The fallen soldiers of a defeated nation are still honored and remembered by all,  be they
        Germans or Confederates or whoever.  The gods of a defeated nation, on the
        other hand, are consigned to a terrible fate--oblivion.  I am
        one of those forgotten gods, speaking as I do for German metaphysics. 
                                                                                                   --Richard Swartzbaugh

Tentatively, but only tentatively, I have identified my program as "Fascist."  I want to try to clarify my thinking on this word.  I am saying that life itself is fascist.  All that Force Theory means by fascism is the same freedom and spontanety of give-and-take that we would attribute to life in general, while admitting, of course, that there is much in this ebb and flow that is in some sense "oppressive."  Democracy within the small family group means that each member,  because that member belongs, can speak his or her piece.  Dictatorship, which is the inevitable reverse side of family life,  is the outcome of a dispute with one point of view prevailing.  Democracy and dicatorship exist, in other words, side by side in constant interplay with one another, within the family.  This is what I call the give-and-take of everyday life.   This blog ignores the entire issue of who is oppressing whom.  I want to speak rather of the liberating effect--liberating from the whole issue of so-called oppression--of the symbolism of the founder of Fascism, Mussolini.  His message was essentially that healthy ranking interaction is lost in abstract, ideological codes, laws and political theories that make up modern democratic society.  We may compare democratic and dictatorial ideas of government.   

The issue of dicatorship versus democracy comes up, finally, only when people speak of large societies including millions of people.  Primitive peoples in small tribal bands never raise the issue, for the reason that there is a spontaneous way to settle disputes.  Inasmuch as dictatorship is oppressive in large-scale societies, citizens are bound to oppose the system.  But we may go on to say that dictatorship is also honest govenment.  Democracy is often every bit as oppressive as dicatorship, but, in addition, democracy is dishonest.  For the reason that democracy is dishonest citizens may well oppose it even more than we oppose dictatorship.  To restore govenment to a dictatorial idea is simply to return to honest government (which, of course, citizens still will have to oppose). 

I am going to allow myself, in a certain spirit of irony, to submit the paradox of a "freedom to oppress."    There is a certain dictatorial oppression in every relationship.  There is almost no instance of human interaction that is not oppressive in some way, and in that sense dictatorial.  Government is simply a large affront and injustice, but not one which is essentially different in kind than the sort of pushing and shoving that we face everyday in the family and on the street.  What distinguishes a small relationship, say within a family, is not essentially different than the kind of politics that have been practiced worldwide, whether the guise of democracy or in a straightforward and honest form called "fascism."  I have called dictatorship simply honest government.  At any rate, one cannot theoretically eliminate "human oppression" and still preserve viable, living relationships among human beings in general.  That we have already made clear.  There is a give and take in relationships that give these relations their own personality.  And within this group personality there is a give and take wherein elements of the personality are subordinated to one another according to the various requirements and needs that challenge the individual and group.

In most general terms what I mean by "fascism" is the acceptance of personality as real  .  A good deal was said in earlier sections of this blog about personality as "absolute freedom."  That is, the personality of the individual human being is essentially the same freedom that any animal possesses in its movements.  Regarding human beings, this could be  the personality of the individual, of the individual relationship (as in marriage), or the personality of an entire population.  I have said several times that race is the strongest expression of personality in the face of today's civilization.  We owe a debt, here, to Mussolini--I consider him the most auspicious political expression of Force Theory--for creating, in theory,  a movement around the idea of his own personality.  This was egoism.  But that is what Force Theory is--egoism of the individual and the race.   Mussolini meant of course that this movement would turn around his own personality.  The consideration of Mussolini's egoism is a small technicality so far as we are concerned.  Mussolini for his part brought into existence a movement of in a general sense "nature," as we here define the word nature.  These are points I have been making all along.  At some point however I took a wrong turn.  At some point I began to suggest that Fascism could ever be a well-defined "system."  I do not think that is the case.  It would be more correct to say that Fascism, as I conceive the term, would be a critique of the pervasive impersonalism that is the basis of the theory upon which our present civilization is built.  I have talked and will talk about communism and democracy as ideology.  We can draw Christianity into the discussion too.  I have not mentioned, on the other hand, the Inca civilization of Peru presented by Thomas Moore in Utopia as the model for all social theory.  I do not need to go into the details of the Inca system, but its rigidity caused its collapse at the hands of renegade conquistadores.

Fascism is not a system for all eternity but, quite the contrary, is many moments that come into being and pass away. Again I raise the issue of "plasticity" and "freedom" of human relationships as they spontaneously adapted to new and largely unpredictable circumstances and conditions.  Fascism follows anarchism in affirming the individual.  But there is more. I will try to be clearer here than I have been so far on the paradox of the "collective individual."   Jesus loves me, this I know.  Mussolini loved only himself.  That is essentially what I revere in Mussolini.   I love him, not Jesus, because Mussolini left me alone to love myself.  Jesus on the other hand does not want me to love myself!  Under Fascism, but not under Christianity, I can love in myself what is best in me, which is the personality that I acquire through race.  I am the person that I am by accumulating and concentrating within myself the personality of race.   Jesus would not understand my point of view.   He would not have any of this, so I am informed. This is not the time or place to go into the more arcane pronouncements of democratic and Christian theorists.  Suffice it to say that these systems all share, for our purposes, the one quality that they are inflexible and therefore "anti-life."   Be that as it may, this simple fact of two opposite personalities of two human beings (one of them fictitious) plays out world-wide in two distinct points of view.  Fascism, built around the personality of one man--who loved himself--is essentially a nature philosophy that opens the individual to possibilities that have no systemic definition.  Later I will talk about communism and democracy as social systems in which the individual is trapped and rendered impotent. 

