Topic: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

Classical German philosophy--Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer--begins with an imposing view of a Weltseele or Dialectic or some grand principle which moves the world.  Philosophical Anthropology refers first and foremost to a more pedestrian--literally and figuratively--fact of existence.  That fact is this:  that human existence properly defined began as the first ancestral human stood upright and held, and carried, a mere stick as a tool.  Then he went about his business.  This humble beginning the human being has parlayed, over centuries, into what we know as culture and society.  Inherent in the use of this stick, we are saying, is a kind of contradiction.  That is to say, the human being cannot use the stick without contradicting himself.  The stck is the person and behaves as the person; but the stick, as culture, is not the person.  It is in the ways humans resolve this contradiction that culture comes about.  Mediating between the person and his "contradictory" culture is society, or the relationship--through technics--of human beings one to another.  What was closed as instinctive familial relations is, through technics--the artificial mediator of the human's relation to nature--both opens and mediates between human beings.  Technology--or infrastructure, as we call technics in the widest sense--locks humans into positions in which they, as citizens, are structured.  Philosophical Anthropology has this message:  that the widest cultural relations are prefigured in the primal fact of tool use.  We pass then on to a final point:   that culture does not permanently resolve the contradiction of man and tool so much as pass on to new contradictions, ending finally in a massive and comprehensive  contradiction between man as his own creation; that creation being the idea of Man in a "higher moral sense."  Man is not so much a factual entity as a value or an idea of good.   Philosophical Anthropology leads the way in a theoretical critique of that idea of man.   But the factual result of the ultimate contradiction is race as a phenomeon of nature, which effaces (we are saying) the artificial concept of the species Homo sapiens and its theoretical expression as Man. 


Humanity and Homo sapiens are two different things, appearing as they do in two entirely different contexts.  They have different etymologies, different meanings; the words have nothing important in common.  But there is more.  Humanity and Homo sapiens belong to different orders of being.  Humanity, we are saying, is a word--as in the word's most common context--of a "moral" order.  We are talking here not of an issue of fact but one of  imperative. In saying "humanity" we are ascribing a cateogory of being wherein one person--you or me--is admonished to act.  There is an issue of right or wrong.  The word Homo sapiens, on the other hand, contains no imperative but is simply an issue for scientists.  Homo sapiens is a phenomenon we can safely leave to biologists and physical anthropologists.  As such--since our objectives here are more philsophical than anthropological--Homo sapiens will not be a topic of discussion.  The methodology of this essay, Philosophical Anthropology, has a history starting in Germany circa 1920 with the work of Max Scheler Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.  This is a seminal work in philosophy and one from which, in the basic concepts and methods, later Philosophical Anthropologists--Arnold Gehlen and Helmuth Plessner to mention two--have not fundamentally departed.  The objective of these writers was to formulate a Wesensbegriff des Menschen or a view of a so-called essence of Man.  Examples are straightforward and simple.  Gehlen, for instance, defined the essential trait of a human being (who could be Homo sapiens or in a higher sense Humanity--as a Mangelwesen, or creature of deficiency.  The human being was deficient in biological weapons of defense and attack; he was slow moving and lacked biological, gene-based features that would allow him to survive; survival was left to his own creativity.  We are not inclined at this early point to review all the basic ideas of Philosophical Anthropology that there are; more of this will be left to later.  At this early time in our essay I want to point out, simply, that the early Philosophical Anthropologists never were clear about whether the thing or phenomenon they were talking about was Humanity or Homo sapiens.  Of course a certain amount of confusion is likely wherever the methods are "philosophical"; thus this discipline, which has only just begun in recent times, has an excuse for vagueness.  What the quality of "humanness" was in the human being--where a person was human because of his humanity or his membership in the biological species Homo sapiens--was simply taken for granted.  It is taken for granted in the vast literature about human beings that what is meant by Homo sapiens is Humanity and vice versa.  We here are making no such assumption.  In saying this, while adopting some of the main concepts and methods of Philosophical Anthropology--for instance, that we focus upon "early man" to find the direction and essential nature of human life in civilization of later times--our main purpose is to move beyond this earlier discipline.  I propose a word taken from Eugen Duehring, Force Theory, to indicate a newer version of Philosophical Anthropology.  Our purpose is to reject the word Humanity as the moral imperative of human action and, on the other hand, to allow the substitution a likewise venerable word "race" or "rasse" to take its place.  We do not need to dwell long on race; that is not our purpose.  We are concerned rather to show how Humanity contradicts race; and how the concept of Humanity, as the imperative to affirm Homo sapiens over the race, affirms a decadent form that the human biological species is. 


In der Literatur werden häufig Ableitungen vom lateinischen „radix“ (Wurzel im genealogischen Sinne), von „generatio“ (Geschlecht im genealogischen Sinne, aber auch „Art“, im Sinne von „Wesen eines Dings“), sowie „ratio“ (ebenfalls in der Bedeutung „Wesen eines Dings“ oder „Art und Weise“) beschrieben.  Wikapedia.de

Consistently, but not with iron certainty, the word race (German: rasse) appears derived from words of both Indo-European and Arabic languages that suggest "root" and "origin." Strangely, indeed, there is even a possibility that the word race descends from Arabic where, in a non-Indo-European language family the sound and sense are the same as in our own languages.  There is always a chance that these etymological researches are off track.  But there is a stubborn and persistent sense of the word "race" that should make race not anathema to philosophy but at the philosophy's very center. What is often said of the everyday use of the word--that the word is vague and undefinable--is obviously correct.   It is a word bandied around loosely, according to a person and group's situation.  Its history in civilization is venerable.   The word "being" is vague, used as it is in every sentence spoken (as "is" and "are"--Heidegger); but philosophy is only challenged to isolate and define "being." We are taking the position here that the word race has, or should have, a status in philosophy comparable to the word being.  The methodology and problem area of this essay will be, corresponding to the training and inclinations of the writer, within the tradition of philosophical anthropology.  This will not be an empirical study; allowances will be made for the vagueness of the subject.  This subject is both Homo sapiens, the species, and Humanity.  I say both.  There are actually two topics at issue; our purpose is not to combine them but to separate them.  Our sole purpose, it appears at this juncture, is to identify the idea of Humanity for what it is--a moral, not a scientific, category.  We want to show also, again using the basic concepts of Philosophical Anthropology, the role of the idea of Humanity in social institutions we identify as "democratic."  As our essay progresses we propose to show how Humanity, as a concept, is contrary toreality.   The idea of race is introduced.  The notion of race, as we present it, spans the divide between science and philosophy.   Race is a fundamental concept without which no understanding of the present human situation is possible.     We are proposing that race and being are synonymous concepts.  In the case of "race" we could even argue that race is a principle of the greatest cosmic proportions and one closely connected to being itself, as the root or origin of being.  In the idea of race we are moving in the direction, I aver, of ultimate reality.  Race is where we came from and where we are going.   Any sense of the meaning of a word--and any notion of whether such a word can simply be dropped from our vocabulary--may come from perusing the history of this word.  The word race, I suggest, can no more be abandoned, on grounds of philosophy or science either one, than can the word "being" which is in every sentence we speak.  We are "bound" to race as we are bound to being.

