Topic: 29. HUMAN NEEDS VERSUS RACE NEEDS

I.

I teach you a higher order of nature.  The human being is something to be surpassed.  The way to the higher being is race...
                                --Swartzbaugh (apres Nietzsche)

There is a reality--race--more basic than society.  Society as we commonly think of it is little more than a passing figment of the human imagination.  Society is here and there, according to human fantasy; race is forever. We learn what society is when we think of what feature of the human being--language--society is based upon.   The social order is a creation of what I will call the utopianism of language.  Philosophers have forever dwelt upon the subject of utopia; and that topic will not evade us here.  We differ from traditional utopianism, on the other hand, by saying that utopia is not a distant goal to be aspired to but, on the contrary, is present--as language--in everyday human life.  Everyday conversations, we are saying, contain small and unenforced promises; these together--along with the enforcement of these promises--constitute the "utopianism' that anteceded society and of which society is composed.  This point needs further clarification. 

We have already talked about the practical value of language; what is being discussed now, however, is a "side effect" of language that it forever presents unfulfillable promises.  A promise that is unenforced and unenforcable I call utopian.  Language is essentially made up of these small promises; and language as a whole is "utopian."  We are saying that such small promises resolve themselves over time into large promises, the largest of all which is utopian society.   Utopia is a common theme of philosophy and one we will not neglect here.   But there is more.   At present it must suffice to say that, while utopia is believed by some to be the goal and conclusion of society, the reverse is true.  Utopia, at first small utopias strung together by language, is the first institution of human beings and long preceded the advanced relations we call civilized society.  Society as a human institution, and one founded on the "promise" of language, has always, in its smallest elements, been utopian.  The vision that society is built upon has been present in the smallest conversations of palelithic hunters.   That one human being can promise another person anything is already utopianistic, on a small scale, of course, but adding to all the promises that there ever were.  We may add that utopia is and remains "idealistic," in the sense of unfeasable.    I want to review and highlight what I have just said.  Along with the need early man had for language there was something--we call it "utopianistic"--that promised an unfulfillable unity and brotherhood of mankind.   Society has been built upon this promise.  But the promise remains unfulfilled and unfulfillable.  Meanwhile, the conflict between race and society steadily sharpens.  The underpinnings--money, law and oil--that hold society together are fragile; whereas the instinct of race is strong.  We contemplate a vast new world before us.  This--the apocolyptic end of society--is the conclusion we have been building to.


The usefulness of society, we are saying, exhausts itself in the species character of the human being.  We are not saying that society is useless, only that society as we now think of it is pertinent only to what is lowest--most decadent--in the universal man.  We think of everyday consumer goods and services--this is all that society aspires to.  But there is more.  The point to be made presently is that civil society is inherently anti-racist.  This is understandable.  Race is essentially the aspiration, inherent in some people more than others, to surpass the species.  This they do in the choices they make.  The subject of choices will appear here later.  We may carry this point further.  We could even consider society as in an important sense anti-human.  We may suggest that society regards human beings themselves as incompatible with society--humans are inherently lawless--and, as science and technology, society can just as well replace humans with machines.  In this regard--like a factory or an economic institutions--humans can be replaced by machines and technics.   Nor are law and moral values necessarily per se human.  We understand race, on the other hand, differently than we understand society.  Race for its part is always a relationship between human beings.  We aver that race is finally the ultimately real relation between humans. Race is the feature in human relationships that, through choices, transports these relations beyond the so-called human race as such to, as this species' highest aspiration, something beyond humanity.  We speak at the risk of rising to Nietzsche's hysterical pitch.  In any case, the being we propose is a social being, too, but first of all a being which, itself, carries nature to higher and higher orders of being.   