Democracy is the ossified remains of countless agreements, first freely entered but then recorded as the structure and form of human relationships; and  finally these recorded relations are reduced to contractual and involentary legal enforcement.  Democracy preaches freedom to enter agreements.  This I have said countless times in my  blog.  Democracy practices, on the other hand, merely the enforcement of agreements; in this legalistic enforcements of agreements qua contracts is the oppression of democracy.  Through agreements arises the democratic paradox of forced equality and forced personal association. Freedom under democracy means the ability of the individual to freely enter agreements; but democracy appears, as a rigid system, in the enforcement of these agreements.  Democracy thus degenerates spontaneously into legalistic dictatorship.  Democracy has been called a "rule by laws."  That is precisely true.  But we fail to see any distinction here between democracy and communism as "rule by theory."  Theory and legalism are ideologies derived from the bad ideas of the French and English Enlightenment.   We will consider communism in much the same way as we do democracy, as an "agreement" which was never agreed to but enforced all the same .  The sole "force" of Fascism is in its provision that we "should" revere Mussolini as Fascism's founder.  Having conceded that, we are then free.

Fascism and anarchism are kindred in spirit.  This has been said many times before as to the points of coincidence.  Where Fascism prevails over anarchism, in my view, is that Fascism has focus and draws together, spontaneously, persons sharing a common viewpoint.  No other doctrine does this as well.  The bond that there is, ultimately, is one of "nature"; by nature we mean race.

Humans were using tools/weapons upwards of three million years before they began talking.  The human being then is first and foremost a tool-using animal, as Ben Franklin called him.   We look then for the essential human traits, among them language and the ability to make agreements, to be acquired in that almost  3 million year period.  Language--and the agreements it enables--derives from human technological ability.  First technics and then language is the order of human evolution.   If humans enter relations depending on language--I call these relations agreements--it is safe to assume that the capacity for verbal understanding is constituted, finally, by something technological in human nature.  In technology, on the other hand, we are seeing something more than simply a stick or stone used as a tool, or even a more complex artifact such as an ax or bow and arrow.  These implements are used to chase down and kill animals as food.  Rather, these same tools were used at some point to subdue fellow human beings, either to eat them or enslave them.  Thus over a long period of time, and before humans had the capacity of language, tools became an element or factor within human relationships.   Thus what in relationships was first a simple projection of individual personality, in a gesture of face or hands--a gesture of intimidation, say--became over time a threat with a stick or club.  Sticks and stone, wielded with strength and experise, leveraged human dominance and intimidation in the same way that human huntsing was extended.  Tools extended the human personality in the same way that the body itself extended personality.

All personality, which is the living wesen inside an animal's body, attempts to surpass that body.  This is not a point difficult to understand; simple examples are ready at hand.  The "essence" of a lion, in chasing a gazelle, attempts to surpass the actual capacity of the lion's body to run.  In simple language, the lion tries to run faster than he can.  It is through this self-surpassing trait of personality that the human being comes to invent technology.  Technology is what allows the human beings to overcome the distances he cannot overcome with his body, to shoot an arrow further or to propel himself faster in puruit of game.  What is more difficult to understand, on the other hand, is that the being having surpassed itself or himself, passes in a manner of speaking over to something else that is otherwise outside it- or himself.  Thus the human being passes "in essence" into the stick he is holding.  But there is more.  I said earlier that the stick "completes" the arm.  If that is true, it is also true that slavery completes the stick.  The slave transforms what is focused and specialized into a generalize field of use.  Because the stick (or rod or the fasces, Roman symbols of authority) subdues the slave, the slave becomes structured into the life of the master.  We still may call this relationship social.  The technology-mediated relation is a structure among human beings.  Only, unlike the individual family, the mediated relation has no content of instinct.  But also, unlike the agreement, this tool-mediated relation has none of the intellectual content that would allow us to call it an agreement.

My thesis here will be that the first agreement between human beings was an "anti-slavery" agreement.  We are assuming that slavery existed at a time, while at a rather advanced stage in the evolution of paleolithic technology, was came before humans had the capacity of speech.    I have stated all along here that slavery would have appeared only with the beginning of agriculture, and denser and more settled populations.  I now want to qualify that statement.  I think early on, in a hunting and gathering way of life, human beings actually could coerce the behavior of fellow humans in the same proficient and expedient way that they had come to hunt animals.  Humans may have long been prey, as in cannibalism; but they may also have been technically enslaved, or forced into a subservient and serving status.  Such would be possible through weaponry as existed at that early time.  So, when language appeared slavery was already in place.  I made the statement earlier:  the tool completes the arm; slavery completes the tool.  That is true.  Slavery, even before language, would have been a natural extension of the human technical capacity.  We are unclear regarding the actual food resources of the lower paleolithic.  We have to assume that populations were small, but within these populations there was a division of labor other than by gender; and that this division was enforced by weaponry.  I believe that slavery is a "natural" human relationship, but one, on the other hand, that can be accomplished through and around tools and weapons.  In that sense--that slavery is mediated by technology--human relationships had already, at a very early period of human culture, even before language, begun to acquire an "artificial character."   It remained only, with the appearance of language, to translate tool-mediated and tool-expedited relations into formal or legal relations.  At first these relations were expressed by laws, that is, stated directives and policies.  There remained however a problem.  That is, to distinguish slaves from those who were not slaves.  For this purpose there was reqired "agreements."

