(7 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Society is a whole that is less than the sum of its parts.  What we are asking, finally, is a point of value.  That is, if society is more than the sum of the parts--that, say, the "consciousness" or Hegelian Geist of society is more than the sum of its individual human members--we could infer that your life or mine is "worth" less than society's life.  We could suggest that a sacrifice on your part or mine might be justified on grounds that society is a higher value than either of us.  The implications of this proposition are simply staggering.  By saying society is worth more than any of us separately, we have conceded ourselves, in effect, to society.  But of course this is only what we hear and read in our sacred documents written at the founding of our Nation.  Social entities--above all nations--are consistent in that point.  We have, in a word, with the statement that society is worth more than the sum of its part, justified all the wars and miseries on behalf of society.  When society has sacrificed our individual needs to its own needs, it has acted in a philosophically consistent way.  Through our combined interaction and cooperation, we have created a being that justifiably demands our personal acquiescence and sacrifice.  This high rank of society in nature is consistent with Hegelian philosophy.  We accept the Hegelian dialectic method; we deny that the dialectic fulfills itself in the Geist of the State.  Here we will take the bold step of suggesting that society is not "worth" even one of its members.  Society--the Nation State or by whatever name it goes by--does not think.  Only, the individual person thinks for society.  A society is never brighter than its brightest person.  But there is much more to consider.  The brightest person is likely to be inhibited and tied down by the politics of the people around him.  So that actually, for some hint or suggestion of intelligence in human life we must look to the individual person in the conduct of his own life.  That is an appropriate sphere wherein choices are made for better or worse.  Society is an example of a kind of devolution, wherein the greater organism descends to the level of a primitive, bovine ancestor.  The intelligence in life is entirely an individual one that frees itself from any larger whole


(3 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

posited as real for two persons.
agreed upon by two persons
agreed upon as in "agreement"
to break an agreement is "immoral"
to keep an agreement is "moral," or "of value."
do we agree upon reality as we agree upon some mutual business?
how close is the idea of value to the idea of business?
to break an agreement means to violate a trust.
instability in relationships.
we still have not proved--there is no proof--that a value is in and of itself real.


(3 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Natural Law and Positive Law are based in fact.  We know what Natural Law is if we understand, say, gravitation.  But Positive Law (posited or man-made law) is equally a fact.  That certain rules of human behavior are written or codified is a fact; and these rules are en-forced likewise a fact, all too directly evident were one to break the rules. Enforcement is a fact that is quite physical and, for some people, quite palpable.  Humans , by threat of punishment from other humans, by guns or merely sticks used as weapons, are forced to obey these laws.   They are the rules of man; they are artificially made by men but, on the other hand, enforced as they are they are palpably factual.  They are empirically real, and for some persons all too real.    A law that a man must do such and such is as much a fact as that this rock, when dropped, must fall.  But there is more.  We still confront the issue of "should" and what we can call Moral Law.  Every human whomsoever understands, even if only in his own way, the idea of right-ness, virtue, morality, value and so forth.  Every human insofar as he uses the word "should" has, or "should have," some understanding of the word.  "Should" may be, without counting, the most commonly used word in English.  It is also a word that cannot be traced to or connect to any fact.  Should--which word evokes the idea of an entire moral order--if it is a concept at all, it is one without any facticity whatsoever.  In other words, if we say a person "should" do something or other, there is no reference at all to any fact that he has done this, or will do it, or has done it, or that the thing that is to be done is in any way a fact.  The closest the word "should" comes to any factual consideration is in the idea that a person has, that a thing predictably will behave in such and such a way, because it has always behaved thusly.  This is how Hume talks of our idea of causality.  On the other hand, such a psychological meaning of "should" is not what we mean here.  There is with should--and the entire idea of value--an entirely different issue than our expectation of physical events.  Having advanced my argument this far, I want to say only that the terms in which I speak are highly simplifed and simplistic.  The kinds of expressions and words ("normative" would be one of these) that are used by academics in their turgid articles will not be used here, giving our own writing a rather naive and unprofessional character.  I have yet to find an internet article where the phrases "it is just" and "it is moral and moral" are not used without defining the words justice and moral.  Socrates would complain; so do we.  These words are used as though what they refer to is as real and ordinary as this table I write on or this chair I sit in.  They are not however this kind of fact.   We make an assumption here that polemics--and are frankly polemical--get bogged down in difficult terms.  There is nothing, however, overly complicated by the terms Natural- and Positive Law.   A large part of the difficulty in understanding human beings at all, as they talk to one another, is in interpreting the common word "should."  One "should" take out garbage in the morning.  Or, to leap to a whole different level of interaction, but one where admonishon is the main way of speaking, is that one "should" love all human beings simply by virtue of the fact that they are human.  The very word "human being," it turns out, is a moral word.  (We have considered another word--race--and it appears now that race is not a moral word on account of its being simply banned from consideration as moral; thus race must be a fact. (!))  There are words which have no factual basis but only what we are calling a "moral reality"; and yet these same words are entirely common and are used passionately as though they mean something.  Such a moral or value word is "human being."  These are words for phenomena that appear not through what a thing or being is, so much as through how a thing or being is used by human beings.  A human being becomes a human being only by being treated or understood as such.   There is no such thing, finally, as a "real" human being if by "real" we mean factual.  A human being is only the object of behavior, never the source of behavior.  There are beings whose reality is not factual but consists, rather, simply in being moral as opposed to immoral; the moral reality of a being consists of it being "of value" or of the moral order.    Jesus would be such a being.  Moreover,  indeed every human being has a moral being that is not factual but derives of this aforesaid moral order.  Plato would say this being "participates" in the moral order or The Good. 

