Force Theory can be summed up in several sentences.  (1) Technology may be defined generally as "open"--unbound by instinct--behavior.  (2) Human behavior by virtue of and through technology is formless.  (3) Society imposes, secondarily, a formed relationship upon humans who otherwise would be an an unformed technolgical relationship.  This secondary relationship is the one called "eternal" or absolute in the pronouncements of religion.  The name of the group of beings within this relationships is Humanity.  (4) Humanity as a social, or static, relationship comes into collision with the living or biological relationship within the real species Homo sapiens.  (5) The species Homo sapiens, as any species, is nothing permanent but is unfolding in that it may "surpass" (Nietzsche) itself.  The species Homo sapiens revolts against the faux species Humanity; the manner and mode of this revolt is the ideology of race.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-05-14 15:11:54)


Agreements first appeared among hunters and gatherers.  To come to an agreement, properly speaking, is a uniquely human capacity.  The first hunters and gatherers were not human; but over millenea the hunters became human and thus, finally with the capacity of language, they could "agree" with one another.  To agree is essentially to enter into an agreement.   Of course, the agreements were about the sorts of things that concerned hunters--especially, planning a hunt.  Another task might be to counter intruders into the band's hunting territory.  There were only a few tasks at hand, relative to what exist today, so one agreement was usually fairly similar to another; an agreement would follow a certain sequence.  The men would invite one another to collaborate in a hunt; the men would coordinate their movements throughout the hunt; they would finally divide the spoils of the hunt among themselves and their families.  Such agreements, although articulated in language, were over time reduced to habits and conditioned reflexes.  It is unlikely at that time that arguments ever arose; disputes were seldom.  For one thing, the men knew each other intimately.  Their agreements were formed around their mutual perceptions of the individual personalities and needs of each man. Of course, as societies grew--which they could do with the beginnings of agriculture--human beings were less familiar with one another as individuals.

As I said earlier, agriculture demands an entirely different spatial and physical orientation of humans within a given enterprise.  Agriculture as an enterprise is obviously different than the enterprise of hunting, with workers distributed carefully over the land but moving very little.  The very fact that a hunting band moves implies a different thought process and also a different agreement.  Agriculturalists are like the plants they tend; they are anchored to a plot of ground.  Also the work of agriculture is very simple from a technical/technological point of view.  Most agriculture was carried out at an early time with a simple stick for digging; cultivation was done on hands and knees.  The family stucture--the clan and extended family--were carried over from hunting and gathering; but the introverted (we may say) activities of agriculture, with each person in his or her small space, stressed existing forms of agreement.  There was on a given day no plan between clan members to come together; they all knew their places on the land without prior agreement.  Where agreements were necessary, on the other hand, was in the issue of land boundaries.

There came to be other issues in agriculture, for instance the distribution of water, which was often in the original agricultural lands in short supply, and these issues had to be settled by agreement.  Whole governments arose originally for the purpose of distributing water and ensuring land boundaries.  Of course there came to be, too, disputes with surrounding peoples who threatened intrusion.  The main point to keep in mind for our purposes is that an agreement was simply a plan to collaborate, among several persons; and this agreement was to work together and to distribute the products of this work; and finally that there would be no force used by principals in the agreement to settle dis-agreements (disputes).  Force would be passed outside the group of principals to an entity--which could be any kind of entity, even a physical object (oracle?)--that existed, in the minds of the principals, solely to settle disputes and preserve the integrity of the original ageement.   In these terms, every small agreement between even as few as two person served, finally, to bring about a concentration of force in a central entity; this organization or social being became a repository, so to speak, of force.  At the same time, however, there deepened a split between the everyday interaction of persons, principals or simply citizens, and the agency which "governed" them.
Do hunting societies differ from small agricultural societies in the matter of agreements?  The form and structure of agreements are the same in both societies; but the content is different.  First it must be considered that hunting bands are very small and widely distributed.  Thus it is obvious, since all able adult males must be engaged in hunting, the leader of a given band of hunters--those actively participating in a given hunt--will include the band leader.  The leader of the hunting band will hunt along with the others and he will have a selfish interest in the outcome of the hunt.  He will receive, as agreed, a share of the product of the hunt but not necessarily a larger share; all will share equally.  I take this conclusion from a study of the Bushmen of southern Africa.  The leader will show leadership not in the division of the food--which is shared equally--but in his role in mediating disputes among the other (say) three men of the group.  Here is where true leadership may show itself, we shall suggest.  The leader, although involved in the enterprise (the hunt), still shows a certain distance from the hunt as an "impartial observer" who can settle differences among the men--even when he himself is involved in these differences--from an "impartial perspective."  The success of the hunt, though a short-term agreement, may depend upon the impartiality of the leader.  It is as hunters that human beings have evolved; and it may be safely assumed that the agreements that humans have among themselves show traces of these beginnings--with the actual arbitrator of disagreements being a part of the overall enterprise.  Of course, as I have already suggested, over time and throughout history the leaders have trended to distance themselves from parties to agreements and consequent disputes within agreements, to become, finally, altogether--in theory--impartial overseers. 