The agreement, as opposed to a law of enslavement, arose to restore, albeit in an artificial way, a certain community of equals that had been compromised since the introduction of technics in ingroup relations.   That is, even as there were slaves, there had to be people who were not slaves but were free community members.  These would include, for instance, one's own wife and children if one were in a position of authority.  Equality was first stated as a promise by one person to another not to make that person a slave.   Humans, with certain quid pro quo in mind, agreed in other words, not to try to enslave one another.  We are saying that this is what an agreement consists of essentially:   a mutual statement that neither party will try to enslave the other.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-10-15 14:18:47)


I said earlier that "the stick completes the arm; the slave completes the stick."  I will follow Engels on the point that slavery, at the point in human evolution where social groups advanced beyond the simple family, was all there was to society. (Anti-D)   The slave concept was the basis of human society itself.  A bit of clarification is needed.  Slavery was the added concept in human relations wherein what we call composite society could come about.  Such a system could incorporate, within small populations and under dire conditions of survival,  relationships beyond the simple family and hunting or agricultural band.  Slavery was an expeditious concept to enlarge the size of a group.  Issues that would slow and impede action in a larger group were expedited by slavery, in which decisions were made by a select and prechosen group of members.  The squabbling of the kind that goes on always within the nuclear family, among husband, wife and siblings; and even among members of the clan or extended family--that is, where people assume their roles spontaneously and fight for every advantage--this type of friction is absent between masters and slaves.  With a brain and a body that obeys command, the group could go efficiently forward.  It is said that dictatorship is more efficient than democracy in following a focused course of action; slavery is expeditious by the same principle.  Democracy, in its pure form, is a nicety or cordiality in relations but is a luxury in these relations rather than a necessity.  Democracy, as I said before, is a notion lost on primitive peoples; on the other hand, given the possibilities of the land to support larger groups, slavery was momentarily the most facile way of organizing these people and the most frictionless.  Whatever else we say about slavery, this concept has a venerable role in the human past.  Engels then as I say was correct in ascribing to the concept of slavery the first rise of what we call composite human groups or ones that are advanced in a division of labor.  Engels said that slavery is a necessary phase of the evolution of society.  We concur in this.

At an early age of human history, the same weapons that were used to hunt were used also to settle interpersonal disputes.  The person who lost an argument would, at least temporarily, be relegated to a disadvantaged status that would be, by our definition, tantamount to slavery.   Society itself was structured through weaponry;  one's status would depend on which end of the weapon he was situated.  Such a social group was viable and even superior in that the disputes that impair group life on a small scale--the arguments within the limited family and band--would be settled without friction.  This is why slavery, we are suggesting, came about at a very early time in human history.  As soon as there were tools--before language, in other words--there was likely slavery.  This assumes that there was land and food enough to support a slightly larger population.  It is probable that slavery came into existence as soon as family and band grew even slightly larger than what these groups were under the most dire conditions.  Slavery is a very old and venerable human institution and one that will not likely disappear.  On the other hand, it is also true that relations between close family members (husband, wife, children and so forth) began to fall into the category of "slavery" rather than persist in the ordinary, biologically set rythm of petty argumentation.  In short, society became rigid according, that is, to the rigidity of the technics enforcing the slave concept.  Traditional philosophy, of Rousseau, Locke, Hobbes and so forth, not to mention Spengler and Nietzsche, affirm the spontaneity of so-called Naturvoelker, while decrying the rigidity and ossification of more modern social forms of civilization.   A distinction between Kultur and Civilization  points to a certain "superiority" of so-called primitive peoples.  In fact, we are suggesting here, not only rigidity but outright slavery set in as soon as human groups grew beyond the barest size necessary for mere survival.  Slavery was a "natural" growth, but one made possible by the leveraging effects of technology.  But while only specific and focused action can be ascribed to the simple stick, the violence of the stick when applied to a human slave, can be a general action.   To repeat:  the arm is extended by the stick/weapon; but slavery extends--amplifies, diversifies--the stick.  But the socially practical side of slavery--that it expedited settlement of arguments of group members--also meant, depending upon how slavery saturated and dominated group life, that individual social relations (within the family, etc.) lost all intensity; the social corpus itself was drained of life.

There always has been a certain "democracy of life."  If any meaning could be ascribed to Rousseau's idea of "natural freedom," it would not be the physical equality among them but would be a manner of resolving disputes that was afforded by "nature" rather than some formal legality.  We are saying, in other words, among animals, even, as obviously humans too, there has been a way of settling disputes, a certain "discussion," we may say--even without words and language.  This "give and take" constitutes the democracy of nature.  Such give and take is part of the being's collective adaptation to its surroundings.  Differences of "opinion" or of self-interest are settled "informally," through gestures, noises, bites and so forth.  With the coming of slavery, on the other hand, this spontaneous adaptation to nature and to one another was reduced to technical (armed) mediation.  The tool, not the personality of the individual, settled the issue.  Furthermore, the weapon in the hands of a group of men set the fate of the entire group, which was divided into weapon-holders and virtual slaves.  Of course our most familiar instance of such power was the knights of feudalism, armoured riders in relation to helpless foot people.  That balance of power changed, as Engels says, with the invention of the armour-piercing longbow.  These interactions of subservient and master classes and castes play out in complex ways throughout history.  The relations of master and slave had set in, permanently, long before the appearance of language.  Unfortunately there is no good archelogical evidence to support the claims we have been making here.  We know only that human beings had tools and depended on them for a livlihood; how they were used otherwise is open to speculation.   We are speculating, however, that use of tools in intragroup relations would be a natural consequence simply of having tools; that they would be used, in other words, to settle disputes within the group.  And moreover that resolution of disputes would be permanently encoded in one way or another in group life, simply by the tendency of humans to repeat and ritualize actions of the past.  In this way technology that had begun in the context of the relation between human and nature spread, we are saying, to the context of relations of humans among themselves.  It is important to emphasize that this complex course of events had taken place before the advent of formal language. 

