18. ZWANGSGELLSCHAFT

PHASES OF CULTURE

INTRODUCTION
By phases of culture I mean hypothetical stages.  I have already discussed [cite] the origins of human culture; and in doing so I pointed out that there is no pure "state of nature" for humans, so long as they are human.  To be human, I aver, is to have use tools and technics in an existence that is mediated and mediating.  Human beings have always had culture; culture is what defines human beings.  On the other hand, within the gradual climb of culture, over a three million year period,  to more complex forms, there appears to dominate one principle or the other.  These principles in turn define levels of culture.  Thus, for instance:  (1) personal force in human relations dominates the first period; (2) technological development is the theme of the second; (3) slavery--accomplished by the use by one group of  technological prowess to constrain another group; (4) the appearance of a community of dominating"equals" out of the community of dominated "unequals"; and finally (5) the self-contradiction of "cooperation of equals."

I. THE PERIOD OF PERSONAL FORCE
In the earliest human communities there was no equality or inequality, either one, so far as these terms suggest anything institutional.  Life for humans was straightforward and simple, or as we may say here, "fascist."  There was in this phase a pecking order, so to speak, among humans established through personality traits of dominance and submission, on the level with many animal species.  There was rank, certainly, but not rank institutionalized in any abstract category; only rank built on qualities of strength and leadership.  Thinkers from Rousseau to Engels speak of a primal "equalitarianism."  This was not so.  Human differences were recognized, but only as individual--not group--traits.  Many primitive tribes, such as the Bushmen of the Kalahari, rank themselves in this way.  This is "pure" fascism.  This is not a human institution, however, but a rank order of personality.  As I say, life among such ranked and ranking people is straightforward.  There is no suggestion that such life is especially violent, because this certainly is not the case; only that this life is direct.  So that, in other words, in the case of an offense of one person against another there is immediate (as opposed to inter-mediate) retaliation.  This retailiation could be on the part of an individual or the whole group.  In such a society there is no stigma attached to pure revenge.  Certain contributions from the individual are enforced by the group.  In general terms, such a society is no different than most communities existing today; except that--and this is a mental process--life is understandable.  We could speak of certain "fascist" qualities of life, even simple activities like killing one's own meat.  Such "barbaric" practices are shunned today by individuals; who, however, are constrained in situations, also, calling for revenge.  To be "fascist" in these terms is to fail to invoke archane principles to explain and direct everyday, ordinary activities.  In the earliest times, life was simply understood as it appears, unproblematically, or "fascistically."  Again, however, one's own personal qualities direct how one will understand any given situation; such a situation does not have to be "explained" to him by intermediaries.  We may speak of men and women of this period as "real" humans, who, even as tool-making and using creatures that they were, had a direct comprehension of life and did not call everyday existence anything other than it appeared to be.  Of course, there were stronger and weaker members of the community; this fact was not turned through culture into something religious or other-worldly.   Finally, tools and culture generally were turned to the surrounding world, or the environment of objects; tools were directed outward, away from the group, while relations among members of the group were still on an "animal" level of primal instincts and "fascistic" force.  It is easy to see that Friedrich Engels conception of the Teutonic mark, a benign grouping of primitive socialists, was Engel's own private fantasy and one easy to disprove by the facts of anthropology.  Also, Rousseau's conception of a vegetarian equalitarian is false.  I prefer Oswald Spengler's conception of early man as a Raubtier (carnivore).  But in social relations, the human being was similar at this early period to other animals, most of which have instinctive pecking orders based on personality, natural strength and other individual qualities.

II. THE PERIOD OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE
Personal force--here we talk of bodily strength and coordination--was partly supplanted by technological prowess; but this transition was only in the human relation with his surroundings, not his social group.  The human being advanced technologically even while he maintained his instinctive "fascistic" social order.  Again, as I said at the beginning of this section, we are speaking of a hypothetical period; of course, in all this evolution, technology was impinging on instinctive behaviors in all areas, even the social areas.  This development began early one.  But the tools one made and used determined the success of the individual and group in providing a livlihood.  It was in his external relations--with the surrounding world of animal and plant food--that technology assumed a major role in human life.  This I said already in an earlier section [cite].  We point out, first, the simple sticks and stones used as tools constituting the earliest human culture

