I object to the word racial prejudice, or bigotry, for the same reason I object to the word prejudice as a word overused and meaningless.   I have had to tolerate these words as applied to myself.   The word bigot certainly applies to me.  I am first of all a bigot by existing at all.  To exist is to exist assertively.   In the (now many) years I've lived I haven't minded charges of bigotry, except, of course where there was more on the line--money and a way of life as a professor--than just my personal feelings.   But here I risk lapsing into that whinny tone common to conservative writers when they fall victim to the agents of so-called political correctness.  I want to be as objective as possible.  As to the word prejudice:  we can, after all, say that one is prejudiced in favor of being alive just by virtue that one is alive.  And if one is a white man he is taking up space that could be lived in by black men.  To be alive at all is to be bigoted.   Prejudice of some sort applies to every facit of life.  The ironies of political correctness have begun to be discussed in America--not so much in Germany--and that is all we need to say.  Force Theory did not win this battle; the forces of political correctness simply put their heads in a noose and hung themselves.  Force Theory on the other hand is, we are saying, heir to this new climate and will take advantage of it, opportunistically, as able.  Naturally I will not, given the oppotunity to do something, let these verbal and material affronts and deprevations pass without notice.  I feel that a certain redress is in order if not legal; but I may not live long enough to see that happen.  There has been an din from one end of America to the other, demanding "political correctness," that may eminate from only a handful of persons and ones, moreover, with very little substance or final clount beyond the sound of their own voices.  But this din is against a background of constitutionally polite and passive white people that, called the silent majority, are the main basis of American civilization and culture.  Of course, these voices or "spokespersons" have never been seriously tested for bravery.  There have been instances of backlash but these were minor.  What is being said by Force Theory is that the main collision of wills is still to come, not in the short term but in the near future.  This remains to be seen.  What Force Theory has proposed to do is to discuss the underlying process of society and nature wherein such a collision would come about.  This is a purely intellectual, as opposed to ideological and religious, line of investigation. 

I said earlier that "racism"--a philosophy that whites are "superior" to blacks--once supported the social and economic system of the Old South.  We are making a statement to the effect that, yes, an ideology--whether or not objectively true--can support a social system.  We are not arguing at this point that there are objective differences between humans that make one group or the other more suitable for slavery.  This is an entirely different issue than the one at hand.  This statement that a belief in racial differences supported a system of slavery in the Old South is in itself true and a matter of clear historical record.   We are not here confirming or denying the truth of racism.  We are not asking whether or not blacks are "inferior" to whites in a way that would justify enslaving them.    The only rationalization of such slavery would be in the fact, present to the whites of the Old South, that their livlihood depended on cotton farming and the institution of slavery.  In making their point they are only saying what Engels and Morgan said:  that ideology follows from economic necessity.   

The idea of race has survived the idea's irrelevancy.  Slavery as we say was necessary at that time and given the precise level of technological advances in the area of planting and harvesting cotton.  All considerations of the "truth" of that institution therefore followed from the institution itself.    Pronouncements on the inequality of the races have been printed in Southern newspapers and published as sermons for anyone to read.   Southern ideology was probably indifferent to the facts that were stated; rather it was an ideology of expediency.  Nor is there a need of this essay to pronounce on this issue of actual racial differences.  Of course we are also conscious of the fact that the issue would seemingly demand from us a direct response; there will be bystanders clamoring on all sides for some pronouncement from us as to whether the races are indeed "equal" or "unequal."  Here silence on the issue is already suspect.  But we are saying very little that could be used either for or against racism.   

Our argument so far is very generally "materialistic."    The discussion so far is about society, not about race as such.  But there is more.  Once we peel away the prgamatic issues from our discussion of race, the opportunity appears to look once more at race, not so much as part of a  human agenda so much, on the other hand, as a phenomenon of nature.  Race is no longer a fabrication made out of material expediency.   Later we will see race is real, apart from human conspiracy, as the creative principle of the cosmos.
Given slavery, on the other hand, some sort of rationalization, to answer honest questions that people might have about the morality of enslaving a large number of people--depriving them of rights that others have--might be in order.  The motive for such a rationalization, then, was not "truth" but was to uphold the existing social and economic system.  Finally, what is the "truth" of the Old South?    We might be tempted to make some statement of fact.   At this time we might want to say that whites are superior to blacks; or that whites are not superior to blacks.    But this is not an issue we are going to get into here.   The only issue now at hand is whether racism, as we define the word, supports some other idea which constitutes a motive for believing that blacks are inferior to whites.  This is a fairly simple matter.  In other words, assuming that some people are motivated by material need--which could include outright greed--and that, perhaps simply as an afterthought or to explain their actions to outsiders, they assert that whites are superior to blacks.