Formal human language, which was first spoken language, emerged out of the vague sounds that humans, like many other animals, instinctively make as signals to one another.  This is a point worth noting.  In other words, language originated in the context first of relations between members of the same limited bands and in contexts that demanded no mental efforts.  One sound would mean: "Out of my way!" or something like that.  These are primarily social signals rather than signals of the complexity that would be necessary to organize and carry out a hunt or any sophisticated cooperative activity.  Language being a refinement of primitive sound signaling, we may infer that the first function of true language was a social one, not a specifically technical or technological one.  The first words that were uttered, we are saying, were commands of a man toward his wife or some other member of his family.   This same facility at language, on the other hand, was carried to a higher level among hunters engaged in complex planning and strategy; also among warriors contemplating how to confront an enemy.  Finally, we are saying that the first language that appeared in human groups was used, first and foremost, to settle the issue of the distinction between a master class--among whom there was to be the original freedom of nature and biology--and, on the other hand, the slave class.  In effect, language (we are suggesting) was used primarily to establish "society" in the true human sense of the word, as, in other words, a structure dividing "free" from "unfree."  Language thus in theory restored to half the society the "freedom" and "equality" that had been lost through technological force of one human being toward another.  On the other hand, such new "freedom" was as I say "theoretical."  All that was done was, as technology had caused all human beings to be, so to speak, "under the stick" of authority, now half of persons, perhaps more or less, were awarded freedom albeit freedom in an abstract sense.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-10-11 15:59:18)


By the time language appeared in evolution, the human being had already had a lengthly history of technology.  The tools to date were simple.  On the other hand, a "society of the stick"--or "fascist rod"--had already inserted itself in human relations.  We must be clear on this order of evolution.  Even with rather simple hunting bands, as soon as any concept of in-group versus out-group emerged, one group was using the tools and weapons at hand to subjugate its rival. But there is more.  Regular members of the group, even relatives, had been effectively subjugated as slaves.  Slavery, like later money, was over a very long period of human history an entirely natural idea, expedited as it was by even the most primitive weaponry.   Slavery originated at this early time, prior to 500,000 years ago, when there was no language.  Group organization, we are saying, was by this time hierarchical in an order dictated by technical assertiveness of some members.  I will speak shortly of "means of intimidation" as a counter-concept to Engels' "means of production."   It is not too much to suppose that no human relationship was left unaffected by the intrusion of technology.  Of course, as technologically astute the males dominated the females.  We might also find beatings administered to carry out the dictates of dominant males.  In a certain sense, the intrusion of technics into human life upset the balance not only between the human and the animals upon which he preyed, but the social life of group members. 

That social life, more than the capacity of the human to hunt, is what interests us presently.  Rousseau asked how inequality among humans appeared; and he rightly ascribed this unequal relationship to an inequality of  possessions. But we want to emphasize the idea that these possessions were first not money, of course, or even property, but technical means of intimidation.  This inequality was modified over time to become an abstract force represented by money and possessions.  The principle here is easy to understand.   The inequality that we find within the human species is a leveraged inequality, through possessions, of course, but specifically the possessions wherein humans could intimidate one another.  For Engels' "means of production" that determined social rank, we substitute "means of intimidation."   Means of production, we suggest, came about much later in history than means of intimidation, which was in place already when human beings first learned to hunt.  The weapons they used to kill animal prey were turned by humans on one another.  This violence did not lead to death, usually, we are suggesting, but to a certain climate of fear within the group wherein some members rose to the top of the group--mindful of course of the possibility of revolt by underlings--and some sank to the bottom.  I earlier mentioned baboons as "exemplary fascists."  Baboons faced the challenge of living on open ground without the protection of trees and rocks, and so would have made good food for larger predators; the baboons held their own, however, by strict social organization.  Likewise the early human beings lived exposed in open ground.  The later acquired a strict social discipline, however, not simply by hierarchical instincts but by technological prowess by some members which in itself had an organizing and regimenting effect on the group.  Thus with a pressing need--protection of the group from menacing predators--and the newly found technical advantage, an organization arose that faced every challenge.  Human beings first likely ate the animals that attempted to prey on them.  Finally, human groups turned their weapons on one another.  These conflicts could be devastating; but the wars also were instrumental in building larger, more complex groupings.   Where sufficient food existed to support larger groups, these groups grew in size and corresponding complexity of organization.  The point to emphasize here is that all these developments I have described so far took place without language.  Language rather came later.

What is being suggested so far is that technology developed  in the paleolithic period at the expense of the "natural democracy" of biological or instinctive give-and-take that had characterized humans qua animals.  When language appeared, then, what humans faced was a community that had already lost any flexibility or any ability to accomodate simple misunderstandings and to work out new challenges spontaneously.  A major task of language, then, when finally it appeared, was to re-establish human relations on some sort of basis of equality and free discussion.  Society had already become, at this early period, rigid; language was inserted into human relations to restore the original contact between, say, male and female and among the members of the close or familial group.  It is not too much to suppose that communication among humans through formal speech already presupposes a certain equality among speakers.