A hunting enterprise has important differences from an agricultural enterprise.  In hunting men share a territory, and within the territory they collaborate heavily and socially.  As hunters the men are highly social and collaborative among themselves.  An "agreement" within a hunting group should show elements of "inclusion" (collaboration in the actual hunt) and "exclusion" (dividing the product of the hunt).  I talked about this earlier (cite).   In an agricultural setting, on the other hand, any agreement starts with a division of land for the purpose of farming.  The only real agreement in an agricultural society, large or small, would be that men would respect one another's right to certain land.  Each farming within his plot of land, the issues then that a farmer would have with his neighbors would be regarding where a line divided one farm from the other.  The bureaucrats--essentially, the government--of Egypt were surveyors; and surveying engendered the high sciences of that region.  All this has been recorded in history.  Yet the collaboration that farmers may have had with one another was, at that early time and among such primitive farmers, at a very simple, even a nonexistent, level.  Farmers worked alone or with their immediate families.  But their life eminated, then, from that small plot of land neighboring perhaps countless other such plots.  I have already used the term "agreements of exclusion."  While hunters stressed sharing food--a better word would be they divided food equally--farmers stressed land ownership.  (Note Russian Commnunism could separate farmers from their land, not land the farmers owned but were simply affixed to through feudal ties with landlords--only through great brutality.)  With this possessiveness of farmers in mind, we may go on to discuss, finally, the real difference between such farmers and, on the other hand, hunters. 

Hunting--and here we must specify the particular hunt there is, on this or that day or hour, rather than simply the overall tendency to hunt together--is structured through agreements that come into existence, as men lay down a plan; once that plan is executed, the agreement passes away.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-06-08 14:19:56)



In the Collaborative Society the chief is also participant in the major enterprise of the group (always hunting).  Thus in a dispute between hunters there is nowhere to appeal other than one of the hunters themselves.  In the long term, in all the twists and turns of history, this simple principle has profound consequences.  There is finally a contradiction between the social order necessary for collaboration and on the other hand an "equality" of human beings.  For collaboration to be successful there must be some mechanism or principle within the structure of the collaboration to resolve disputes such as inevitably arise.  Where collaborators are unequal these disputes are resolved, always, in favor of the stronger party.  There is a leader and a follower; the sole motivation of the leader is to keep the enterprise alive, wherein he is likely to be respectful of his follower.  The first human hunting bands were mostly like that, with the strongest hunter--the leader--as also the chief of the band.  Thus the disgruntled subordinate hunter had nowhere to appeal to express dissatisfaction.  I call this earlist human grouping collaborative.  Other animals, for instance lions as they coordinate efforts in the hunt, are this way; as a continuation of the hunting strategy human beings fostered collaboration.  I may have earlier suggested that this strategy of human hunters as protofascist.  There is some logic in this association.  I could stress the advantages of such grouping.  There were never any arguments, or very few; at least none that were carried very far or could interfere with the success of the venture.  In the matter of dispute-resolution we may say, clearly, that the protofascist system was superior to what exists in a modern democracy.  In saying this, that dictatorships are superior to democracies in resolving disputes I have not said anything new.  The point in this writing must be to see how deeply disputes affect the functioning of societies.

