Topic: 44. RACE = SPIRIT

Hegelian dialectic is a principle without a body; here we are going to give dialectic a body.  Several important criticisms of Hegel are as follows:  (1)Spirit (Geist) is an incorporeal entity.  (2) As such, with no physical presence, Spirit cannot be proven to exist.  We are making a major assumption in saying with Hegel that logic and the categorical relations between ideas are more than a play of the human mind; they are a process "out there" in the cosmos.  Hegel would seem to be remote from our study of Philosophical Anthropology.  Stretching one's mind to make connections is what philosophy does in general; and we must do this as Philosophical Anthropologists.  These criticisms of Hegel are obvious and legitimate.  Reading Hegel we are rapidly bogged down in all sorts of imponderables.   Yet when we sort through all the convoluted writing and the highly abstract concepts which are left undefined, the central Hegelian idea in its purely abstract expression--the dialectic of Spirit--is simple and straightforward. That principle is this (and I cite especially Robert Tucker Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx):  Dialectic is a process [the word "process" left undefined] wherein Spirit [again, an undefined word] objectifies or externalizes itself in some thing outside itself.  That thing is perceived by Spirit as its own, Spirit's, "other."  The discussion that follows the self-externalization of spirit has to do with the relationship between Spirit as it originally was and the new or objectified "other."  Hegel is clear on this relationship.  Spirit sees its "other" as confining and even opposed to itself.  The relation is one of hostility and "alienation."  We see in its basic outline the first structure of the relation between spirit and its other.  To this we add a third movement of the total process.  That is, Spirit, knowing the opposition of its "other" to Spirit itself, enters into a new relationship with the other in which Spirit "reconciles" itself to the other.  This--thesis, antithesis and synthesis--is the final triadal relation made famous by Hegel and parlayed finally by the post-Hegelians into a myrad of diverse theses on human history and politics.  Engels was the founder of "dialectical materialism" wherein was sought a material cloak or substance for Hegel's arcane principle.  Again, we aver here as Philosophical Anthropologists that Engels' notion of matter has been no less etherial and other-worldly than Hegel's Spirit.  It is in that vein--to make still another attempt to give Hegelian dialectic a "body"--that we continue here.  We look precisely for such a body in a mere word.  That word is race.  I refer here to the venerable etymology of this word, its presence in different languages and yet all suggesting the seminal meaning "root" or "source."  The origin of "race" is in the Latin word radix or root.  To use Heidegger's phrase, we are saying race is a word "heavy with Being."  We are saying also that the word race has defied all efforts--the most recent coming from some anthropologists--to banish the word.  We do not finally need to defend the word race; when banished from our vocabulary it simply reappears of its own accord.  To say that such a word, "heavy with Being," lacks a good scientific meaning does not proscribe the word; the meaning that race has is locked into the conscious and unconscious thinking of all humans.  If white people banish the word race, and make a religion out of this very banishment, black people or red or yellow people will just bring the word back.  This has already happened many times.  Finally, we are taking a principle of being contained in Hegel's dialectic and are linking it to a fact of being, or race.  Race is the general "root" of existence; and Hegelian dialectic is the logical process wherein this root reproduces and advances itself--sexually-- in the material world.  Race unfolds "dialectically," as the male finds his "other" in a female; as he is compromised and opposed by her; and as the man reconciles with the woman through his own self that he finds in their mutual child.  This is the dialectic of nature whose physical form--race--gives empirical and palpable evidence of the dialectic process itself.  Through the idea of race, we are saying, Hegelianism makes sense in the real world.