The ultimate physical object sought by Christians is the Holy Grail.  For Hegelians such as I, the sought-after holiest of holies is what Hegel called the "negation of the negation."  Force Theory supplies some answer as to what this sacred sought-after being is:  it is the contradiction of language and technology.  What we are saying here is that language does not so much further the purpose of technology--that is not language's main function--so much as language reverses the effects of technology in human relationships.    Man's relation to nature is another matter.  Here, in his gathering and providing food, language would manifestly further this purpose.  Hunters being able to lay down a plan and coordinate their respective actions in the hunt would, of course, be at considerable advantage over beomgs without speech.  We have already established these practical benefits of such speech and have given them as a reason why speech would finally appear.  Language in the formal human sense has a limited history, appearing only 500,000 years ago; human technology is older by millions of years.  The main point made here is that language is in an important sense anti-technology, where, in other words, technology intersects with human relationships.  I have already said that technology, intruding as it does in these relationships--enforcing so to speak a universal slavery--deadens any personality that would otherwise be in relationships.  I have not said, but will say now, that a relationship no less than a person can have personality.  We call race in this sense "personality," as race is also a relationship.  These considerations were presented earlier in this blog. 

I also said that where language becomes a relationship that is antithetical to technology, it, language, constitutes an agreement.  The agreement, by establishing human relations as equal and fair, contradicts the leveraged and artificial inequality in a relationship mediated through technics.  I said in my section on philosophical anthropology that the stick completes the arm. The human arm is itself weak and just hangs at the person's side; the stick leverages the action of the arm and makes the arm formidable.  This point took up  the majority of pages of this philosophical-anthropological section.  In these last pages of this blog, on the other hand, I have emphasized that the slave completes the stick.  What is suggested here is that the stick plus the slave is for many practical purposes in effect a complete machine.  It is easy to see, if we consider the stick plus the human, how humans in an inventive mode would impart this general concept, dissected into elements and reconstituted in physical terms, to the idea of a machine as we know it today--albeit a machine without use of a biological human being.  The human technician contemplated the complex consisting of a stick which complelled the slave to action.  Stick and slave were a contiguous system, a complex of cause and effect.  The technician, seeking to improve on this system, graudally over time undertook to substitute one element of the system for another, finding success where precisely the human elements were dropped and purely physical ones were added.  This process of removing human factors from the machine as unreliable and replacing these elements with mechanical ones extended beyond slavery, in fact, into the industrial age. The slave was precisely the component of the original machine which first became obsolete, freeing the so-called master--who now has been simply a technician--from the drawbacks of slave labor. As the mechanical side of industry grew and the human side diminished, human beings as workers gained more freedom--not to work but freedom from work.  The great problem of civilization today is what to do, simply, with human beings, not merely those released from slavery but those dropped from the industrial process altogether.  The descendents of slaves, of course, with their respective abilities and personalities, were essentially the waste left behind as the textile industry turned to mechanical means.  Automation sealed the fate of the so-called proletarians, who were not, it seems, destined as Engelsian dictators of the world, but as perpetual, armless and legless consumers.  The mechanical and technical side of civilization has been completed; now what is left is a human problem of vast proportions. 

This was an impersonal, artificial relationship between a master and a slave even before the existence of language.   So if we talk about the early relationship between master and slave as being abstract, impersonal and artificial, we do not mean the artificiality and abstraction supplied by a human mind.  There was no mind at this early period, before speech; all mind is is the ability to have abstract symbols.  The stick which mediated the relation between master and slave was an "abstraction" in the sense that the stick was outside and apart from--"other than"--the biological person.  All mind was, when mind first appeared, was a reflex of the "otherness" of the stick.  At the same time, however, the mental or symbolic representation of the stick was also an abstract contradiction of the stick.  Language served at this transitional time to sort out a master class as such, and one which was freed from any subjugation to terms of technical structure which was otherwise the structure of society.  The first idea presented by language was that of equality--of the master class.  What is the same, any assertion of technology within the master class was abjured, if by no other word then by the gesture of shaking hands (to show that no weapon is hidden).

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-10-14 15:24:11)


Force Theory proposes that the first language and the older technology essentially opposed one another.  Whether this relationship persisted is belied by the fact that language has contributed vastly to the progress of technics.  And that technics has brought about structures which further organize and subordinate human beings to a system.  This is the most visible development of civilization.  On the other hand, there remains the issue of the original intent and funtion of language, which, we are saying, was not primarily technical.  In other words, language did not arise directly to asist practical matters of getting food, we are saying, but to clear away from within human relationships the rigidity imposed by a long history of using tools.  Tools had long been used by humans to "oppress" one another; now, with language, this same "oppression" could be circumvented.  Humans simply agreed with one another not to hit one another with sticks, which had been their past habit.  In actual fact, what allowed people to work without fear of physical violence also enabled them to coordinate long-range projects--to contemplate objectives in distant time and space.  Language in this sense had a doublly positive result.  But here, in Force Theory, the focus is on the social problem that humans had "under the stick."  Agreements obviated a certain fascism of the primal stick, the first and for long the only human artifact.  By the same token, these agreements made possible by language were themselves artificial or symbolic constructs.  Also language led to a new round of technological developments which further impacted social organization.  The primary consideration for our purposes, on the other hand, is that the first language contradicted, we are saying, technology specifically as technology is applied--or is an agent of--social relationships.  Language began to facilitate an agreement between humans not to imploy technology to articulate their relations.  I talked earlier about the handshake.  This gesture symbolizes an abjurement of physical force in the relationship; rather the relation is left to the "force of words" alone.  Words

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-10-14 15:41:06)


1.Force Theory now declines to comment further on the issue of race,  in effect agreeing with the new position of their erstwhile enemy.     FT leaves settlement of the race conflict "to nature."    Science, once FT's worst enemy on this subject, has reversed itself on this point of racial differences;  FT can presently just live with what science now says.  FT in other words proposes that we casually let nature take its course in settling the race issue.  We shall let humans themselves settle this issue without any plan.  So we do not contradict the reality--race--that even a five year old child is aware of (as per new research), but instead we build our social order of the future with race and around race.