An agreement is a language-based "understanding" added to a collaborative relationship.  We may speak of a mental framework within which two "parties" interact.  Phases of an agreement may be outlined as follows.  Two men have an idea in common; they share this idea; each realizes that he would profit from a collaboration with the other man.
The agreement has a provision wherein is stated the contribution of each man.  I have called this the "inclusive" phase of the agreement (cite).  The agreement stipulates also how the product of that agreement shall be distributed to the two men.  Thus, if an animal is envisioned, how the meat of that animal shall be divided.  This is very elementary reckoning of which any normal human being is capable.  But there is something further in the agreement which for our purposes is decisive.  That is, it is stipulated that no man shall use his own force to resolve differences that may arise in the course of carrying out the agreement.  One party to the agreement may or may not derive some greater reward through the agreement; that is not the point here.  One hunter may arrange to take a larger portion of the food proceeds, according to his needs.  Elsewhere I have talked about marriage as a contract that stipulates very different roles and rewards for male and female parties, so much so, in fact, that no dissection of the marriage contract could find an advantage or disadvantage one way or the other, toward male and female.  The essential part of the marriage contract that concerns us here is the so-called rule of thumb which in British common law says that a man may not hit his wife (essentially) or hit her with an object large enough to hurt her.  Most contracts are this way.  The handshake between parties in an agreement, in finalizing the agreement and signaling that the agreement shall proceed in practice, says, as anthropologists inform us, we proceed "without a weapon."  (In the handshake each checks the other for the presence of a suspected weapon.)  Finally, the agreement in itself, which was within the capacity of the earliest human hunters, so long as they had language, had one major disadvantage in relation to the protofascist arrangement:  there was no provision within the agreement itself to settle disputes.  I am suggesting that such agreements would have to work by virtue of the persuasive effect of language itself, in which disputing parties would face one another in argument.  Thus in place of force of arms and strength in settling disputes, there would be a sort of war of words, we may suggest.  It is reasonable to think that this state of affairs took up a certain definite although perhaps short period of time in human prehistory, corresponding perhaps to the period in which hunting passed over into agriculture; while on the other hand communities--we should say bands--were miniscule and where there was established among these peoplel no leadership that was separate from actual participants in everyday life and disputes.  In other words, for the continued flow of practical life the people depended upon their own intelligence in discussion.  We may assume that this period was brief.

A contract between parties is a tacit admission that these parties cannot, through the persuasive force of their own words, settle disputes on their own, but must assign such settlement to an "outside and impartial" party.   The two principals thus create a third party to the agreement which has the stipulated purpose of resolving disputes between the principals.  The third party would not exist, at least initially, without this act of the principals.  The third party has no prior existence to its, the third party's, creation as an agreement to enforce an agreement.  Government does not appear as an act of God, we may say.   Of course groups outside the agreement-group can step in to take over as enforcer of contracts; this is a frequent occurance:   barbarian raiders were sometimes invited in to govern cities whose populations were hopessly mired in disagreement.  (cite)   We may suggest it was precisely these barbarian marauders who put the final touch on civilization.  Agreements had become cumbersome since, while they stipulated the forcelessness of collaborators, these agreements provided no direct and obvious ways of compelling compliance as per any agreement.  Such compliance could only come through force.  With this sense of the need for force the populace of a city turned to the agents of violence who frequently impinged upon their cities, the chariot-drivers and mobile cattle hearders, once a source of fear, now an opportunity for peace among the ranks of the cityfolk.  All this is known history.

The thesis so far as been that human institutions originate, not by an act of planning but by the outcome of simple agreements such as happen every day in many instances of human interaction.  The effect of an agreement in a human relationship is to transfer the element of force from within the structure of collaboration to  (some point) outside that relationship.
A democracy such as exists today would come about through some stipulated and voluntary act wherein parties to an agreement, each by express and voluntary sign, pass their own force to a party specially created to "manage" such force and use it for the stated (within the agreement) purpose.  This is the stated role of today's democracy.  In actual fact the force of parties to agreements was passed to warlords and such which had always existed as preditors.  What is suggested here is that force became a reality of social life that was, at first by small degrees but then as a self-sustaining process, that had only minor relevance to the agreements that there were....


Today I'm asking myself is there is an instant need for an agreement of agreements:  to form a separate agreement, which conforms to the form of agreements in general, between the principal parties and the third party. 

So far the third party has agreed to enforce the agreement of the principals.

So far the principals have agreed to submit their disputes to the third party.

As of yet, however, there is no quid pro quo from the principals to the third party.  In other words, the principals have not committed themselves to or agreed to any reciprocity.  In other words, the principals have not said to the third party:  we will do this or that if you will enforce our agreement.

Agreement submitted to contract beget new agreements.  Somehow, I suggest, there must be an agreement between the third party who becomes a principal in a new agreement. Following what was said before, there must be an agreement in which force is transfered outside the agreement's framework to (still) another party.  Or??????

Material from earlier in this topic:

TODAY (This material is a continuation of my "Perpetual Revision". section
I will limit myself in this forum to one or several paragraphs that are attempts, in small steps, to state the most general ideas of Force Theory.  I will not allow this forum to ramble on and on.  Also, this section will be always changing even if only slowly.  By the smallest baby-steps I inch myself forward, or perhaps backward as the case may be.   A word here and a word there will change, in order to present a more precise, meaningful statement.  This is clearly an advantage of Performance Philosophy--in effect, writing with word processing technology on the internet.  The present section should in effect be the introduction to my whole corpus of writing.  I have caught myself in outright impossibilities even in my earlier versions of my general theory.