Relationships through nature--race--compete with relations invented by human beings but not for human beings.  We conclude that race and society are highly antagoinistic concepts.  Relations of human beings through race--and we have already spoken of white people as advanced in this condition--would interfere, of course, with the basic individual relations of civil society.  Engels proposes a collectivism based upon what he knew of society.  We are talking here, on the other hand, of a different order of collectivism, one of nature, in the creation of which human beings as such have had no role.  We have already suggested the paradox that the relations human beings create as species being but not as an individual--egoistical--being.  On the other hand, relations that appear through nature, along with the morphology of individuals of the human species, pertain to individuals as they move creatively, that is racially, to higher forms of life.    Race is this form of human these ascending relationships.  In this sense--that humans form ties through race and life--race is itself a collective form of human existence.    Race creates groups that, while not visionary or theoretical, are entirely cooperative and collaborative.  We propose--or rather we suggest the pre-existing state of-- a communism, we suggest, on the level of life and instinct.  There is already a communism of nature that counters the socialism of language.  Race is an extension of the family instinct.  The family as such is obviously not social.  We may have been building all along to a final conclusion, that of the dialectic of race and society.  This opposition is finally uncompromising.   The individual relations through law and society are obliterated, we may say, by the apocolypse of race.   Outside of society there is no individualism, only the collective instincts of the "species," as Schopenhauer called it (but here identified as race), that is the creative power of nature.  We forsee an apocolypse, an end of the human world as we know it; and finally a resurrection of the white race, from the ashes of this ending, as a creature of living nature.   

What is lost in the end of civilization is gained through the simplicity of familial nature.  The practical value of language persists; its long term utopianism is "rationalized."  Modern society is a rambling, loosely structured nexus extending globally.  It is something materialistically gratifying but hateful to our instincts.  In this we are all anarchists.  There is a death wish directed at society, one inhibited only by everyday material need and habit.  The time approaches, however, not on account of any conscious human wish but of the impulses of creative--racial--nature, for the overthrow of society.  We anticipate a simpler existence more in accord with the simple relations within the small family group.  "Feudalism" is a word we still can use.  In this blog on the other hand, our discussion is theoretical; no intention exists now to be inflamitory or seditious.  We have only a simple need to discuss the issues.  We have talked earlier about Hegel's notion of civil society.  The relations among human beings formed through this nexus are individual relations that come and go through "agreements," which are essentially small and strictly "utopian" and visionary programs.   Such tiny utopias add up to the great collective aglomeration we call society.   Agreements between individuals as such stretch, one by one, virtually around the world where communications and language allow.  What would disrupt this idea is another kind of human relationship.   A disruption and dissolution of this chain would be caused by racism.   Racism is inherently anti-civil society and anti-agreement.  We may suggest that racism, carried to its logical conclusion--as it must be--  means the end of civilization as we know it.  Force Theory acknowledges this inevitability with regret.  At the same time, however, we have already conceded that Force Theory is inherently racist.   Racism is simply the unavoidable destiny of the human species and one which, in the spirit of objectivity and science, we accept.  We do not take sides in the issue of civil society versus racial uheaval.  Communism as defined by Engels would be merely an extension--a final extension--of global civil and anti-racist society.  Engels postulated that humanity, so-called, would rise to this final collectivity.  Engels was mistaken.  Our foreseeable new world--one vastly smaller--will appear out of the apocolypse of race. 

The term "dialectic" remains obscure, a situation not helped by the German writers.  Engels thought he was clarifying the issue by introducing the word "materialism"; he only produced more confusion.  Engels held dialectic to be a "scientific" concept on the level of thought of Darwinism and evolution.  Dialectic remained, for Engles, some obscure Germanistic befuddlement.  A certain honesty is in order as we invoke the term here:  we are not yet free of all mystification and metaphysics.  This remains to be seen.   Dialectic could imply a logical contradiction between two ideas or things, wherein if one existed the other could not.  We considered this earlier; and I consider this earlier in my Philtalk blog (now verschoben).  Dialectic has come in recent sociology to mean simply conflict. 

Engels understood dialectic to be a simple inconsistency of one reality with the other, such as, for instance, the social mode of production versus the individualistic mode of ownership in capitalistic society.  We do not need to consider all these definitions of dialectic, but only to point out in the present context that humans that are united on basic level of existence--race--cannot long be unified on the level of ideas and agreements.  Agreements and civil society, which are individualistic, relate only to individual materialism; race, on the other hand, which is not only an instinct but a human relationship, is final and absolute, corresponding to what Schopenhauer called Wille.  (...to be continued...)