I said earlier that human life is characterized by a certain indirectness, exhibited, above all, in tool use.  To use a tool is to accomplish an objective indirectly.  Animals on the other hand show only direct behavior.  The animal seeing a prey goes directly to that prey without, as would a human being, stooping to pick up a stick or stone as a weapon.  The stick or stone, and all the behavior wherein the stick or stone is obtained, manipulated and deployed, mediates human behavior particularly in areas that may be narrowly defined as practical behaviors.  Human existence in practical relations with the world were, in Hegel's phrase, mediating and mediated.   These various human behaviors seem trite, today, but in a philosophical-anthropological perspective they are important; the entire human mental orientation, throughout its ascending layers of complexity, all eminate from and revolve around the simple indirect primal act of picking up and using a stick.  It is not too much to conclude, even, that such an act of using a stick or stone as tool/weapon is in itself a proto-religious act. The tool, in the thoughts of the early human--such as these thoughts were--may have actually had a magical or supernatural meaning.  The first artifact may have also been the first diety, a mediator among mediators.

At the time of the first tool use, three million years ago, human beings had simple basic social structure, not different than the social life of apes.  Their social life was nothing so complicated as that of mere ants or bees; but the basic elements of social ranking by dominance were in place.  The strength and intelligence of a dominant individual--usually but perhaps not always a male--were the bond that held the group together as a unit.  Where danger was greatest, the bonding--and the order that eminates from this bond--was the tightest.  I may refer to baboons, in particular, because they live in the open with large predators, are preeminent "fascists."  This I believe to be true.  The main point here is that all these social relations, such as they were, were supplied by instinct.  In such relations there is Selbstverstaendlichkeit, or self-evidentiality--directness.  Human social relations are immediate, while technical relations--between human being and his external world--are intermediate.  Human beings have remained "baboons" in their social life.  The conclusion to be drawn is that in thoughts, finally, that a person has about his relations with other persons tend to be direct and unproblematic.  But this last statement must be qualified.  These instictive and direct relations inhere in the simple group; but when social groups become larger and more complex, the same mediational viewpoint that inheres in technical relations comes to be applied, finally, in social relations.

We may have a brief bit of fun, perhaps, in calling primal human social relations "baboon-like" and "fascist."  Under conditions of life on the savanah, where humans not only preyed but were often preyed upon, this "fascism" was an issue of life and death.  We need not repeat the litany of misery our ancestors suffered.  It almost goes without saying that, as the basic fact of existence under which human beings evolved for millions of years, the fascistic social order is ingrained in human instincts.  What has changed, but only recently, is the implementation in interpersonal or social relations of mediated or intermediary forms that began early on as technical relations.  The human being originated as any animal of his basic type originated, with simple social proclivities; and this social orientation remains in his instincts.  The human being began as, and will always remain, a "fascist"--his basic ideas about society and relationships is direct, immediate.  This is an important point and one that must be repeated.  The stage is set, finally, wherein instincts of society and mediating forms of society are counterpoised for confrontation.  The actual playing out of this confrontation is something we will describe shortly.

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THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY OUT OF SLAVERY

I have said that two men in a (hypothetical) Rousseauian "state of nature" exist together, so long as they have a relationship at all (and one does not "wander off into the woods"),  in a fascistic or "baboon"relationship.  That is, one of the men being stronger and more assertive is likely to control, more or less, the other.  This relationship I call primal fascism.  It is also a highly honest relationship that is understood by both men.  We do not have to imagine that this state of affairs is really pleasant for either man; it is a relationship born out of necessity.  Such a relation is imposed by external circumstances.  I have already said that this is a simple, selbstverstaendlich (self-evident) relation.  The complexity of relationships grows exponentially, however, if the two men become four men:  two oppressed and two oppressing.

Behavioral scientists are aware of the significance of the number three in group psychology.  That is, if three individuals--dogs or humans--come together a "pack" mentality arises.  There is one leader and two followers.  Such a pack is apt to become aggressive and predatory.  Such a pack has a group identity and a group will.  For the moment, however, while we assume that some will dominate, and others will follow, we are focusing on the likewise important question of the relationship between the leaders.  They come together for the simple purpose of oppressing the remainder of the group.  That is altogether true.  But there are relationships among the elite themselves that become important and need to be addressed.  It is assumed, within the elite, that the elite members, while not necessarily equals in all respect, have so-called "rights" that have to be respected by the other elite members.  There seems initially no alternative within this elite to impose upon themselves still a further--beyond the simple class structure of oppressed and oppressor--rank order.  In this environment of competition, as there always must be, there is going to be an essential distrust--often a trust that is soon broken--between the elite members.