                                    Force Theory gives up on the current race issue, which has already been
                                        settled in our favor by science (making race an inescapble reality not only of
                                        biology but of thought).   The society of the future must be built upon
                                        biology, essentially the family principle.

2. But there is a further consideration and one where FT does take an interest.  That is, what is of concern now is how, in the first place, did science and philosophy ever arrive at the idea of "equality," of races, of course, but of individuals as well?    The idea of the equality of the races (or of individuals) arose out of a (false)  inference from agreements.  Parties to an agreement are equal--they have equal rights to take from an agreement what the agreement stipulates.  This equality is misapplied to human relationships in general where there is no agreed upon quid pro quo.

                          The idea of the equality of the races (or of individuals) has been a (false)
                              inference from agreements.  Parties to an agreement are equal--they
                              have equal rights to take from an agreement what the agreement stipulates.  This
                              equality is misapplied to human relationships in general where there is no
                              agreed upon quid pro quo. As any abstract or absolute idea, equality is an impossibility

3. We here point out the high relevance of our Theory to the issue of human life, as specifically human, and agreements in particular.   FT, as we present it now, has come down to an analysis of agreements and a suggestion, too, as to how elements of agreements--consent, abjuring of physical violence, and quid pro quo--have been taken out of context (out of the agreement) and presented as a broad theory of society.  The idea of a human utopia is an extrapolation from the utopian provision--that force and violence are abjured--of the "utopian agreement." This primal "utopia," as per the agreement, shall in all modern and medieval theories become society. 

4.The inner process of an agreement is a process of logic. Any social idea as abstraction or absolute idea is like any other absolute idea--the social abstraction is an impossibility.  Like any idea that is an impossibility, the social idea contradicts itself by becoming its own opposite.  Through this self-contradiction, the utopian agreement becomes the draconian contractual agreement.  This process within the small agreement plays itself out in the broad sphere of human relationships in general, in the inner histories of democracy, communism and so forth as self-destructive ideologies.

                        The inner process of an agreement is a process of logic.  Any social idea
                              as abstraction or absolute idea is like any other absolute idea--the
                               social abstraction is an impossibility.  Like any idea that is an
                               impossibility, the social idea contradicts itself by becoming its own opposite. 
                               Through this self-contradiction, the utopian agreement becomes the
                               draconian contractual agreement.

5. This process within the small agreement plays itsef out in the massive and highly complex relationships we calll civilization.   If all civilization is is agreements, then we may conclude that civilization itself is a massive self-contradiction.   Like any idea that is an impossibility, the social idea contradicts itself by becoming its own opposite.  Through this self-contradiction, the utopian agreement--as displayed large in the theator of civilization--becomes the draconian contractual agreement.  Civilization we define as an oppressive and onerous contract where there has been no agreement to begin with.  This, as the contradiction between utopian and contractual agreements, contradicts itself and perishes in its contradiction.  The small, white Spartan culture, which is always there, arises victorious in the waste of the human landscape.

              Civilization we define as an oppressive and onerous contract where
                   there has been no agreement to begin with.



6.This process within the small agreement plays itself out in the broad sphere of human relationships in general, in the inner histories of democracy, communism and so forth as self-destructive ideologies.

7. Any person can enter into any agreement with any other person.  Within that agreement the person and the any-other-person are equal.   This is an absolute truth.  Thus I as a 6'6" man of German-Scotish heritage can enter an agreement with a 4'4" pygmy from Africa, so long, that is, as we can speak a common language that makes the agreement clear.  Agreements are racially blind.   We have been talking all along, as a nebensache, about race.  But in fact, an agreement is indifferent to all personal traits, among them not just race but lifestyle and many other things, other than those traits stipulated  as relevant to the agreement.  I may still have an opinion of that pygmy as a person-in-general.  But if I have agreed to a certain proposal,  these opinions of mine are irrelevant to the agreement.  The opinions I have of the

                     Any person can be in an agreement with any other person.  Outside the agreement, however, there
                          is the chaos of life, in which we must all finally sometime live.

pygmy would only be relevant, obviously by common sense standards, were they to interfere with and make impossible carrying out the terms of the agreement.  What we are talking about here when we say equality is not equality outside the agreement, but only equality within the agreement.   The agreement here is a way of abstractly narrowing down a relationship between two or more persons in a way that is relevant to carrying out the terms of the agreement.   All these things I have said earlier in this blog.

                      Insofar as any person can have an agreement with any other person, any
                           person can be equal to any other person.  But that is true only within the
                           framework of the agreement itself.