The individual ("self" in some contexts) desires, we are saying, to perpetuate itself eternally.  The notion of the self or individual as egoistic and self-aggrandizing has a lengthly history in German philosophy.  Kant and Hegel and following them Max Stirner and Nietzsche all had a profound sense of the inevitability and assertiveness of the ego.  There is no point in recapitulating this great literature; we say here only that the ego or individual is axiomatic in our way of thinking.  If we speak of Hegelian Spirit we can only mean the egoistical individual.  This is the entity that is so-called prime-mover in biology.  Thus if we speak of the "struggle for survival" and "survival of the fittest" we can only mean the individual.  We are saying, as proponents of Force Theory, that the individual is Spirit.  That is, if we speak of Spirit at all--which as Philosophical Anthropologists we are not directly compelled to do--that is to identify the individual as an absolute, striving entity.  This entity has purpose and direction; and that direction is not only survival in the short term but in perpetuity.  We are thinking of the individual, it appears, in much the same way society and culture think of him.  That is, as a sort of intractible and obstinant impasse to the most important goals of society.  The individual is small, but very much "there."  We can speak of this "there-ness" as the self-assertion of the individual.  That is, where the individual or ego is pushed upon, it pushes back.  In today's world, where the forms of culture and civilization are massive and imposing, when many merely physical obstacles have been overcome, the individual in the recesses of his egoism is the lack inaccessable and insurmountable recess that remains.  This is culture's great challenge--to suppress the individual.  I want to be clear on this point.  I began this blog a year or more ago with the attempt to describe this very direction of culture wherein the person--here called the individual--is suppressed.  I talked about the primal tool, a mere stick held in the hand; and I talked about society emerging finally as a sort of "infrastructure" or supportive organization of the tool itself.   Again, there is no purpose here in repeating this material.  We want to go beyond a critique of culture as categorical self-negation and talk, rather, about nature's correction of this contradiction.  Culture collides with nature; and the final battleground of that collision is the small impenetrable recess we call the individual ego.  It is in this collision that the dialectic of nature, which has hitherto deferred to culture--culture is superior to nature in the materialism of everyday existence--that culture meets its violent end.  We do not propose violence; we predict it.  I said that the dialectic of nature is activated within the individual, whom we have called, consistent with Hegelianism, Spirit.  Spirit--or the individual ego--is force of self-perpetuation and self-expansion.  But this force, while itself an insurmountable barrier to culture, also faces an impossible task.  That task is this:  the force that is Spirit can perpetuate itself only by looking to "another," who is not the ego himself.  That "other" now is not a categorical or logical other so much as another human being.  It is scarcely worth mentioning that this other being is the other gender; we have made our point simply in saying that the "other" through which the ego must pass is not the ego himself.  A man striving to perpetuate himself must turn to a female partner; and the issue of their relationship is going to be, of course, only half the ego himself.  This is a serious compromise for the ego or Spirit. 

So, consistent with Hegel, we say that the individual as expression of Spirit turns to "another."  Summarizing our main point here in purely conventional terms:  First it is egoistic for the parent to want his own child.  Secondly, it is anti-egoistic for a would be parent to resort to another human being for purposes of reproduction.  Sexual reproduction is the antithesis of absolute egoism of the individual (as Spirit).   And third, it is racist--renewed egoistism--for the parent to "find" him- or herself precisely in that child.  Racism is the aufhebung or overcoming of the opposition of egoistic parenthood and parenthood through love of a woman.    This is a triadal biological process which expresses perfectly what Hegel called the life of the Spirit.  .  Spirit does not so much objectify himself as this other, as he must go through it.  The other--his female counterpart--mediates in the relation between the ego and the ego's final issue.  But there is more.  The being who issues from the ego and his partner is him- or herself an "other."  The ego who is Spirit "reconciles" himself with this offspring "other" in an act that is motivated, again, through instinct.  The instinct which compels the parent to recognize his or her offspring I call a "racial" instinct.  The "racialness" of the instinct consists of the parent finding him- or herself in the offspring.  Thus it is not in the simple act of sex that the racial principle asserts itself but in the mental-instinctive reconciliation of the parent with the parent's "other."  This reconciliation takes place in spite of, and in adversarial relation to, the dicates of culture.  Culture tells the indvidual that, while he can perpetuate himself through "another" he cannot "reconcile" himself to the issue of his relation with the other.  It is not the bond of parents with one another that constitutes "racism," but the bond of the parent with the child.  Racism is not apparent in the sexual act.  We may appear to be in a quandry here; but Schopenhauer's ideas come out.  The child is already seen in the female "other" of the male.  This is clear racism in the text sense of the word.  I want for a moment look at race as talked about by anthropologists listing themselves in Google.  We may peruse this material.  I have already said that the word race has been challenged in a majority of the entries in Google.  We on the other hand do not shy away from being called racist because that is what we are.  A person who decries this webbsite as being racist, and expects to be applauded as saying something new,  is a moron--because we have already said that is what we are.  