The word Race is used in this section as a counter-concept to the word Humanity.  Race is not seen as anything within Humanity; rather it is the antithesis and eventual replacement of Humanity.  Opposed to this assertion is a vast corpus of democratic theory, which we now oppose.  The word Humanity is the most important word in democratic theory; we now challenge the word Humanity.   We are not going to dispute the word Humanity on grounds of vagueness; on the contrary.  Humanity as a word has been made precise, however, only by giving it a logical consistency that deprives the word of any real content.  We become human, in other words, or acquire the prescribed shared humanity, only by excluding all personal qualities--among them the quality of race--that makes us real to ourselves.  Humanity has become universal only by expunging from itself particular content.  But there is more.  Actual democratic institutions, as they appear in practice, reflect this categorical denial of personality and race or anything about the person, his individuality, that is not universally "human."  Our task is not empirical science, here, but philosophy; a task, in other words, consistent with Philosophical Anthropology.  We may elaborate as follows.  Humanity is a word with a premise and a clear definition, a word, moreover, that is at the basis of our civilization--the Democratic West--as we know it.    Mankind is a synonym.   Humanity and Mankind are also words that have within their premise a logical contradiction.   They are words that, consistent with the world or global mission of a nation (now) such as America, have the intent to include the largest number of beings possible.  No boundaries, national or regional or racial, should inhibit this mission.   Democracy, on the pretext of Humanity, politically includes all persons considered universally human.  I will stress the point that the purpose of Democracy, as with Christianity and Communism, is inclusion.  The broadest number of persons included requires, on the other hand, the broadest conception of what a human person is.  This is an act of thinking or theory that precedes action.   "Universality" itself is not empirical but logical.  It is arrived at through an act of abstraction.  Those traits of a human being that are not uiniversal to all humans are excluded from the definition of Humanity.  There is a simple formula whereby this accomplished.  We do not need to elaborate further.    This is the way the words are written into the sacred documents--we mention our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, the Gettysburg Address and so forth--of our Nation.  They are also impossible words.  They are impossible because, in professing to include a great number of beings--all so-called human beings--they must exclude everything about a human being that is individual and particular.  We are left with meanings of Humanity and Mankind with a perfectly abstract entity that could not possibly be a real human being.  But there is still more.  In order to compensate for this obvious deficiency of the word Humanity--and theorists of Democracy have seen the problem--there is, added to Democratic theory as a sort of adjustment to an inbalance in the theory--a notion of tolerance.  Those features of an individual person--or whole race--that are not universally human, and so are not written into the formula of democracy, are "tolerated."  That means, these traits, while in themselves obstacles to democracy, are "adjusted for" and forced into a relationship within the system that is compatible.

What should our purpose be in this forum? Certainly we should expunge from the word race any sense of everyday "racism"; that is any blind deprecation of individuals and groups.  To compare actual living races with one another is simply not our task here; we may leave that task in the competent hands of biological and psychological scientists whom we trust to be honest.  To identify, rather, the moral content of the word humanity is our purpose; and to release the word race, as the categorical opposite of Humanity, from its moral stigma.  Disproving the moral word Humanity has the effect, we are saying, of vindicating the word race.  Such a view may be considered "anti-democratic."  Again, we must agree on a definition of democracy.  But there is more.  The approbrium that has befallen our word race has resulted from all the politics that there is in the world.  People don't like each other; this disposition we cannot call unhealthy because it is so widespread.  On the other hand, we have to separate the everyday politics of the word from its philosophical/ontological ("concerned with being") meaning.  It should simply be beneath anyone to distract us from our high purpose by charges of garden variety "racism."  So-called bigoted behavior is an altogether different issue than the one before us.    Let psychologists deal with that.  Racism in the ordinary sense is simply an instinct (and, we are saying, a healthy one); our aspiration is to rise above instincts in pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.  We may aspire to a pure theoretical idea of race. That has been my intention all along.  I suggest that as persons who are philosophically aware we should restore the word race to its rightful place as a central concept of being.   

Today science is applied to the term "race."  Discussion as to the validity or invalidity of the word race has centered on the objectivity of the word.  In science, any word needs a precise definition.  That is where we stand now on the "science" of race.  The American Anthropological Society's Statement on Race  [cite] proposes that the word be abandoned for want of scientific rigor.  This proposal may be legitimately argued.  Any word, we are saying, may be dropped from scientific use on grounds of vagueness or lack of specific application.  I do not really believe the word race should be dropped, however; as an anthropologist I could say race means simply variety.  Variety is a general concept in biology and can be applied to human beings among other species.  But taxonomy is really not our issue here.  Nor really, is the taxonomy of humans, as one species among others, precisely an issue for anthropologists.   We can leave the biological questions to biologists.   As an anthropologist who is not a biologist I should say taxonomy is not my area of expertise.  We can leave the whole question of race in a scientific sense--whether race is a good scientific or taxonomic word--to trained biologists.  We may trust their judgement.   Where Force Theory is concerned the word race is not simply a valid word, it is a central concept.  The word race remains, of course, as vague for philosophy as it does for science.  But that is the proper business of philosophy:  to translate vague concepts into language that is precise as possibly.  Science and philosophy are somewhat at odds at this point.  Science tends to avoid questions that lack precise quantification and objectivity.  Philosophy on the other hand does not shy away from nebulous reality. 

Force Theory presents an etymological "proof" of the centrality of race in philosophy.   The "proof" of the "etymological reality" of race is the persistence, through countless languages and from ancient times, of the word race.  The word derives, perhaps, from radix (Latin) meaning root and origin.  But there are no doubt countless languages before Latin in our line of ancestry.  Where there is a word, we are saying, is a concept; and the concept talked about here is a venerable and central one.  What I said in my earlier post, however, is this:  race as a word--as razza (Middle French) or some other word--has long been, in all its vagueness, a seminal and fundamental concept of our culture.    I suggest that race is a word on the order of "being."  Being, we may say, is an much used word--it is in every sentence as "is." (Cf. M. Heidegger)  Being (Sein) itself is vague.  All I say is:  we can use the word race if we want to talk about "origins," of human beings, of us as individuals or of the entire cosmos.   Race may be held to be the "origin of existence."  What is being asserted here, finally, is that far from being a word to avoid--as some anthropologists would have us do--"race" should be embraced as our very reason for existence.  There is the consideration, basic to philosophy and science alike, that an entity--here we are talking about human beings--contains the thing that is its, meant here the person's, source.  (Note and later make sense of:  E.Heckel's "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.")   The thing in which a being originates is the being's essence.  In this principle Darwinism meets Hegelianism.  New Force Theory makes that point. 

What I have said in this section is on the other hand by no means to be taken as a rejection of scientific racism.   Were we to assert that some races are more intelligent, say, or more atheletic, we would be taking upon ourselves a higher burden of proof (but by no means an impossible burden of proof) than we need to.  We are only saying we will leave science to the scientists.   Force Theory has so far made mostly statements of obvious or prima facie truth. There is not much here we are trying to prove, which, in a court of law, would be the best position to be in.   To repeat:  we are not trying to prove that some races are higher or lower than others or even different;  that is for others to affirm or deny.  "Eymological Racism," as we call it, claims only that race is a valid, meaningful word, as "root" of existence.  Our claims are only about the meaning and derivation of words while proof or disproof of these claims would have to come from etymologists, not anthropologists.   For the physical and biological sciences, precisely, there is a higher standard of truth--rigor and exactitude and experimental throughness--than there is for us.  If there is science anywhere in New Force Theory it would be in a minor area.  The small area of which we speak is the "science" of etymology, calling our position as we do simply an affirmation of a word, not of a reality.   This type of argument reduces itself to finally a "fallacy" called argumentum ad populum.  There remains only to say whether "the people" are right or wrong.  Race is the unconscious sense of the people.   We say that until New Force Theory race has not even risen to the level of a logical principle.  Race rather is embedded in the unconscious of "the people."  Again, we call our position etymological racism.  The history of a word, we are saying, "proves" the validity of the concept the word signifies.  For us presently that is science.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-09-09 13:47:45)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