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-02-19 15:57:49)

Re: 29. HUMAN NEEDS VERSUS RACE NEEDS

II.
Objections that there are today to racism are to an impure form of racism.   Thinkers and writers of today condemn what we are calling here "social racism."  We follow them in repudiating social racism.  For one thing, the system of Negro slavery is a dead issue.   We are saying much more.  We are saying that impurities in the racist idea result from a mixing of racial ideas and social ideas.  For instance, a notion of white superiority was a basis of the slave system of the Old South.  We can only understand racism, on the other hand--pure racism--by extracating these social factors from purely evolutional and dialectical ones.  There is some reason to think of the Old South as highly constructive to our final evolutional purposes.  The Old South defined the white and black races, separating them from one another; and finally, in the end of the Old South there appeared a distilled, asocial and anti-social idea of race. 

This new idea--the modern idea of race--the one upon which our present view, called Force Theory, is based.  We may review the premise of Force Theory.  What distinguishes one society from another is the inconvenience that languages differ.  But as languages may be translated one to the other there is finally only one human language.  Also there is ultimately only one society, a human society.   We can say the same of humanity itself, which is one species; this is the species that has language.  Language as a phenomenon is universal--in it is possible to replace all individual languages with just one language.  With one language for humanity it is a short step to a world society envisioned by the communists.

What affirms the species--in the case of humans it is society that affirms the species--suppresses the race.  The racial viewpoint, therefore--much in the tradition of theoretical anarchism--decries society.  But there is more.  No attempt would be made by humans to live without society.  Rather, a future society, one consistent with race, would have to be on a very simple level.  We would have, in other words, what is commonly called a "homogeneous" society where race as a principle is foremost in every man's thinking.  This would be a society, in our terms, of and for the white race.  Such a society has already emerged, I am saying, at least in its basic form, out of the dialectic of slave and non-slave cultures of the American North and South. 

Engels' philosophy of history focuses on the transition of feudalism to capitalism.  At this point in time the security of the family shop is sacrificed to wage slavery as forces of industry prevail over small handwork.  We here follow Engels in looking first at the human side of economics.  We can only sympathize with socialists in believing, as they did,  that an economy should serve people rather than serving itself.   But there is more.  Engels was mistaken in emphasizing species needs of humans over and above racial needs.  The needs of a human being as such, as a member merely of a species of beings, are of the lowest order, scarcely above the needs of an animal.  We have already said--and this is a main point of this essay--that a species is inherently decadent, as a form that has become but is no longer becoming.  We need not resort  German metaphysics here, at all, to prove this point but simply to state that an economy based on the species and species needs--nur gefuttert zu werden--is a decadent economy.  What rests upon decadence is itself decadent.  This I have said earlier in my blog [cite].   The word decadent is here meant  scientifically, not simply rhetorically.   I say decadent, meaning only that the process of growth of a form is ended; meanwhile such a form awaits only to be superceded by a new form.  This new form is at some point visible within the species.  We have suggested that the new form within the old form of the human species is the white race.  Already, as white genes spread rampantly through the amalgam of humanity of North and South America, this process is already obvious.  We may continue.