Nietzsche (cite) spoke in support of "untruth"; he called untruth necessary to human existence.  We have no reason to doubt that untruth may be valuable.  Where untruth is in some sense "valid" is in an enterprise that "justifies" the untruth.  In war, for instance, certain lies about an enemy are commonly promulgated, and by people--journalists and teachers prominently--who swear to uphold standards of truth.  They lie, however, consciously and with wanton disregard for ordinary standards of honesty, concerning a purported enemy.  We see this all the time in newspapers.  The untruth becomes true, however, in the minds of people insofar as their purpose is simply pragmatic.  People are both willing to believe themselves and have other people believe certain lies.  Again, applying this simple principle--that the truth is often a "pragmatic" truth--to the Old South we see that racism was simply a small pragmatic truth of the period.  Black-white differences was a truth of convenience.    In our line of inquiry here we are faced with an unpleasant prospect.  As pursuers of philosophical truth we have to ask whether the Southern economy, based on cotton, was itself a justification of slavery which in turn justified racism.  There would be a line of questions that would follow one another with no end in sight.  We are left of course at this point--because what we have said so far is obviously true and by everyday standards of truth--with a cynical point of view.  Is there any way out of cynicism?    A bit of optimism is in order.  We can say that in the stolid public mind, untruth is never seriously refuted.  No champion of truth ever comes forth to point out error; at least, none that is listened to.  Untruth, rather,  fades away, simply, as the reason for the untruth--its motive--vanishes.  Thus, to take our main example of the Old South, racism fell to the simple fact that slavery was no longer required under the new system of cotton farming.  With slavery gone there was obviously no reason for a justification of slavery.  The ideology of America with its statement of the equality of peoples appeared out of the moral vacuum in the aftermath of slavery.  Of course, there were those who appeared to pronounce Negro slavery an outright evil.  But this newfound "courage" was at the time that slavery itself was historically safely in the past. 

(NB:  Slavery, with the sole difference that the slave masters are brown rather than white, while the slaves are still black, exists in The Dominican Republic in the context of sugar growing.  The slaves are treated every bit as harshly there as they were in our South.  Of course, Americans get sugar from this slave system; so Americans just ignore this situation, not through ignorance, either--because ample information is available on the internet.)

The untruth of racism fell to the simple fact that the economic justification of racism disappeared.   This point is easy to understand.  Our purpose now is, having found the untruth of racism--that its "truth" was simply the support of the economics of cotton farming--we can now look for the truth of racism.   The "critique" of racism provided by history turns into the agent whereby a purified, distilled notion of racism is possible.  This would be a notion free of any "pragmatism."  We are saying here nothing very complicated, only the obvious point that an honest statement of the truth of race will be devoid of any agenda or personal motives in stating that truth.  History--that it takes away reasons for believing falsehood as well as giving them--in this sense is an ally of truth.   The "refutation" that we here present of racism is the following:  We say that racism as promulgated in the Old South is not so much an inaccurate assessment of black and white abilities, as this ideology is "merely" an expedient rationalization for short-term purposes.  Subsequent events in history--the invention of labor-saving machines--is what "disproved" Southern ideology.  If statements about fact are no longer true, that is because the Old South itself no longer exists.  So it is the relevancy of racism rather than its basis in fact that we challenge. 

We fall far short, on the other hand, of saying that there are no perceivable inborn differences between black and white people.  We are only saying that these differences, if there are such, do not pertain at this precise time in historyto anything that we consider materially necessary.  Of course, as soon as we do understand that there are reasons other than an antiquated cotton industry to decry white/black differences, the whole moral question appears once more.  For instance, as people come together for education and business and so forth, the reality of race appears once more and is alive in the minds of people.  So far, still, we have not been asking if race is real, only whether or not race is relevant.  As soon as we dismiss the whole endeavor of asking if race is relevant, we open for ourselves the possibility of what race is essentially.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-09-29 18:00:03)



We have spoken of slavery.  The supposition here was that ideas of racial inequalities were advanced to support the institution of slavery.   The only justification that there is finally of slavery, and the one we will advance now, is--no justification at all.  By justifying slavery through the use of the idea of race we only contaminate and diminish the much greater idea of race itself.   The anti-racist movement, which is institutionally dominant in our churches and universities, has done a great favor to the racist ideology by showing the irrelevancy of race to present-day culture.  Slavery's only justification is that humans for their private purposes, whatever these were, wanted it.  That is "justification" enough.  Humans do what they do because they want to.  When we understand that fact we can predict what they will do; in knowing what they are going to do we may finally make peace with reality.  I want to talk about ideas of relevancy and irrelevancy in our present-day discussion of race.  Race is not unreal because it is irrelevant.  This is a mistake that the anti-racist ideology makes.