8. We have shown the idea of equality to mean simply that, with respect to the terms of the agreement--the quid pro quo--all persons or parties have the same status.  The agreement, as I said earlier, was already in place among the first male hunters of the paleolithic in their (already complicated) hunting arrangements. They had a primitive language and could understand one another.   In fact this--the provision that each shall take from the agreement what is presently agreed upon--is the only meaning that the word equality can consistently has.  Equality means here "no more and no less" than the agreement stipulates.  In other words, if I, having entered the agreement, want to take more than what the agreement stipulates, I would be absolutely forbidden to do so.  The other man the same.  So, in that sense--that neither of us can take more or less than the agreement specifies--constitutes our equality.

                    ....the provision that each shall take from the agreement what is
                         presently agreed upon--is the only meaning that the word equality
                          can consistently has.

9. Having said this, however--that equality has first and foremost a meaning that is restricted to agreements--we must explain how the concept of equality has made its way outside the agreement to play a prominent role in communist and democratic (etc.) theory.  There is no real answer at hand.  This is, however, an erroneous application of the concept of equality.  Equality is meaningless outside agreements, or anywhere where there has not been an agreement.  I am equal to a pygmy, say, if between us we have an agreement whereupon each person takes from that agreement what has been agreed upon.

                                    The stipulation of an agreement that "each person takes what the
                                          agreement stipulates, not more or less," constitutes the
                                         equality that we have.  Equality is a meaningless word
                                          outside agreements.  Neither person can take from the
                                          agreement more than the agreement stipulates

10. In no other way, on the other hand, are we equal--unless perhaps in some other-worldly sense, as "equal before God" (which is difficult to prove).  What democratic (etc.) theory has done is to extend the concept of equality outside the specific relation between two persons (in the agreement) to relationships in general.  Thus there is supposed to be an equality between the pygmy and me that transcends and is outside any agreement we have, and transcends the fact that we do not even know one another as individuals.  We are to be equal not simply in an agreement--where we by our definition of ourselves are in fact equal--but "in nature."

11.  In essence this relationship between the pygmy and me is a contract, overseen and administrated by a "higher authority," before there is even an agreement to start with.  This would be much like declaring two persons as married when they do not yet even know one another.  (Comparison Hindu wedding???)  This is a mythical agreement on the order of Rousseau's Social Contract.   This relationship could perhaps still become one of equality but only after we, the pygmy and I, decided after the fact of our "wedding" to properly agree to it.

                              Equality means in democratic theory the equality of an agreement, but
                                   attributes that equality even before an
                                   agreement has been entered into.

12. Force Theory does not so much advocate racial ideology as it simply "accepts" race--which is the only feasible way of handling the subject.   On the other hand, FT "disposes" of society--calling society as sequence of passing agreements and contracts--making race and family, by default,  the inevitable basis of human relationships.

                                Force Theory does not advocate race as a principle of white life,
                                     but accepts it.  Modern science is already racist enough for our
                                     purposes.  Force Theory, while accepting race, theoretically rejects "society"
                                     as an alternative to race as a principle of white life.

Last edited by richard_swartzbaugh (2009-10-04 15:04:51)


Die enfachste, naturwechsigste Form [der] Arbeitsteilung
                                        war eben die Sklaverei.

                                   The simplest, natural form of the division of labor was preceisely slavery
                                                                             --Friedrich Engels (in Anti-Duehring).

Engels has correctly taken an objective point of view regarding slavery, calling slavery a necessary step toward civilization (and of course thence to communism).  What we are saying, on the other hand, is that civilization is a necessary step to an inevitable slavery.  Civilization establishes the conditions under which slaves are chosen not by some master caste but in effect choose themselves.  Now, Spartan Socialism, as I conceive it, consists of small populations in an agricultural setting.  I have said these things before.  The work of agriculture, and certain other necessary work, is performed by slaves which constitute, as I have already said, half the population.  These are communities entirely of white people, which, on the other hand, have segregated themselves according to "character" differences.   I call Spartan Socialism also White Socialism, as something not for everyone on earth but only for those who have gone through a certain experience of machine-dominated civilization.  Again I delt with this subject in earlier sections of this blog.   Those who presently conform to one set of values--these are "survivors," in effect, from a past age-- will consitute a over-class.   Those whose values on the other hand are of a different order will be relegated to the under-class.   

I do not want to qualify the term "slavery"--I mean this word in the old-fashioned sense.   But this will not be "negro slavery."   What I am talking about as a slave caste is that group of white people who have defined themselves, precisely, through the experience of civilization.  Civilization has been a necessary step in the process of selection of half the white race as slaves.  They are the ones who have these luxuries, they are the ones who first in many cases succumb to them. Whites are also the people who, having experienced luxury can rise above this--this is a necessary condition for leadership under Spartan Socialism.  Modern democracy is a way of life whose material support is through machines.  Civilization, based as it is on machine labor and not on human labor, has declared forced labor a thing of the past.  There has been a canon of priests and intellectuals that any forced, non-voluntary, labor is a moral offense.  Such forced labor has also been declared safely a thing of the past, a vampire with a stake through its heart, with no hope of reappearance. Moral or immoral as such forced labor may be, it is scarcely a thing of the past.  The future, as I have quipped before [original??], is not very futuristic.  Our schools are cesspools of complaceny.   Whatever has been taught to school girls and boys about slavery, these same people will likely go on to in effect declare themselves slaves, waiting for deliverance to the slave society to come. 