Engles featured the transition between feudalistic/agricultural society and industrialism.  Ours is the transition of slavery to a "free" economy.  We accept Engels' definition of a proletarian as one who has only his labor to sell.  Under institutional slavery, this same labor is not bought but taken by force.  The issue of use of force in material tasks is central to Force Theory.   The feature of the industrial/commercial economy that now commands our attention is its spontanuity.  Enterprises with diverse goods and services presently, in today's world, appear and disappear rapidly and in great array.   In this rapid flux and creativity the modern industrial economy contrasts with the traditional economy based on agriculture and militarism.  We may conclude, finally, that slavery fits best in a setting where there is little change in human practical activities.  Agriculture can be carried out by free labor.  Certain advantages accrue to gang labor, however; and here slavery is practical.  In any case, we may expect that certain humans, having the opportunity to subdue their neighbors, and compel them by force of arms to work, will do so.  Here slavery is in any case feasible, with, on the other hand, certain downside risks.  One can set a human being to do a job and he will simply do it.  If a way to do his job is not programmed into him by a boss, the slave himself will often see a way to do his work. An inventiveness and resourcefulness that all humans have is also an attribute of slaves, depending, of course, on the slave's natural intelligence.  If a machine is to be clever, on the other hand, this cleverness has to be built into it by a clever inventor.  The natural human imagination is an advantage humans have over machines.  But there is more:   with slaves there are risks.   Among these risks is rebellion.  The tractor and harvester did not have these same risks; so humans in the role of entrepreneurs applied themselves to the task of building better machines.  We return to the issue of the traditional agricultural way of life.  Unlike work in the factories and shops, where tasks were invented and rationalized, under agriculture slavery was feasible.   Millions of slaves have been employed in one way or another, mainly for drugerous and non-ending work.  With the onset of industrialism this simple formula changed.  It is one thing to harness human slaves to one job; it is entirely a different thing to move them from one job to another.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-02-15 19:33:37)

Re: 29. HUMAN NEEDS VERSUS RACE NEEDS

III.
The paradox that afflicts anarchism, as a theory of society, is that anarchism is anti-social.  Anarchism means--no society.  This principle has been affirmed in word and deed by notable anarchists.  But beyond the anarchist negation of society, what is there left?   How are humans to live together?   It is not a stretch to call anarchism criminal.    But there is more.   This is precisely the paradox that race philosophy must confront.  Race no less than Max Stirner's absolute ego is opposed to society, as we have here defined the word society.   The absolute individual of anarchism absolves himself of social bonds; were this position asserted by every person, the result would be the end of society as we know it.   For the racist position it is the same.  Racism, as I have said in another exchange (with the British anarchists: see google for reference), is altogether a species within the family of anarchism.  We say here not that a racist position eschews all bonds whatsoever with all persons whomsoever, only that these bonds--through race--are not mediated by the terms of so-called "human" society.  The bonds referred to here are familial ones of instinct and personal bonding.  Still, racism--which we affirm here--is compelled at this point to present some "constructive" notion of human organization, whether social or in some way proto-social, that would carry humans so bound together in a viable agenda of life.  Racist persons, bound by instincts, must still assert themselves in a world of other--and adversarial--humans and in a way, we are saying, that does not disadvantage white racialists (we are calling ourselves) when confronted by the kind of organization which has hitherto proved formidable throughout the human species. 

The institution of slavery is anti-society.   I have said that race is an anti-social fact.   Slavery for its part introduces the force of nature into human relationships, where force was originally but, through language and agreements, has been lost.  Slavery is simply the creative perpetuation of natural violence in relationships.   More must be said on this issue.   Slavery simply destroys society.  That is the best part of slavery.  The worst part of slavery is that, in defining human relations in terms of force--and thereby perpetuating violence between larger groups of people-- the lower elements of humanity sometimes win.  A higher race is supplanted by a lower race.   We give Haiti and Ancient Greece as examples. We conclude that any racialistic theory of nature and man will be anti-social.  It is not too much to assume that it would be counterintuitive to believe that any social idea whatsoever, understanding the word society as we have understood it here, could be built upon the idea of race.  Racialists are in this sense anarchists.  But there is more.  Assuming that the human being does benefit from society, and particularly (we are saying) a simple society, we are forced into the position of wanting to reconstruct society, somehow, upon the ashes of as once-society leveled by the forces of race. 

We pass again to the issue of slavery.   What slavery does, in a given instance, is to first set whole races against one another--when it is natural and evolutionally creative that they do so--but slavery sets slave and non-slave groups apart.  It was the institution of slavery that first defined, in America, the white and black races and determined that their destinies would forever be separate.  But there is the further consideration that, notwithstanding Northern religious patronizing of blacks, whites here proceed along their original evolutional path.  The dialectical relation of slave and master classes resolves itself as the anti-slave, but also anti social, idea of the "pure race."