What we strive for here is a purified idea of race.  That is, for instance:  Any notion that race is a consideration in an economic system is true or false, but not necessarily true.  I am willing to accept the premise of the Old South that Negroes were better suited than whites to conditions in cotton fields in the hot Southern summers.  There just is no point in challenging this statement.  If the statement is challenged, those who support it--who have not yet bothered to support it--will just go ahead and prove the statement scientifically.  That would end the issue.   We are not supporting or challenging any allegation of the superiority or inferiority of one group over another for some man-made and artificial purpose.  What we are saying rather that the whole issue of superiority or inferiority for some particular economic or social purpose is extraneous to the underlying reality of race.  The notion of race has undergone changes over the century; and these changes in definition most certainly have to do with economic and material purposes of the day.    This fact of changing definitions has been raised as an objection to the overall idea of race.  In fact, the baggage that the race idea has carried--and then shucked off--is in itself a confirmation of the idea.  Race is an ever-appearing notion that, even where confused with culture and nationality, appears then elsewhere in a new guise.  The idea of race is apparent anywhere there is a notion of biological and genetic continuity.  This--towards the absolute biology of race--is where we direct our attention.

In this--that we cleanse the race idea of extraneous notions--we are consistant with science.  There is a purely biological idea of race.  Human life like the life of other organisms is in a genetic link with the past.  I might raise the question of male/female differences.  I might show that males and females are absolutely unlike one another and that the differences are in fact more mental than they are physical.  Science (cite: Brain Sex, a PBS program, also a book) makes these differences clear.  Today's attack on racism and sexism as a philosophy bases itself, on the other hand, on the "irrelevancy" of race and gender.   Assumed in the charge against racism is that racism is not relevant to anything "important" that human beings have to do.  When the differences between male and female shown to be inescapable facts, the argument is raised, as I say, that these differences are not relevant to the social and economic system we have today.  In fact, this point is well taken. Women and blacks perform rather well in the jobs that we have to do.  But this performance is not the issue we have to deal with here.   If we assume all America is bent on some high moral purpose, race is probably irrelevant to this purpose.  The "racism" I propose concedes this entire argument to the opposed anti-racism.  All we are saying is that race is or is not relevant to this or that task that humans have to do.  If we simply disregard this purpose--which is going to change from place to place and time to time--we may actually move forward to discover what race actually is.  Race has no purpose at all.  We may qualify this statement only by saying that race has no purpose that we know of.    Races appear and disappear.  But so do human lives.  We cannot speculate here, nor can anyone, on the ultimate "purpose" of human life.  We want to know only what is real and unreal.  If our quest is for reality, race is real but the purposes humans have are perhaps unreal except as passing fancies.

In philosophy--as opposed to economics or psychology--we have to accept the idea that, at some point in reality, any notion of purpose, relevancy or irrelevancy disappear.  There is no justification for slavery.  There is also no philosophical position that can ultimately discredit slavery, inasmuch, of course, as slavery just exists.   What is real is rational, as Hegel said.   In its time no one, scarcely, raised an objection, at least not one that was listened to.  At any point of time, if an idea was perceived as relevant to a perceived important task, the idea was accepted.  Untruths exist with equal acceptance along with truths.  As I said before, these untruths are never intellectually refuted in the public mind.  They simply lose their relevancy.  That is where we stand now in regard to the question of race.  But that fact belies our purpose in this essay.  We are not here to show the relevancy of race at all--we may assume race is irrelevant to anything other than itself--but to show, properly and in the best and most sincere tradition of philosophy, that race exists.


Fundamental to human relationships--and this is universal--is the idea of usefulness.  A person enters a relationship voluntarily more often when the partner in the relation is useful.  There is no point decrying the fact that human beings  contrive to get service out of other humans.  Animals of burden and other human beings are essentially put in the same thought category.  This is an inescapable fact of life and one upon which modern society, with its superifical democratic theories, is solidly built.  We are led to the inevitalbe conclusion that there is no essential difference between many relationships that ordinarily occur in the course of an ordinary day and, at the same time, relations of master to slave.  In every relation there is, almost, there is a person either having ascendency or trying to get it who imposes on some other person.  Husbands and wives are not outside this sphere of "coercion."  What we are asking in the present essay, on the other hand, is something more.  We ask how the idea of race arose in the general context of the kind of relations humans have.  The idea of race as we present it here has arisen in the context of social relationships.  Human beings did not wait for biologists to discover race as a datum of science; rather race was an observation of human differences that focused upon suitability for purposes of slavery.  Race, as we construe the word here, is inseparable from the idea of slavery. 

