philosophical Anthropology that its science be called science and its philosophy called philosophy.  Examples are not hard to find.  I spoke earlier of a large tooth found by paleontologists in Africa.  The tooth is too large to be of a modern human; on the other hand the tooth's shape suggest that, indeed, this is a species related to our own.  The tooth's biting area is rather flat, unlike that of an ape.  The inference can be that this species ate in a manner similar to modern humans, grinding food rather than crushing and stabbing it.  But there is more.  Chemical analysis of the tooth shows that its owner ate meat.  We are talking, then, of a species that ate large animals as food but did not, on the other hand, use teeth to kill its prey.  How did protohumans of that period obtain large animals.  The only possible conclusion (other than eating carion) is that they used tools and weapons to subdue large game animals.  We may stop a minute here and these statements we have now made.  The tooth--as a distinct shape that shows a genetic relation to our own teeth--is an ascertainable fact.  Also, that the being ate meat is clear.  These conclusions are hard science.  But we move beyond these conclusions to an area of speculation that, indeed, may be called good speculation--responsible thinking--but, since the actual tools of the being are not present to us (later they will become visible, however), we are in a realm marginal to science, perhaps, but at any rate lacking the "hard" empirical test of science.  This speculation we may call "science" in the "soft" sense of the word science.  We have not drifted off, in other words, into the netherworld of arcane contemplation where nothing is entirely clear.  But that is about to change.  Philosophical Anthropology at some point passes over into just such vague speculation.  The word "essence" of which Philosophical Anthropologists are so fond is just such an example.  What do we mean by "essence"?  What we are saying about our field, which is the subject area of this blog, is that science appears to us, under certain conditions, a restraint rather than a help.  We want to get beyond science, not to bad science but to new science.  The only way to pass from facts that are obvious but old and uninteresting is through a phase of "pure speculation" which is open and nebulous but free and creative.  I draw out these observations about PA in order to form a basis of the subject under discussion.  We are no longer looking at small objects with definite forms about which we can make definite statements.  We have passed on to a much larger subject that includes many humans in complex relationships.  We are bound to leave pure empirical science at some point and move on to a certain grandiose vision that bears resemblance to the speculations of Plato and Hegel.  We are Hegelians.  Engels' views were responsible and serious without being hard science; we follow in his path, hoping, that is, to make a statement that is testable and empirically definable.  The point we are making now is rather simple.  At present our point is that the ideologies that there are--communism, fascism and democracy--in no way affect the workings of a modern industrial and technological system; they pertain, rather, to the relationship of human beings to these systems.  Ideologies of this sort are an afterthought, or after the fact of a system that somehow runs by itself; and it runs without any sense of purpose or direction.  All these ideologies--like Philosophical Anthropology itself--are simply statements of human identity in the face of their own technology.  They are all attempts to distinguish humans from their own technology.  We are saying that PA, unlike fascism, communism and democracy, is a more or less self-conscious, purposive attempt to find a human identity in the technical and industrial system that engulfs us all. 

I said earlier that technics is "intelligent." ; that is,  intelligence is inherent in technology.  Better said, we should add that technology uses the intelligence available to it.  Intelligent humans produce intelligent technics.  Yet the motive energy of technology shifts at some point to the technics itself, so that it is not humans who intelligently make and use technics, it is the technics which use what intellectual resources are available to it.  In Africa technics does not thrive; in Europe it thrives.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-07-13 15:23:49)



By phases of culture I mean hypothetical stages.  I have already discussed [cite] the origins of human culture; and in doing so I pointed out that there is no pure "state of nature" for humans, so long as they are human.  To be human, I aver, is to have use tools and technics in an existence that is mediated and mediating.  Human beings have always had culture; culture is what defines human beings.  On the other hand, within the gradual climb of culture, over a three million year period,  to more complex forms, there appears to dominate one principle or the other.  These principles in turn define levels of culture.  Thus, for instance:  (1) personal force in human relations dominates the first period; (2) technological development is the theme of the second; (3) slavery--accomplished by the use by one group of  technological prowess to constrain another group; (4) the appearance of a community of dominating"equals" out of the community of dominated "unequals"; and finally (5) the self-contradiction of "cooperation of equals."

In the earliest human communities there was no equality or inequality, either one, so far as these terms suggest anything institutional.  Life for humans was straightforward and simple, or as we may say here, "fascist."  There was in this phase a pecking order, so to speak, among humans established through personality traits of dominance and submission, on the level with many animal species.  There was rank, certainly, but not rank institutionalized in any abstract category; only rank built on qualities of strength and leadership.  Thinkers from Rousseau to Engels speak of a primal "equalitarianism."  This was not so.  Human differences were recognized, but only as individual--not group--traits.  Many primitive tribes, such as the Bushmen of the Kalahari, rank themselves in this way.  This is "pure" fascism.  This is not a human institution, however, but a rank order of personality.  As I say, life among such ranked and ranking people is straightforward.  There is no suggestion that such life is especially violent, because this certainly is not the case; only that this life is direct.  So that, in other words, in the case of an offense of one person against another there is immediate (as opposed to inter-mediate) retaliation.  This retailiation could be on the part of an individual or the whole group.  In such a society there is no stigma attached to pure revenge.  Certain contributions from the individual are enforced by the group.  In general terms, such a society is no different than most communities existing today; except that--and this is a mental process--life is understandable.  We could speak of certain "fascist" qualities of life, even simple activities like killing one's own meat.  Such "barbaric" practices are shunned today by individuals; who, however, are constrained in situations, also, calling for revenge.  To be "fascist" in these terms is to fail to invoke archane principles to explain and direct everyday, ordinary activities.  In the earliest times, life was simply understood as it appears, unproblematically, or "fascistically."  Again, however, one's own personal qualities direct how one will understand any given situation; such a situation does not have to be "explained" to him by intermediaries.  We may speak of men and women of this period as "real" humans, who, even as tool-making and using creatures that they were, had a direct comprehension of life and did not call everyday existence anything other than it appeared to be.  Of course, there were stronger and weaker members of the community; this fact was not turned through culture into something religious or other-worldly.   Finally, tools and culture generally were turned to the surrounding world, or the environment of objects; tools were directed outward, away from the group, while relations among members of the group were still on an "animal" level of primal instincts and "fascistic" force.  It is easy to see that Friedrich Engels conception of the Teutonic mark, a benign grouping of primitive socialists, was Engel's own private fantasy and one easy to disprove by the facts of anthropology.  Also, Rousseau's conception of a vegetarian equalitarian is false.  I prefer Oswald Spengler's conception of early man as a Raubtier (carnivore).  But in social relations, the human being was similar at this early period to other animals, most of which have instinctive pecking orders based on personality, natural strength and other individual qualities.

Personal force--here we talk of bodily strength and coordination--was partly supplanted by technological prowess; but this transition was only in the human relation with his surroundings, not his social group.  The human being advanced technologically even while he maintained his instinctive "fascistic" social order.  Again, as I said at the beginning of this section, we are speaking of a hypothetical period; of course, in all this evolution, technology was impinging on instinctive behaviors in all areas, even the social areas.  This development began early one.  But the tools one made and used determined the success of the individual and group in providing a livlihood.  It was in his external relations--with the surrounding world of animal and plant food--that technology assumed a major role in human life.  This I said already in an earlier section [cite].  We point out, first, the simple sticks and stones used as tools constituting the earliest human culture

I said earlier that human life is characterized by a certain indirectness, exhibited, above all, in tool use.  To use a tool is to accomplish an objective indirectly.  Animals on the other hand show only direct behavior.  The animal seeing a prey goes directly to that prey without, as would a human being, stooping to pick up a stick or stone as a weapon.  The stick or stone, and all the behavior wherein the stick or stone is obtained, manipulated and deployed, mediates human behavior particularly in areas that may be narrowly defined as practical behaviors.  Human existence in practical relations with the world were, in Hegel's phrase, mediating and mediated.   These various human behaviors seem trite, today, but in a philosophical-anthropological perspective they are important; the entire human mental orientation, throughout its ascending layers of complexity, all eminate from and revolve around the simple indirect primal act of picking up and using a stick.  It is not too much to conclude, even, that such an act of using a stick or stone as tool/weapon is in itself a proto-religious act. The tool, in the thoughts of the early human--such as these thoughts were--may have actually had a magical or supernatural meaning.  The first artifact may have also been the first diety, a mediator among mediators.