It is at this point, then, that something like a "democratic government" appears.  Democracy in these terms is a contract solely among members of an elite, who, in a spirit of distrust, impose upon themselves some way of resolving their inevitable differences.  By contract we mean that within the agreement, force is transfered out of the agreement and to a third party or government.  Democracy in these terms would be a general agreement.    We see, finally, that democracy does not appear as the elite which has control gives up its control.  This is certainly not the case.  Democracy appears rather when the elite members themselves attempt to restore trust within their own group by imposing, together, a central authority over all of them, one whose purpose is to enforce agreements that are made.  Of course this government--which may be called a "third party"--comes itself to be an oppressor.  It is not my purpose to condemn, however, the oppression of government.  My purpose is rather to condemn the redundancy of government.  For honest--fascistic--oppression, we substitute redundand and dishonest oppression.  Dictatorship in these terms is only a name for honesty .  Democracy is dishonest bullying.

I said earlier that dictatorship is simply honest government.  This is true.  The subjective, willful will of one or several men is imposed upon willing or unwilling citizens.  In these terms, all disagreements that do inevitably arise are settled by force according to the one principle:  the will of the dictator.  That is the way disputes should be settled.  We may pause for a minute to speculate on whether a system were possible that is based on a pure lottery way of settling disputes.  In other words, in a dispute the highest card picked by a disputant would settle the case.  Duels once acted to this end--success in a duel, though, had nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of one position in the dispute or the other.  Yet the duel was a way of settling disputes.  We are beyond that, of course, and will never return to it.  Picking cards though at least gives disputants and even chance.  For our purpose, an even chance is a better chance, in most cases, than the chance one has in a democractic court of law.   This is to say that the principle of "fairness" in disputes has never really been understood let alone accepted in the history of culture.  Yet "fairness" and "objectivity" is what is opposed on citizens by democracy.  It remains only to say that in a democracy nothing like "justice" ever occurs; such an issue is lost in disputation.   

It is precisely in such a dictatorship, on the other hand--so long as the society does not excede a certain size and extend to an overly diverse, polyglot population--that trust can flourish.  The force of the dictator is extended downward, individual to individual, through the entire population.  We call this a pecking order, but we should have a better, more respectful word for the system.  Better would be to call this a fascistic order.  Anyway, whatever we call such a social group the group  has a subjective presence, understood by everyone in his or her own subjective way, much as my own arms and legs understand what my brain is saying.  This is an order known subjectively or as an "internal form," as I referred earlier to subjective reality. The order of my body most certainly is not a democracy so much as subjective regemintation.  Democracy, for its part, demands that every issue be settled by a "fair" mediation which, for its part, is born out of the mistrust equals have for one another.  The democratic system is indirect, obscure, inefficient and certainly not "fair."  Issues are settled rather for precisely this third party, which is not actually an organic--subjective--part of the social corpus.  These are all considerations I hinted at earlier but must now be drawn out.  In simpler terms, democracy is to society like a puppet is to a puppeteer; dictatorship, on the contrary, is what my mind is to the feelings in my fingers and toes.  In democracy, society is turned inside out; society exists only as an external form.  Finally, dictatorships as societies stand in relation to one another in the aforementioned (Rousseauian) "state of nature"; they are subjectively-constituted human entities with no objective forms to bind them together.  Objectively constituted social groups, on the other hand, can be bound to one another by further, more complicated ties and terms--and bound as well to everything else in the universe.  Essentially, the democratic society is formless and incohate.

AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN OPPRESSION
African oppression is the oppression of everyone--absolutely--by one man.  The anthropologist GP Murdock has described African dictatorships as "peas in a pod." Their trait in common is the concept of the Big Man.  This Man, who has many wives and children, has life-and-death power over all his subjects; these subjects concede absolutely any power they may otherwise have.  This absolute power is what Hegel was referring to when he spoke of Africa as a place where "none are free."  The sterotypic picture of Africa is one that corresponds to my own reading (I have never been to Africa and will never go).  What will be required here, inevitably and as readers raise their own questions, is how African oppression, in concept and practice, differs from the oppression I attribute to Europeans.  It is true that among Europeans the idea of democracy, equality and "freedom" have entered into their thinking at every phase of their history, not only in periods of ostensible democracy but in times of oppressive dictatorship.  I thinking of democracy here not as any fixed system, that is forged to stand the test of time, but as a process through which human beings resolve, or attempt to resolve, their differences and in doing so soften and loosen the effects of the oppression of force that inevitably must exist.  Democracy is misunderstood as a system; it is not a system, as I say, but an ongoing attempt to force apart, IN a moment of consideration and contemplation, parties locked in disputes who would otherwise settle differences through personal force even to the point of violence.  The basis of democracy, I aver, is the contractual agreement.  Rousseau spoke of the Social Contract, which is a contract between citizens and government.  The position taken here, in this writing, is that there is in effect a social contract, but that it is between two individual persons.  These two parties then also agree to place authority in the contract in the hands of a third party, in the event that there is a dispute between the principals.  The contract then evokes a third party, or government.

The third party in this agreement is government, understood as an arbitrator of differences.  Therefore when we invoke, as I have done earlier, the concept of force, that is meant to be the overriding principle that holds a society to gether.

Here I am going to soften my stand, somewhat, in favor of "democracy."  For example, Africans cannot agree on anything whatsoever; and their relationships are a nightmare of mutual intimidation.  Such hopeless dominance behavior precludes any constructive cooperation.  Rather than to fight one another, Africans hand over--absolutely--to a Big Man all authority.  Such authority is correspondingly absolute.  Such behavior of leader and follower in Africa has become a cliche of anthropology.  White behavior is different.  That there is a racial factor, based in genetics, is something we must consider.  Of course white societies become arbitrarily oppressive in times of extreme exigency--war, calamity and so forth.  In their eternal naivete, white people see a given system of government as potentially eternal, but for the efforts of understanding people who put an end to this or that system, democratic or dictatorial.  Force of course dominates politics in extreme times; whereas democracy usually appears in good times.  The feature of war that precludes democracy, the need for extreme force within a group that corresponds with forced used against an enemy, does not preclude creative and cooperative relations, as evidenced by the fact that people are highly inventive during war, as they are destructive.  Great inventions have appeared during times of war.  Where democracy enters, then, is when men have a certain discretion in their relationships; when, in other words, they can think of themsleves and thus, on their own behalf, enter into relationships of agreement with other men.  It is in these descretionary relations that disagreements come about. 

It is precisely here--to mediate in these disagreements--that "democratic" governments come about.  I said earlier that dictatorship is simply honest government.  There is every reason to accept dictatorship in time of exigency; no one ever contests that at the time of its happening, or even thinks of democracy.  Democracy in these terms is a luxury, demanded by people who are in, by their own volition, agreements withe other people.  These agreements degenerate into disputes, usually petty ones; democracy is created as sort of a judicial system which must have its own power and authority, even though these disputes are numerous and small.  I said that I would soften my stand regarding democracy.  I do think democracy is a natural process, more in the order of a long term luxury than an immediate necessity.

European culture is creative; African culture is not creative.  This is a proposition proscribed in ordinary literature.  Nevertheless, with the freedom of the internet, that is what is being said here.  Creativity involves not simply individual ingenuity, which African occasionally do have, but equally importantly the ability and capability of humans to associate with one another cooperatively.  This is a vital ability.  Africans apparently do not have this ability, inasmuch as, plain to see, they always argue among themselves; they must immediately must settle a dominance or pecking order between themselves, and settle this absolutely, before they can have a simple coversation.  The relation between whites, in normal life, is to set aside these differences if only momentarily, in order to have a cooperative relationship.  It is in the setting of these cooperative, free relations that disputes arise.  During wartime these disputes are overwhelmed by the exigency of the situation; in effect, these diputes are settled by the force of events themselves rather than any problem existing between individual humans.  Where, however, there is no exigency, all success or failure of the relationship must inhere in that relationship itself; or the power to settle that relationship must be transfored beyond the principal parties to a third party, which is governement.