I said earlier that humans--not only people who are given some high sacred commission but ordinary humans in everyday conversations--talk in such a way that they waffle between the factual orders and moral ones.  They say this or that "should" be or this or that "should" happen.  This is the most common level of communication that there is--in references to moral ideas rather than factual ones.   Thus we may say that a law (Positive Law of human making) is a fact; and the enforcement of that law is a fact.  But we still have not said the law is "good."  That would mean, even though we have established the law as fact, it is a fact solely of human artifice. Law would be an act, or rather an en-actment, of another human being just like ourselves and one who could be our enemy just as well as our friend.  We do not know this en-actor, or how he came to have the right to control you or me through laws and the enforcement of laws.  We are however not interested in the unfairness of the situation; that would be simply to substitute our own values for those of another person.  What we are concerned with, rather, as Socrates would be concerned, is with value- or morality-in-itself.  Socrates, having provided the first and perhaps the most compelling critique of the idea of value, then leaps to the conclusion that value must be something "in itself."  That there is an "existing" but transcendent Good that makes certain human acts good and others not good.  We think that Socrates' critique can stand; but his solution to the problem of the non-factual-ness of value has to be dismissed.   Humans made the law; humans may unmake the law.  We may see some practical need for the law--indeed this is how and why laws are made, that they are practically necessary.  But if this is our sole mode of reasoning about the law, the law while practical, still has no majesty.  I have used the word majesty before.  Majesty means in the present context something "more" than the immediate practical efficacy of a thing or action; but which evokes respect, and where it does not evoke respect it "should" evoke this.    And it applies to situations where no immediate practical reason exists.  In other words, there is no immediate practical use I can see of allowing criminals and offenders of varous sorts into my neighborhood; but I am also told by this or that priest or man of God that it is moral to let them in.  We simply do not agree.  We have no common ground.  It is enough to say that the idea of "should" has no connection, empirical or logical, to the idea of "is."  And value has no connection, empirical or causal or logical, to fact.  The lack of connection between value and fact is the cause of uncertainty and insecurity especially in human relationships.  That is because "value" is subjective.  That is, value is just some person talking (to use an apt vernacular expression); it is just this white person or this black person stating a point of view.  Value is you are me, he-said or she-said, with no common point of reference.  What the idea of morality or value does, we are saying, finally, is to set some common point of reference so that we can talk together on the assumption that there is a common ground.  This idea corresponds to Voltaire's idea that, if God does not exist it would be necessary to invent him."  We are inventing morals, but morals which have some "objective" validity--that is they are something that apply to you and me both.  Here objectivity means something different than it does in common observation.  If we both see this table or chair, these things have "objective" validity.  It does not mean that they are necessarily there, but simply that they are an "object" of the senses of more than one person.  This is what objectivity means--commonality.  Therefore a value is objective if--so it is believed and posited (meaning to be unilaterally asserted or created)--when it is shared by humans.  We may finally grasp the idea that, as a general moral idea, the state, society and civilization that we share is based on a moral idea, not on physical or legal necessity of any kind.