At the time of the first tool use, three million years ago, human beings had simple basic social structure, not different than the social life of apes.  Their social life was nothing so complicated as that of mere ants or bees; but the basic elements of social ranking by dominance were in place.  The strength and intelligence of a dominant individual--usually but perhaps not always a male--were the bond that held the group together as a unit.  Where danger was greatest, the bonding--and the order that eminates from this bond--was the tightest.  I may refer to baboons, in particular, because they live in the open with large predators, are preeminent "fascists."  This I believe to be true.  The main point here is that all these social relations, such as they were, were supplied by instinct.  In such relations there is Selbstverstaendlichkeit, or self-evidentiality--directness.  Human social relations are immediate, while technical relations--between human being and his external world--are intermediate.  Human beings have remained "baboons" in their social life.  The conclusion to be drawn is that in thoughts, finally, that a person has about his relations with other persons tend to be direct and unproblematic.  But this last statement must be qualified.  These instictive and direct relations inhere in the simple group; but when social groups become larger and more complex, the same mediational viewpoint that inheres in technical relations comes to be applied, finally, in social relations.

We may have a brief bit of fun, perhaps, in calling primal human social relations "baboon-like" and "fascist."  Under conditions of life on the savanah, where humans not only preyed but were often preyed upon, this "fascism" was an issue of life and death.  We need not repeat the litany of misery our ancestors suffered.  It almost goes without saying that, as the basic fact of existence under which human beings evolved for millions of years, the fascistic social order is ingrained in human instincts.  What has changed, but only recently, is the implementation in interpersonal or social relations of mediated or intermediary forms that began early on as technical relations.  The human being originated as any animal of his basic type originated, with simple social proclivities; and this social orientation remains in his instincts.  The human being began as, and will always remain, a "fascist"--his basic ideas about society and relationships is direct, immediate.  This is an important point and one that must be repeated.  The stage is set, finally, wherein instincts of society and mediating forms of society are counterpoised for confrontation.  The actual playing out of this confrontation is something we will describe shortly.



We start this blog where Rousseau started his treatise on inequality.  That is, we envision a (hypothetical) "state of nature," in a forest somewhere, where there are only two men each vying with the other in a dominance battle.  It is true, following Rousseau, that either one can walk away from the relationship by simply disappearing into the forest.  Rousseau said that one or other of the two men could simply, at his personal volition, depart from the relationship.  This would actually be the case.  Rousseau however said this ability of each man to leave the relationship constituted the equality of the two men.    But if there is an equality here on one level, there is still no equality in the relationship so long as the relationship persists.  The men still probably need each other to survive.    There are only two men in this hypothetical situation; and they must want to keep the relationship in tact.  With the relationship in place, and with some sort of cooperation between the two men, and in the absence of any break, one man will prevail over the other; the stronger and more "persuasive" of the two will control the other. We don't precisely have to determine who achieves a larger "reward" in the relationship--who gets say more food, for instance--because for our purposes such issues are imponderable. 

Such a relationship we may aptly call oppression.  The term oppression has been given a negative, perjoritive meaning by present day democracy; actually, however, democracy has succeeded only in defining "oppression" to where we can constructively use the word.  ("Truth" and "freedom," on the other hand, used positively, are undefinable.)  The bond between these two men is the bond of personality.  Here I may get ahead of myself a bit.  This relationship I may describe as "pure" fascism.   That is, in the relationship between the two men the controling force is simply personality and physical strength; such a relationship is immediate, rather than intermediate.  This situation of immediacy existed, more or less, in the earlier phases of human culture.  We may look at Bushmen, for instance, and the manner in which leaders exert themselves in groups of four or five men.  Such people are "fascist" in an almost unadulterated, absolute sense of the word.  Some anthropologists call these people "equalitarian"; they are by no means equalitarian.  To them, equality or inequality, either one, would be arcane abstractions outside their sphere of understanding.  There is only one more thing to mention.  Rousseau's "state of nature" is only a hypothetical idea; that is the way Rousseau wanted the term "state of nature" to be understood; that is the way we must understand it.   The facts of the situation are that the human being was always "human"--he had language and technics--and so was never in a "pure" state of nature; nor was he ever "purely" fascist, in the sense I use the word.  On the other hand a certain simplicity and directness--Selbstverstandlichkeit (self-evidentiality)--existed in the relationships of the earliest humans as the exist today among primitive tribespeople.    It is this simplicity and immediacy I here call "pure fascism."  Certain instincts inhere in human relationships, always, that evoke this condition of the past, but which always, depending on the culture of a place, inhibit these instincts.  More precisely, culture tends to substitute abstract forms of "oppression" for instinctive forms.

I have used the example of two men, alone among themselves, in a remote forest as a hypothetical situation.  Hypothetical is all this situation could be; inasmuch as nowhere have two men normally, as opposed to exceptionally, lived together in a forest.  Furthermore, we are assuming that the two men have no tools or weapons; and they do not have corresponding skill in using these weapons.  To dominate or "oppress" one another they would have to use hands or other biological weapons (teeth?) to control one another.  This would be difficult to do, as Rousseau correctly maintained.  I want to mention here the political leader Benito Mussolini [Richard Swartzbaugh, google], who in individual utterances laid down some of the points to be made here.  These utterances have to do with the role of individual personality in history.  Mussolini was an entirely unfortunate person whose great personal, and even literary, abilities came to be entirely overshaddowed by the clutter of history.  We may evoke his memory here, and give recognition where recognition is deserved.  Mussolini understood, as did Rousseau, that the large forces of history eminate from individual force. So, in effect, that the history of the world is no greater, finally, than the history of the individual. Mussolini may have been the optimal actual expression of Rousseau's natural man.

Several possibilities suggest themselves:
(1) Human beings have always had tools (or weapons).  Tool use is what defines a human being in the first place.  Moreover, tool use has determined the course of human mental development.  Corresponding to tool use there has evolved mind, which is the symbolic reflex of tools, or tools "internalized" in human behavior.  Human beings thus interact with their surroundings through mediation of tools and the mind that is the reflex of tools.   But they come also to interact with one another through these same symbols.

(2) The relationship that now exists is not solely between two men, at all, but between two or more men acting together as "oppressors" and, on the other hand, two or more men existing together as "oppressed." The class society began in these terms very early in human prehistory.  Pure fascism, as I have used the term, gave way soon to a sort of deluted fascism wherein men variously considered each other not only as superiors and inferiors, but, sometimes, as equals.  There had to be, early on, a certain commaradere--mutual respect--in the oppressing class.   Furthermore, too, because human beings could, from the outset, coordinate their actions through the symbols of language; and because tool-use demanded cooperation on a new, non-personal level of interaction;  it followed therefore that many activities that were individual activities became collective ones.  The primal condition of pure facsism, that I described above, transitioned into a collective fascism wherein, on one level of interaction, men were forced (and I say forced) into concessions among themselves in order to achieve the oppression of the weaker class.  This was a democracy of sorts born out of fascism.  I call this the "Greek" phase of culture; inasmuch as the Greeks, founders of democracy, also supported slavery.



I have said that two men in a (hypothetical) Rousseauian "state of nature" exist together, so long as they have a relationship at all (and one does not "wander off into the woods"),  in a fascistic or "baboon"relationship.  That is, one of the men being stronger and more assertive is likely to control, more or less, the other.  This relationship I call primal fascism.  It is also a highly honest relationship that is understood by both men.  We do not have to imagine that this state of affairs is really pleasant for either man; it is a relationship born out of necessity.  Such a relation is imposed by external circumstances.  I have already said that this is a simple, selbstverstaendlich (self-evident) relation.  The complexity of relationships grows exponentially, however, if the two men become four men:  two oppressed and two oppressing.

Behavioral scientists are aware of the significance of the number three in group psychology.  That is, if three individuals--dogs or humans--come together a "pack" mentality arises.  There is one leader and two followers.  Such a pack is apt to become aggressive and predatory.  Such a pack has a group identity and a group will.  For the moment, however, while we assume that some will dominate, and others will follow, we are focusing on the likewise important question of the relationship between the leaders.  They come together for the simple purpose of oppressing the remainder of the group.  That is altogether true.  But there are relationships among the elite themselves that become important and need to be addressed.  It is assumed, within the elite, that the elite members, while not necessarily equals in all respect, have so-called "rights" that have to be respected by the other elite members.  There seems initially no alternative within this elite to impose upon themselves still a further--beyond the simple class structure of oppressed and oppressor--rank order.  In this environment of competition, as there always must be, there is going to be an essential distrust--often a trust that is soon broken--between the elite members.