Race as construed by Force Theory is not a biological concept so much as a way of living together.  I here introduce the social idea of race.    Race has appeared, as I say, not through simple observation or even science, but through the historical experience of slavery.    I said earlier that, even though we can safely assume that race is a biological and scientifically ascertainable fact, such a fact is simply irrelevant to the way people actually think.   We are not considering biology here.  Whether there are biological differences or not is not a matter of concern, except, of course, so far as these differences are relevant to the way humans really live.  How humans live, I suggest, is through slavery of some kind or other.   We assume here that in their relations of interdependency, the idea of slavery has appeared in one form or another.  The very fact that humans depend upon one another, and in their relations of dependency aspire to gain ascendency over one another, suggests slavery.  This is a very ancient and accepted idea.  Slavery has not disappeared.  I am not speaking only of the slavery that exists still in Africa and other tropical and negro areas, but in the institutions even of white people.  Marriage is an example.  Marriage contains the suggestion, as Fourier stated, of buying and selling humans for certain purposes.  This is true even when a partner in marriage has sold him- or herself to buy the other.  The idea of buying and selling humans is alive in the idea of marriage; and this in turn, especially in Africa and the Mideast, is apparent in the thin line that exists between buying and selling slaves and buying and selling partners for marriage. 

At some point in white history, however, humans began to scrutinize one another for suitability as slaves.  Certain people were considered amenable to becoming slaves, and these were made slaves.  White people no less than Africans today began to cast about for slaves, rather than to take them from their immediate families and social groups.  The Vikings had slavery, and slaves were a motive for Viking raids far and wide.  Vikings took Irish as slaves. Indeed, until recently--and it has been only very recently that machines have seriously replaced humans as components of the economic system--that white people have not uninhibitedly looked for "appropriate" slaves.  Historians tell us now that Columbus was primarily looking for slaves.  We may assume one motive in venturing to the outlying regions of the world was to avoid immediate neighbors who had strong armies and defenses.  The search for slaves was carried on without any special interest in moral issues.  It was done simply as an extension of general economic expansion and was relentlessly undertaken by Europeans.  The first settlement of North America, Jamestown, was an economic development not a place for human settlement.  And with that economic base came an immediate search for slaves; the Indians however were not disposed to become slaves. 

Thus when we think about the meaning of the word race, we can set aside simple observations of human differences--these are an everyday and automatic part of living--and look rather at the more astute comparisons of humans in terms of suitability for one or another task in an envisioned economic system.  Such comparisons are the basis of the idea of race.  There is no more to the issue of race than this.   Racial differences, we are saying, consist in abilities and disabilities in performing certain tasks.  Beyond such differences between people there is scarcely any interest in the minds of average people.  It would be of interest, for instance, that one person could work in the hot sun; it would be of no interest that one or the other person is more peaceable or violent so long as that difference did not pertain to some immediate task at hand.  Whether these abilities are acquired through culture or through genetics is not a special concern, so long as the persons themselves are amenable to the task at hand.  The idea of race, in other words, is not an intellectual construct so much as a social and economic one.  But there is more.  The institution of slavery did compel some humans to astutely see differences in other humans and so to propound a rather consistent and astute idea of race.  There came to be, through the experience of slavery, an idea of race that was finally entrenched in the human mind.  Finally, as slavery became irrelevant to the economic system--as machines took over labor from human beings themselves--the idea of race emerged to separate humans from one another, to relegate people, in other words, into categories which became the basis of the new society.   As slavery created the idea of race, then, race in turn form the basis of the new separation of humans in the post-slavery society.  We have already identified certain groups as different than ourselves; and this distinction constitutes both the basis of our coming together with them and our separation from them.


Where there are no high standards of logic in argument--which is just about everywhere--relevancy and irrelevancy are used as a criteria for truth.  There are ideas that are true but rejected on the grounds, for example, that these ideas are irrelevant.  We witness or read about this fact everyday just as we witness also its opposite.  There are ideas that are untrue but nonetheless held as true simply because they are relevant to some issue at hand and, in the public mind, are considered supportive of a position on that issue.   The connections between facts and events have to be called,  in this context, "religious," supernatural and subjective.   Such trends of thought have countless examples in newspapers every day.   I have called this state of mind "pragmatism."   What is being suggested now, on the other hand, is that philosophy, in order to carry on its timeless calling for "objective truth," must look beyond pragmatic truth.   But is the disposition to find objective truth a question purely of philosophy or is it also an issue of intelligence?   The need for relevancy is symptomatic of a mob mentality.  That is what is being suggested here.  What is being said is very simple.    Intelligence itself will normally look beyond pragmatic truth in order to find a deeper, more essential truth.   To seriously consider an idea true on grounds of relevancy is tantamount to stupidity.   I want to pursue this point further. Such a disposition is what is aptly called the mob mentality.   Relevancy and irrelevancy are not serious criteria for truth in any sense of the word truth.  These points of view are simply an expression of an emotional disposition; and they carry a society along in the mode of brainless stampede.  Anything can be relevant or irrelevant to anything else; so finally all human motives are reduced simply to desire and instinct.   The bovine call for relevancy of ideas accounts for much of human history, and in particular in all the mistakes humans have made.  Relevancy and irrelevancy have supported humans in wars and religious pogroms. 