Force--meaning the person's assertion of physical and personality human (or animal) traits to compel behavior of other humans--stands opposed to agreement as a second, and uniquely human, relationship.  Agreement and force are antithetical terms in the context of our present discussion.  Logically, where a relationship is governed by force, it cannot be mediated by agreement.  In fact, it is unthinkable (logically impossible), at least in theory, for an agreement to have in it force; the force would nullify and render impractical the agreement.  Yet, prior to language in human evolution, relationships were essentially governed by force, or the will of the strongest member of the social group.  This is not to say immediately that the behavior of a group governed by agreement will be different than that of a group governed by force.  There is a certain "logic" in animal behavior that prefigures, or suggests, human behavior within agreements.  Birds may "agree" to nest and raise young, although this behavior is the result of a chain of instinct.  All this has been discussed before by others.  What occupies us now is the fact that, notwithstanding the outcome of a chain of behavior, the inner mechanism of instinctive (forced) behavior is entirely different than the mechanism within an agreement.  The human agreement cannot work with any element of force within it; otherwise the agreement would not be   "agreeable."

Also I want to warn against any suggestion that agreements cannot contain any provisions of inequality.  I have already talked about indentured servitude and (for that matter) marriage.  The point of an agreement is the fact, precisely, that the relationshiip has been entered voluntarily.  Force cannot be exerted to compel one party or another to enter the agreement.  This is an assumption of all agreements and contracts.  Whether a party can leave the agreement voluntarily is another matter.  Neither party can exit the agreement without fulfilling the terms of the agreement; but the compulsion to remain in the agreement is not provided from within the agreement but from outside it, by, in other words, the third party.  On the point of the decision to enter or constraint to exit an agreement no force can be exerted.  Force contradicts the element of agreement within the collaboration.  I want to outline this premise in the simplest way.  Force, as I define the word here, is essentially individual; agreement is a social collaboration.

Thus, for instance, if I force a slave to do a task, he is not collaborating with me so much as he is acting simply as a tool in my hands.   An agreement, on the other hand, brings together motives of at least two persons--motives which in themselves may remain obscure.  The point of an agreement is that both parties are "willing."  Also there is the consideration that both parties, as human beings with normal intelligence, understand their respective roles and rewards.  An agreement is a plan...    The relationship of force may not disappear with the completion of a task; the relationship may persist as a perpetual slavery.  Agreements come and go...

Causality by force and causality by agreement:  when a human being acts, he acts according to some principle of causality.  There is a "causality of nature" which the person does not need to understand, or may understand only partially or may understand, as frequently is the case, through some instinct.  A bird, even, "understands" how to fly; the human being understands the effect of a stick or stone thrown at an unprotected animal.  These things are obvious.  But in dealing with fellow human beings, and particularly with those with whom he shares a language, there is a "causality of agreement."  A good part of what we are doing here--the success of what we are doing--depends on how well we comprehend this causality of agreement.  The other causality we may leave to physical scientists.  But we see that human life changed radically when humans, through language, were able to "agree" with one another; they became "agreeable"; they began a road to success wherein their only natural enemies were other men.  It has long been obserserved by philosophical writers that even a casual conversation contains some philosophical premise, in effect a sort of "agreement" as to, at any rate, what constitutes "reality."  The reality they have in mind is a reality through agreement; and here a different--radically dissimilar--idea or premise of causality holds sway.  This is a "human" or ideational causality.  This causality appears with the first true language.   It is an idea that is highly vague and need constant refinement and discipline:  such causality in its earliest phase may be called religious.  Religion, through assiduous discipline and experience, passes by degrees into science.  Such progress is documented through the archeological and historical records.  In the end, however, the human idea of causality "by agreement" changes the relationship of human beings to one another from a relation through force to a relation through agreement.  It is left at this point to understand why within any agreement there can be no idea of force; and within the concept of causality by force there can be no concept of agreement.  Religion, as I say, confuses the two concepts and renders them both unviable; while, on the other hand, science brought into human relationships simply imprisons humans in static and rigid ritualized motions.