How a race is defined or what makes it distinct from other races is not going to be our problem.  Nor will we care, even, if a race can be defined at all.  The consensus sapientes of our civilization is that race cannot be defined at all, nor is it believed that race even exists.  The anthropologists and sociologists that I acquaint myself with on Google.com all say the same thing.  Race is a figment of the imagination.  I respect the authority of these people to say what they say.  And, too, I do not deny the validity of their assertions.  It is simply not my job, I believe, to go head to head in an argument with these people.  I respectfully defer.  I'm sure my old friends--David Duke among them--would turn their heads in shame because of our acquaintance.  My only point is this:  why pick an argument on some topic where I am simply going to loose that argument?   I would loose this argument on race.  Or, while I could come up with some supportive facts, I would nonetheless become mired down in the adversary's assertions and profuse empirical data.  The whole discussion--the very questions that are raised--is at the behest of my anthropological and sociological colleagues.  I cannot win an argument with them because I cannot dictate the terms of that argument--they dictate the terms. Then there is my teaching job to think about.   Here is my white flag of surrender.  Rather, I am going to abandon my old strategic position in order to take up a new one.  Roman armies did this when outnumbered.  There are realities I have to confront.   The fact is, not science but culture plays an important part in defining race.  In fact, simple observation may not place a part in defining race, depending, of course, on the precise location or society we are talking about.  The matter is rather simple.  In the Old South race was a concept basic to the hierarchical and economic structure of the place.  Slavery was basic to the economy; and the concept "negro" was basic to slavery.  As anthropologists say, race changes in concept from place to place, culture to culture.  These considerations have put me in a position where I cannot prove anything.  My purpose here, then, is not to "prove" an racist or racial ideology but to make this ideology logically consistent.  I am not out to establish any point of view as fact.  Throughout my entire studium, at any rate from my freshman year in colege, I believed in the "actual" existence of race.  I want to talk more about my ideas of that early time.  I believed it was my duty to give credence to a race concept.  I have been true to that mission.  But my strategy has changed; in the spirit that discretion is the better part of bravery,  I concede the rightness of the general anthropological position that deprecates the entire concept of race.  This conclusion was long in coming.  I have also talked earlier about my career as a student and my first acquaintance with Philosophical Anthropology at Tuebingen under Bullnow.  The effect of PA on my general perspective was simply to break down all my old ideas, and particularly my deference to science and hard empiricism.  My schoolboy attitude when slow and unconscious change in my long years as professor, first at Ole Miss then at Eastern Illinois University.  I can talk about all the details of my life; and I feel these things are relevant.  It is said that one's random experiences are as important as his focused attention.  This is true.  In any case, when I came out of my long "slumber" my views on race had changed.  It is a totally Quiotic mission to convince Americans of anything pertaining to race, inasmuch as, as front and center as race is in our civilization, it is also true that these people have made up their minds already.  Both have they come to a hard conclusion, they also accept--rather paradoxically, because this is at odds with what they basically think--the "religious" view of their spiritual leaders.  Their preachers, professors and even anthropologists are revered as great authorities.  That is true.  But many people who go to church do not, in the last analysis, believe in God.  We don't call these people, here, hypocrites.  We just say they have divided feelings.  But there is more.  One cannot argue with such people.  My purpose, then, that I have had before me always is just to make a living, in the only way I knew how, as a teacher.  And I existed in a world of people for whose view and even scientific prowess I had no respect.  I have talked already about my dismissal from the University of Mississippi.  As Oscar Wilde said about himself "on the dock," I deserved my fate.  So I also deserved my fate, not as an immoral person--though racism is counted as immorality--but as one who is young and politically stupid.  I have changed my point of view.  Now I accept the "science" of my colleagues.  At the same time, however, I do not need their science, either.  I just said minutes ago that race may well be a fantasy in the minds of people.  This is what I accept race to be. 

The word race is of venerable family tradition.  Philologically and geneologically, as in the Latin source word radix,  it means "source" or "root."  This is the general meaning that comes to English by virtue of the Indo-European language family.  Even Arabic words have some sense of RAD and race.    This we know about the history of the word race.  The Latin radix appears throughout the English language in such words as radius, radiate and so forth.  We have the sense here of a center or source from which lines radiate. If the word radix were not in our own word race, then radix would appear many places and, perhaps, resurface commonly.   We turn now to the American Anthropological Association Statement on Race (google this) which proclaims the word race should be dropped from English on several grounds:  scientific meaninglessness, as causing immoral acts againt humanity and so forth.  (The anthropologists assume the word humanity has meaning but race does not.)  But words do not await approval of scientists before they can be used; they come to us from ancient times.  This is not to bely the contributions of scientists and anthropologists in particular.  Most of my life I have been a student or teacher of anthropology; I give this field my full respect.  I value greatly what anthropologists have done as field workers and researchers; the education of a Physical Anthropologist rivals that of a medical doctor in its rigor.  We are not here deprecating the entire field of anthropology.  We must grant authority where authority is due.  We expect from anthropologists little bits and snatches of information now and then.  This is the use to which they are put; this is their apointed task.   Examples are not hard to find.  If for instance we want to know if a fragment of bone is human or animal, or if its owner was  male or female, and so forth, we consult an anthropologist.  This is a narrow field of knowledge and one in which special training and compentency is required.  But there is more.  If there is a question whether the definition of race that you or I might give corresponds to anything in reality, that might be something about which the anthropologist could give an informed opinion.  He might say that there is nothing in his field, which is human biology, that corresponds to the definition you or I give.  He is saying our definition of race, if we have one to offer, is not scientific.  He is pronouncing on the connection between a real phenomenon and a word; here he looks for consistency and verifiability.  But he is not in any position of authority to pronounce on the validity of a word purely and simply, just as a word.   His area of expertise is in human biology, not in language.  Thus when we say--as we are saying here--that race is a "good" word, we are within our rights to ignore the anthropologist.  He has authority in biological science but has no authority whatsoever in language of the realm.  He would be, and in this case is, intruding in an area he doesn't belong.   Even those who pronounce on language--teachers of English--have no authority, finally, when the will of an entire people as to which or what are valid words.  There is simply a disagreement on how the word should be defined.  THE VALIDITY IN THE WORD IS IN ITS CAPACITY SIMPLY TO SURVIVE IN A LANGUAGE.  Words of a language are in competition with one another.  A word may be dropped from a language on account of disuse.  This is a major argument for the existence of the word race, which by no means is unused.  The vehemence of some religious and academic leaders is in itself an argument for the existence of the word race--it will not go away on its own.  We have to concede that we are talking about one culture--our own--not all cultures and languages.  Humans, we say, not universally or in every culture--because in some cultures there is no word that corresponds to our word race--but in our own culture we do use the word race.  In fact--and this is now said frequently--race is a word for a phenomenon that is central to our culture.  Our culture of America is about race.  That is a categorical statement we will make here under the banner of Force Theory.  It is preposterous to suggest that we all just not use the word race; because we now use it all the time.  And we use it as though it means something.  People of our language family have always used closely related words that have meant something fundamental to life.  We suggest here that the word race means "source" or "root" of existence.  Force Theory will not abandon the word race simply on account of the sense we have of some "metaphysical" content:  we quote Heidegger as saying that a word (he did not specify race) may be "heavy with Being."  Race is one of those great words of venerable tradition. 