In the preceding forum I laid down a basis for discussing the issue, which is of final importance here, of the "objectification" of culture.  The result of democratic, free relations among human beings--their ability to enter freely into agreements, and the corresponding appearance of "third party" institions--has the overwhelming effect of "objectifying"human relationships. This is an important point to consider.  In these terms, obviously, a society with a "democratic mentality" (this includes Russia, we may say) can grow much larger than petty dictatorships.
The terms binding humans in petty dicatorships are those of force, pure and simple.  Democracies, even where these are sporadically implemented, and so long as there is a system of arbitrating disputes, provide additional relationships which are capable of indefinite expansion.  The "global society," of which Africa is not a part, is simply a network of such voluntary agreements.  We are suggesting perhaps that Africans are "ememplary fascists"; that appears to be the case.  We are not arguing here, however, whether European or African government is more "honest"; we have already settled that issue--the African Big Man concept is indefinitely more honest than democracy, which is convoluted and obscure.  The very creativity of Europeans portends the downfall of European society as the result of hyper-objectification.  Even the slave concept among Europeans has lost its true force of personality, and has devolved, finally, into, in effect, goverment by machines.  So when I say European society is more creative than African society, it must be stated, as well, that Europeans are susceptible to the failure of the thing that holds together all society--and all life.  What sustains society and life is personal force, that is,  subjective reality.

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL THEORY
CONTRADICTIONS AND RESOLUTIONS

COLLABORATIVE SOCIETIES
In the Collaborative Society the chief is also participant in the major enterprise of the group (always hunting).  Thus in a dispute between hunters there is nowhere to appeal other than one of the hunters themselves.  In the long term, in all the twists and turns of history, this simple principle has profound consequences.  There is finally a contradiction between the social order necessary for collaboration and on the other hand an "equality" of human beings.  For collaboration to be successful there must be some mechanism or principle within the structure of the collaboration to resolve disputes such as inevitably arise.  Where collaborators are unequal these disputes are resolved, always, in favor of the stronger party.  There is a leader and a follower; the sole motivation of the leader is to keep the enterprise alive, wherein he is likely to be respectful of his follower.  The first human hunting bands were mostly like that, with the strongest hunter--the leader--as also the chief of the band.  Thus the disgruntled subordinate hunter had nowhere to appeal to express dissatisfaction.  I call this earlist human grouping collaborative.  Other animals, for instance lions as they coordinate efforts in the hunt, are this way; as a continuation of the hunting strategy human beings fostered collaboration.  I may have earlier suggested that this strategy of human hunters as protofascist.  There is some logic in this association.  I could stress the advantages of such grouping.  There were never any arguments, or very few; at least none that were carried very far or could interfere with the success of the venture.  In the matter of dispute-resolution we may say, clearly, that the protofascist system was superior to what exists in a modern democracy.  In saying this, that dictatorships are superior to democracies in resolving disputes I have not said anything new.  The point in this writing must be to see how deeply disputes affect the functioning of societies.

HUMAN GROUPINGS BASED ON AGREEMENTS
An agreement is a language-based "understanding" added to a collaborative relationship.  We may speak of a mental framework within which two "parties" interact.  Phases of an agreement may be outlined as follows.  Two men have an idea in common; they share this idea; each realizes that he would profit from a collaboration with the other man.
The agreement has a provision wherein is stated the contribution of each man.  I have called this the "inclusive" phase of the agreement (cite).  The agreement stipulates also how the product of that agreement shall be distributed to the two men.  Thus, if an animal is envisioned, how the meat of that animal shall be divided.  This is very elementary reckoning of which any normal human being is capable.  But there is something further in the agreement which for our purposes is decisive.  That is, it is stipulated that no man shall use his own force to resolve differences that may arise in the course of carrying out the agreement.  One party to the agreement may or may not derive some greater reward through the agreement; that is not the point here.  One hunter may arrange to take a larger portion of the food proceeds, according to his needs.  Elsewhere I have talked about marriage as a contract that stipulates very different roles and rewards for male and female parties, so much so, in fact, that no dissection of the marriage contract could find an advantage or disadvantage one way or the other, toward male and female.  The essential part of the marriage contract that concerns us here is the so-called rule of thumb which in British common law says that a man may not hit his wife (essentially) or hit her with an object large enough to hurt her.  Most contracts are this way.  The handshake between parties in an agreement, in finalizing the agreement and signaling that the agreement shall proceed in practice, says, as anthropologists inform us, we proceed "without a weapon."  (In the handshake each checks the other for the presence of a suspected weapon.)  Finally, the agreement in itself, which was within the capacity of the earliest human hunters, so long as they had language, had one major disadvantage in relation to the protofascist arrangement:  there was no provision within the agreement itself to settle disputes.  I am suggesting that such agreements would have to work by virtue of the persuasive effect of language itself, in which disputing parties would face one another in argument.  Thus in place of force of arms and strength in settling disputes, there would be a sort of war of words, we may suggest.  It is reasonable to think that this state of affairs took up a certain definite although perhaps short period of time in human prehistory, corresponding perhaps to the period in which hunting passed over into agriculture; while on the other hand communities--we should say bands--were miniscule and where there was established among these peoplel no leadership that was separate from actual participants in everyday life and disputes.  In other words, for the continued flow of practical life the people depended upon their own intelligence in discussion.  We may assume that this period was brief.