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-02-20 16:32:10)

Re: 29. HUMAN NEEDS VERSUS RACE NEEDS

IV.
Society has lost the power to excrete. --Nietzsche

I said earlier that racialism is at a disadvantage in disputes with other theories of society.   That is true.  The source of this deficiency is the fact that, as a species or genus within the family of anarchist theory, racialism is inherently anti-society.  We can understand part of the issue if we just consider the antagonism that society and its spokemen have for the idea of race.  Racists are unwelcome in the university and church, of course, but this rejection goes to the heart of what a society is in the first place--an anti-racist institution.  The advantage society has over race is continued into the realm of theory.  A social theory that affirms society will of course triumph over a theory of society that is antithetical to society.  A theory of society cannot be built upon a foundation that assumes society is unnecessary.   It is a contradiction, we are saying, to claim to make a contribution to social theory, yet to say only that society is decadent.    This and other considerations however do not defeat racialism.  The critique by anarchist racialism of existing society--that society as a species thing is decadent--still stands.  The prevailing social theory that dominates our universities has only proven that society is of value for society.  This is a small victory.  What society means for individuals, on the other hand, or within the total perspective of nature and life, is entirely another question.  We may still say that society, like the "species" society avowedly sustains, is decadent.   And we make such a crique the center of Force Theory.   Society's, and as the theory of society, socialism's, great nemisis is--society itself.   Left to itself, without any interruption by natural forces, society would finally negate itself.  Society moves inexorably by some internal mechanism or logic to exorcise or eject from itself anything contrary to itself.  The thing most contrary to society, finally, is the individual person.  We have called this person racist to his core.   But racism need not be evoked as the nemisis of society; it suffices to say that the individual is self-ish.  Self-ish-ness finally defeats the entire purpose of society, which purpose is to become entirely itself.  Society is ultimately a creation of logic and tecnics; it is not necessarily human.  Society--as the human mind itself (see earlier sections)--is only grudgingly human.  Society we are saying starts as something human but devolves to something mechanical.

Thus far we have simplistically suggested that all things of nature are opposed to all things purely human, and vice versa.   This view has to be qualified.  Force Theory is not essentially a "romantic" or vitalistic philosophy.   Vitalism would put us in an ideological camp with Ludwig Klages and and his notion that Geist als Widersacher der Seele.  This is not a position we finally want to take.  Klages is only a step in the right direction.  The challenge we face is that, while we aspire to construct a viable social theory, our basic premise is anti-social.  Anarchism and racialism both oppose society. This is where our challenge presently lies.   If we affirm any things the human species has accomplished through society, we must deny the necessity of the individual and the race.  If on the other hand we affirm the individual and race, we have to reject or even deny the existence of society.   Our way is clear only so far as we understand the contradiction.    The premise of Force Theory--the force of which we speak is that of nature and race--is antithetical to society as an ex-centric reality.  Society operates according to its own laws, which are derived from language and the kinds of ex-centric products of the human mind.  Our views favor nature and "life," on the other hand, which have their own laws.  What we propose, under auspices of Force Theory, is a sort of compromise.  There is no way we can reject human history or, on the other hand, the creative--and destructive--forces of nature.  We propose a truce.  Having said that, it is left only to say that society as it has grown is uncompromising.  The laws that society has laid down are absolute.  The compromises set forth in Force Theory are tantamount, from society's viewpoint, to the absolute negation of society and all that humans have created.