I want to say at this point (I am unsure of myself) that agreement means that two "things," undefined as to what sort of things they are, may act upon one another with a sort of (Newtonian, let us say) force, like a billiard balll hitting another billiard ball; or they may interact "by agreement."   The effort of humans has been to bring together "things" that move together without causal force.   The word causality may be a misnomer in the case:  it would be more correct to say that an agreement is a movement of "things" without causal intervention.  So, if two or more "things" are inclined to move together, to achieve some desired effect, they are said to "agree";  and this happens without force or causality of any kind.  Force in this instance, when there is an agreement in effect, would be introduced from outside the agreement in the event that the agreement does not function properly.  There is in this case a predisposition of things--always, it appears, humans themselves-- to act together.  I may be saying at this point (I don't entirely know) that human beings, coming together and exchanging words, understand themselves to be in agreement.  Thus instead of two billiard balls moving upon impact in this direction or that, we have the idea that human beings who have initially no idea that they are moving in a (mutally satisfying) direction, then come to understand that they are moving thusly.  Once they understand their movement, then--through an act of finalization (handshake)--they "agree" to perpetuate this movement by removing all personal force that they would have between them, and vesting that force, instead, in a third party which would re-inforce the terms (mutually understood movement) of the agreement.  What I am arriving at here is the idea that human beings may, through language and mutual "understanding," say that they are moving in this direction or that, and that to maintain this direction is to their mutual benefit, as it were without causality; and that force "should" be applied only at the impartial discretion of the third party; and at that only on the occasion of a misfunction within the disagreement.  The point being made finally is that any theory of agreements must presuppose a large element of harmony already in relationships that exists apart from any physical (or psychological) causality.   Within agreements the principle of causality, as we understand the word from Newtonian physics (and I leave Quantum Mechanics out of the picture at present; since that concept brings new issues), i simply suspended.

There is the further consideration that force exerted in an arrangement that exists originally through harmony may have a disrruptive effect.     As I have said repeatedly, Performance Philosophy is a daily record of thinking, without any concentrated effort--as would be done in preparation of a finished book--to reconcile inconsistancies.  With the fact in mind that I may elsewhere said otherwise I will go on to say, additionally, that an agreement seems to presuppose a pre-existing condition of harmony.  For example, when three bushmen men agree to undertake a hunt, they know what to expect from one another; they have hunted together countless times.  Before the specific hunt in question the men meet to discuss details; they plan the place and time.  There are numerous details to discuss for each hunt.  But there is likely to be no serious disagreement between the men.  Agreements in general, from the simplest to the most complex societies, are much like the agreements of the bushmen:  these same agreements have been entered before, time after time.  Yet the individual agreement is finalized in each case by a handshake--signaling, as it does, that no force (no weapons) will be used to settle disputes. In a simple agreement, even, disputes may arrise.  If they do it is agreed upon, additionally, that these disputes will be submitted to a third party for arbitration.  Then the agreement can be carried to completion or disbanded, as the case may be.  But in the case of each agreement thus conceived and enacted there is a certain (we may say) presumption of harmony.  There is going to be no discord.  It is possible to draw analogies from natural science:  we presume the earth will circle the sun, because of the earth's inertia and the fact that there is nothing to deter or inhibit the earth's motion.  This inertia is all that is meant by the "harmony of nature."  In the case of agreements there is the element of human invention--fiction, even--made possible symbolically through language.  What is being proposed in any agreement is something that exists, essentially, already in actual fact.  What is being proposed, then, is not anything new but simply the protection and continuation of what already exists.  To perpetuate and protect in its present motion is what an agreement does.  And the most important feature of the agreement is to remove any trace physical force, if that is possible, from the agreement.  If--to carry on the analogy of the moving earth--any new physical-causal force were introduced, the earth would be thrown off course.  This we may readily assume.   What I am arriving at slowly is a conception of an agreement as something highly limited and fragile; and something bound, moreover, to pass shortly out of existence.  To form agreements in the first place, the principals must know what to expect of one another; to understand one another's interests.

Is trade an "agreement"?  Trade is a transfer but demands nothing complex by way of agreement.  An item traded is its own "bond" and "security."  When somethng is transfered and payment made, the entire transaction--agreement?--is concluded in an instant.  I do not mean here to bely the great complexity of human relationships.  I am trying to anticipate problems with this general theory of agreements.  Where agreements are of particular importance, and the administration of them critical, is where some long-term relationship is anticipated and every aspect of the problem--personalities of the principals and technical issues--is delt with thoroughly, presumably in writing.  I point out this difference between trade on the one hand and complex agreements on the other in order to account, as I finally must do, the high volume of trades, today, between ethnically and racially different groups where, finally, there is very little understanding and communication very shallow.  What I am saying is that agreements generally presuppose that people know each other very well, that they are perhaps even familials (family members); their degree of strangeness to one another strains any agreement they might be in.  We may finally go on to talk about "democracy" as a sort of "social contract."  All democracy states, in its sacred and secular documents, is that harmony is better in human relationships than disharmony; and that any disharmony that there is must be resolved, by extreme force if necessary, to avert any disruptin of the general system.  The general system is likely to be too big, simply, to be practical.  If there are to be agreements that work, no agreement should be larger than can be carried out between familials; while no third party, overseeing "force" should be larger than it takes to manage just a few agreements at a time.  Most of the issues of human life must be left to biology.