The Good is generated out of the contradidictions among elements and entities and principles that are useful.  It is from the self-contradictions within the useful that The Good appears.  But the reverse is not true.  The useful does not appear by the "doing" of The Good.  Rather what appears out of doing The Good is ritual, or empty, repetitive action.  Yet society--which is not primarily useful--consists precisely in such useless ritual acts.  At the same time, however, doing The Good compromises the majesty--the unifying power--of The Good.  That is why societies die:  the kill, precisely by doing The Good, their own unifying principle.

Earlier in this blog we made the distinction, following Hume and Carnap, between fact and value.  I want to know, throughout this writing, whether when we say the word "man" we are talking about a fact or a value.  Can we talk of a value as "something"?  If so, could the something we talk about be a man, not as a fact, in other words, but as a value?

There is no such thing, in any practical sense, as absolute certainty.  This may now become an axiom of Force Theory whose implications are great.  There is only relative certainty.  Likewise there is only relative uncertainty.  In a given situation the man can always entertain a guess as to what the right action might be.  We now go on to a distinction--vis-a-vis certainty and uncertainty--between the human being and an animal.   For the animal the world around it is relatively certain or uncertain.  Recently we have talked about self-evidency (selbstverstaendlichkeit); we are in the general area of this consideration.  The world for the animal is relatively certain (self-evident) or uncertain.  Certainty will encourage the animal or human, either one, to act.  Uncertainty will inhibit its or his action.  We see certain examples of this, as when an animal reacts to the mere rustle of branches; the animal thinks it is being stalked.  The animal exerts itself very quickly but perhaps also wastefully.   A human being might pause to consider other possibilties, such as that it is merely the wind rustling the branches. The human listens carefully before expending valuable energy running or acting to defend himself.  For the human being, we are saying, there is an area--a rather wide space--between on the one hand certainty and on the other uncertainty.  This is the area for consideration and thought and planning.  For the human there are finer shades of certainty and uncertainty.  These nuances are material for thinking.  The human is slow to react because he "cerebralizes" his responses in accordance with the finer distinctions between what is know and what is not known.  The known and unknow are a vast dark area full of ominous portent but also presentl new possibilities that are not there for animals.  It is precisely in this area, now grown larger, that the phenomon arises that we call trust.  The human being trusts, the animal does not trust.  Trust means to submit to a reality that is still largely unknown, or certain only to a relatively small degree. I have said that the human trusts, but the animal doesn't.  That is true.  It is precisely, we are saying, in this area defined by trust--where the human will commit himself to an action or thing that is not entirely certain--that there arises what we call human culture in the most general sense of the word culture.  Culture--and society and all institutions--are based on trust.  But that is only to say that humans commit themselves to a reality--that only humans, but not animals, can know--that is uncertain.  Culture arises out of an in response to an uncertain world.  A course of action, we are saying, that seems certain turns out to be, finally, a wrong course.  In this case the situation was simply more uncertain than first thought to be.  The core of culture is not, that is, in the accomplishment of some goal but in the mitigation of error caused by erroneous estimation of chances.  This is our general position.  Of course, there is the human's relation to so-called nature (the terms we use are simplistic and hypothetical); there is also a man's relation to other men.  Force Theory proposes that the essence of culture is in its capacity to mitigate the mistakes that humans are bound to make.  Humans do not take the view that discretion is the better part of value; or that it is better to err on the side of saftey.  Humans are risk takers.  Culture steps in where human beings have failed.  The example which will appear throughout this blog is in the case of justice.  We will talk frequently about agreements and contracts; we will talk about how agreements differ from contracts.  In these cases it is always assumed by the men entering these institutionalized relationships that the relationships will possibly fail; they will then resort to justice.  The agreements (and so forth) evoke culture; they are the essence of human institutions.  So here again culture is compensatory rather than primary.  In talking about technology we could develop the same theme, to the effect that the first use of culture was tentative, exploring with a stick, say, where the hand refused to go.  The hand was a vital organ and hurt when bitten or stuck.  The hand was always cautious and moved slowly and tentatively where there was danger; technics essentially took the place of the hand in this work.  Were a task certain, the hand would engage.  But many tasks had only the vaguest prospects of success; here technics were used.    Culture as technology "reached" in an exploratory way into the vague area of uncertainty.  A great deal has been left out of our philosophy of technology to date--and this includes the profound and insightful Arnold Gehlen--about the function of technology not merely to act and create, but to explore.  Technology was originally a product of human intelligence, but an intelligence whose domain was not the certain reality that got the attention of animals, but the uncertain reality that lay outside of primal animal interest.  These things--trust where the animal would not want to trust, exploration and engagement in a risky course of action--are motivation for culture; and they determine the nature and outcome of culture.  Justice is an example.  There is, or would be, no reason for justice were human agreements and understandings certain.  Justice is a "higher" form of culture than a mere agreement; the contract evokes justice.  In this way, to overcome the primal fact of uncertainty, other institutions whether legal or technological are evoked to fill the void between certainty and uncertainty, a void that was always there for animals and humans alike, but one that only humans came to understand for what it was.  Human culture exists in the face of uncertainty. 