It is at this point, then, that something like a "democratic government" appears.  Democracy in these terms is a contract solely among members of an elite, who, in a spirit of distrust, impose upon themselves some way of resolving their inevitable differences.  By contract we mean that within the agreement, force is transfered out of the agreement and to a third party or government.  Democracy in these terms would be a general agreement.    We see, finally, that democracy does not appear as the elite which has control gives up its control.  This is certainly not the case.  Democracy appears rather when the elite members themselves attempt to restore trust within their own group by imposing, together, a central authority over all of them, one whose purpose is to enforce agreements that are made.  Of course this government--which may be called a "third party"--comes itself to be an oppressor.  It is not my purpose to condemn, however, the oppression of government.  My purpose is rather to condemn the redundancy of government.  For honest--fascistic--oppression, we substitute redundand and dishonest oppression.  Dictatorship in these terms is only a name for honesty .  Democracy is dishonest bullying.

I said earlier that dictatorship is simply honest government.  This is true.  The subjective, willful will of one or several men is imposed upon willing or unwilling citizens.  In these terms, all disagreements that do inevitably arise are settled by force according to the one principle:  the will of the dictator.  That is the way disputes should be settled.  We may pause for a minute to speculate on whether a system were possible that is based on a pure lottery way of settling disputes.  In other words, in a dispute the highest card picked by a disputant would settle the case.  Duels once acted to this end--success in a duel, though, had nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of one position in the dispute or the other.  Yet the duel was a way of settling disputes.  We are beyond that, of course, and will never return to it.  Picking cards though at least gives disputants and even chance.  For our purpose, an even chance is a better chance, in most cases, than the chance one has in a democractic court of law.   This is to say that the principle of "fairness" in disputes has never really been understood let alone accepted in the history of culture.  Yet "fairness" and "objectivity" is what is opposed on citizens by democracy.  It remains only to say that in a democracy nothing like "justice" ever occurs; such an issue is lost in disputation.   

It is precisely in such a dictatorship, on the other hand--so long as the society does not excede a certain size and extend to an overly diverse, polyglot population--that trust can flourish.  The force of the dictator is extended downward, individual to individual, through the entire population.  We call this a pecking order, but we should have a better, more respectful word for the system.  Better would be to call this a fascistic order.  Anyway, whatever we call such a social group the group  has a subjective presence, understood by everyone in his or her own subjective way, much as my own arms and legs understand what my brain is saying.  This is an order known subjectively or as an "internal form," as I referred earlier to subjective reality. The order of my body most certainly is not a democracy so much as subjective regemintation.  Democracy, for its part, demands that every issue be settled by a "fair" mediation which, for its part, is born out of the mistrust equals have for one another.  The democratic system is indirect, obscure, inefficient and certainly not "fair."  Issues are settled rather for precisely this third party, which is not actually an organic--subjective--part of the social corpus.  These are all considerations I hinted at earlier but must now be drawn out.  In simpler terms, democracy is to society like a puppet is to a puppeteer; dictatorship, on the contrary, is what my mind is to the feelings in my fingers and toes.  In democracy, society is turned inside out; society exists only as an external form.  Finally, dictatorships as societies stand in relation to one another in the aforementioned (Rousseauian) "state of nature"; they are subjectively-constituted human entities with no objective forms to bind them together.  Objectively constituted social groups, on the other hand, can be bound to one another by further, more complicated ties and terms--and bound as well to everything else in the universe.  Essentially, the democratic society is formless and incohate.



I.  The true origin of democracy is ultimately in a negative concept--distrust.   Earlier it was said that equals are the ones, precisely, who do not trust one another.  Any agreements that they have that turn into disagreements cannot be settled without severe argument or even violence.   But there is more.  Violence between equals persists to the point of destruction of both parties.  This is notoriously true.  Therefore, in an effort to prevent this violence, the equals create between them an "arbitrating party," which is in effect a party stronger than either of the principal parties.  Were the arbitrating party not stronger, it would have to defer to one or the other principals; its effectiveness in settling disputes would be compromised.  The contradiction between concepts of equality and trust resolves itself, as it must, into the concept of "fair" and "objective" government.    Finally, the source of equality is in the notion of a partnership--originally to subdue humans as servants and slaves.  An entire concept of middle-class force opens up.  Oppression, as I have termed it here, spreads downward from the middle class to the classes subservant to the middle class.  Oppression, by the same token, that begins with the middle class is imposed upward, to create another oppressor class--government.    Of course, the middle class choses, at least originally and by some Rousseauian "social contract," this artificially imposed governmental force.  These are points I have already made in earlier sections, scattered throughout this webbsite.  I mean to refute any notion that democracy arises as a result of something called moral progress.  There is some truth in the democratic-ideological assertion that to be democratic means to "choose" one's government; on the other hand, democracy is born out of oppression of some kind and resolves itself, ultimately, back into oppression of some kind.  Democratic choice is a momentary thing, a fleeting instant, that essentially does not change the quality of anyone's life; it is a kind of "honor among theves," to use an entirely appropriate expression.

II.  Social change occurs inevitably, given a certain level of human intelligence and originality.  Slavery, for which purpose the middle class of equals comes into existence--that is, as a bund to enslave human beings at the time of a relatively inferior technological advance--dies out with the improvement of technology. The slave is transformed from a human entity into a mechanical entity. The essential thing to be talked about at this point is that slavery comes about ultimately as a very general process of human "self-objectification" or "self-externalization.  Hegel discussed this.  As described here, tool use--which began as primitive artifacts such as spears and handaxes--evolved by degrees to a conception of slavery;  human beings could be subjected to a "force of arms," which is more extensive than mere force of hand and fist.  The technology of simple hunting and (perhaps) warfare transitioned to raiding for slaves.  But the order--we may still call it a social order--which, consisting of slaves and slave masters, was an objective order.  Many slave societies grew large (many stayed small), larger altogether than would be possible through force of fist and personality and simple verbal persuasion.   The objective order was self-perpetuating and self-expanding, without limits; finally, as the terms of slavery became more vague, and proliferated into concepts of servitude and proletarian labor, such a society had no longer any limits or definitions.  Society became a rambling chaos, but one born originally out of the simple capacity of the human being to create himself outside himself, as physical tools and artifacts.

The slave as a human being is thus finally transformed into a machine with human qualities; an improved slave, we may say.  But the reverse of this comes about:  the human being reappears qua human but as a discarded machine.  The new proletarian is a slave, and in this sense an objectification of a human being, but one who is obsolete.  From human inventiveness a new human population appears, one that is not subjectively human, that does have a self-awareness or consciousness, but takes on an external form of a taxonomic human being.    These are simply discarded slaves.  It is not too much to say that a free slave is simply an obsolete machine.  That would be a true statement.  There are extreme human problems that now occur at this stage of history:  the rise of the proletarian, in other words, the question of what to do with human beings who are simply redundant.  There is a period in which humans are employed to cope with the kind of gaps or disjunctions that occur inevitably in the total human process.  A new purpose is found for human beings, however, and this is probably their most important function--as absolute consumer.  The human population that remains after mechanization of work is kind of a filter or muscle, like the heart, that keeps money flowing and gives the economy direction.  This is something Marx and Engels never saw coming. 

Thus it is the lowest elements of society that keep the society running and whose purposes, practical and aesthetic, give direction to the economy.  We may contrast the society we presently have with that of the Greeks, whose purposes were intellectual and aesthetic.  It is not the problem here to evaluate goals, however, but just to understand mechanisms that produce the world we live in.  On the other hand, it may suffice to say that the class--the middle class--which has produced the oppressions we now see should liberate themselves, finally, from these oppressions to take up occupations of intelligent people--art and philosophy (like the Greeks).  This would be an Aryan society, envisioned as the noble life (the "difficult path") in the Upanishads, of the original Aryan community of India and Iran.


African oppression is the oppression of everyone--absolutely--by one man.  The anthropologist GP Murdock has described African dictatorships as "peas in a pod." Their trait in common is the concept of the Big Man.  This Man, who has many wives and children, has life-and-death power over all his subjects; these subjects concede absolutely any power they may otherwise have.  This absolute power is what Hegel was referring to when he spoke of Africa as a place where "none are free."  The sterotypic picture of Africa is one that corresponds to my own reading (I have never been to Africa and will never go).  What will be required here, inevitably and as readers raise their own questions, is how African oppression, in concept and practice, differs from the oppression I attribute to Europeans.  It is true that among Europeans the idea of democracy, equality and "freedom" have entered into their thinking at every phase of their history, not only in periods of ostensible democracy but in times of oppressive dictatorship.  I thinking of democracy here not as any fixed system, that is forged to stand the test of time, but as a process through which human beings resolve, or attempt to resolve, their differences and in doing so soften and loosen the effects of the oppression of force that inevitably must exist.  Democracy is misunderstood as a system; it is not a system, as I say, but an ongoing attempt to force apart, IN a moment of consideration and contemplation, parties locked in disputes who would otherwise settle differences through personal force even to the point of violence.  The basis of democracy, I aver, is the contractual agreement.  Rousseau spoke of the Social Contract, which is a contract between citizens and government.  The position taken here, in this writing, is that there is in effect a social contract, but that it is between two individual persons.  These two parties then also agree to place authority in the contract in the hands of a third party, in the event that there is a dispute between the principals.  The contract then evokes a third party, or government.