This webbsite promotes anarchist theory, race theory and Hegelian dialectics in a combination whose catalyst is Philosophical Anthropology.  There is no reason for me to hyperventilate further in this way.  The two major points made in the overwhelming majority of google webbsites are these:  (1) Race does not exist; (2) racism, in speaking of something that does not exist, is immoral.    There is a slight of hand  that confuses us as to whether race does not exist; or whether race is immoral. It cannot be said both that racism is immoral and race does not exist.  If one thing is true, the other is not.   If it is said that racism is immoral, it is implied that the reality racism referrs to does exist.  That reality is race itself.  This is our conclusion.  At the risk of promoting an "immoral" idea we may continue to say that race does exist; race is the root of being and the external or physical side of the dialectic of nature.  What we have said now, in summary, that racism could occur at any level of sexual reproduction, even among amoebas, say, or genderless organisms:  that is, that the (Schopenhauerian) Will to reproduce one self must be carried out by means of, and through, the gender "other" of the individual.  It is egoistic for the parent to want a child; it is anti-egoistic for a would be parent to resort to another human being for purposes of reproduction; and it is racist--renewedly egoistic--for the parent to "find him- or herself precisely in that child.  That fact--the fact of sexual reproduction--contradicts the absolute will of the individual to reproduce purely and simply his own self or ego.  Sex is the compromise he makes.  The issue or offspring then is not fully his own self but, like the sex partner, an "other."  The racism of the dialectic of nature and biology is in the "synthetic" phase of the process wherein the individual identifies his own self in the child.  This is the "reconciliation" of the opposition and otherness of sexual reproduction.  That the parent is "reconciled" with his or her own child is of course instinct and bonding; but this is a "racist" process which leads, finally, to an entire new type of human being in an entire new division within the human species.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-09-26 22:17:21)


Racism is the "love" of oneself; but this self that one loves must first be found through the "other."   We propose that in answer to our question--what is racism?--we evoke the Hegelian triadal equasion.  Furthermore we are saying that racism is the highest form of love, that it can be reached only "dialectically."   To love oneself as one finds himself in another is the essence of racism.  I propose that racist love is the highest love that there is.  This is the bold outcome of my line of speculation at the end of my career as a college professor and parent.   I hesitate to use, probably for the first time, the word love inasmuch as the word is vague and undefinable and overused.  Christians use the word love.  We propose to give "love" a better definition, however, as simply affirmation of oneself.  One may affirm one"s self, and desire to possess one's self. There is self-esteem but also a number of components psychological and theoretical in this self-affirmation.  Culture discourages this affirmation; the individual asserts it inexorably.  Every act that is an individual act is also a racist act.  There is no point in becoming maudlin.  We are saying simply that one wants to cling to one's self in the face of possible or actual separation from oneself.  We are speaking philosophically, of course.   Something should be said about philosophy:  this is the discipline which refuses to accept its own limitations.  Through philosophy we are free to rise beyond the dingy waters of empiricism.    We may define the word love but also we have made clear the fact that love, or any other word used in this blog, is not necessarily an empirical concept.  This blog is a work of philosophy, not of science.   Even while anthropology as such commits itself to a fairly rigorous empiricism, Philosophical Anthropology does not.  PA is essentially philosophy.  As we say, philosophy is always straining at the boundaries of caution and staid observation.  We might define love in Hegelian terms as a certain resistance to the loss of one's self.  Love means in this context that, were one to actually "lose" his self he would want to regain this self, to come again together with it, to appropriate or re-approriate this self.  Here the idea of religion is invoked as religare, to re-link.   But first the self that is thus regained  must be lost.  We now look at ways the self may be lost....

I have said that philosophy, like the present writer, has no sense of its (or his) limitations.  That is true.  Two things, culture and death, are implicated in the loss of self.  At present the problem area is strictly biological.  The self is lost through the mortality of the individual.  To perpetuate this self--which one loves--he must reproduce himself in a simply biological way.  Unlike amoebas, on the other hand, sex is the person's necessary mode of reproducing oneself; that means turning for the purpose of reproduction to an "other."  Here we pass from a conventinal biological statement of the facts of sex to the metaphysical and categorical reasoning of Hegel.  This "other" is not oneself; so that the self reproduced through the other is not one's own self, entirely.  In the first phase of this relationship there is a negation of oneself, that is a turning to another than is not oneself.  The other is not merely another, she is categorically different and even opposite.  But the is more.  Before we discuss further the purely biological issue, we should differentiate the dialectic of culture and that of nature, which work in opposite directions--and produce results that are also in categorical opposition to one another.  Culture is the loss of the self categorically into culture's universal terms.   The act of using a tool prefigures society in general; but the tool translates individual action into a universality of all human action.  Every tool by itself generalizes the features of an individual and translates him into a "universal man."  