The Three Pillars of Force Theory are these:

1. Liberalism has prevailed because it has been consistently anti-racist.   Conservatism, on the other hand, as Liberalism's adversary, has been ambiguously--inconsistently--racist.  Force Theory decries this weakness in Conservatism and attempts to correct it.  The problem, we are saying, is Conservatism's obession with nation and itsattempt to reconcile American Jingoism with racialism.  This is a futile task.  Nation and race as concepts are entirely different and incompatible.  This lack of understanding of the two concepts has mired Conservatism in a fatal self-contradiction.  Our prescription is to eject Nationalism from the Conservative agenda, leaving only racialism.  And to build a social theory around the idea of race.
2.  Much of writing in the area of Force Theory is a tortuous and confused depiction of the evolution of human culture.  Force Theory has taken on the task to understand how, in his long evolution, the human being has come to become possessed by ideas that are contradictory. To depict such a history is a laborious task.   Human culture in general is a entity disturbed by constant and confusisng internal contradictions.   Force Theory presents a long and rambling--often inconsistent--idea about how, from earliest beginnings as a tool-using animal, human beings have engaged themselves in a way of life that itself is confusing and contradictory. Since this part of Force Theory is still work in progress, some order and coherence may presently be brought to the subject matter.

3. Finally, as confused and contradictory as human culture and history have been, one reality emerges as something permanent.  Upon this reality we may build a complete (gesamt) conception of the society of the future.  This idea is race.  Race--an entire process wherein the human being transcends himself as a new and higher biological species--is the constant in human effort; and is the reality which will replace the confusion of culture.  In race--which Heidegger calls "heavy with Being-- there is certainty.

Humans come together in an entity or institution called society.  We enquire, naturally, what that entity is.  We have so far given a "negative" account of society, proposing that this entity is an arrangement whereby humans come together, true, but without liking or caring for one another.  There are many anecdotal accounts from daily newspapers and television that support this idea.  We are a community of laws; and any hostility towards another person must be directed through authorities.  Direct action is out of the question.  For our part, we do not ordinarily think of harm we may do without considering the element of society.  I would gladly kill, not my neighbor, but my neighbor's dog; indeed I have personally spent hours fantasizing about this.  But killing a mere dog in our Country brings a prison sentence.   What the court decides about your relation with your "enemy" is not always to your liking.   I hesitate to use the word "enemy."   Here we are speaking purely hypothetically and theoretically, so we can allow ourselves, at the risk of violating some proprieties of white conversation, to use this word.  Arabs speak straightforwardly and unabashedly of their "enemy," white people do not.    For the moment we are gong to think, hypothetically, like Arabs.  We live with our enemies, not in a state of peace, precisely, but in a condition of mediated and authorized strife.  We live in faux peace with our enemy, but only because we are not permitted a direct relation with him.  To speak of this social relation as one of peace and understanding would be a mistake.   Society does not change one's essentially hostile point of view, it simply builds relationships around this relation in the full expectation that the relation is hostile.  In thinking about human relationships we are here forced into a difficult and troubling situation.  Arabs may spend in hours in their desert tents, surrounded by the concubines and weapons, conspiring to hurt their enemies; perhaps planning an ambush behind some sand dune.  We can image them there; that is what Arab nomads do. That is, if I want to damage my enemy, I cannot do so, directly, without also damaging society.  We can speak of racism in this context.  Our relationship as white people with other races is mediated by society; and the society itself stands or falls on account of how this relationship evolves or deteriorates.  Society IS the relation between, say, black and white people.  The corollary of this proposition is that, obviously, if we attack society, then we effectively part ways with our enemies; we no longer are living with them.  They are neutralized as enemies.  The Arabs say: the enemy of my enemy is my friend; and the friend of my enemy is my enemy.  We are asking precisely if, in this context, society might actually be our enemy.  A reasonable position might be racialism, in which case we would finally destroy society.  Or it might be anarchism, in which we would destroy society but we would also neutralize a real or imagined enemy.  Either case is drastic.  These issues however are not to be finally settled here; they are settled in the minds and hearts of individuals.  Likely they have been settled along time ago.  Society, like Force Theory or any other ideology, is itself an ephemeral being.