The issue now at hand is race.  It is true that race was held to be "relevant" to the institution of slavery in the Old South.  We have already admitted that.  We also said that this idea of relevancy of race did in fact support, if only indirectly, the slave system.  But there is more.  We have also exposed the fallacy of using the principle of relevancy to demonstrate the "truth" of anything; so that race is not a "truthful" principle in the context of slavery.  There is no attempt here to justify slavery, pointing out only that given the type of technics at the time and economic demand the slave system was inevitable.  The slave system also finally became its own refutation, exposing as untruthful the use of race to justify slavery.  What is left in the aftermath of slavery is a clear vision of what race finally is.  Of course, the truthful justification of slavery is slavery itself.  The same holds for race:  race needs no justification, it simply exists.  "What is real is rational,' a quote by Hegel I have used before. 

To ascribe relevancy or irrelevancy to race is to misunderstand race.   This is a wrongminded approach to race and one fraught with serious consequences.  Rather, race has been an innocent, almost childlike victim of the demands for relevancy.  Insofar as race is irrelevant to society--society being the "important fact" that humans support--it, race, is believed not exist.  The contrary is true.  I say race is "innocent," a flower-like thing that is not of man--where deception is possible--but of nature.  We now mean to expose the fallacy and purport the truth.

Anti-racism is the other side of the coin.   Racism that once organized and brought humans together in the institution of slavery , as master and slave, now separates people.   Anti-racism is considered relevant to the building of an American superstate.  But anti-racism is again the "relevancy" argument against race. be continued...

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-01-04 15:40:00)


I. The species is decadent; the race is progressive and creative:   The point of view taken here is that in one important sense, race and species are opposites.  Science does not ordinarily make this distinction between race and species.  Our purpose here is to suggest new possibilities even while these may be only hypothetical.  Simply stated:  race is becoming; the species has become.  A race is what the new species will finally become.  One or several races finally destroy the species that they, the races, once were.  By this line of reasoning--that race is creative while species is stagnant--why would we not want to build our society on the principle of race rather than on species?  Why would we not want to devote our way of living together on the white race, say, rather than on the mouldy, static concept of mankind?  In any case, what humans finally do together or separately must affirm the creative force of life.  "Mankind," which has entirely become, confines and contradicts this principle.

The accepted scientific view is that race is simply a small but definable section of the larger group, the species.   The species encompasses the race.  What is propounded by science finds its way into ideology as the concept that the white race, say, is a small part of humanity or mankind.  This is the assumption that finds its way into every preacher's sermon.  That humanity is a grandeose thing while race is insignificant is the premise of American society.  This idea has never been disputed.    We submit now in Force Theory that races within a species do resemble one another, of course, and in this resemblance they constitute a taxonomic group.  This is the legitimate science of taxonomy.  Where ideology is concerned, however--the extrapolation of social principles from biological ones--there are entirely different issues.  These issues must be dealt with in a complete theory of society.  The taxonomy of race has little bearing on the dynamics of race.  A sustained emergence of a race out of a species portends the doom of the species.

Within the race there is choice.  One can breed in or out of his or her race.  For instance, one may couple with a person not of his or her race; in that case the couple's children will not be of his or her race.  This is a freedom persons have within a race, in other words, not to be,  through one's children, of that race.   This freedom does not exist within the species.  One can breed only with persons of one's own species--intrafertility is the working definition of species.    This choice or lack of it has serious implications.  It is through individual human choice that new varieties of humans (or other animals and plants) come into being; and these varieties pass over finally into new species.  Free choice gives race its dynamic character.  The lack of choice causes the species to die.  Old species--which was decadent just by virtue of being a species--pass out of existence.  What we say of the human species, or homo sapiens, we say also of the idea of so-called Mankind.  This is a decadent notion.  We do not want to build our society of the future upon such a notion.   For its part, the white race is the creative principle upon which we found our future social order.  And this is true, incidentally, all the more for the fact that one can choose, through coupling with a person of another race, to drop out of the white race and white society.  (This is called the culling effect.)

There seems to me no reason, presently, why species and race cannot be seen as distinct and separate "entities," operating, as I say, according to distinct and separate principles.   The race appears within the species; that does not mean that the race is of the species.  It would even be possible to assume that race and species are in a sort of competition with one another.    Biological science at present has no provision or study, known to me, that comes to this conclusion; so the burden of proof is on me, now.  I have tried in past pages of this blog to lay some sort of groundwork for coming to my conclusions.   In any case,  I earlier said that the species, precisely because it is exclusive and self-contained among other species, is decadent; it has within it all the possibilities it can logically have.   The species, almost by definition and by virtue of a venerable past of successful competition, has come to have a certain "standing" and respectability in nature in general and in the company of other species.  The species is by definition "successful."  Like any successful entity, it is conservative--it "strives" to maintain its place in its world.  Respectability and consciousness of success, however, is, on the other hand, per se decadent.