                  In the handshake--which makes the agreement an absolutely non-violent relationship--each checks the other for the presence of a suspected weapon.

SOCIETIES BASED ON CONTRACTS (FREE ENTERPRISE)
A contract between parties is a tacit admission that these parties cannot, through the persuasive force of their own words, settle disputes on their own, but must assign such settlement to an "outside and impartial" party.   The two principals thus create a third party to the agreement which has the stipulated purpose of resolving disputes between the principals.  The third party would not exist, at least initially, without this act of the principals.  The third party has no prior existence to its, the third party's, creation as an agreement to enforce an agreement.  Government does not appear as an act of God, we may say.   Of course groups outside the agreement-group can step in to take over as enforcer of contracts; this is a frequent occurance:   barbarian raiders were sometimes invited in to govern cities whose populations were hopessly mired in disagreement.  (cite)   We may suggest it was precisely these barbarian marauders who put the final touch on civilization.  Agreements had become cumbersome since, while they stipulated the forcelessness of collaborators, these agreements provided no direct and obvious ways of compelling compliance as per any agreement.  Such compliance could only come through force.  With this sense of the need for force the populace of a city turned to the agents of violence who frequently impinged upon their cities, the chariot-drivers and mobile cattle hearders, once a source of fear, now an opportunity for peace among the ranks of the cityfolk.  All this is known history.

"CIVILIZATION"
The thesis so far as been that human institutions originate, not by an act of planning but by the outcome of simple agreements such as happen every day in many instances of human interaction.  The effect of an agreement in a human relationship is to transfer the element of force from within the structure of collaboration to  (some point) outside that relationship.
A democracy such as exists today would come about through some stipulated and voluntary act wherein parties to an agreement, each by express and voluntary sign, pass their own force to a party specially created to "manage" such force and use it for the stated (within the agreement) purpose.  This is the stated role of today's democracy.  In actual fact the force of parties to agreements was passed to warlords and such which had always existed as preditors.  What is suggested here is that force became a reality of social life that was, at first by small degrees but then as a self-sustaining process, that had only minor relevance to the agreements that there are...  (under revision; to continue

Only human beings have contracts or agreements of any sort, which require language and an understand of future time.  Other animals, even birds, have the nuclear family; but they do not have marriage.  In the sense that contracts, through language and human abstract thinking, transcend biology suggest that marriage belongs, rather, to the sphere of objective reality;  that marriage for instance is a sort of tool or other detachable sort of thing of which the human being has many.

TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF FORCE

A THEORY OF FORCE
A serious study of the notion of force is called for here.  The fascist thinkers that there were--facism was sadly overwhelmed by the practical reality of the war period--never got to the philosophical basics of their own ideology.  There is no desire here to appropriate the word "fascisim," which has become a pejoritive term.  We must go on.  I talked in the last forum about how words that have been stigmatized in the popular vernacular come, over time, to have more meaning than words signfying "good" things.  Hence the word force, stigmatized as fascism, does today mean something; while words such as freedom and democracy and truth mean virtually nothing.  This is the situation that has evolved.  Where we are to build a philosophy of man and society must be upon words with real meaning.  One of these words is force.  The meaning is there--also the implications--but there still remains the task of eliciting these meanings and implications.  With this mission in mind I introduce the concept of Zwangsgesellschaft, or Society of Force.  A lot of my effort initially will consist of softening the word force, because it need not be construed as a harsh reality, only as the long-term reality that there is.   Democracy implodes in the self-contradiction of equality, which is the above-mentioned fact that normally there is no trust between equals.  In the master-servant relationship, on the other hand, there is trust so long as this trust is understood as predictability:  what the master will do, or what the servant will do, is predictable.  This can be established through simple experience.  Such direct relations obviate the need for "third parties," which are irrelevant to the basic workings of society.  Third parties are essentially redundancies.  Also it is a mistake, one committed by all voices of democracy, to distinguish between fascist or dictatorial governments and democracies as simply "forms of government."  Dictatorships may or may not be governments, in the third-party sense of the word government.  A dictatorship may (or may not) be simply an expression of force, in which case the basic contradiction of all society is resolved--the fact that equals do not trust one another.

Note new policy:  I will enter new writing at the end of a section rather than  at the beginning.  I will also leave old writing, much of which I consider more or less worthless.  My bad writing, and there is a lot of it, does offer some idea of how a piece develops.  Also there may be a seed of an idea there; I need to cull this material.  rs

There were matings and even marriages between humans of different bands; but these were achieved partly through force or, as we say, "rape."  Brides were taken as booty.  Human beings, taken in slavery, may have been history's first property; the possession of them constituted wealth.  The point to be made here is that the dynamics of continuity and change within a species were the same for humans as for other animals.  There was competition between groups, matings were between individuals close to home, with little contact or knowledge of humans more than a few miles away.  With the advent of language, on the other hand, a scarce 500,000 years ago, new possibilities appeared.  Knowledge of the human species widened.  I talked earlier of language as a universal phenomenon among humans; individual language differences were a minor obstacle.  Along with language there appeared trade.  We can now trace trade routes that extended across great areas of the world, sometimes more than a thousand miles through Europe, America and Asia.  Gradually there emerged a human idea of the human species as a whole.  It was slow in comming.  Technological advances in transportation assisted this knowledge.  Humans understood the human species as a whole.  Through language and trade, furthermore, they have attempted to build a society--an artificial order--upon this otherwise biological concept.  The human species, on the other hand, remains an artificial concept.  The species is "fact" so long as we consider humans a species among other species of animals.  The human species, or so-called "humanity," is, on the other hand, a pure theory insofar as any relationship is implied in this concept.  Humanity is a "theory" that, in fact, may benefit humans materially through a complex division of labor, in the same way that any group, by virtue of more members, can leverage their technical abilities.  We have spoken of these issues earlier.  But there is more.  The way the species is creative is in its own dynamic principle, wherein, through race the former species is replaced by a new species.  It is of this principle we must think now when we propose a "society" of the future.  The relations between humans, consistent with the forces of nature, must be coercive.   We are left with the paradox that, from the perspective of nature and evolution, the society--here altering our definition of society as simply an order of humans--that is coercive favors the race over the species.  The species, in Nietzsche's words, is something that will be transcended.  The mode of relationship that carries this principle forward is coercion.

Force Theory must anticipate criticism.  In fact, I would be the first to concede that Spartan Socialism, as the eventual white society, makes no sense in terms of what we experience today. There is an anecdote that has always fascinated me, of middle-class American tourists whose plane crashed in the Andes mountains.  They all surived the ordeal.  They related afterwords, however, that following the crash, in as little as half an hour, they all began having thoughts that they would kill and eat their fellow passangers.  It is quite thinkable with this anecdote in mind that white people, if they can be caused to accept cannibalism, will accept slavery of weak-minded white people and some of the other "draconian" provisions of Spartan or White Socialism.  We are at no loss for an explanation.   Prohibitions against cannibalism are taught in the schools; how little these small sermons matter when humans are fearful or severly stressed.  What we are saying, in other words, the further lives of humans are removed from any pressing issue, the more they see themselves as creatures of high morality and lofty teaching.  American gets its idealistic point of view from the European Enlightenment, in other words the worst and most unrealistic ideas that Europe has to send us.  I have said this before.  America has also never known a time of physical necessity.  What demands a solution, on the other hand, is--will turn out to be--the collapse of American agreements.  Democracy, so called, is engaged fatally in a flat-out logical contradiction which may be called the paradox of forced equality.  The American way of life, here called Americanism, will not survive this fallacy.  The way is now open to a State of Nature, which I call Spartan (or White) Socialism.