"Otherness" is a natural event in human thinking which humans inherit from their animal past.  Even though it is a human being thinking that this or that thing is "other" than he is, his mentality is then in accord with the way animals in general think.  This is a "natural" or "animal" way that humans think.  But there is more.  If an animal sees a stick or stone, the animal knows that this thing is other that it, the animal itself, is.  And for the human, too, the stick or other object is not the human himself.  To the man the world itself is "other."  The being of the man as that of an animal, in an animal mode of thought, separated mentally from the being of the stone.  And in the otherness of the world the human being can define himself, conversley, over against that world, as not the world.  This is the beginning of human categorical thinking.   But we have to move to a somewhat different idea.   At a certain point in evolution, the human being began a more complex relationship with the world around him, in which  he, the human, took ahold of nature in a way that involved him and connected him to nature as never before.  We are tempted to say, along with Klages and other German romantics, that the man has always been separated from nature; as a human being he despises, says Klages, this tree or living thing.  But the romantic philosophy is mistaken; the reverse is true.  What was a separation now becomes, through culture--even at culture's earliest stages--a connection.  In taking hold of a stick, the human takes hold--in a certain intimate way that we must call practical--of nature; he comes together with nature.  What we are saying is quite simple.  We can leave the SCHWAERMEREI of German romantic philosophy to the aesthetes.   Culture is a special involvement with nature. This is the natural order of things in our proverbial State of Nature.   It was the primal or unculture apeman who was separated from nature; he could admire this tree or stone, but it would be an entirely aesthetic admiration.  There was no intimate involvement of the primal uncultured man with the world around him.  That stone over there is other than I am, certainly, unless I pick up and use it as a tool.  Then, at that time, the stick becomes at least "connected" to my arm; but over time this connection becomes more or less "intimate" and is even encoded, finally, in the instincts and minds of human beings.   Hegel talked about otherness.  This blog is not a work in Hegelian scholarship; so I will assume, based on what I know or have read, that Hegel brought together the ideas of andersyen (otherness) and entfremdung (alienation).  Hegel assumed that one was necessarily alienated from that of which he is other.  Here we strongly separate these two concepts.  For alienation to occur, we are saying, there has to be an original conjoining.  This happens when the human being takes hold of and begins to "use" this or that stone or stick.  We call this connection culture.  Once the human being picks up the stone he "joins" nature, as a stick is joined as tool to the arm and hand.  From this point in our discussion we can reach a more remote, but more immediately relevant, conclusion.  That is, that the FACT OF ALIENATION SETS IN WITHIN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HUMAN BEING AND HIS CULTURE.  That is, what had been conjoined now becomes separated.  This is not "otherness" itself, which is an entirely natural and expected phenomenon, and one that dominates much in human life as all of animal life.  Alienation follows the otherness that is AUFGEHOBEN or overcome by a cultural synthesis.  First, through culture, things or beings that are other are conjoined through culture.  Then what was connected is separated.  This is a rhythm or dialectical cadence of the man-culture relationship.  Indeed, the human being--as Heidegger and extistenialists hold--can live in a world that has become, in effect, the same world of categorical "otherness" that characterized the first world, that of nature.  What once was culture--a connection between man and nature--is now simply a world, not the original world of nature that once was, but a world entirely of human making.  But this world is now "other."  We call this new world the "alienated" world of the human being--alienated because it once was connected to humans even as it constituted, by itself, a connection with nature.  Culture, as we said, is a connection with nature, not a distancing from it.  Therefore Klages is wrong.  But where new ground for critical philosophy opens is precisely in the fact that, THE ESTRANGEMENT OF THE HUMAN BEING FROM NATURE IS ALL THE MORE RADICAL ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT OF CULTURE--THE IDEA THAT THE HUMAN BEING HAD BEEN ONCE CONNECTED TO NATURE THROUGH CULTURE.  Alienation is the final act of culture, wherein the human being, once a part of nature through the tools and technics of his life, now finds himself in an entirely new world.  This world is of his own making, as a way of connecting to nature, while at the same time "other" than not only nature, but than the human being himself.  This is a condition of total alienation.  And it is a phase of human life, moreover, that demands resolution.  The contradiction would be fatal.  I propose "race," that is, unfolding Being, as the negation of the negation, the Aufhebung or resolution of the contradiction of a culture that is now "other" than its human creator.