In Force Theory, to be merely static and conservative is to be decadent.  Life either expands and progresses, or withers.  This statis quo orientation of the species, as a form of Nature, is in this sense decadent.   Race, on the other hand, which emerges out of the species--like a child out of the parent--is full of new life and possibilities.  We may dwell at present on the "conservative" orientation of the species.  The species, as I say, is entirely contained within itself; it cannot take on, as a new part of itself, genes or possibilities that come from outside itself.  These new possibilities, if there are to be any, must come from within the species; but the species does not want them.  These new genes and possibilities are, from the vantage point of the species, simply "mutant."  Mutants are mainly, statistically, harmful to the species; they are woefully harmful, in the viewpoint of the species, if these mutuants spread.  Race from the standpoint of the species is simply a mutation, but one moreover that proliferates on its own accord with no account given to the already proven successes of species adaptation.  Race is the way nature resolves the issue of mutations within a species.  Race is an "entity" in a position to take the position of an independent, new species  and one moreover in competition with the old species.  This new threat comes even before the race has achieved genetic separation from its parent species.

II. The race is new, vital life:   Life we say expresses itself as a creative force through the race, not the species.   An example of a "successful species," because of its longevity on earth, is cockroaches.  Where racial forms appear, the evolutional advance is faster and more profound.   Racially, life advances as inward and outward form.  Race continually refines its own forms.  White people, precisely through racial mixture--because they mix out and not in--become whiter than they once were.  This is "cosmic whiteness" expressing itself.  Race is always passing out of itself, as waste, redundant and contradictory genes and possibilities.  Lower and degenerate forms of the stronger race pass out of their original race and into other races, which can be thought of as sponging up these bad genes.   Race on the other hand, if race is strong, does not take on corrupting genes and possibilities coming from outside itself.   Race takes into itself from outside itself only what is relevant to its own advance.  Thus the race--the stronger race--becomes over time more what it is, and less what it is not.  The white race advances in this way.  Degenerate forms of the white race pass out of the race, but into other races.  White people become "whiter."  Thiss is not a law of man but a law of nature.  Culture attaches itself to race and either affirms or contradicts this basic order and orderliness of nature.

III. The battleground of competition between race and species is the individual:  Within the individual a multitude of forces and principles are at work.   We may assume that any normal person has within him, genetically, principles of both race and species.  In the context of Force Theory we are saying that what is conservative and staid in the person is "of" the species; what is radical and adventurous is racial.  The person has within him or her tendencies to identify with or depart from his or her own race.  We may consider first basic mating before proceeding to the more subtle issues of race and species.   In the terms we are thinking now--and here a certain reversal of perspective is necessary compared to the ordinary contemporary "democratic" viewpoint--to be radical means to become more of what a person already is, in the face of what is essentially what one is not.  Here we may take up the sensitive issue of "race mixing."  To be radical is to allow or promote race mixing--but only if the mixing is "out."  We will say, for example, it is permissable for black and white to misceginate, while, on the other hand, the mixed offspring are not considered white but rather black.  Thus white genes go to the black race; black genes do not go to the white race.  This is in fact the present policy of the white race, meaning, of course, that the black race gets whiter--slowly, like Brazil--while the white race gets whiter.  The white race is now whiter because the people who do not want to be white are sponged out of the white race by the black race.  This is one example of racial evolution.  The  paradox we present here is that it is precisely race mixing, as we have qualified the term, that advances the cause of racial purity.  These are all principles working on various levels through the entire spectrum of biological evolution.

The species does not [note the recasting of this sentence:|] reject diversity, since within the species there may be all sorts of bizarre apparitions--as there are among American black people.  What the species abhores and fights against is the concentration of unique features in separate or segregated populations.  The species evenly spreads, as through osmosis,  any changes that occur within it throughout the species as a whole, affirming the species and the standing of the species in nature.  The species is centrifical.   Race on the other hand hordes newness.  Race is gravitational, it clings to what is unique to itself, while it discharges through miscegination what is species-bound back to the species.   A strong race exhibits its strength precisely in controling the outcome of miscegination.  The weaker race takes on the unwanted genes of the stronger one. 

IV. Culture that is "about" the (human) species is decadent:   Culture includes such activities as art, economics, religion and so forth.   Extending our perspective beyond biology to human culture, we may understand that economics, where it is about the species, is decadent; where economics--we would rather say art--is about the race it, economics, is creative and dynamic.  Friedrich Engels in Socialism limits himself to the area of human activity, consumer economics, that is of most universal human preoccupation and for that reason is the most trivial and inherently uncreative area of human endeavor.  Engels spent his life concerned about whether this or that humdrum person had all the cooking pots he needed.  Certain work is needed before we can make the required fine distinctions of biology and culture.   We need a great deal of discussion at this point to define species and race from the vantage point of life itself.  This essay will affirm race as creative and castigate the species as decadent.  But we may go beyond the purely biological issue, raising, as we are about to, the question of human culture. Our main examples of culture will be art and economics.  Race, species, art and economics--these are things we will try to bring together in a single picture.