We are Fascists, but not because we reject democracy, here and there, as an appropriate form of co-existence.  There have been workable democracies, from the Viking Thing to Greek councils.  All these democracies are among persons who are already social peers.  They do not apply to the lower and slave classes.  This is a matter of historical record.  General democracies, on the other hand, such as Americanist democracy, are not simply a bad practice, it is a flat-out logical contradiction.  Democracy for us today means forced equality and forced association.  This is the worst oppression of a sensitive human being conceivable--that he be brought into physical and conversational contact with humans that are of a much lower, we may almost say of an animal, nature.  I have tried in earlier sections to lay the groundwork for an understanding as to how this dismal picture has come about.  Briefly, the history of democracy is prefigured by the course and outcome of the simplest agreement.  Democracy as we know it today have turned from utopian or visionary agreement to a draconian contract.  What exists in microcosm in the logic of agreements has played large in the history of many millions of people.

                                       Force Theory is not primarily a
                                            theory of race.  Force Theory
                                            is a critique of "society."

The cover of Newsweek Magazine (September -- 09) displayed the head of baby with the caption:  "Is your baby racist?"  I want to here dwell on this subject.  There has been a general tendency of the academic and scientific community to reverse itself on the issue of nature versus nurture.   This is a consistent reversal, one major event of which was the PBS series "Brain Sex" that dwells on male-female differences.  But this is a far-reaching philosophical turnabout, insofar as, even weekly it is reported that science finds new ways to connect human biology and culture.  One article [cite] finds orientals more likely to experience social rejection; and explains the oriental propensity for ritual--what was previously thought pure culture--as aconsequence of sensitivity to rejection.  Through MRI, the actual pathways of pain, of oriental vs. caucasion (who are less prone to rejection feeling), are shown.  What this tendency of science and academic philosophy means to Force Theory is that FT no longer has to refute, on its own, the old "carte blanc" idea that culture, not biology, accounts for much of what humans do.  This development means that the burden of proof regarding, among other things race, is lifted from the shoulders of FT--from our--shoulders and placed squarely upon the opposition.  FT for its part can concentrate on the other side of human behavior--here called agreements--which explains in good part why human beings deny that race exists.  Race, along with other personal qualities, is denied in agreements as long as agreements are in force.  More of this later.

It now appears, as a result of extensive formal empirical studies within the university, that 5 year old children generally make distinctions, first, by skin color; and they follow these distinctions, secondly, with value judgements.  All Force Theory proposes is to follow the wisdom of these white children.   Our point is to learn from them, not the reverse.   Force Theory is not a theory of race.  Thus the sin of Force Theory is not racism, precisely, but to avoid the whole issue of race; to let that issue play out, in other words, on its own.  Our sin is the one of omission, not commision.   The Newsweek article is clear on this point.  Far from being color blind, it says, human beings are naturally highly sensitive to differences of race; they have a sense of group identity that they inherit as an instinct.  Why then should Force Theory bother with the whole question?  Newsweek says clearly:  parental and teacher intervention is necessary to turn children away from their inherent racist viewpoint.   All Force Theory is saying is, no, as parents we are going to make no effort along these lines with our own children.  We were never inclined to do this anyway.  Let nature take its course with children!   Force Theory commits the "sin of omission" simply by being relaxed in the face of certain subjects, among them race.   But there are other subjects.   In Mexico I witnessed "police brutality."  I always thought the police in Mexico acted appropriately in detaining, shaving and imprisoning  the white American hippy trash that came to Mexico and acted tastlessly (if not actually illegally).   There is a fascism of police work that is entirely acceptable to FT.  The best governments I believe are "oppressive dictatorships" precisely because they operate efficiently and expeditiously, and express the wishes of the best and most productive elements of society, the middle class.  Moral judgements on the subject of behavior in this or that country outside the USA are simply inappropriate, since they assume agreements.  The only justice there is is inside an agreement; where an agreement is lacking, there is no truth, justice or any of these things.  This is our most general consideration.