The third party in this agreement is government, understood as an arbitrator of differences.  Therefore when we invoke, as I have done earlier, the concept of force, that is meant to be the overriding principle that holds a society to gether.

Here I am going to soften my stand, somewhat, in favor of "democracy."  For example, Africans cannot agree on anything whatsoever; and their relationships are a nightmare of mutual intimidation.  Such hopeless dominance behavior precludes any constructive cooperation.  Rather than to fight one another, Africans hand over--absolutely--to a Big Man all authority.  Such authority is correspondingly absolute.  Such behavior of leader and follower in Africa has become a cliche of anthropology.  White behavior is different.  That there is a racial factor, based in genetics, is something we must consider.  Of course white societies become arbitrarily oppressive in times of extreme exigency--war, calamity and so forth.  In their eternal naivete, white people see a given system of government as potentially eternal, but for the efforts of understanding people who put an end to this or that system, democratic or dictatorial.  Force of course dominates politics in extreme times; whereas democracy usually appears in good times.  The feature of war that precludes democracy, the need for extreme force within a group that corresponds with forced used against an enemy, does not preclude creative and cooperative relations, as evidenced by the fact that people are highly inventive during war, as they are destructive.  Great inventions have appeared during times of war.  Where democracy enters, then, is when men have a certain discretion in their relationships; when, in other words, they can think of themsleves and thus, on their own behalf, enter into relationships of agreement with other men.  It is in these descretionary relations that disagreements come about. 

It is precisely here--to mediate in these disagreements--that "democratic" governments come about.  I said earlier that dictatorship is simply honest government.  There is every reason to accept dictatorship in time of exigency; no one ever contests that at the time of its happening, or even thinks of democracy.  Democracy in these terms is a luxury, demanded by people who are in, by their own volition, agreements withe other people.  These agreements degenerate into disputes, usually petty ones; democracy is created as sort of a judicial system which must have its own power and authority, even though these disputes are numerous and small.  I said that I would soften my stand regarding democracy.  I do think democracy is a natural process, more in the order of a long term luxury than an immediate necessity.

European culture is creative; African culture is not creative.  This is a proposition proscribed in ordinary literature.  Nevertheless, with the freedom of the internet, that is what is being said here.  Creativity involves not simply individual ingenuity, which African occasionally do have, but equally importantly the ability and capability of humans to associate with one another cooperatively.  This is a vital ability.  Africans apparently do not have this ability, inasmuch as, plain to see, they always argue among themselves; they must immediately must settle a dominance or pecking order between themselves, and settle this absolutely, before they can have a simple coversation.  The relation between whites, in normal life, is to set aside these differences if only momentarily, in order to have a cooperative relationship.  It is in the setting of these cooperative, free relations that disputes arise.  During wartime these disputes are overwhelmed by the exigency of the situation; in effect, these diputes are settled by the force of events themselves rather than any problem existing between individual humans.  Where, however, there is no exigency, all success or failure of the relationship must inhere in that relationship itself; or the power to settle that relationship must be transfored beyond the principal parties to a third party, which is governement.

In the preceding forum I laid down a basis for discussing the issue, which is of final importance here, of the "objectification" of culture.  The result of democratic, free relations among human beings--their ability to enter freely into agreements, and the corresponding appearance of "third party" institions--has the overwhelming effect of "objectifying"human relationships. This is an important point to consider.  In these terms, obviously, a society with a "democratic mentality" (this includes Russia, we may say) can grow much larger than petty dictatorships.
The terms binding humans in petty dicatorships are those of force, pure and simple.  Democracies, even where these are sporadically implemented, and so long as there is a system of arbitrating disputes, provide additional relationships which are capable of indefinite expansion.  The "global society," of which Africa is not a part, is simply a network of such voluntary agreements.  We are suggesting perhaps that Africans are "ememplary fascists"; that appears to be the case.  We are not arguing here, however, whether European or African government is more "honest"; we have already settled that issue--the African Big Man concept is indefinitely more honest than democracy, which is convoluted and obscure.  The very creativity of Europeans portends the downfall of European society as the result of hyper-objectification.  Even the slave concept among Europeans has lost its true force of personality, and has devolved, finally, into, in effect, goverment by machines.  So when I say European society is more creative than African society, it must be stated, as well, that Europeans are susceptible to the failure of the thing that holds together all society--and all life.  What sustains society and life is personal force, that is,  subjective reality.


2.  NEGATION OF THE NEGATION (This section is  being perpetually revised)
The issue that Force Theory raises regarding equality is this:  Persons understanding an agreement will enter that agreement only on terms of equality.  We must be specific as to the meaning of the word equality.  The relationship in a true agreement assumes that neither party has the means, legally speaking, to unilaterally (selfishly) act to impose some outcome on the agreement.  There may be "descrepancies" in the agreement, as identified by Marx and Engels in their theory of so-called surplus value.  The equality between parties rather derives from the fact that each receives, by way of quid pro quo, what has been agreed upon.  In fact, "what has been agreeed upon" is the true source of the word equality as it applies in any context--or out of context.  (Equality is an undefinable word in the context of democratic theory.)    There remains, however, material from earlier sections of this blog wherein I sketch essentially the same idea. Equals have no way of settling disputes among themselves except by turning to an entity determined by contract.  The contractual provision in an agreement is the provision that stipulates that, in the event of a disagreement, parties turn for settlement of that agreement to a person or entity (court and so forth) outside and beyond the simple agreement itself.

The idea that equals are going to work together evokes, by logical inference, the inevitability of some sort of dictatorial oversight of the parties to an agreement.  The paradox we are faced with is that the very notion of equality assumes, in real social practice, the opposite of equality--an absolutist dictatorship.  Absolute equality can exist only through absolute force, or what is the same--absolute inequality.  Later this blog will discuss an alternative to the extremes of present day Americanism and democracy.   This blog favors a moderated dictatorship, or a relationship that, in terms to presently be explained, a government "by Nature."  These considerations are  central to everything else I will say in what follows.   Lately I have been saying that equals or unequals, either one, will work together so long as all parties abjure the use of any force whatsoever.  This agreement I call "utopian."   Collaboration, or working together, may be productive.   But incidental to this collaboration is the fact that inevitably disputes arise ; and these disputes hinder and even destroy the productive work that there is to do.  Dispute resolution, not the advantage of human beings working cooperatively, is the theme of this blog.  To have a productive collaboration, men need between them an agreement. 

Within this agreement the men are equal:  if they are equal in all ways they remain equal within the agreement; if they come into the agreement unequal, they are made equals in the terms of the agreement.  Equal means always, however, in respect to force.  If they are equal coming into the agreement with regard to force, this force is taken away from them; if they are unequal in regard to force when they come into the agreement, this force is again taken away from them.  Within the agreement the men are equal with regard to force, in other words, because within the agreement neither man has any force at all.  I will mention the handshake:  the handshake finalizes the agreement as each touches the hand of the other, and ascertains in doing so that the other does not conceal within his hand a weapon.  The handshake is symbol of--no force here.   The paradox we are faced with is that the very notion of equality assumes, in real social practice, the opposite of equality--an absolutist dictatorship.

It is precisely equals-in-force who would, where each asserts his point of view within the close confines of a collaborative arrangement, destroy the arrangement and perhaps one another.  Were the men unequals-in-force there would be no such destruction.  In fact, the collaboration could continue.  The man with the superior force would simply en-force his own point of view.  All disputes would be resolved in favor of him.  Under conditions of hunting and gathering, where there is perpetual hunger and need, and the margin of survival of the people is very slim, such expeditious settlement of disputes is the norm.  It is precisely the issue of how to settle disputes between equals-in-force that belabors the whole cooperative process of large scale societies.  Communist theory is based on the assumption that collaboration is superior to competition--that goes without saying.  But the strategy of heavy-handed dictatorship is superior to equalitarian societies in the issue of dispute settlement.  In fact, equals in property and "rights" are more likely to be disputatious, I aver, that societies with unequal wealth and rights.  By this line of reasoning dictatorships are more efficient economic systems.   The point of statecraft has been, we may suggest, to bring equals together while negating the sinister fact that it is precisely equals who, through equal force that they possess, can readily destroy one another. It is precisely equals-in-force who would, where each asserts his point of view within the close confines of a collaborative arrangement, destroy the arrangement and perhaps one another.