Human beings having the greatest luxuries have in effect by their life choices declared themselves, in many cases, to be future slaves.  There are those who apply themselves seriouslynot merely to their jobs but to their lives. These we call serious people, not greatly rewarded under the present culture; but they establish themselves, exactly through this barnyard of luxury, to be a master caste in the society to come.   As I say, luxury and ease which single out examples of higher character who do not succumb to luxury.   The best people come often from the wealthiest classes; but today they are not much heard from because their message--seriousness--is irrelevant to existing society.   Other humans who would seem to have every advantage in life fall into dismal array when exposed to luxury:  these are the ones who need an external discipline such as would exist under white socialism.

I want to anticipate a potential source of misunderstanding.   In no way does the experience of modern civilization militate against future slavery.  Precisely the opposite is the case. Civilization teaches us to think and act in a moral and humane way; but civilization also allows humans to act and live anyway they want.  In this setting human beings sort themselves out through the choices they make.  And they sort themselves out with almost infallible accuracy.   Civilization through a certain filtering and culling effect has already selected and segregated the two future social castes under Spartan Socialism.  Of course we hear in the educational and religious teachings of the modern West that a man cannot legitimately or morally be deprived of certain so-called "inalienable rights."  We may dismiss this proposition, which we have all heard, as nonsense.  The effect of the teachings of civilizations as to "rights" has been entirely superficial.  In fact, it is good that we have so long heard these things and that some people believe them, as part of the overall culling effect that will finally segregate people into the categories to which they naturally belong. 

The feature of civilization upon which I now dwell has to do, rather, with the shere opulence and benificence of our present way of life, when, in fact, the very words "order" and "diligence" have lost their meaning.  Self-selection of slaves consists just of a complacent acceptance, without further ado, of this civilization.  My purpose here is not to decry the lives of many people but to point out the good that will come out of civilization, wherein people chose their next life.  This is not a life after this one, as in Hindu philophy, but a life in the real society to come which I have identified as Spartan Socialism.

One volunteers as a slave in the next society by overeating, watching televison and sports, and not paying their rent or meeting other obvious obligations.  An intelligence test would be part of the slave recruitment process.


The stick completes the arm.  The slave completes the tool.

The use of the stick is that it extends and completes the arm.  By stick I mean a stick in principle as a fascist-stick.  The arm and hand use the stick in order to extend and leverage human force.

"Stick" means here force of "the rod," that is the expression of a human intention to bring about an effect.  The "stick" is a thing of man.  "The stick" is a principle for which fasci are a symbol.  Human effort--whether that effort is in relation to nature or other human beings--is in principle fascist.  Sticks (fasci) mediate the relationship of humans to nature; sticks also mediate the hierarchical relation, of dominance and submission, of one human being to another.

How "the stick" or fascist rod evolved from a primitive implement is a question with which we now occupy ourselves.

A stick can be:
   a digging stick to poke about the ground for food...
   a weapon to kill animal prey
   a weapon in wars with neighboring human groups
   a weapon with which to subdue alien humans
   a weapon with which, once alien humans are subdued, to force them into slavery
   an automated machine requiring little or no human intervention, thus eliminating the need for slaves

The form of the "stick" follows from its purpose to dominate the slave and to extract his labor.  No less than military tactics proceed from military technology, slavery proceeds from the technics that keep slaves working.   The "stick" in the period of slavery is contiguous with slavery itself; we may speak of a "slavery machine."   

But it is also true that features of the slave pass to the stick.  Slave and stick transmutate back and forth into one another.  The stick coerces the slave; the slave coerces the stick.  The slave becomes the stick.  The stick becomes the slave.  Slave and stick merge.  The finished product of the stick-slave machine is the absolute machine.  The contribution of the slave as a human source of labor is lifted (aufgehoben).  The contribution of the master qua master is lifted. 

The human being for his part becomes an absolute consumer.  Humans are "free."  No longer is there a master or slave, either one.   No longer is there a social structure of any kind, other, that is, that what human beings arbitrarily create.

Fascism as an ideology comes into being as a perfected social relation where no social structured social relations exist.

Philosophical anthropology states that the relation between master and slave is mediated through the principle of "the stick."   

The human being is "fascist' or uses leveraged, mediated force in relation to nature.   The human being in relation to nature in this elemental stage--whose relation is mediated by the stick or primitive tool-- is himself primitive and poor.

The stick is not yet an machine.  But the slave attached to (dominated by) the weapon is a machine.
The slave is the prototypical machine, upon which non-living machines are modeled.  The tool which causes the slave to work is the stick.  The stick extracts labor--the useful quantity--of the slave.   The weapon-tool transforms human beings into a "labor quantity."

Engels (Anti-D) says that before slavery humans preyed upon one another for food.  We open this possibility here as a suggestive hypothesis.  But, says Engels, the potential of humans as a source of labor soon appeared as a more appealing prospect than humans did as food.  Human-on-human predation was for the purpose of extracting labor.  Labor is considered an abstract quantity, as are food, water, land and so forth. 

Engels says that labor is the one quantity that the propertyless man can sell.  Labor as a quantity can be thought of, and effectively separated from, the laboring person.  How this labor is to be extracted from the person is an open question of civilization.  The stick is one possibility; an agreement with quid pro quo is another.  The sale of labor is at an advanced stage of civilization when there can be an agreement between seller and buyer of labor.   But at an earlier period, where there is no real concept of money, the "stick" is necessary to extract labor.

tool "completes" the man (ein noch nicht fesgestelltes Tier--Nietzsche) in relation to nature.  but the relationship is very primitive, just as the tool is primitive.
by the same token, the slave completes the weapon-tool.
the slave, by application of the simple rod (weapon-tool), completes the man.  in short, the slave does all the work, the master does no work.