The modus operandi of this blog is apriori reasoning.  To some this appears old-fashioned and futile.  First I lay down one or several premises, and then draw logical conclusions--as logical as possible--from these premises.  As for the premises, they are not necessarily afforded any  empirical and support.  I might  return later to contribute some fact or other in support the premises. This is in accordance with my very general agenda, which is not to prove anything but suggest relations between ideas.  Logic, not fact, is the objective here.   The mode of reasoning is out of fashion with anyone claiming to be scientific.  It resembles rather the kind of argumentation of the old Church fathers.  Schopenhauer might approve (cf. his essay "How to Win an Argument.").   But there is more.  We do not contradict science, ever, or get too far from a real world of facts.  Nothing said here is contrary to science; everything here is, if not proven, then at least is naturalistic as opposed to religious.  In accepting the general views of scientists on such subjects as genetics and evolution, and in confining ourselves to logical propositions rather than empirically derived ideas, we greatly reduce our own burden of proof.  We speak only of nature, in other words, if perhaps in some antiquated terms such as did the Natural Law philosophers in their time.  The worst we can say is that our science, which does not interest me so much, is somewhat outdated.  There is no need to go head to head with anthropologists, for instance, over the subject of race or human nature, when the anthropologist is going to be superior in the area of fact even while, on the other hand, he is weak in logic.  Our grounds for argument will be in the area of the logical or apriori connections of ideas. We are scientific here and empirical to the extent that we are never religious or mystical.  We avoid pseudo science such as science-fiction sorts of things; never do we lower ourselves to psychic phenomena and so forth.  We have no dispute with science--we respect it--and we try not to contradict it, unless accidentally and through outright ignorance.  There is more to say on the topic of the relation of Force Theory to science.  I believe we are within the bounds of Philosophical Anthropology, whose relation to science has never been properly clarified by the early Philosophical Anthropologists such as Plessner and Gehlen.  Nor, other than some lapses by Christian Philosophical Anthropologists, has there been a lapes into anything categorically unscientific.  This has been the case while PA was still a budding field  Never do we invoke God or space aliens or anything of that sort.  As for our premises regarding "nature's plan," I do not feel that that is a problem so far as we are concerned.  I "entertain" here the idea of "natures plan" just so we can move on, expeditiously, to a conclusion.  I have even decided in advance what that conclusion is going to be (see below).    So far two premises have been set down:  (1) So-called "nature" has certain "rules" or "expectations"  (2) The human being "knows" these expectations by virtue of some "instinct" or code that is implanted in him in his genetics.  For instance, the human being does not "expect" to fly like a bird, therefore he does not normally "try" to fly.  With the realization, however, that he could theoretically fly, the human being tried and finally succeeded in doing so.  In effect, the human "violated the rules of the game."  These are all assmptions I have laid down as premises.  There has been no attempt to prove any of these assumptions.  Rather I have moved on to draw the conclusions that would follow logically:  That is, that there is "guilt" inherent in the very fact of culture.  This guilt--not practical necessity--is a major mover of culture in its evolutionary development.   Thus each practical act of culture is followed by an ritual act of expatiating guilt.  Evert act if culture separates the human being from nature, not only the nature of land and physical things, but the nature within human beings that brings them together as family.  Society we are saying is a creation of guilt.  Finally, the bonds of family that once existed within primal human groupings have been dissolved, or are under severe attack, by the new relationships around technics and through culture in general.  Following from the premises we have stated (but have not proven), the relationship we have today in what is called society are essentially religious bonds or ones that expatiate old guilt.  Thus, for instance, how we treat criminals and humans who are other than we are is essentially a ritual.  This ritual derives from some idea of the Good, in a non-practical and repetitive action that not only gives character to society but establishes what society finally is.  The Good is an idea that has resulted to bridge the gap between humans and nature that opened with the first culture.  The Good expatiates the bad that comes of violating nature's ingrained rules.