The word equality does not describe any "natural" condition of human beings; equality is stipulated, rather, in agreements between humans.  Rousseau said human beings in an original "state of nature" were "equal."  I do not think this was so.  The physical and personality differences among humans preclude any sort of equality between them.  But early in human history--more acurately, prehistory--there was, I aver, some sort of idea of equality that came about through language and what language makes possible--promises and agreements.  Thus the equality of which we speak here is an abstraction, certainly, but one that humans were capable of just in ordinary conversation.  Equality did not await, in other words, the arcane pronouncements of the French Enlightenment.  Human beings made or proclaimed themselves equal by a special provision of agreements:  that is, the agreement to the effect that neither party would invoke his own physical prowess to attempt to enforce his personal point of view within the agreement. 

Agreements between equals must be entered into with nothing between these principals but trust, which is a polite way of saying that, other than their shared need for one another, there is nothing between them at all that would secure their agreement.  The mutual need must suffice to sustain the relationship. There are several ways of stating this truth.   To be equal means that the factor of force is not present in their relationship, compelling one or both of them to do this or that thing.  Equals have to trust one another; which they never want to do.  Trust, it may be said,  is never "pure."   In trust there is always distrust.  One trusts generally only when one has to trust.  To enter into agreements "freely" and as "equals" is the hope of every man;  each person gives something in return for what is given to him.   Yet each person in a situation of trust would prefer, altogether, to have some force in place to enforce his own point of view.  The slogan of our time--equality and brotherhood (trust)--therefore entails a contradiction.  Where there is equality, there is no trust; and where there is trust, there is no equality.

Force is the manner of relationship that is given to human beings by nature, genetics and biology.  Through institutions of human making, on the other hand, as Rousseau has already said, and also through weapons of war and intimidation, human beings can extend force against one another.    It is appropriate to talk of a "baboon-like" social order that human beings inherit from their primate past.  All this is the anecdotal material of anthropology.  Also anthropologists have investigated [cite] the possibility of small groupings of humans that have only an instinctive basis.   The point to be made here for our purposes that force, so long as force is in place and does not have to be disputed and decided in every case of interaction, provides a way that human beings can live together without fighting.  Later I will discuss the "African" model:  here issues of dominance have to be fought out in every instance of interaction, with an absolute authority invested, finally, in a so-called Big Man.  This is authority on a very primitive level.  From this point on, as humans ascend to higher levels of biological and cultural evolution, this brute intimidation gives way to a certain "democratic process."

J-J Rousseau proposed a hypothetical situation where two men existing in a "state of nature" try to enslave one another.  Without weapons of any kind, and without fences or exclusive rights to property, this enslavement would be impossible.  There is required, said Rousseau, a structure of law, property rights and government for one man to enslave another.  I will come back to this hypothetical case.  There will be no basic disagreement here with Rousseau's hypothesis.  What will be added, however, is several more men into the equasion.   The "fascist thesis," as I will call it, is that given four men in this example two will try to enslave the other two.  Relationships in this group of four are exponentially more complex than they were with merely two men.  For instance, there are the relationships between the "oppressed" parties and the "oppressor" parties.  These are much like the relations between the single oppressor and the single oppressed person.  There is nothing difficult to understand here. 

Where the equasion becomes vastly more difficult, on the other hand, is the consideration that there are still relationships to be formed between the two oppressors themeselves; and these relations are affected, finally, by the relations between an individual oppressor and an individual oppressed person.  For instance, one oppressor in a dispute with the other oppressor (his ostensible ally) may forge an alliance with one of the oppressed. This would be an appeal to the ranks below. The object of the traitorous oppressor would be to overthrow his ostensible ally and set himself up as sole oppressor.  And the strength in the alliance between oppressor and oppressed would be that the two trust one another, which is only to say that they understand that any disagreement between them can be settled by arbitrary force.    This conniving between oppressor and oppressed to overthrow another oppressor  is indeed a common theme of history.  But there is more.  The fact remains that allies--equals at first--trust one another less, commonly, than they trust the people the alliance oppresses.  The proposition will be submitted here that there is a basic instability built into history, as the very structure of history--a dialectical or self-negating structure--that accounts for broad movements of this history.  There may be some final resolution to the paradox of history--that the two goals of human beings, equality and trust (brotherhood)--contradict or negate one another.  This resolution will be suggested later, as part of the "fascist hypothesis":  a unity of the subjective and objective sides of life in the idea of the community of race.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-05-26 13:50:37)



In the Collaborative Society the chief is also participant in the major enterprise of the group (always hunting).  Thus in a dispute between hunters there is nowhere to appeal other than one of the hunters themselves.  In the long term, in all the twists and turns of history, this simple principle has profound consequences.  There is finally a contradiction between the social order necessary for collaboration and on the other hand an "equality" of human beings.  For collaboration to be successful there must be some mechanism or principle within the structure of the collaboration to resolve disputes such as inevitably arise.  Where collaborators are unequal these disputes are resolved, always, in favor of the stronger party.  There is a leader and a follower; the sole motivation of the leader is to keep the enterprise alive, wherein he is likely to be respectful of his follower.  The first human hunting bands were mostly like that, with the strongest hunter--the leader--as also the chief of the band.  Thus the disgruntled subordinate hunter had nowhere to appeal to express dissatisfaction.  I call this earlist human grouping collaborative.  Other animals, for instance lions as they coordinate efforts in the hunt, are this way; as a continuation of the hunting strategy human beings fostered collaboration.  I may have earlier suggested that this strategy of human hunters as protofascist.  There is some logic in this association.  I could stress the advantages of such grouping.  There were never any arguments, or very few; at least none that were carried very far or could interfere with the success of the venture.  In the matter of dispute-resolution we may say, clearly, that the protofascist system was superior to what exists in a modern democracy.  In saying this, that dictatorships are superior to democracies in resolving disputes I have not said anything new.  The point in this writing must be to see how deeply disputes affect the functioning of societies.

An agreement is a language-based "understanding" added to a collaborative relationship.  We may speak of a mental framework within which two "parties" interact.  Phases of an agreement may be outlined as follows.  Two men have an idea in common; they share this idea; each realizes that he would profit from a collaboration with the other man.
The agreement has a provision wherein is stated the contribution of each man.  I have called this the "inclusive" phase of the agreement (cite).  The agreement stipulates also how the product of that agreement shall be distributed to the two men.  Thus, if an animal is envisioned, how the meat of that animal shall be divided.  This is very elementary reckoning of which any normal human being is capable.  But there is something further in the agreement which for our purposes is decisive.  That is, it is stipulated that no man shall use his own force to resolve differences that may arise in the course of carrying out the agreement.  One party to the agreement may or may not derive some greater reward through the agreement; that is not the point here.  One hunter may arrange to take a larger portion of the food proceeds, according to his needs.  Elsewhere I have talked about marriage as a contract that stipulates very different roles and rewards for male and female parties, so much so, in fact, that no dissection of the marriage contract could find an advantage or disadvantage one way or the other, toward male and female.  The essential part of the marriage contract that concerns us here is the so-called rule of thumb which in British common law says that a man may not hit his wife (essentially) or hit her with an object large enough to hurt her.  Most contracts are this way.  The handshake between parties in an agreement, in finalizing the agreement and signaling that the agreement shall proceed in practice, says, as anthropologists inform us, we proceed "without a weapon."  (In the handshake each checks the other for the presence of a suspected weapon.)  Finally, the agreement in itself, which was within the capacity of the earliest human hunters, so long as they had language, had one major disadvantage in relation to the protofascist arrangement:  there was no provision within the agreement itself to settle disputes.  I am suggesting that such agreements would have to work by virtue of the persuasive effect of language itself, in which disputing parties would face one another in argument.  Thus in place of force of arms and strength in settling disputes, there would be a sort of war of words, we may suggest.  It is reasonable to think that this state of affairs took up a certain definite although perhaps short period of time in human prehistory, corresponding perhaps to the period in which hunting passed over into agriculture; while on the other hand communities--we should say bands--were miniscule and where there was established among these peoplel no leadership that was separate from actual participants in everyday life and disputes.  In other words, for the continued flow of practical life the people depended upon their own intelligence in discussion.  We may assume that this period was brief.

                  In the handshake--which makes the agreement an absolutely non-violent relationship--each checks the other for the presence of a suspected weapon.