As I said earlier, I am not out to prove anything but make race a logically consistent point of view.  I want at this point to bring in my connection with David Duke.  He may well not remember me; I prophesy, however, that some day he will be asked about me and our conversation.  This occurred in Urbana, Illinois sometime in the 80's.  Since then I have perused his writtings such as there have been on the internet.  When I say I want to make racism a logicaly consistent viewpoint--while not necessarily "proving' this view--I mean, that is, to expunge from the race concept everything that has been brought one way or another into the discussion about race.  This would include nationalism, religion and all sorts of unnecessary and encumbering "baggage" that mires us in imponderables.  Thus, this will be a "pure" theory of race, a point of view distilled of everything extraneous.  If we have to cast out nationalism and gingoism--and I say we do--we simply will.  There is nothing "holy" for us about the American nation, which like every other nation since 1500 AD is an abstraction.  The nation has nothing to do with race.  Affirming the nation, as many do, it will always be at the expense of the race.  Nationalism is, as they say, color blind.  We would like it to be color-aware; logically, it is simply not this at all.  Race is closer to the idea of tribe; but race is tribe in a special purified sense.  Religion is likewiseinherently color-blind.  Religion has nothing to do with race.  It is possible to invent a religion of race; but the religion must be specifically about race.  Even then, the whole principle of religion--as a symbolic link in the sense of Latin religare--is inherently not only not racist, it is anti-racist. As I said once before, liberalism has been consistently anti-race and anti-racist; conservativism for its part--and David Duke would have to be considered a Conservative in the traditional sense--has been only inconsistently racist.  We want to change that here.

Were I to purport to have discovered or invented the white race, I would fail.  That would be to become mired in values and imponderables and also be knee-deep in science that is simply over my head.   No one would listen or believe me.  So, that is not what I'm going to do.  There is one other serious possiblity, however, which is the right one.  I'm not going to do anything, at all, only to follow a strategy of omission.  I omit to correct the assertions of the avowed enemies and adversaries of the white race.  Because these adversaries have the most consistent and definable idea of all regarding who is THEIR enemy. They listen to their instincts.   It is these decriers of whiteness, not me or other whites, who have invented this race.   Inuit or Ojibwa are Indian names that were invented by surrounding groups and enemies; Inuits and Ojibwa had entirely different names for themselves than the ones that have come down to us.  The word "human being" was of course invented by humans themselves, not universally but here and there; but only humans can talk.  They are obviously recognized as the species they are by other animals, but there is no name for them.  Gorillas distinguish between white and black people, and so do dogs, I am told, in the South.  The whole issue of taxonomy is confused; and science has not brought clarity.  There is no particular point in adding or denying any aspect of the world-wide opinion of my people.  That is where we must base our racial ideology--with the assertions of people who are not ourselves.  My concept, for instance, of "German" and "Southerner" has been impressed upon me, in school and in church and information media, all my life.  There is where I form my opinions of these people.  Out of these opinions, of non-Germans and non-Southerners, I begin to build a philosophical system.  This is a common practice:  to invert the opinions of average people to arrive at new truths.  That is what is being done in this blog.  In this inverted, but not untrue, system the values represented of men of the Old South and of Germans of their great period--1900-1950--are core concepts.  The values and concepts that emerge here are simply representations, sometimes softened but often exaggerated, of an ideology called odious to mankind.  I should clear up a possible misunderstanding; I am bound to be accused of this serious offense.  I am not claiming here, anywhere, originality.  It would be arrogance on my part to claim I invented Force Theory; actually my enemies--people who have decried me and castigated me in my university--who have invented all these "awful" things that appear in this blog.   I have said all along that race and racism are simply politics of the day. I do not invent these politics; other people, who oppose me, invent them.  I do not pick fights, as the peace-abiding person that I am.  I only defend myself.   In places where humans cannot distinguish among themselves on the basis, say, of skin color they pick some other distinction.  Therefore we are not saying, in Force Theory, that race is an absolute in terms of empirical characteristics that are relevant to certain values.  Race is a term invented by humans; and which humans these are--whether they are the identified people or the people doing the identification--is irrelevant to our main purpose.   But there is more.   What is being done under the heading Force Theory is to understand the generic meaning of "race," as radix or root, and understood as a principle of life.  Race is essentially the time dimension of human biology.   We are not connected initially with the persons around us but with those who have engendered us.  We are a race in time.  Our race consists not so much, directly, of the bond we have with the people in our neighborhood, so much as the bond we share with our grandparents.  The race exists in time.  And through a common time span we constitute, together, as white people, the full bond of race.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-10-15 13:29:54)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

CHAPTER III:

Before coercion (technics-assisted force) there was dominance and submission.  The earliest human attempted to dominate his world in general.  Men tried to dominate women and vice versa.  *******Men acquired tools and technics before women.*******What is coerced (controled by technics) we can define as "property."The first use of tools, at the outset of the Paleolithic, was in interpersonal relations as one person tried to "impress" another.******Men intimidated women and made them, in effect, into "property.""Property," as we define the word here, is control of an object (which could also be a person qua object), by use of coercion.  Coercion in the context of Force Theory means leveraged--technics-assisted--force. ****The relation of dominance and submission, established through the ages by nature, was upset by men's use of tools (weapons) against women.

Dominance, and by implication submission, is at the center of animal group life.  At issue is a necessary group "structure," which is universally achieved through relations of dominance and submission.  What we are saying is elementary zoology.   Animal mutuality gets its organization and integration through a sort of bossiness that inheres in nature.  Whether the planets are "bossed" by one another has to remain an open question.  But with regard to animal species there is no question.  There is scarcely any animal species, we assume, that does not have what I have earlier called "baboon fascism."  This does not have to be a clear order.  Within a given "group" of animals, however we define the word group, the order will change as individuals rise from a condition of submission to one of bossiness.  Apes, of course, are structured this way in groups; but so are cows and chickens and dogs.  We turn to human beings.  We like to think of humans as a higher order of nature.  Certainly humans have refined what is given to them by way of animal instinct.   Born into some persons is a quality of "leadership."  This has something to do with a higher intelligence; it also has to do with size, strength and health--purely physical things.  Males tend to dominante  females.   But this last relationship depends on the circumstances of the group.  Danger tends to bring out male leadership; whereas the presence of children raises the dominance of women.  A complete philosophy of society must deal with this purely biological issue before it goes on to consider the purely human aspects of human relationships. 