FROM 51:

We ask what is the relation of a white person to a black person?  Or a gentile to a Jew?   I want to keep the cast of characters small for purposes of coherency and simplicity.   We are not talking about the Old South, where a slave was in effect a personal artifact or tool.    The point to be made is that the interracial relationship, in either case, is, in our own time, religious and through agency of morality and The Good.   It has to be thus because mutual usefulness and use no longer exists.   Today and in the civilization of high technology--where humans factor less than machines--the white man accepts the people around him because he thinks that that is the right and moral thing to do.  He is in a relationship with either of these groups because in his own mind he "should" be in this relation.  This is the essence of his religion.  There is no practical reason for the connection.  This is true in today's economy.  Once upon a time in the past the white man enslaved the black for financial gain and to support an industry.  This was his reason for being with him; now that reason no longer exists.  There must be some other reason the two are together.  I can think of no reason other than religion, morality and the idea of The Good.  Now, in the absence of any practical reason to be in the company of black people, the only answr we are left with is religion.  Our relation is religious.  I cannot stress this fact enough.  But there is more. This is not to say, however, that religion in itself is "practical" because obviously it is not.   Religion rather compensates for the lack of mutual usefulness.  First there is mutual use which bridges or covers over otherness; then, that use disappearing, a gap between humans opens which is radical otherness.  That gap can ber closed, at least temporarily, by religion.  Religion  fills in the breaches in practical life where because of conflicts and contradictions of the elements of an economy.  Religion re-connects (in the Latin sense of religare) disperate practical acts which fail to intersect or cohere.  Religion is essentially an attempt to make up for, symbolically, the failings of the economy and of human technological cooperation.   We are presently close to Engels and Marx in the point that morality and The Good is itself a "reflex," in their terms, of the economic conditions of the time. Yet religion is not per se economic.   We do not reject Marxism but above all the insights of Engels and his anthropological mentor LH Morgan on this point; our only purpose is to enquire as to the ancient beginnings of the entire notion of morality and The Good, which is in the uniquely human practical relation with nature.  The practicality that inhered in the human's first knowledge of a stick or stone, in which he found this object to be useful, began a long course of events which resulted (we are stretching to say) in the present relation between (as we have said) the white man and the black man or Jew.  The human being came into intimate association with an object that was previously simply "other."  Instead of being other than this other, simply, the human being became part of it or it became a part of him.  So the object and the person were not now other, precisely; yet neither were they one together.  The contradiction inherent in this first relation between the man and the tools of his life carries over, finally, into his relations with other human beings.  The other humans are, as in culture in general, not now other, nor are they one and the same.   But this "sameness which is still otherness" is a paradox; and there opens the fact we now call "alienation."  Religion and its idea of The Good serves the purpose that it "resolves" contradictions within human practical existence.  At first, in the primal human's relation with his meagre stick or stone tool, there was no alienation.  There was simply the comfortable relation of some object, like a stick or stone, used as a tool, to the tool's user.  But humans soon began using one another as tools.  We are at this stage in our argument at the level of a simple cliche of sociology:  that humans often use one another in an impersonal way.  Force Theory accepts this cliche as true but wants merely to get behind it to a deeper principle.  Assuming that is true--that humans "use" one another--what happens when, having used one another as tools, they stop using one another in this way?  Having been brought together by culture, they are now separated by their respective cultures.   Such peoples exist in the same space, having been brought together by culture, but live in that space in an entirely new and different way.  They are together still, in this space; had they not been brought together originally by culture, their presence in the same space would be considered mutually invasive and hostile.  It would be as though one group had invaded the territory of the other group.  Here they are now, living in the same houses and carrying on the same lives, yet without the original infrastructure and purpose that first brought them together.  They are "other" now than one another.  But this otherness is also exaggerated and exacerbated by the fact that there is no natural principle--more specifically, a natural spacing--wherein they would accept one another as "part of nature."  Not now in a State of Nature, or what is the same "part of nature," they are even more strange to one another than they were when in a "State of Nature" in relation to one another..  This--when strangers meet who are more than strangers, they are aliens--is where religion enters.  There is a short term purpose for religion.  A set of symbols and rituals are implemented in place of the older ties of use and mutual usefulness.