A contract between parties is a tacit admission that these parties cannot, through the persuasive force of their own words, settle disputes on their own, but must assign such settlement to an "outside and impartial" party.   The two principals thus create a third party to the agreement which has the stipulated purpose of resolving disputes between the principals.  The third party would not exist, at least initially, without this act of the principals.  The third party has no prior existence to its, the third party's, creation as an agreement to enforce an agreement.  Government does not appear as an act of God, we may say.   Of course groups outside the agreement-group can step in to take over as enforcer of contracts; this is a frequent occurance:   barbarian raiders were sometimes invited in to govern cities whose populations were hopessly mired in disagreement.  (cite)   We may suggest it was precisely these barbarian marauders who put the final touch on civilization.  Agreements had become cumbersome since, while they stipulated the forcelessness of collaborators, these agreements provided no direct and obvious ways of compelling compliance as per any agreement.  Such compliance could only come through force.  With this sense of the need for force the populace of a city turned to the agents of violence who frequently impinged upon their cities, the chariot-drivers and mobile cattle hearders, once a source of fear, now an opportunity for peace among the ranks of the cityfolk.  All this is known history.

The thesis so far as been that human institutions originate, not by an act of planning but by the outcome of simple agreements such as happen every day in many instances of human interaction.  The effect of an agreement in a human relationship is to transfer the element of force from within the structure of collaboration to  (some point) outside that relationship.
A democracy such as exists today would come about through some stipulated and voluntary act wherein parties to an agreement, each by express and voluntary sign, pass their own force to a party specially created to "manage" such force and use it for the stated (within the agreement) purpose.  This is the stated role of today's democracy.  In actual fact the force of parties to agreements was passed to warlords and such which had always existed as preditors.  What is suggested here is that force became a reality of social life that was, at first by small degrees but then as a self-sustaining process, that had only minor relevance to the agreements that there are...  (under revision; to continue

Only human beings have contracts or agreements of any sort, which require language and an understand of future time.  Other animals, even birds, have the nuclear family; but they do not have marriage.  In the sense that contracts, through language and human abstract thinking, transcend biology suggest that marriage belongs, rather, to the sphere of objective reality;  that marriage for instance is a sort of tool or other detachable sort of thing of which the human being has many.


A serious study of the notion of force is called for here.  The fascist thinkers that there were--facism was sadly overwhelmed by the practical reality of the war period--never got to the philosophical basics of their own ideology.  There is no desire here to appropriate the word "fascisim," which has become a pejoritive term.  We must go on.  I talked in the last forum about how words that have been stigmatized in the popular vernacular come, over time, to have more meaning than words signfying "good" things.  Hence the word force, stigmatized as fascism, does today mean something; while words such as freedom and democracy and truth mean virtually nothing.  This is the situation that has evolved.  Where we are to build a philosophy of man and society must be upon words with real meaning.  One of these words is force.  The meaning is there--also the implications--but there still remains the task of eliciting these meanings and implications.  With this mission in mind I introduce the concept of Zwangsgesellschaft, or Society of Force.  A lot of my effort initially will consist of softening the word force, because it need not be construed as a harsh reality, only as the long-term reality that there is.   Democracy implodes in the self-contradiction of equality, which is the above-mentioned fact that normally there is no trust between equals.  In the master-servant relationship, on the other hand, there is trust so long as this trust is understood as predictability:  what the master will do, or what the servant will do, is predictable.  This can be established through simple experience.  Such direct relations obviate the need for "third parties," which are irrelevant to the basic workings of society.  Third parties are essentially redundancies.  Also it is a mistake, one committed by all voices of democracy, to distinguish between fascist or dictatorial governments and democracies as simply "forms of government."  Dictatorships may or may not be governments, in the third-party sense of the word government.  A dictatorship may (or may not) be simply an expression of force, in which case the basic contradiction of all society is resolved--the fact that equals do not trust one another.


We make a distinction, necessarily, between conflict and contradiction.  What Force Theory does now, Communist theory failed to do.  First we may speak of conflict.   Conflicts are of an "animal" source and can continue indefinitely.   Human beings have conflicts that endure forever; there are conflicts reported in the news that are virtually centuries old.  One tires of hearing about them.  In the case of contradiction, Widerspruch--with the implication of "spruch" being of the logical nature of language--there is a different outcome.    A contradiction cannot continue; it is self-negating.    So, when a contradiction appears there is an immediate demand for some resolution.  A contradiction (Widerspruch) is logical and social and demands immediate resolution. Humans will attend directly and with determination to sort out a contradiction.  That is because, by definition, one party caught in an outright contradiction precludes the existence of the other party.   A contradiction means always a virtual fight to the death.  The clash between capitalism and the feudal workshop was clearly a contradiction; so Engels was right in this major point.  The very presence of the capitalist system precluded the existence of the feudal, clan-based workshop.   Where Engels was of disservice to theory was in his contempt for formal philosophy; he admired Hegel but did not employ Hegel's methods consistently.  Sociology, through the "marxist" influence, has become muddled.    Sociology does not seem to understand Hegelian dialectic; the term "dialectical materialism" is a total confusion and bound to lead to unsound results.   Sociology in a has lumped together conflicts with contradictions, so that one never knows what is being talked about.  Worldwide, since the Industrial Revolution, there have been few contradictions, only many conflicts.  Any confrontation that is religious or racial or national is likely to be a mere conflict and, as such, may continue for hundreds of years with no resolution in sight.  Historically, it was only after a certain point of development that human life began to appear as contradictions and resolutions of contradictions, and so to become, in the true sense of the word, "dialectical."  There has always been a kind of animalistic squabbling that has endured the length and breadth of humanity and that corresponds, basically, to the lives of most animal species.  Humans are territorial and convetous of each other's belongings.  That much is clear.  What Engels identified as a "collision" of social production and capitalistic acquisition appears to be true "dialectic" that, as such, demanded resolution.  We agree with Engels that history as a purely human phenomenon does lead categorically to a universal socialistic state; society is inherently socialistic, not in its status at one time or another, but in its movement.  Society moves inexorably to socialism and moves dialectically.  The contradictions within society at earlier levels demand resolution through mediations that themselves become new contradictions.  But we are still at loss to know how this whole process started.  For answers we turn to Philosophical Anthropology.  In fact, since the Industrial Revolution, which propelled society forward to pure socialism, there has arisen only one major contradiction:  that between society and life as race. 

We turn again to our homely example of two men, Robinson and Friday, on a desert island.  The discussion began by Duehring we can continue here.  On a small island, relations between two men are not going to be neutral; the men are not going to ignore one another.  So they are going to enter into what we call a "relationship."  (1)This relationship will likely first be one of conflict, certainly unease.  Each will try to get the upper hand in a manner consistent with universal primate instincts.  This conflict, as I say, could continue indefinitely with neither man gaining a clear advantage.  In fact, animal groups are virtually structured through such ongoing mutual bullying I have called "baboon fascism."  Such bullying is not necessarily destructive; it has normally been constructive and constitutes a sort of order in the animal world.  Were the men to continue in this manner, their island would be simply another example of the order of nature. I want to speak further of this relation between Robinson and Friday.  Friday did not fancy being bullied and he became contrary.  That is he opposed Robinson.  The sort of relation of contrariness between Robinson and Friday would obviously preclude any cooperation; but that is alright, under these circumstances; animals in any event seldom or never cooperate.  The two men would be happy with what they had, as mere animals are, without the cooperation that they could have had.  But a change was about to occur. 

(2)The sword of Robinson was introduced into the relation.  Also, the two men became consistent with one another in their behavior.  I speak of consistency with one another, not cooperation or collaboration.  The phrase that fits from modern jargon is that the two men were "moving in the same direction."  That is, whether they agreed or disagreed with one another, they were "on the same track" and were not at odds.  It would be totally irrelevant to, as Engels did, to point out some fairness or unfairness in the situation.  Or even, again as Engels did, to sarcastically describe the feelings of hurt that one or the other men experience.  We are now speaking of an objective situation.  The objective or objectives that the men had may have been the plan of the man with the sword; Friday may have had no personal interest in such goals.  Yet, whether the objective was set by one man or by both men is presently not the point; the point is simply that both men were "moving in the same direction," to use a phrase from modern corporate language.  We are not going to ask presently whether "moving in the same direction" is necessarily a good or bad thing for one or both persons.  Suffice it to say that the presence of a sword in the hands of one man turned a situation of conflict and contrariness into one of consistency.  In the sense that the contrariness of one man precluded cooperation between the two men, the sword "resolved" the conflict--the conflict could be called a contradiction.  The sword precluded any further relationship between Robinson and Friday based on animal mutuality or what I've called baboon-like bullying.  The relation between Robinson and Friday was now categorical and logical and one of absolute opposition, to be resolved, precisely, by the same object--the sword or stick or rod--that in the first place defined the relation as one of contradiction.    In the "dialectical" structure, of proposal and opposition to proposal, the sword was the "synthetic" resolution.   In earliest human relations, this would be simply a stick or stone used by one man as a weapon against another man.  The stick is not an "organ" of a biological species; it is rather a "tool."  There is an important distinction I have been making all along between an organ, such as an arm or hand, and a tool properly speaking.  The tool is an open, the organ a closed, concept.  The relationship between Robinson and Friday was THROUGH the tool.