My policy, as I have already said, is to insert early in a particular topic the most recent general statement of Force Theory.  This I will do now:Equals-in-force cannot readily collaborate for the reason that these equals have no good way of settling disputes among themselves.  This statement is central to everything else I will say in what follows.   Collaboration, or working together, may be productive.   But incidental to this collaboration is the fact that disputes arise inevitably; and these disputes hinder and even destroy the productive work that there is to do.  Dispute resolution, not the advantage of human beings working cooperatively, is the theme of this blog. All we have said at the point is that cooperation often will produce results to the satisfaction of more than one person.  In collaboration there is a systematic (but not necessarily a planned) coordination of effort.  Animals often collaborate in this sense.  Lions for instance divide labor in a hunt,  just as do human hunters.  But in the case of human beings something important is added to collaboration:  that is recognition of a certain competition or dis-agreement within the structure of the overall agreement.  To have a productive collaboration, uninterrupted by destructive dis-agreement, men need between them an agreement.   Agreements are outside the capability of animals; only humans have them because only humans can share thoughts and make plans.   We can call these plans plans for collaboration; such plans are not yet necessarily agreements.  The human plans are simply abstract models for a future course of action.  This capability that human beings have as been amply and ably discussed by psychologists.  What on the other hand remains obscure, so far as I know, is the idea that humans add to these abstract plans some proposal that is uniquely human:  that is, a provision for disagreement.  This provision is to the effect that, precisely, no physical force will be used to settle dis-agreements with the agreement.  This provision to exclude physical force in the settlement of disputes, which inevitably will occur in the close confines of the agreement--where men with perhaps violent dispositions are in constant contact--is finalized by the handshake.  This is a universal way to symbolically state that both parties are "in agreement."  Anthropologists say that the handshake is a gesture wherein each man checks the other for a hidden weapon.   This would support our general theory of agreements.  What distinguishes then collaboration from agreements is that within agreements, finally, physical force is excluded as a possibility to settle disputes.  But the question still remains, if force is taken out of the agreement, must this force be transferred elsewhere, say, to a third party?  And then, recognizing that disputes will inevitably arise--human nature and self-interest being what it is--is there still a need, in order to make the agreements lasting and viable, to finally use force to en-force terms of the agreement.  With this need in mind we may take up the issue of contracts.

There is the issue of impartiality in the enforcement of agreements.  This comes up more when contracts are considered, inasmuch as agreements do not assume anything more than that no force will by used by either of the principal parties.  And this means physical force.  The possibility is still open, obviously, for the force of verbal argument; this would be the only remaining way to enforce, from either party, the point of view of that party.  Now, within an agreement  men are "equal":  if they are equal in all ways they remain equal within the agreement; if they come into the agreement unequal, they are made equals in the terms of the agreement.  Equal means always, however, in respect to force.  If they are equal coming into the agreement with regard to force, this force is taken away from them; if they are unequal in regard to force when they come into the agreement, this force is again taken away from them.  Within the agreement the men are equal with regard to force, in other words, because within the agreement neither man has any force at all.  I will mention the handshake:  the handshake finalizes the agreement as each touches the hand of the other, and ascertains in doing so that the other does not conceal within his hand a weapon.  The handshake is symbol of--no force here.

It is precisely equals-in-force who would, where each asserts his point of view within the close confines of a collaborative arrangement, destroy the arrangement and perhaps one another.  Were the men unequals-in-force there would be no such destruction.  In fact, the collaboration could continue.  The man with the superior force would simply en-force his own point of view.  All disputes would be resolved in favor of him.  Under conditions of hunting and gathering, where there is perpetual hunger and need, and the margin of survival of the people is very slim, such expeditious settlement of disputes is the norm.  It is precisely the issue of how to settle disputes between equals-in-force that belabors the whole cooperative process of large scale societies.  Communist theory is based on the assumption that collaboration is superior to competition--that goes without saying.  But the strategy of heavy-handed dictatorship is superior to equalitarian societies in the issue of dispute settlement.  In fact, equals in property and "rights" are more likely to be disputatious, I aver, that societies with unequal wealth and rights.  By this line of reasoning dictatorships are more efficient economic systems.  The point of statecraft has been, we may suggest, to bring equals together while negating the sinister fact that it is precisely equals who, through equal force that they possess, can readily destroy one another.