We cannot omit the Darwinistic proposition that throughout nature, on all levels, there is a "struggle for existence."  Competition for territory is to be distinguished from competition for mates.  There is also a struggle for position in a group hierarchy.  One promise of society--that it will ameliorate such struggle--is clearly false:  society constitutes simply a new environment within which the old struggle takes place, but with new weapons and defenses.  In the case of human beings, however, such a struggle is leveraged through the capacity that humans have--which is first and foremost a mental capacity--for tools and technology.  Technology intrudes into human relationships; there is a fundamental difference, for instance, between emotional affinity and technological force in relations.    What we have in mind here, however, wherein we can pass from what zoologists tell us to the more anthropological problem, is the behavior specific to our species--technology--and the way this intrudes into the relations of dominance and submission.  There is a general proposition presented to first year anthropology students, that technology extends human ability to subdue nature.  We should review that statement.  To use a spear or bow and arrow to kill an animal is more effective than using teeth and claws and physical strength. By using tools as weapons men could more readily get food and fight off other dangerous animals.  These we can call "external" problems that early men faced.   It appears from this description of early human behavior that technology is used primarily in relations between humans, as I say, and what is outside their group.  In this essay I will assert a contrary proposition.  What is being said here is that the first technology acquired by human beings, or their immediate ancestors, was not used to hunt or defend the group, either one, but was directed, on the contrary, towards a man's own group members. The use of a stick by a chimpanzee gives us a clue.  Chimps wave sticks at each other in "displays" of anger and intimidation.  This we suggest is the way humans used sticks.  Assuming that this is true--that the first use of technics was to dominate members of the user's own group--the whole "mentality" of technology would be different.  The primary meaning of technology would be its effectiveness in an effort by one person to "impress" another person.  Technics would first and foremost be used in intra-group belligerance. 

We have to qualify this assertion.  It is also true that technics, as has always been assumed, serves the human purpose of mastering the person's external world.  That remains true.  On the other hand, in the first use of tools by humans is prefigured the structure of society--which is tecnics "aggressively" applied to the achieving of social order.  This proposition is the basis of my own interpretation of Force Theory begun by E. Duehring.  By Force here we mean coercion of human behavior through the use, by some person, of violence leveraged through the use of technics.  At first these technics were merely sticks and stones thrashed or thrown about.  But the males of the group--strongest, most intelligent and already the leaders--were the best at this behavior.  The male brain and hormonal and physiological makeup were best suited for this application of technics.  It is not too much to suppose that the human evolved for perhaps hundreds of thousands of years before he used tools for their more obvious purpose, of getting food and protecting the group.  Technology began as, and remains, an agent of society.  At first such technical prowess put the males in firm control of the rest of the group. This dominance however (we are saying) was altogether lopsided and created a relationship in which males were overbearing and where women, for their part, had no real role in group life.  At this point we introduce the institution of marriage to correct this inbalance.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-04-02 18:41:12)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

Force theory today is performance philosophy; this means that the theory is under revision.  This is a constant process.  The writer, which currently is RSwartzbaugh, does not hold himself to consistency which subordinates logical structure to creative speculation.   There are contradictions and inconsistencies throughout the corupus of FT.  These must (somehow) resolve themselves.  Or, they may only be apparent contradictions with easy resolutions.  Several ideas have been presented as to "the origins of society" which perport, also, to be of the "nature of society."   We may review these.  One view holds that the first social institution came about as an agreement between men, probably as to the form and content of a proposed hunt.  The "deal" was closed by a handshake.  In the handshake the men foreswore any violence among them in the course of the undertaking.  We assume that a group of humans was at that time already in place.  This would consist of a gregarious grouping, like a family or a small band of relatives or people who, simply, found each other at random and became "friends."  Such groups exist among chimpanzees and perhaps even wolves.  What such animal groups lack is the kind of formal understanding of which humans alone are capable.  I have called such an understanding an "agreement," which comes together through language, necessarily, but which can also be indicated by physical symols, as I say, like the handshake.  This agreement I have already discussed in earlier sections [cite].

Lately I have gone on an apparent tangent.  I say apparent.   My discussion lately has focused upon coercion as the possible origin of society.  Again, the nature of society would be shown through its origins.  The issue was raised of leveraged--through the technics of weaponry--force by one person to compel servitude of another person.  I used the formula, that, namely, "the tool completes the arm; the slave completes the tool."  The stick held in the hand of paleolithic man fulfilled a specific purpose, to probe the ground or kill an animal; this was also a limited purpose.  Applied by one man, the user, to another man--the used--the stick can have a general purpose, as general, in other words, as the capacity of the slave or servant subdued by the stick.   The whole process of technology runs a course between, first, the use of a tool to force a result; and secondly, the application of the tool, as weapon, to a second person to, to the extent and range of behavior of a full human being, serve the first person.  The human who first used a stick to hit another person, compelling this second person to action, was the one who first created society.  In simple terms, it was possible only through leverage force to coerce behavior that can be called slavery.  By applying coercive or leveraged force to humans themselves, one or several men could be "master" of the world around him; he could supply all his (known) needs.  The first subjects, however, were not strangers--there was no attempt to go beyond the immediate familial group for slaves--but were members of the immediate group, first and foremost the women.  The women were not skilled technicians; they did not think technologically.  Male technics compelled women to sex slavery.  This slavery was the first slavery of humanity.  But there is more.  Many of the best traits of women--good council, for instance, and healthy nurturing and communication skills--were lost in the oppression of female slavery.  The system became a burden on men and women alike.  A paradox--contradiction--appeared in human history.  This is something I have talked about lately.  That is, rather than to reject leveraged intragroup cocerion, or slavery, humans declared the slavery to be two-sided.  Women were declared masters, not to replace the men--who remained masters--but to master the masters themselves.  She who was a slave became a master of her own master.  The mutual "ownership" we call marriage was the original or seminal human institution and the one from which all further institutions--in trade, politics and all other activities--were born.  In all human institutions, we are saying, there is a "mutual acquiescence," an abjuring of violence towards one another.  What is suggested here, in a very general way, that what we conceive as "democracy" is not so much a freedom that a person has from the action of another person, but, on the contrary, a mutual or bilateral "right" to inflict a counter coercion on that other person.   This is not a mere "technical" difference between democracy and Force Theory but one with serious implications.




outline:

Before coercion (technics-assisted force) there was dominance and submission.  The earliest human attempted to dominate his world in general.  Men tried to dominate women and vice versa. 

Men acquired tools and technics before women.

What is coerced (controled by technics) we can define as "property."
the first use of tools, at the outset of the Paleolithic, was in interpersonal relations as one person tried to "impress" another.

Men intimidated women and made them, in effect, into "property."

"Property," as we define the word here, is control of an object (which could also be a person qua object), by use of coercion.  Coercion in the context of Force Theory means leveraged--technics-assisted--force.

The relation of dominance and submission, established through the ages by nature, was upset by men's use of tools (weapons) against women.

Men and women re-established a balanced relation between themselves by the institution of marriage. 

Previously, men--through technics--held women as property.  Marriage did not repudiate technology or essentially change the fact that the relation between the sexes was "technological."  Rather, the "technology" of the relation was redefined. 

Now, while men still "owned" women, the women also "owned" men.  The fundamental idea in technology--to "coerce" nature--was broadened to include "rules" of human behavior. 

The "rule of thumb"--specifying the object with which a man could strike a woman--was instituted.

That men could own women and yet women could simultaneously own men involves a contradiction.

Mutual ownership contradicts the original idea of technics, a unilateral coercion.

Technology in its original sense was "externalized," that is applied to the surrounding world.

Technology became the means of one familial group enslaving another.

...to be continued...