The "dialectic" of race and species; of race culture and species culture:    The species, even as the species is confining and static, competes against the race.  This conflict is simply natural selection.  There are polyps in the sea whose new branches compete with the older branches, all this competion while the forms are still joined.  There can be--and is--a struggle between the general form and the form within the form.  Indeed, where there is life there is no aspect of life that is free of this "struggle for survival."  It is not enough to point out that the race is a form within the species; race and species are living entities and as such strive to develop at the expense of the other.   I am suggesting something other than is currently thought in biological science; therefore I accept a further burden of proof.  What I am saying simply is that this is the same universal struggle for survival among living forms, in this case outer and static forms and inner or vital forms.  Race and species are two different entities:  the one survives and endures, as its mode of existence; the other expands and even, in surpassing itself, dooms itself to extinction.  In Nietzsche's phrase, "Man is something that shall be surpassed."  This is precisely true.  But its mode of advance is through the race--at the expense of the species.

Race is a choice.  The species, on the contrary, is no choice.  One is born into a race without being consulted, obviously, and without any free decision.  But there is more.  While having no choice of the race into which one appears as an individual, there is for him or her still choice as to where to pass one's genes and possibilities.   One chooses a mate; that is a true choice in every sense and one that sets the person in one culture or the other.  Marriage is both a genetic and cultural choice.  We may follow mainstream philosophers in assuming that choice is an act of will, an event of biological and personal assertion.  Through choice the person is "free."  So far in this blog, and for good reason, I have avoided the word "freedom" as undefinable.  Freedom in the context of Force Theory means simply the ability to "choose" between one possibility and the other.  We may still assume that there are internal forces and principles "coercing" one's "free" choice; even emotions and other internal stimulae are coercive.  Insofar as one acts according to any internal motive, however, the person is "free" in choosing one possibility over another.  This is true of one's choice of a marriage partner, and simultaneously of one's race--not his race as extending into the past, but his race extending into the future.  We may qualify the word race here to mean future race.  Our decisions in general never are about the past, which is unalterable; they are about the future.  Still, one has no choice about the species, since the person imparts his genes and possiblities to the species in general, so long as the race does still belong to the  species.  One does not have to impart one's genes and possibilities to a given race, however:  in this one has a choice.  Of course, one can still impart his or her genes and possibilities into a race other than the one one is born into.  Whatever choice one makes in regard to a given race, that choice alters the race inwardly and outwardly.  If I choose not to bear black children, that fact alters the black race; if I choose to bear black children, that choice alters the black race.    Every choice I make whatsoever, in my culture and personal relations, affects race.   No decision I make affects species.  All decisions I make are absorbed uniformly, along with everyone else's decisions--and these are decisions large and small that we make countless times every day--by the species.  If we consider a choice an act of will, then race itself appears through an assertion of the individual, who, as we have said, is the focus of will and willing, or of pure nature. 

Trust is a suspension of free choice.  As we trust, so we agree to suspend any assertion of will.  I have already talked about true trust as a state of mind of human beings who, through language and promises, are together in an agreement.  Trust means in the context of an agreement that the human renders himself "vulnerable" to another person.  Any choice within the framework of an agreement is absolutely disruptive to that agreement.  To have an agreement in the first place means that everything stated in the terms of the agreement has already been decided.  Any choices that there have been are in the past and in that sense outside reach of any free choice whatsoever.  I have talked about agreement extensively in this blog.  An agreement can be seen as a confinement, in that sense contra naturam, in which choice and even life itself, as a vital force, is suspended.  The agreement is most perfectly represented in writing, as an abstract expression of language, where any living motives are per se suspect.

Both choice and trust can be understood only with reference to an agreement:  choice is about an agreement, in the formulation of an agreement [here I am skating on thin ice:(];  trust is a state of being within an agreement.  Choice is always active in making an agreement; choice is never, on the other hand, welcome inside an agreement.  Choice and trust are seen here, in Force Theory, as logical and empirical opposites.  Where there is free choice there is no agreement.  Where there is trust there is already, in effect, an agreement.   If I say I trust a person, I withdraw all personal input--choice--regarding what has been agreed to in the first place.  There can be specific provisions for trust:  I entrust my money to a stockbroker with the stipulation that he not buy and sell stocks in my account without my permission.  In this agreement I do not trust my stockbroker.  Or, I may give him permission to buy or sell stocks in my account.  Here I trust him.  To trust is to withdraw one's own freedom of choice, and to render oneself--for a reason--vulnerable to possible abuse.  We conclude by saying that agreements stipulating trust are regarded as "species" oriented.  Here I am going to have to make myself perfectly clear:rolleyes:.  I may qualify myself to say that the species rather than the individual person or race is first to benefit from agreements.