A contract is a "supervised" agreement; the supervisor is called the "third party."  The supervisor must agree, for its part, with the principals that an agreement exists; and the principals must authorize, for their part, that this or that third party shall use force to enforce terms of the agreement.  The sole act of the principals is to transfer force (personal violence) to the third party.  The third party then holds all force; the principals hold no force.  Disposition of the use of force--the decision to act with force--is entirely in the hands of the third party; the use of force is at the descretion of this third party.  In a pure theory of contracts the third party has no reason to exist other than its role in enforcing terms of the original agreement.  A third party may finally enforce a number of agreements at the same time or sequentially; thus the third party may have a continued existence even as one or the other agreements is completed and passes away.  This I have already said.  What must  be added at this point is a characterization of the third party in terms of any further role it might have in agreements.  That is, it may be asked whether the third party is actually itself party to ("part of"?) a specific agreement.  The answer is no.

By this line of reasoning, if we call government nothing more than a third party to agreements, then we must conclude that government has no reason to exist except to assist parties in agreements.  In fact government has evolved largely in this capacity as third party.  Even intruders into a society--invading barbarians--are often given a role as mediators in agreements.  We may consider the idea that cites are composite entities that has come together as centers of trade; this trade is simple cooperation and division of labor.  In an important sense a city is itself an "agreement."    But the parties to this city-agreement may not agree on everything; disputes erupt which, aggravated by tribal and ethnic differences, may threaten the existence of the entire society.  Here a "barbarian" intrusion would be welcome.  Elsewhere (The Mediator) I suggested that Jews are sometimes invited into a large society to settle disputes; in Germany they were originally tax collectors, or agents representing goverment in relation to the general populace.  There are many instances of this sort of thing in documented history.

The third party is an enforcer of an agreement but it is not a "principal party" to any of the specific provisions of that agreement.  The original agreement provides, for instance, that a certain service will be rendered and a certain payment will be made.  The third party does not render that, or any, service nor does it make any payment.  Those provisions are left up to the principal parties.  Were the third party to be a "principal party" to the original agreement, that would be a so-called conflict of interest.    To be such a party would compromise the third party's impartiality.  At this point it is necessary to emphasize the impartiality of the third party.  It is possible now to state the essential equality of the principal parties to one another.  All equality means in this context is that in terms of the original agreement, one party is not favored over another.  I want to avoid confusion on this point.   Where the real or ultimate advantage is within the agreement to one or the other principal parties is often hard to say; one may get more out of the "deal" than the other, for all we know.  That kind of equality or inequality is not presently the issue.  The equality that we talk about is that the terms of the contract are enforced "impartially."  As the terms are stated there is no advantage given by the third party to one or the other of the principals.  We may jump ahead of ourselves a bit, here, and ask the question of the origin of the idea of human equality.  The word equality is written into sacred documents throughout history.  This idea is no discovery of wisemen; it is a concept implied in all contracts.  And there have been and still are millions of contracts all with this concept of equality of parties.  We are talking about a concept--equality--that is specifically human; but it is not an obscure or arcane idea that sprang out of the mind of some brilliant individual.  That is hardly the case.



This next writing must, as I have already said, square with the material in the preceeding paragraph. If it does not square, I'm saying, the following material is invalid.  I cannot continually rewrite the whole opus every time I change my general theory; I will try to edit and change non-conforming material slowly.   If I said earlier, at the outset of my work, that "equals will not enter an agreement because they have between them no means to enforce the provisions of that agreement.  I said later that "equals do not exist except as abstractions."  I said further that the idea of equality in fact does not exist outside agreements.  Thus obviously my later statement is inconsistent with my first.  I think that by bringing out this inconsistency, and doing this before someone else does, is almost tantamont to resolving issues that there might be.  Sherlock Holmes said that a danger seen is 90% already dealt with.  That is hopefully the case here. At present I say this:  that persons desiring collaboration, but who are not equal "in Nature" or "in natural fact" (one may be "in natural fact" stronger or richer or have more social leverage than the other), will, in entering an agreement, stipulate that in the terms of the agreement neither is "stronger" than the other.  In other words, neither person has the ability, contractually as per the agreement, to resolve differences or disputes in his own favor.  Once one person exercises "unequal" force, the agreement is suspended.  All these terms--especially "stronger versus weaker"--need careful attention and definition. 