I said earlier that race is the collective personality of the individual.  In the modern world, race is the only meaningful statement--one that commands respect--of the personality that there is in nature.  Otherwise, without race, there is no personality.  We are all simply individuals isolated and ineffectual.   I stand by this statement.   I have by this time also presented a broad background for understanding this last statement.  I have put personality in the context of evolution.  Form and action are united through personality, while personality is relatively meaningless except in interaction with other personalities; the broad form of this interaction is race.   We can understand why race and society are antithetical to one another.  They are competing modes of human relationship.  A racial person is not per se social at all because he finds his relationships through the deeper order of nature we call race.  Race is a collective personality and, as such, a way of behaving in unison with others.  We may make the sweeping generalization that, in America, black and white peoples, white and Jewish peoples, have no real or evolutional relationship whatsoever.  What they have is a social--species--relationship.  It is understandable that if America is a society, race and racism are antithetical to America.  This has been said and we affirm that it is true.  However, by declaring a point of view socially and morally wrong, we do not banish this view from the broader theater of evolution and nature.  We return to Force Theory as a total philosophical-anthropological perspective.  Force Theory places personality  at the center of its political thinking.  We are saying that in the face of society--which in affirming a decadent species does in its deepest philosophical roots oppose evolution--race is all there is left that is politically significant to the human personality.  I would suggest that, as an individual, my own personality means nothing, except insofar as it intersects, interacts with and reenforces the broader personality of my race. I have a meaningful personality--it stands for something within the broad spectrum of the evolution of new species--only through race.   Race is collective identity, through which--because persons contribute to the evolution of a (new) species--of the person.  We may go on to say much more.  Humans evolve--evolution moves forward--in our interactions based on free choice.  I want to pause to clarify this last statement.  It is through the choices that we make--first and foremost in the selection of a marriage partner--that moves the race, and therefore the just-emerging species, forward.   Personality is simply a sum of the choices we make in human relationships and in aesthetic preferences.  I have said this earlier and affirm it here.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-02-21 18:08:26)

Re: 29. HUMAN NEEDS VERSUS RACE NEEDS

V.
An arbitrary choice--starting with the choice of a marriage partner--affirms the species, always.  For instance, if Man A mates with Woman B, the offspring will always be human.  As far as the species as a whole is concerned, the man might as well have mated with Woman C or D.    In any case, their children will be human beings of some kind or other.   All these random matings, when added together, will not change the species at all.  In fact, the more random the matings are, the more the species will hang on to its old forms.  Since the species by definition is closed--no new genes are coming into the species or going out--there can be no source of change from outside the species.  Nor can the species, in the way we normally define the word species, change any other species.   We may expand our thought, however, to include all kinds of choices which happen to be arbitrary.  To show that any decision whatsoever, so long as it is an arbitrary decision, only supports the existing species and confirms the species' old form, is a more difficult matter.  Here we need to exerise imagination.  We are saying that human behavior that is random and unreflective, and does not entail serious choices, goes to support and sustain the species as a whole.  We can talk about "promiscuous" behavior in a very general way, as being directionless.  This means, in other words, that such behavior does not point in the direction of anything new within the species.  Of course accidents happen--here we may introduce something new into the species.  But short of accidents, random behavior is species-sustaining behavior but does not aspire--as we say race aspires--to something beyond the species.  This is the way the mass of human beings live out their lives--as "mere" human beings.  Their behavior is simply species behavior.  Likewise their social order, that they affirm and maintain, is simply the order of the human species as a species.  Such a social order does not aspire to anything beyond the species.  Such an order would equalize human beings as species beings.  Anything a human being choses to do--arbitrarily--results in some kind of support for the human species as a whole.  We mean, simply, unreflective and spontaneous kinds of choices people make.  This could be to vote for or support a certain political leader.  This could be the choice of a meal or restaurant for the evening.  The outcome ultimately will mean the same thing for the species as a whole.  The human being has exercised species behavior, merely.  For its part the species is a closed entity; anything that happens within this closed circle is species behavior.

Spengler talked of a man as a person "of race."  We understand here what Spengler meant.  A person "of race" makes reflective and careful choice the result of which, we know, point to an order beyond the human race.  They aspire to a another--we assume "higher"--level.  These choices would first be in the family, in the choice of a marriage partner.  This is an obvious choice.  The other choices, we are saying, are regarding issues of culture and refined aesthetic taste. 



...the opposition of society and race

...the opposition of race and species.

...the species character of existing society--that it pertains to the human species...

...the race contradicts existing society just as, as a natural force in relation to a fixed and decadent entity, race contradicts its own species character...

racism is anarchism.

racism is also a purifying, simplifying force...

und so weiter und so fort

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-02-22 19:38:07)