We may take the example of marriage.   Marriage stipulates the "union" of two members of the human species.  Of course, as was the case in Mississippi, there could be a racial requirement.  But in general, in all societies, marriage is a contract between human beings without discriminating race. Marriage is an agreement about the species, not about the individual or the race.  The children that ensue from marriage are to be human, not white or black or red.  This is the arrangement that human beings accept complacently and, as per agreement, on trust.   Marriage thereby becomes a vehicle for unrestricted miscegination.  Religion sometimes passes beyond offering the possibility of miscegination to the requirement of miscegination.  The Spanish in Mexico had this requirement; as did the Moonies and certain cultish groups.  Agreements--precisely because they demand trust and forbid choice--are favored for species ends, to, in other words, secure the biological and cultural uniformity (in the species mind, adaptibility) of the species.  Choice, which is anti-agreement, is also anti-species.  Race, as of the individual, obstructs the free flow of genes and possibilities from one extremity of the species to the other.  Agreements by definition, in the terms we have discussed agreements here, demand equality--and uniformity--of their parties, even as, as we have already said, the species is a biological expression of this very idea of uniform distribution.  [review this material:rolleyes:]

The human being lives in the world through his culture.  For this reason--that humans have culture with them and around them always--issues of biology and issues of culture are often difficult to separate.  Oswald Spengler speaks of culture, in its healthy phase, as "grown together" with race as the soil of a plant is grown together with the plant itself.  Culture as we define the word is not biological, but is about biology.  Spengler should have pointed out, at the same time, what a liability culture can be:  where culture and biology are indistinguishable, an attack of some sort--here we may imagine some sort of "cultural virus"--on the culture would be an assault, simultaneously, on a people's race or biology in general.  Culture and biology may be intertwined, by they are nevertheless external to one another. Human culture is only a physical and, what is the same, a mental thing; where culture is mental it is purely abstract and in that sense "external" to issues of essential life.  This--the distinction between biology and culture--will be our basic point of view.   Here again we may distinguish racial from species objectives of culture.    Culture, which is a conscious human effort to support life, is creative when culture is "racial" but decadent when it is simply "human."   Two areas of culture may be considered as examples of what we are talking about.   Art, for instance, although an apparently ephemeral and fleeting thing, is always individual and in that sense, too, racial.  What is merely economic, the thing Engels talked about--a mass of pots and pans for the kitchens of workaday people--is merely human, and in that sense decadent.  Just to say a thing is practical is to identify that thing, as such, as "decadent."   The very word economics suggests a reality that is in decline simply because any economy is a "human" economy.  Human means here of and pertaining to the human species, Homo sapiens.  Words such as mankind and man are used in this context.  The species as any species should be seen as an as an external enclosure for which there are no new possibilities.  The species is what life has become, a pure outline, but within the species appear new forms--these new forms we call race.   

Life declines within the species.   Seeing the species as the outer form limiting inward possibilities, the species has "become" entirely what it is, with no chance for change as a species.  Any change to the species comes first to the race, which is "open" to new possibilities.   Race has no immediate boundaries and is free in its choices and possibilities.  The race, as I say, is itself just such a boundary or confinement,  being--and passing away-- but not becoming.  Race is the child, the species is the parent. 

"Mankind," is an entirely abstract, species-focused word and in that sense "decadent."  As societies increased in size, and incorporated ever more diverse human elements on some sort of "contractual" footing with one another, the sacred documents of such groups--we may mention the American Constitution--use words such as "humanity" and "mankind" that are devoid of any content whatsoever other than the content of species.  In my Philtalk essays I talk about such words.  New research on apes shows apes can talk and use words as symbols in thinking much as so-called humans do.  In fact, if we take language to be the defining trait of "human being," apes are essentially as human as most people.  What confines Homo sapiens members in the living world is their genetic isolation from other species.  The word species indicates genetic exclusion, as I say, in biology and in certain communication in general.  The form of the species, in this situation of exclusion and isolation, does not change; the form simply passes away to make way for another species.  This is the order and progress of the living vital force.  The agency of any change that there is is race.  Through race, which emerges within a species, the species is simply overwhelmed by new form and new creative possibilities.  The race and species enter into a confrontational "dialectic," with the species the conservative and confining agent and the race as the creative, form-abolishing agent.  Correspondingly, human culture takes part in this confrontation.  What is creative in culture is what is also emphemeral and individual.  Thus, for example, art--in the widest sense of the word art--triumphs over the dull reality of everday economics.  The race supplants the species.  The very word "mankind" is slated for extinction.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2010-01-04 16:32:37)