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-03-30 17:31:02)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

III
Earlier I began a discussion of property, which is relevant here.  Property is more than a thing in one person's (or animal's) possession or under his (or its) protection. Mere possessions would be want an individual holds to himself by fending off would-be robbers.  The issue of possessions is as simple as that.   Property, on the other hand, is a more theoretical issue and one which may cost me some effort.   Property is a uniquely human concept.  Rights of ownership are essential to the idea of property in sensu stricto.   Thus our problem turns around some concepts of rights.  While conceding that "rights" and "property" are central to the present discussion, we also want not to get lost in an overly tortuous analysis of these things.  It must suffice to say that there is an inherent identity between use of a tool--even a mere stick--and the concept of property.  The point to be made here is that property, which is first and foremost a concept and not a physical thing, has arisen in conjunction with tools and technology which are physical things.  The mentality of tool use has resulted, in evolution, in all that we call institutions in the higher sense of the word.  Such a connection of the physical and mental realms is basic to Philosophical Anthropology as well as Force Theory.  Again I must emphasize that property originates from, is established and held, through the agent of technology ("the stick," of Force Theory).  A study of human evolution bears this point out.  Even while humans were first technicians, and only much later gained language and the symbols we call institutions, the first institutions were prefigured by the use of tools--weapons of "display"--by dominant male members of the familial group.  Ideas and "mind" may have arisen precisely to inhibit tool use in interpersonal relations.

Once possessing tools and weapons, a man's control over his surroundings--in things and persons--was more than he could have managed by his bodily strength and personality alone; such possession or control was leveraged.  The Roman idea of pater familias--which gives the father live and death power over his own family--expresses the leveraged dominance of the male leader.   What made the man dangerous, potentially, was not his physical abilities but his primary control of, that is, the technology of force.  What gave his power over "nature" made him dangerous to other humans.  Of course, women and children were not prey, but simply "property."  To hold a woman or child as property was an absolutely unilateral relationship, in the sense that one's house or dog is property.  The force extends from the tool, we are saying, to a thing as a mere object.  The mentality of property violates a principle of natural group life wherein, as a counter principle to natural bossiness and "baboon fascism," there is a kind of elemental or primal democracy.  Such equalitariansm--the principle that each person or being has a "say" in group life just by virtue of being born into that group--inheres in group life throughout the living kindom.  This is something I have not emphasized so far; I have spoken of "natural fascism" but not of "natural democracy."  In any case, balance had already been established, in evolution, between the forces of democracy and the forces of bossiness.  In other words, life before the rise of human institutions was "democratic" even while it was structured through dominance and submission.  The insertion of tools and weapons into human relationships, and particularly in the relations between man and woman, caused a destabilization of (what we now must call) a "natural democracy."

The idea is simple.  Restraint in using a tool is as important to the use of the tool as is the "positive" application of energy--here called force--in the overall technological process.  I must restate this idea.  Overuse of a tool has a destructive effect, and one which must finally be countered.  There are examples of overuse--or "over kill"--that run throughout human history.   Many species of animals were killed by overzealous hunters.  Of course these consequences in the context of hunting and other practical, food-oriented practices were altogether minor in comparison to the damaging effects of using a weapon against one's own family members.  Human institutions were a reflext of tool use, we suggest here, wherein tool use was restrained.  In the context of the male-female relation, and in the discipline of children and so forth, the "Rule of Thumb" was instituted.  This rule says that a man can hit his wife with an object no larger than the thumb.  This is Common Law, of course, but it was in practice probably at the outset of language and human institutions in general.  The handshake--to prove that one holds no weapon--also came into being and is universal today.

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

III
Earlier I began a discussion of property, which is relevant here.  Property is more than a thing in one person's (or animal's) possession or under his (or its) protection.   Mere possessions would be what an individual holds to himself by fending off would-be robbers.  He considers a thing "his" in the face of someone who would take the thing from him.  I say "someone."  A possession properly speaking, as a phenomenon of biology and "nature," is something a person is aware of, and aware of needing and wanting.  Here we are talking about a possession as being a thing in a primal or "animal" relation with the possessor.    But possession is not yet property.  Property--more precisely, the human terms of possessions--is something animals do not have but humans consider sacred.  Property clearly involves a relationship between human beings and on strictly human terms.  What these terms are, precisely, and where or in what stage of evolution the terms emerged, remains to be seen.

Property for its part is a more theoretical issue and one which may cost me some effort.   Property is a uniquely human concept.  Rights of ownership are essential to the idea of property in sensu stricto.   Thus our problem turns around some concepts of rights.  While conceding that "rights" and "property" are central to the present discussion, we also want not to get lost in an overly tortuous analysis of these things.  It must suffice to say that there is an inherent identity between use of a tool--even a mere stick--and the concept of property.  The point to be made here is that property, which is first and foremost a concept and not a physical thing, has arisen in conjunction with tools and technology which are physical things.  The mentality of tool use has resulted, in evolution, in all that we call institutions in the higher sense of the word.  Such a connection of the physical and mental realms is basic to Philosophical Anthropology as well as Force Theory.  Again I must emphasize that property originates from, is established and held, through the agent of technology ("the stick," of Force Theory).  A study of human evolution bears this point out.  Even while humans were first technicians, and only much later gained language and the symbols we call institutions, the first institutions were prefigured by the use of tools--weapons of "display"--by dominant male members of the familial group.  Ideas and "mind" may have arisen precisely to inhibit tool use in interpersonal relations.

There is no difficulty in defining property as opposed to simple animal possession.  I want to try to establish here, and thus fill a hole in Force Theory, a connection between the way humans take specifically human possession of a thing--through technics--and the symbols and rules and institutions through which humans hold those things.  To be clear:  I have said that property consists of a possession acquired through the physical agent of a "stick" or tool.  No physical tool or weapon is asserted, on the other hand, in holding the possession in relation to other humans.  A physical stick is not used, at least not immediately, in maintaining a connection between the person and the property.  We have to use images to make this point.  We envision a man in a castle, armed with swords and arrows, vigilant in the face of surrounding marauders.  Here weapons would be used to fend off thieves.  But this primal confrontation does not happen, usually, under terms of advanced society.  Earlier, under the heading Philosophical Anthropology, I raised the possibility that the "stick"--which prehumans acquired long before language and the other symbols of culture--is the basis of thinking.  That is, thinking itself is a "reflex" of the stick.  It would be easy here to get lost in the obscurities of psychology when this essay is more strictly sociological.  The generalization submitted at this juncture--which is more a hypothesis than a theory--is that institutions evolved in conjunction with technology.  It is a mistake I aver to separate technics from thinking and technical thinking from human institutions.  Institutions are simply the mental reflex of technology.  So, if we say that human beings acquire possessions through technology, it is also true that humans hold possessions through the same technology.  A thought is itself "technical."  The thought has the same purpose and source as the--our--proverbial stick.  But there is more.  There remains the issue of human "mutuality."  If a thought is a "stick" with which to hold a possession, we assume as well that other humans have their "sticks" as well.  In other words, possessions as property are held by the owner only with the consent of other humans.  We are talking already, when raising the issue of consent, of a kind of mutuality that runs through society wherein ownership is not unconditional, but involves the consent--and thereby the control--of other men.  We approach the issue of marriage, which I call the seminal human institution, with these observations in mind.

Property in the human sense entails consent.   One man holds property, but does so only in terms of a "technicality."  I find the word "technicality" suggestive.  There are technicalities of law; suggested is the notion that technics is a more general term than simply the notion of a physical tool.  ["Upon a techicality..."  This is a phrase we need to look at again.]  In property we already see some sense of mutuality; a sense, we will see, that culminates in the institution of marriage which is entirely bilateral and mutual.  In property ownership, there is recognition by the "owner," who has taken possession of a thing by leveraged or technical strength, that other persons exist, too, who would have an interest in that thing.  So, in property in sensu stricto, the possession is not absolute but conditional.  Such conditional ownership offsets the feature of technical acquisition that such acquisition is leveraged and exaggerated.  We give the example of the castle as being ultimate ownership.  Society simply does not allow such unconditional ownership.  In this bias of society is corrected the lopsidedness of technical--leveraged force--acquisition of property.  The dialectical correction of technical acquisition is the law, as human beings understand the term.  This is not natural law but human law.