Allthough perhaps invented and used by an individual, the tool is a statement of generalized humanity.  Through the tool a person becomes impersonal and general.  These are all things we have been saying throughout this blog.  So far we have discussed only culture and have left the biological issue aside; yet--again overstepping limits imposed on us by the common sense of science--we stretch to make a connection.   Culture eventually contradicts biology in the following way.  The universal man of culture--the generalized man that is the essence of a machine or tool--comes into collision with the absolutely individual man of biology.  It is not simply that the individual exists as such--because the lone individual, although accepted in culture, can easily be managed by culture.  The conflict arises when the individual asserts himself as such.  Again, each individual so long as he accepts his individuality absolutely, and "knows his place" in society, can coexist with the absolute generality of the man idealized by society.  The individual life ends before society and the individual come to blows.  He dies.  But the family, on the other hand, is an affirmation of the individuality and self-ness of the person for eternity.  The family expresses the love that a man has for himself, a man that is not society's man, and finds the object of this love in another person to whom he is linked not societally or culturally but biologically and naturally.  It is in the assertion of the self to overcome the mortality of the self that the collision with culture occurs.  Society respects the death of the individual as consistent with the aims of society.  In sexual reproduction, on the other hand, the person "finds" himself or "comes home to himself" in another person; and this relation between the sex partner and the child is an unmediated relation; or what is the same it is a relation mediated by biology and nature.   The human being thinks of the sex act as perpetuating himsef as an individual self.  It is truer that he scatters himself about and could not find himself in any one person.  But he therefore finds himself in, and reconciles himself with, a whole race of people.  This is consistent with the etymological meaning of the word race in Latin radix or root-source.  This is all true.   But a dialectic of nature begins with this self-perpetuation that parallels the dialectic of culture, but in an opposite direction.  Culture by the process of negating the self produces a universal self in which no individual self can be found.  In short, culture engenders a self-lessness in which the individual disappears.  The individual can fight this degrading of himself only by turning to "another," a being who is not him and therefore, initially, is simply another competitive human being.  This other being is initially simply a person taking up space that the individual could claim for himself.   In resorting to such a person--the Hegelian "other"--the person essential contradicts himself.  This is only an initial denial of himself, inasmuch as the issue of the relationship is again his self.  This is a renewed and perpetuated self.  But this new self is only half, at most, the original self.  Loving or affirming this new self is a transcendental act of reconciliation, or a re-appropriation of the self by the self itself.   This is "racist" love, because it is the self that loves itself, but loves itself "in" an other.  Through the love the self has of itself, one's love expands to incorporate others so far as they "carry" oneself.  The individual, through the race, transcends himself but only that he may re-join (religare=in a religious mode) his own--otherwise lost--self.  Nature as the individual surpassing himself just to be himself is the material or biological "religous" form of nature..

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-09-29 18:28:26)


The collision between nature and culture will take place, finally, we are saying, in the small recesses of the individual psyche or psychological makeup.  The self is the hard and intractable core that is left after culture extracts what it can from the person.   Culture has taken over from nature all the personality of an individual that is transferable or alienable.  A certain expression of individuality is still possible which I call art.   A word about art is in order.  art is what the individual contributes of himself and to himself. Art is pure self-affirmation.  Art is not racial and racist because art is what the person finds of himself outside himself, but not through other persons.  But art is of the self; the self itself is racist because the final assertion of self-ness, and the one that pits the individual against society, is assertion through other persons with whom the individual comes together, or finds himself at home with, as a race.  We contrast this racism with the person that descends from culture and society.  Thus for instance, if we are talking about a simple tool or artifact, even a mere stick, a certain scratch or mark on the stick,  which probably was put there as both an indentification as individual property or as an ornament--such marks could have been the origin of art itself--would be the sole contribution of the individual qua individual to his tools.   Ornamentation of this sort, which was identifiable as belonging to a certain person, was itself personal and resulted in later phases of culture in the developed artistic productions.  these productions, of El greco or Druer, are still individual--and "useless."  Art is not for a general purpose, or what is the same, a practical purpose as something postentially "useful" to humans in general.   Art and the history of technology have gone their separate directions. What distinguishes art from technology is the individuality of art as opposed to the generality of technics.   Our main focus here however is not art, and this, too, is not a major theme of Philosophical Anthropology.  The issue for mankind is technology as a universalizing and generalizing force, and in that sense--since art is individual--anti-art.  Any art is as an expression of individual personality an anarchistic act.  On the other hand, art is a "harmless"--that is, in itself inert--expression of personality.  