The proper servant of man is man.  Oscar Wilde said that, given machines and high technology,  no man should ever consider another man a servant.  Wilde was mistaken at least in theory (and theory is our concern here).  I will be as specific as I can in such a short space.  There is an expression:  "If you want something done right, do it yourself."    But this is not the way human beings usually think.  They are simply not that energetic.   A person thinks, rather, "How do I get someone else to do this task I want done?"  This is not a thought of our own day, merely, but a quest of all times.  The basic observation made by even primal man, probably before he mentally evolved to his present brainpower, was that his fellow human beings all go through the same motions to satisfy their basic wants; so that what one man does, another man can do too.  The thoughtful person observed that some other man could provide his, the first person's, wants.  The trick was how to make this happen.  Only basic needs were at issue.  And, men not having risen to the level of superfluous luxuries that our present time offers, basic wants were all that there were in that early time.   It required no special intellect to comprehend that, if John wanted something, Harry could do or get this something for John.  It remained only to hit upon a scheme to make that happen.    Probably human beings had arrived at the idea of slavery before they even had a brain larger than an ape's; apes themselves may have this idea.  First there was a kind of animalistic bullying I call "baboon fascism."  But as Rousseau mentioned early in his Essay on Man, in the early years of human existence, where there was no "society," the oppressed person would just disappear into the woods; there was no holding him in one place.  In that time no culture or society whatsoever; and there was no means to constrain or coerce men.   We are looking back to a time long ago.  I mention Philosophical Anthropology as the discipline that focuses primarily on this period and the small interactions between just a few men in a primitive setting.  We see then that in human prehistory something occured that was unique in nature.  I refer to the first tools and technology.  Man adopted tools, at first nothing more than a stick or stone, to assert himself against nature and on behalf of himself.  But this meant first to assert himself against other men.  The natural idea by one man of enslaving another one now became a practical possibility.  Earlier in this blog I asserted that, with the first tool--and enslavement was what the first tool was used for--all that changed.  Technology enabled one man to leverage his intelligence and dominant personality to coerce behavior in another man.  This coercion, through something as little as a stick weilded as a weapon, ushered in the first society in the human sense of the word. 

The anthropologist Leslie White in his work The Evolution of Culture stresses the idea that cultures can be ranked, from lower or less complex to higher or more complex, by the amount of energy harnessed by these respective cultures.   White ignores slavery as a source of energy for human purposes.  Indeed we may say ohne weiteres that slavery has been the main source of energy harnessed in culture, until the time of the machine.  White like the Philosophical Anthropologist was writing under constraints by post-War ideologies.  Americans think what we do not have to think, in this blog, that slavery is a "sensitive issue."  Here we can speak objectively.  The human being has a natural propensity for slavery, not only on the part of a master class to implement it but on the part, just as well, of  a slave class to concede to it.  This may be a simple matter of what psychologists call high self-esteem versus low self-esteem.  We do not need to get into this issue.  We are only saying that, if not in paleolithic times then soon into neolithic times the human being has had slavery.  Intellectuals such as Aristotle and Plato found nothing wrong with it.  We may assume that civilization "advanced" through slavery.  In writing this blog, then, I am simply conceding the point to ancient wisdom and am ignoring recent day pronouncements.  The machine age is opposed to slavery simply because, we are saying, the machine is a better servant of man.  Of course, there is the further issue of energy.  The machine requires natural resources beyond man to run.  The human being for his part, as master or slave either one, requires only human energy.  Today the unknown factor is energy--where to get it.  Unfortunately the philosophical-anthropological speculations of Gehlen and others get us nowhere on this question.  I may interject that Philosophical Anthropology speculated deeply on the nature and origins of the life force; this discipline never did try to bridge the link now proposed by Force Theory, that between life and human society.  So when we procede down this new road, to understand precisely the nature and role of technology, we are entering a new phase of philosophy.  Force Theory has made this stride.   

We have said that the first role of technology was to enable slavery, which had been an enduring thought of higher life since the early primates.  This point can be proven.  The point is so obvious that I don't want to spend time on it here.  The main issue I want to raise at this time then is this:  has technology ever been anything other than an agent of human slavery?  This is the drift of our present speculation.  Technology does more than simply mediate the distance between man and nature; it surrounds the human being on all sides.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-05-27 14:47:11)


Note new policy:  I will enter new writing at the end of a section rather than  at the beginning.  I will also leave old writing, much of which I consider more or less worthless.  My bad writing, and there is a lot of it, does offer some idea of how a piece develops.  Also there may be a seed of an idea there; I need to cull this material.  rs


As per my superficial research, there appears to be no German word that clearly expresses what English speakers mean by "conflict."  Widerspruch could be either conflict or contradiction.  We look at the history of Widerspruch in Hegel- and Posthegelian philosophy and see certain confusion.  To develop a philosophy of history, as Hegel and Engels tried to do, seems to me to suffer under the burden of this vague German word.  The point to be made, and one that can be made more clearly in English than German, is that a conflict is obviously not a contradiction.  World history is little other than the story of many conflicts; but only a few contradictions.  Thus the dispute between England and France over some small piece of land or a trade route is not going to be "resolved" by some "synthesis" as Hegel proposed; these disputes are never resolved but simply disappear after time.  This is a point I have made several times earlier.  The human and animal world is altogether put together through conflict, which is veritably the principle of order itself.  Things cohere and structure themselves by gravitational "empathy" but simultaneously keep themselves apart through a sort of repulsion we may call conflict.  To undertake to find precise distinctions here puts us at risk of falling into a metaphysical muddle; I try to avoid this.  In any case we may say of conflict that, in the instance of primal man, who was embroiled in the small conflicts of his day as we are in ours, the conflicts that there were passed away, finally and simply, to be replaced with new conflicts.  There were disputes over land and women.  The point about conflict that concerns us here is that no party in a conflict has to vanish or perish on account of defeat.  Defeat in a conflict means simply that one party or the other retreats from the field of battle and loses the disputed territory or property.  There is nothing more to conflict than this.  Real contradictions are more seldom.  I want to dwell on a point made earlier.  That is, the sudden occurance of a stick weilded as a tool or weapon changed human history from one entirely of one conflict followed by another to, as an occasional eventuality, an outright contradiction.  The stick did not resolve any existing conflict, in the way we understand conflict, but parlayed a given conflict into categorical contradiction.  We can see this in very simple perspective if we understand the terms armed violence as opposed to unarmed violence, or mere fisticuffs.  The mere stick and the leveraged relationship of dominance and submission brought with it the idea that humans could become involved in a life and death struggle we call contradiction.  The stick brought with it threat of extermination of one or the other side of a conflict.  The stick had in this sense the effect of making a termporary and passing dispute, that was not so much resolved as forgotten about, into a final and perpetual state of affairs.  Here, at the point of the origin of technology, was the first possibility of "hegelian" contradiction. 

We may suggest at this stage of our argument that the stick contains a contradiction within itself, one that parlays itself, finally and in rather clear stages, into new contradictions and new resolutions.  These are the stages of world history in a formal sense of the word history.  I earlier mentioned the Industrial Revolution.  In this case, the fact of machine industruy makes impossible the small workshop based on a clan division of labor.