I am moving closer here to a general conception of "equality."  Human equality is a concept; it is not, for instance, on the other hand, a fact.    As a concept it is a human relationship; the concept is not a statement of how things "are" in natural fact but as an ideal condition.  The conventional wisdom on equality is that as a concept its appearance had to await an evolution of the human condition to a state of "higher" moral and educational development.  Equality is thought impossible to the Greeks, for instance, not merely because they held slaves--although slavery was evidence of Greek so-called backwardness--but because simply they were old fashioned, they were like beginning students in the university of life.  This is how we may state our case.  Equality (to emphasize not as a fact, because equality is never a natural fact but is only a concept) could only happen, it is avered, in "modern times."  Clearly here there is a pride (arrogance?) of the present, which is the "most advanced."  The vision of the present is believed to be 20-20. 

But we must try to decide then, if we don't believe equality is an outcome or final conclusion of some vague "moral progress," then we still must determine where equality did come from, as a result of what natural or mental process.  What is suggested here, in this work, is that equality is a provision of agreements.  It is to agreements we must look for an idea of the origin of the idea of equality.  And agreements came about with the origin of language itself, probably 500 thousand years ago; and agreements exist wherever there is language:  among the Eskimo, pygmies or whomsoever. It can be supposed that insofar as pygmies have language they can have, and do have, agreements.  Furthermore, to the extent that they do have agreements they also have equality among themselves.  So, say, the pygmies or Ibo or Australian aboriginals do have the idea of equality;  but they have this idea only to the extent that they have agreements.  This is the logical consequence of our original assumption.  The distinction among peoples worldwide, finally, as pertaining their notions of equality, will be determined by how pervasive full agreements are in their lives.  We have to give examples.  It may be suggested that agreements among Africans tend readily to break down in impossible, unresolvable disputes which are settled through violence.  Europeans are less inclined this way.  Small agreements tend to be rolled into larger ones.  The consequence of this "agreeableness" among Europeans means that these people live perpetually in the framework of some agreement or other.  This means furthermore that Europeans are going to consider themselves "equals" at all times, finally, if not in the specific provisions of agreements then under their general provisions. 

Again, however, as I have been suggesting in earlier sections of this blog, while, progressively, more and more life among Europeans is rolled into agreements and contracts, and equality is so immediate and pressing a "reality," the forces that are released slowly and consistently in African society begin to menace one another.  Objective forces on the one hand and subjective forces on the other come, in Euro- and American society to confront one another in a pure, distilled form and the eventual clash is magnified in one or several events.  Shortly I will discuss the implications of "race" in this clash.  To summarize this clash in simple terms:  what happens individually in Africa is shifted to a broad collective basis in Euro-America.DELETED MATERIAL FROM OTHER PARAGRAPHS:  AWAIT FINAL DELETION


I want to throw more weight to agreements among hunters to agreements among farmers.  In this regard I will also move toward a general theory of "governement."


What in society is uniquely human?  Human society is a product of human thinking.  In asking about society we must ask first, then:  what is unique about human thinking.

What is unique about human thinking is negation.  I talked extensively in earlier sections of this blog, but in particular in my material now verschoben on  When the editor of Philtalk, Uwe, sees fit to release this (legally or illegally confiscated) material it will amplify what I've said regarding the thinking of the now-famous Koko the "talking' gorilla.  It appears that Koko does think using symbols in the same way that humans think.  Lower animals, dogs for instance, cannot think using symbols.  The great accomplishment of human reason, on the other hand--or logic--is that human beings use negations in thought.  For instance, I have a symbol A; I also have a symbol not-A.  Negating symbols are used in formal logic.  What I am talking about here, however, is nothing so arcane as formal logic.  At this point I make (what I call) a bold assertion, that, namely, human beings commonly think using  negations.   The history of cultures is their increasing tendency to use negatives in codifying [word to be defined] their collective existence.  A simple example is at hand.

I.At the primitive or hunting/gathering mode of life people talk about "alleviating their hunger."  Hunting is an act toward that end.

II. In so-called advanced cultures, people talk about "negating hunger."  They talk about a state of existence that is not-hunger. 

III. In the dissolute phase of culture the paradox becomes obvious:  not-something is nothing at all.  Thus culture is built finally on an absolute--the absolute negation--of nothing or nothing-ness. 

Hunger finally exists as does everything irrational.  I have talked about race as the irrational creative power of nature.  The "fascist state" that replaces the negation of the negative is a work of nature, not man.  Yet within this state human life remains viable.