Rather in the assertion of the individual self by the self itself the collectivizing of the self in a racial point of view is what not merely threatens but finally subverts culture, society and civilization. .  So far as technics is general, it is embraced by human beings in general.  and insofar as technics of one man is adopted with facility by another man, the technics is shared.  The usefulness of  technics to humans in general has the effect of degrading what is individual in the individual.  I said earlier, and I want to repeat now, that in the individual tool, which may be only a stick used for this or that, is contained the whole of humanity.  That is, within the mere stick, used by early man as an implement, the idea of a universal man of the future is prefigured.  The logic of this idea is not hard to understand; I have already expounded on this subject early on.  What is said here is that the stick extends the arm; the stick as an extension of the arm becomes the arm; and insofar as the stick is the arm, and the arm is the person, the stick is the person.  Finally, insofar as humans universally adopt this same stick, and the stick is the human collectively, the idea of humanity as a whole appears.  That is where we stand now with our argument.  But there is more.  Technics as itself a "universal human being" comes into collision with what is left of nature within the recesses of the individual psyche.  I want to be clear about this point.  the individuality that is still there in the ndividual has now long been harbored, focused and nurtured, albeit unconsciously.  The indivual as individual has sharpened his resistence to culture as the generality of humans.  A collision is in the making.  Indeed, the more technics absorbs what individuality of the individual is loose and alienable.  But there is more.  In engendering offspring, the man finds himself anew in these new persons; and what is more of his self in himself is less in these offspring.  Yet the love that the man has for these scattered evidences of himself is more than the love that he has for his self in himself.  The love of race thus transcends and exceeds the love that a person has for his own but limited self, because his self thusly begins and ends with his self.  It is in the act of reconciling himself with the extension of himself in another person that the human being transcends his mere individuality and finds selfness in those of his race.  Thus racial love is still individual love for oneself, but the object of this love, one's self, is found scattered in a wide number of persons.  These persons where the individual finds himself are collectively called a race.

Nationalism and racialism do not go together.  They are inconsistent ideas.  Force Theory has emerged, through Eugen Duhring and finally in the present webbsite, out of a general Conservative tradition of thinking and writing.  But Conservativism has been highly ineffectual in competition with Liberalism.  That is because Liberalism, we are saying, has been consistently anti-racist while Conservatism has been inconsistently racist.    Here, under Force Theory, we mean to correct that inconsistency.  But meanwhile we must throw out much Conservative baggage.  I am speaking mainly of Nationalism as a point of view.  A perusal of Google documents my thesis that racism is often attributed, rightly, to racist Conservatism and racial theory to day.  Only theory is presently at issue; I want to make this point perfectly clear.  If we speak of racism, it is as perennial and thick as Illinois prarie grass in springtime.  Racism as such is something that does not concern us, inasmuch as we are not concerned with anythng that thrives on its own without human intervention.  Racism is an instinct and one that flourishes among the overwhelming majority of white people without help from intellectuals.  My topic is solely theory.  My purpose is certainly not to foment racism but the straightforward one of constructing a consistent theory of race.  To that end Nationalism must be rejected.  At best Nationalism confuses the idea of race, and at worst directly contradicts it.  A nation is one sort of thing; race is another.  They are categorical opposites in fundamental points.  A house is not the people who live in the house, and vice versa.  The Nation--which was a very late invention in human history--is simply a line drawn in a circle and includes the physical land within that circle.  But the Nation is there "in theory"; that is, the dimensions of the land are stated in some document and this document is "administered." Oswald Spengler spoke poignently of nations that had become "mere geographic boundaries."  But we are saying here that that is what nations, as a consequence of their own self-assertion, strive to become.  And they sacrifice real human beings to that end.  In the context of nationalism, racialism and individualism are condemned as "anti-patriotic."  It is simply not true, as some Liberals aver, that nationalism foments racialism.  The contrary is true.   Boundaries of the nation have to be "recognized."  In the meantime, human beings can come and go in and out of the nation without changing the essential concept of nation.  What is true of individuals is true of whole populations; thus, a "race" of people could enter a nation, and be "part" of it or "belong' to it, yet the nation would exist independently of these people.  There might not need to be a conflict between a people and a nation; they need not be at odds with one another.  But a nation, as a reified element of culture, can assert itself over its citizens as individuals and as members of groups.  Cultures may do this, and nations especially.  The territorical instinct of humans becomes, through the nation, an instinct of territory.  The territory, not the humans, asserts itself expansionistically.  Also, the interests of whole populations may not correspond to the interests of the nations, setting the stage for conflict.  Thus when we talk about race we have to be clear that race is not nation and vice versa.  Race is a group expression, essentially, of the same self-ness that an individual knows within himself.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-09-30 15:33:45)