The phrase that fits is "hearts and minds."   This is the guiding objective of my country in invading some other country--to win the loyalty of those human beings.  There is no place for sarcasm in this essay and I will not use it now.  I am saying only whateveryone knows, that the purpose of my countrymen in being in a country not their own is not to kill anyone.  On the contrary, the only intent is to "win" or take over the very soul of the country.  This of course is an impossible objective but it is instructive that an attempt is even made.  "Hearts and minds" is what television advertising aims at.   Essentially the idea of "hearts and minds" is to capture virtually the will or volition--the very soul itself--of persons of those foreign countries.  This action does not consign them to slavery, precisely, because people everywhere, confronted with Americanism in all its aspects--its democracy, its material plenty and its force of arms--will simply concede.   This is the theory.   All contrariness will, in theory, disappear.  Any perusal of the facts of history will bear out the idea that this idea--to capture hearts and minds--is not isolated to America or modern history.  What has come about as a result of leveraged or technological violence, perhaps since the time that the stick was first used as a weapon, is that humans try to coerce other humans to do work that they, as weapons possessors, want done.  We have envisioned a man with a stick.  He wants to move a stone.  His first thought is not, we are saying, to use the stick to move the stone.  His first thought is rather to hit another man to force him to move the stone.  Were the stick not present, the man would use his own strength to move the stone.  The second man would not be enslaved; his will or "soul" would remain his own.  The only relation the two men would have would be one of conflict.  Contradiction, on the other hand, which is an entirely different relationship, could come about only with the advent of the tool.  The tool, as I said, is not an organ but a principle entirely new in nature.  The premise of Force Theory is that one's original purpose in using the tool was to coerce some action on the part of one's family members.  That the tool was used for other things, to dig in the ground or hunt, was a secondary outcome of tool use.  Violence of man against man was the result of the first tool.  This leveraged force, it is now said, brought about a condition also unique to the human being:  outright contrariness.  Animals are never contrary because they are not subjected to force of arms, only the casual biting and pushing that constitutes simple conflict.  The force of arms, on the other hand, of which only human being are capable, sets into motion a process of contradiction followed by resolution and new contradiction.  "Nature" does not as such move dialectically, only through conflict.  The dialectic first described by Hegel (perhaps Hericlitus or-----) does not apply, contrary to Engels, to anything outside a relationship that solely humans have that is mediated through technics.  The fact of the weapon in the hands of one man does not produce defeat, merely, but something we now recognize as submission.  Here one submits when one hands over his will or volition to the dominant power.  The weapon serves the very specific purpose of excising from a person his contrariness that is his will to serve himself; he now concedes that will to the master.  What has prevents the submissive party from being a perfect servant is the will of that servant to serve himself; that is removed.  This kind of abjectness is not only enforced through technology, not merely the technology of warfare and violence, but the technology raising the so-called living standard, but by every institution of society.  Through religion society preaches abjectness.  Again, as I say, the tenor of my comments is not sarcasm but objective analysis.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-05-29 15:29:25)


There were matings and even marriages between humans of different bands; but these were achieved partly through force or, as we say, "rape."  Brides were taken as booty.  Human beings, taken in slavery, may have been history's first property; the possession of them constituted wealth.  The point to be made here is that the dynamics of continuity and change within a species were the same for humans as for other animals.  There was competition between groups, matings were between individuals close to home, with little contact or knowledge of humans more than a few miles away.  With the advent of language, on the other hand, a scarce 500,000 years ago, new possibilities appeared.  Knowledge of the human species widened.  I talked earlier of language as a universal phenomenon among humans; individual language differences were a minor obstacle.  Along with language there appeared trade.  We can now trace trade routes that extended across great areas of the world, sometimes more than a thousand miles through Europe, America and Asia.  Gradually there emerged a human idea of the human species as a whole.  It was slow in comming.  Technological advances in transportation assisted this knowledge.  Humans understood the human species as a whole.  Through language and trade, furthermore, they have attempted to build a society--an artificial order--upon this otherwise biological concept.  The human species, on the other hand, remains an artificial concept.  The species is "fact" so long as we consider humans a species among other species of animals.  The human species, or so-called "humanity," is, on the other hand, a pure theory insofar as any relationship is implied in this concept.  Humanity is a "theory" that, in fact, may benefit humans materially through a complex division of labor, in the same way that any group, by virtue of more members, can leverage their technical abilities.  We have spoken of these issues earlier.  But there is more.  The way the species is creative is in its own dynamic principle, wherein, through race the former species is replaced by a new species.  It is of this principle we must think now when we propose a "society" of the future.  The relations between humans, consistent with the forces of nature, must be coercive.   We are left with the paradox that, from the perspective of nature and evolution, the society--here altering our definition of society as simply an order of humans--that is coercive favors the race over the species.  The species, in Nietzsche's words, is something that will be transcended.  The mode of relationship that carries this principle forward is coercion.

Force Theory must anticipate criticism.  In fact, I would be the first to concede that Spartan Socialism, as the eventual white society, makes no sense in terms of what we experience today. There is an anecdote that has always fascinated me, of middle-class American tourists whose plane crashed in the Andes mountains.  They all surived the ordeal.  They related afterwords, however, that following the crash, in as little as half an hour, they all began having thoughts that they would kill and eat their fellow passangers.  It is quite thinkable with this anecdote in mind that white people, if they can be caused to accept cannibalism, will accept slavery of weak-minded white people and some of the other "draconian" provisions of Spartan or White Socialism.  We are at no loss for an explanation.   Prohibitions against cannibalism are taught in the schools; how little these small sermons matter when humans are fearful or severly stressed.  What we are saying, in other words, the further lives of humans are removed from any pressing issue, the more they see themselves as creatures of high morality and lofty teaching.  American gets its idealistic point of view from the European Enlightenment, in other words the worst and most unrealistic ideas that Europe has to send us.  I have said this before.  America has also never known a time of physical necessity.  What demands a solution, on the other hand, is--will turn out to be--the collapse of American agreements.  Democracy, so called, is engaged fatally in a flat-out logical contradiction which may be called the paradox of forced equality.  The American way of life, here called Americanism, will not survive this fallacy.  The way is now open to a State of Nature, which I call Spartan (or White) Socialism.

We are Fascists, but not because we reject democracy, here and there, as an appropriate form of co-existence.  There have been workable democracies, from the Viking Thing to Greek councils.  All these democracies are among persons who are already social peers.  They do not apply to the lower and slave classes.  This is a matter of historical record.  General democracies, on the other hand, such as Americanist democracy, are not simply a bad practice, it is a flat-out logical contradiction.  Democracy for us today means forced equality and forced association.  This is the worst oppression of a sensitive human being conceivable--that he be brought into physical and conversational contact with humans that are of a much lower, we may almost say of an animal, nature.  I have tried in earlier sections to lay the groundwork for an understanding as to how this dismal picture has come about.  Briefly, the history of democracy is prefigured by the course and outcome of the simplest agreement.  Democracy as we know it today have turned from utopian or visionary agreement to a draconian contract.  What exists in microcosm in the logic of agreements has played large in the history of many millions of people.

                                       Force Theory is not primarily a
                                            theory of race.  Force Theory
                                            is a critique of "society."

The cover of Newsweek Magazine (September -- 09) displayed the head of baby with the caption:  "Is your baby racist?"  I want to here dwell on this subject.  There has been a general tendency of the academic and scientific community to reverse itself on the issue of nature versus nurture.   This is a consistent reversal, one major event of which was the PBS series "Brain Sex" that dwells on male-female differences.  But this is a far-reaching philosophical turnabout, insofar as, even weekly it is reported that science finds new ways to connect human biology and culture.  One article [cite] finds orientals more likely to experience social rejection; and explains the oriental propensity for ritual--what was previously thought pure culture--as aconsequence of sensitivity to rejection.  Through MRI, the actual pathways of pain, of oriental vs. caucasion (who are less prone to rejection feeling), are shown.  What this tendency of science and academic philosophy means to Force Theory is that FT no longer has to refute, on its own, the old "carte blanc" idea that culture, not biology, accounts for much of what humans do.  This development means that the burden of proof regarding, among other things race, is lifted from the shoulders of FT--from our--shoulders and placed squarely upon the opposition.  FT for its part can concentrate on the other side of human behavior--here called agreements--which explains in good part why human beings deny that race exists.  Race, along with other personal qualities, is denied in agreements as long as agreements are in force.  More of this later.

It now appears, as a result of extensive formal empirical studies within the university, that 5 year old children generally make distinctions, first, by skin color; and they follow these distinctions, secondly, with value judgements.  All Force Theory proposes is to follow the wisdom of these white children.   Our point is to learn from them, not the reverse.   Force Theory is not a theory of race.  Thus the sin of Force Theory is not racism, precisely, but to avoid the whole issue of race; to let that issue play out, in other words, on its own.  Our sin is the one of omission, not commision.   The Newsweek article is clear on this point.  Far from being color blind, it says, human beings are naturally highly sensitive to differences of race; they have a sense of group identity that they inherit as an instinct.  Why then should Force Theory bother with the whole question?  Newsweek says clearly:  parental and teacher intervention is necessary to turn children away from their inherent racist viewpoint.   All Force Theory is saying is, no, as parents we are going to make no effort along these lines with our own children.  We were never inclined to do this anyway.  Let nature take its course with children!   Force Theory commits the "sin of omission" simply by being relaxed in the face of certain subjects, among them race.   But there are other subjects.   In Mexico I witnessed "police brutality."  I always thought the police in Mexico acted appropriately in detaining, shaving and imprisoning  the white American hippy trash that came to Mexico and acted tastlessly (if not actually illegally).   There is a fascism of police work that is entirely acceptable to FT.  The best governments I believe are "oppressive dictatorships" precisely because they operate efficiently and expeditiously, and express the wishes of the best and most productive elements of society, the middle class.  Moral judgements on the subject of behavior in this or that country outside the USA are simply inappropriate, since they assume agreements.  The only justice there is is inside an agreement; where an agreement is lacking, there is no truth, justice or any of these things.  This is our most general consideration.