Once possessing tools and weapons, a man's control over his surroundings--in things and persons--was more than he could have managed by his bodily strength and personality alone; such possession or control was leveraged.  The Roman idea of pater familias--which gives the father live and death power over his own family--expresses the leveraged dominance of the male leader.   What made the man dangerous, potentially, was not his physical abilities but his primary control of, that is, the technology of force.  What gave his power over "nature" made him dangerous to other humans.  Of course, women and children were not prey, but simply "property."  To hold a woman or child as property was an absolutely unilateral relationship, in the sense that one's house or dog is property.  The force extends from the tool, we are saying, to a thing as a mere object.  The mentality of property violates a principle of natural group life wherein, as a counter principle to natural bossiness and "baboon fascism," there is a kind of elemental or primal democracy.  Such equalitariansm--the principle that each person or being has a "say" in group life just by virtue of being born into that group--inheres in group life throughout the living kindom.  This is something I have not emphasized so far; I have spoken of "natural fascism" but not of "natural democracy."  In any case, balance had already been established, in evolution, between the forces of democracy and the forces of bossiness.  In other words, life before the rise of human institutions was "democratic" even while it was structured through dominance and submission.  The insertion of tools and weapons into human relationships, and particularly in the relations between man and woman, caused a destabilization of (what we now must call) a "natural democracy."

The idea is simple.  Restraint in using a tool is as important to the use of the tool as is the "positive" application of energy--here called force--in the overall technological process.  I must restate this idea.  Overuse of a tool has a destructive effect, and one which must finally be countered.  There are examples of overuse--or "over kill"--that run throughout human history.   Many species of animals were killed by overzealous hunters.  Of course these consequences in the context of hunting and other practical, food-oriented practices were altogether minor in comparison to the damaging effects of using a weapon against one's own family members.  Human institutions were a reflext of tool use, we suggest here, wherein tool use was restrained.  In the context of the male-female relation, and in the discipline of children and so forth, the "Rule of Thumb" was instituted.  This rule says that a man can hit his wife with an object no larger than the thumb.  This is Common Law, of course, but it was in practice probably at the outset of language and human institutions in general.  The handshake--to prove that one holds no weapon--also came into being and is universal today.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-03-20 14:36:59)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

deleted

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-03-21 15:03:17)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

IV
"In the simplest sense, democracy is rule by the ruled."[US History Encyclopedia: Democracy (Answers.com/topic/democracy)

Marriage is no less slavery than the unilateral slavery that preceded marriage.   Marriage simply adds an additional layer or dimension to the already existing practice of slavery--the idea, in other words, that not only does a man own a woman, but that woman simultaneously owns the man.

We must at this point distinguish between conditional and unconditional ownership.  Conditional ownership would be control of or power over a thing with the consent of persons other than the principal owner.  Persons consenting to this ownership are not formally declared actual owners; they do not originally exercise joint ownership.   On the other hand, persons giving consent to ownership may step in, and exercise control of the owned thing, when such terms of primary ownership are violated.  So, for instance, the city may take possession of a house that violates city codes (and so forth).

The conditions (formal terms of ownership) in a democracy, an ownership by the people of the ruler, and a simultaneous ownership of the people by the ruler, are no less onerous than unilateral slavery (say, of the Old South).  The distinction between democracy and formal slavery is that democracy is a two-sided ownership; formal slavery is one-sided. 

Slavery in the Old South was more or less conditional ownership.  For one thing, slaves were often heavily mortgaged; so that the bank had an interest in the slaves.  From the bank's standpoint, the slaves should be kept healthy in the event that they be foreclosed upon.

We pass to the institution of marriage.  Here too there are rules--conditions--of ownership.  The first has already been talked about--the rule of thumb.  A man cannot hit his wife, in this common law principle, with an object larger than the thumb.  The rules that there are in marriage go to the issue of violence.  Battery is one of two grounds of divorce in Illinois (the other being dissapation of funds).

We are saying that conditions of ownership do not alter the essential slavery of an institution.  Democracy decries slavery, yet democracy allows marriage.  Democracy is itself slavery--a mutual enslavement by ruler and ruled, but under conditions not less onerous than those that characterized the original human practice of man/woman slavery. 


Marriage, I have said, is the seminal human institution and the one from which every other institution is ultimately derived.  Where we look for the earliest institution, obviously, is going to be in the earliest--and smallest--human grouping.  Marriage is the first relationship where there is reciprocity, a giving and getting that is made clear at the outset of the relation.   A man and woman come together, we are saying, in the presence of witnesses and announce their intentions.  This at first is a quinessential grouping for the simplest purpose--to propagate the species.  At the same time, however, the relation is not simple animal mating.  What is aspired to in the marriage contract is a total long-term relation in which children can thrive.  Obviously, the formal contract is built around a relationship that already existed, "in nature," between man and woman.  The physical and mental differences between men and women, and their role in the survival of the group, had long been recognized.  Marriage, then, was an abstract framework for such grouping.  But there is more.  Marriage appeared in the context of a human behavioral trait--technology--that was already artificial.  Technology itself entailed no contract or formal agreement.  The case was simply that technology unsettled the purely biological or "natural" relation between men and women.  Marriage appeared for the purpose of "rectifying" this inbalance.  Women were restored, at least in theory, to their original place as equals to the men.  The question that remains before us, then, is how all the other formal institutions that there are could be derived from such a simple and elemental agreement.  Here we look into the entire question of reciprocity.

I said earlier that the stick completes the arm; the slave completes the stick.  This statement is central to, and origininates with, what is presented here as Force Theory.  The human being serves himself through what is around himself.   His purpose is self-ish, that is, selfish.  The general idea is simple.  Philosophical Anthropology presents a history of human life in the context of technology of man's making.   Also, consistent with Force Theory and classic Hegelianism  we say that a person projects his self outward toward things; and the things so affected project themselves, in return, back to the person as "service" to the person.  Human anatonmy in competition with other animals is deficient; the stick completes human anatomy in a specialized way.  The stick turned on one's fellow beings, on the other hand, gives the stick is general usefulness to supply the real needs of the stick's user.  The human technician, having what he wants, is "complete."   Human beings have this capacity of self-projection and self-leveraging; animals do not.  Our argument so far, combinding anthropology with a general conception of so-called "human nature," advances knowledge of humans beyond what traditional philosophy has so far provided.   But there is more.  The human creates for himself a lopsided world in which his own force unbalances (we may say) "nature."  The human being has a disturbing effect on the world around him.  He compensates for this in the symbols of religion (from the Latin religare, to re-link).  Symbolically, perhaps, but also in reality the person sets out to serve nature--through technics and technicalities--as nature now serves him.  Our prime example, within the small original familial group, is marriage.  Marriage is preceded historically by the enslavement by men of women. 

In marriage, we are saying, the woman symbolically, and also in a real sense, enslaves the man.  The man does not cease to be a slave owner; rather the relationship is now bilateral.  We need to understand this relationship.  For instance, throughout modern social theory--or democratic theory--are the notions of "freedom" and "equality."  We do not protest these words; only, we want to given them definite meaning.  For instance, if the person who owns another as slave is himself owned by that same slave, where is the "freedom" of each person; and where is the "equality"?   Democratic theory is subtly aware of this paradox, it seems, as in the statement shown earlier:  Democracy is rule by the ruled.  What is to be pointed out here is that such valued states as freedom and equality are conditional.  A French aphorist said that the Frenchman imagines himself to be one fifty millionth a dictator; when he is 100% a slave.  We share this view.  Is it possible to be said to own a thing when that thing also owns the owner?  We are left with the prospect of two persons each the owner of the other.  In a one-sided relation--master toward slave--the scenario is different.  The master commands the slave to act; the slave acts.  Where each person is simultaneously owner of the other, the outcome of any command could be different. The persons must have between themselves an agreement or understanding.  In any situation, one person must acquiesce as slave while the other commands.  We assume the persons take turns being master and slave respectively.  Any command is conditional, that the slave side in the relation could assert his ownership status and simply countermand the other's order.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-03-25 15:48:50)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

V.
The three great ideologies of modern times are Christianity, Democracy and Communism.  At the heart of all three, I am saying, is the idea of "inclusion."  This is the one idea they have in common. In each view there is a an idea of a "universal man" who is to be included in the great concept each ideology presents.  No one is to be left out on any grounds.    We may say confidently that Christianity, Democracy and Communism are vague on all other points.  There is confusion in each view, for instance, on the subject of structure and organization and the rank each person would have, individually, within the system.  I would not submit that any of these views are equalitarian, necessarily--except on the issue of inclusion.  Each person is included by virtue of his or her "humanity" or participation in the species Homo Sapiens.  Theoretical--philosophical anthropological--grounds of why a person should be included in the respective world order is unclear.   Force Theory, which has affinities with Fascism, takes a different perspective which puts it at odds with the prevalent world views.  We are not ducking any conflict by saying that Christianity, Democracy and Communism are so vague on the issue of the origin and nature of society, as well as the structure of relations within society, that there is no reasonable prospect of challenging the ideas on any issue except that of inclusion.  It is simply true, as any perusal of democratic theory will show--and the complex interconnections between the European Enlightenment, Social Contract theory, and so forth--that all the great respectable ideologies that there are are masses of confusion.  To worry ourselves with the nuances of these ideas would cause any scholar a nervous collapse.   In the backwaters of the collective soul, on the other hand, there is still another view of the human being and his real and envisioned society.  This is Force Theory, propounded by Eugen Duhring and kept alive and expanded here.  Thus we can say, if the dominant views promote inclusion, New Force Theory does not base itself on any idea of inclusion.  Force Theory promotes exclusion of some persons, inclusion of others, and attributes success force Force-based societies  to their policies of inclusion and exclusion.  Force Theory-based societies would be exclusive in their most basic foundations.

In each view, whether Christianity, Communism or Democracy,  there is a conception of a "dark era" that precedes the envisioned world order.  This is a sort of fog that has clouded the human being, unaware of his true nature and destiny.  At this time there is no awareness of the possibilities of a human being, qua human, in relation to other humans.  Humanity is sunk in a great period of ignorance along with all the disadvantages that a person would have in being separated from other persons.  In this time humans were in effect no better and no better off than animals.  We could call this the animal period of human existence despite the fact that humans had long had tools and language.  But that was in the past.  Then came Enlightenment.   Different ideologies see this enlightenment differently.  But in one moment there is a sudden consensus sapientes, a burst of philosophical awareness, what is called in other fields the "Aha! solution."  At some point in history, some one or several intellectuals, individually or together, receive what in earlier periods would be called Divine Inspiration.  In fact, some prophets do still consider themselves devinely inspired.  It was in this spirit that the Englightenment appeared in Europe, along with ideas of a Social Contract and Natural Law.  In all these pronouncements, however, there was a common thread--the "unity of mankind."   It is clear that by "humanity" was meant nothing scientific; even in the 18th century the strictly scientific, taxonomic Linnean concept of Homo sapiens was not entirely understood.  By "mankind" was still meant persons compatible with a given social order; while, on the other hand, by "society" was meant a compatible relation between persons capable of such a relation.  What society or humanity, either one, meant was obscure; and above all these concepts fit into political agendas of their respective times of history. 

Were our plan to attack democracy--but that is not our plan--we have an obvious point of attack.  I want to say at the outset that democracy among friends is a good idea.  A small group needs input from its members; that is why, in fact, even small African groups are democracies, more or less.  Democracy here is not simply about making decisions, which one person could do alone; it is also about sharing responsibility for decisions, especially bad ones.  So we are left with a more or less positive idea of democracy.  Where democracies fail, I aver, is where they include too many people all imagining themselves as decision-makers.  At some point a social group has to exclude persons.  Democracy is still possible under a "fascist" concept; New Force Theory says only that a group shall relegate among its members decision making according to who will be affected by the decisions made. If I make a decision, I should feell the affects of that decision.  This is a simple formula for a viable democracy and one we can promote here.  But the society I envision also places emphasis, equal to inclusion, on exclusion.  Persons are admitted to the viable democracy on the basis of compatibility and cooperation.   We regret to say that  large groupings in general, and certainly America in particular,  become filled with  parasites and dead weight.  I may talk here about American democracy in particular.  America is too big to be a viable society.   Americanism is by no means a provincial philosophy of just one geographic place; it is a concept that competes with Catholicism and Communism to become a "world order."  We learn this fact through a simple perusal of the daily newspaper.  There is no other way to explain the "global" mentality of America, whichs acknowledges no territorial descretion and which denies inherent--not subject to Americanist preaching--human differences.  What then is our point of attack.  What can be challenged in Americanist democracy is the idea of "inclusion by virtue of common humanity."  The word human does mean something; the word humanity is a word invented specifically for ideological and political purposes.  Anthropology as the most comprehensive study of Homo sapiens would have something to say about "humanity."  But politicians and religious leaders consider "humanity" too important a topic to be left to anthropologists.

The word Race is used in this section as a counter-concept to the word Humanity.  Race is not seen as anything within Humanity; rather it is the antithesis and eventual replacement of Humanity.  Opposed to this assertion is a vast corpus of democratic theory, which we now oppose.  The word Humanity is the most important word in democratic theory; we now challenge the word Humanity.  Humanity is a word with a premise and a clear definition, a word, moreover, that is at the basis of our civilization--the Democratic West--as we know it.    Mankind is a synonym.   Humanity and Mankind are also words that have within their premise a logical contradiction.   They are words that have the intent to include a number of beings. Democracy, on the pretext of Humanity, includes all persons considered human.  But necessary to achieve this universality is an act of logic.  Those traits of a human being that are not uiniversal to all humans are excluded from the definition of Humanity.  There is a simple formula whereby this accomplished.  We do not need to elaborate further.    This is the way the words are written into the sacred documents--we mention our Declaration of Independence, our Constitution, the Gettysburg Address and so forth--of our Nation.  They are also impossible words.  They are impossible because, in professing to include a great number of beings--all so-called human beings--they must exclude everything about a human being that is individual and particular.  We are left with meanings of Humanity and Mankind with a perfectly abstract entity that could not possibly be a real human being.  But there is still more.  In order to compensate for this obvious deficiency of the word Humanity--and theorists of Democracy have seen the problem--there is, added to Democratic theory as a sort of adjustment to an inbalance in the theory--a notion of tolerance.  Those features of an individual person--or whole race--that are not universally human, and so are not written into the formula of democracy, are "tolerated."  That means, these traits, while in themselves obstacles to democracy, are "adjusted for" and forced into a relationship within the system that is compatible.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-03-30 14:29:29)

Re: 31. THE PURE THEORY OF RACE

bump forward