A lengthly segment was included early in this blog on the idea that human culture is "alien" to the human being himself.  This notion does not originate with this blog, but has long been a leading idea of Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophy.  Such names as Feuerbach, Bauer, Stirner and Engels all come to mind.  My perspective here has been that of Philosophical Anthropology.  I have attempted ot find the beginnings of "alienation" in the earliest human culture, in the era before language but at the precise onset of tool-use.  The stick used as a tool--which even chimpanzees are capable of but do not incorporate into their ordinary life--was also the moment of origin of "alienated culture."  Hopefully some new insights were provided then, in this blog, as to the nature and fate of human culture. We have seen how human culture is "other than" the human being himself.  That is, in simplest terms (and the ones we always come back to), the stick that "completes" the arm is also "other" than the arm.  What is true of the arm-stick relation persists throughout the entire history of the relationship of the human being to his culture.   In this last segment I have introduced something new.  That is, the "practical alienation" inhering in culture is paralleled, in addition, by a certain "moral" alienation.   That is, the human inherits from his animal past some sense or instinct as to certain "rules of the game" laid down by nature.  There is a certain sense, that if the fruit is high in the tree, the human being, weaker and less agile than the ape, "should" not climb the tree; furthermore he should not hit the fruit with a stick.  In his mind the person thinks that, simply, he should not have that fruit.  In the Garden of Eden story, God denied Adam and Eve the fruit but they took it anyway.  The force proscribing the fruit would in reality have been nature itself; and the enabler would have been human culture.  There is a sense that humans inherit from their animal beginnings that, again, the fruit is just not the right of human beings.  They take it anyway.  There is the story of Prometheus; again, he was not given a "right" to fire--he took it anyway.  I would say this--the prohibition of the human, by virute of "natural immorality" (essentially, weakness)--is what denies humans access to the fruits of nature.  We run the risk here of lapsing into a sort of poetic or Rousseauian maudlin sentimentality about a "state of nature."  There are, however, certain other facts that can be introduced here.  These come mainly from newspapers and television about everyday American life.  These reports have to do with happenings in our civilization that contradict all common sense.  What I mean is this:  things are allowed to happen which should not happen.  There are events of violence in the face, merely, of some verkehrt morality of Christian or democratic forgiveness and tolerance, which, in a true State of Nature--we are thinking more of Hobbes than of Rousseau--which "naturally" demand retribution.  A sort of nature-in-the-raw has overwhelmed our cities and our whole civilization.  I cannot speak of this state of events without lapsing into a certain Conservative whineyness.  Objectively, however, such events raise a legitimate philosophical issue.  How, in departing our proverbial state of nature, in which life was "nasty, brutal and short" (Hobbes), have we come to reinstitute this state, precisely, in the middle of our cities.  This is a paradox that attracts our most serious attention.  This blog simply loves paradoxes; that is our stock in trade.  In the context of what was said above in this segment, there is a clear answer:  humans allow a certain State of Nature to reappear in their midst, a certain "struggle for existence," we may say, simply to expatiate the "sin" of our human departure from nature three million years ago.  Thus if we think of society at all, we must say that it is both not nature and of nature.  Humans have created a RITUAL wherein they act out the parts of our animal ancestors, for which or whom "nothing is or was ever free."  Bruno Bauer said:  "The history of religion is the critque of religion."  Here we are offering a concept of society as an historical outcome; and we are suggesting, thereby, a critique of society, not as an entity that profits humans, solely, so much as one that expatiates the guilt of humans first entering culture.  This makes society dangerous--not so much to humanity as a whole, because in fact human beings are secure collectively in their culture--but to individuals.  Society is a menace, we are saying, to you and me personally.  Society removes humans in general from a "struggle for existence," but it places you and me, individually, right back in that struggle.  This is the paradox of culture and society.

Society may be defined as one's living together with people one simply does not like.  This--a negation--is what society actually is.    I say this at the risk of reducing what is a serious philosophical issue to a mere quip.  Soceity as a concept is contrary to the old adage that if one does not like a person, one should simply avoid him.  Under this assumption--that society is a negation--it could be suggested that one could rid oneself of enemies simply by abolishing society.  That might be a more humane course of action than attacking these same enemies within society.  We are not saying this, precisely, but perhaps something close to it.  Force Theory has attracted adversaries just on account of this negatism.  But there is more.  Not only does one live with people he doesn't like, he may gain nothing from them materially or mentally.  He is, in effect, carrying baggage that he does not need.  This is a cynical definition of society but consistent with Force Theory.  The corollary of this idea is that, if one accepts the idea of society, and can live with and in it, he accepts also close contact with people whom he does not like.  The next--and obvious--question is:  how did such an arrangement come about.  And what, in the absence of practical material ties of trade and reciprocity, holds society together?  Force Theory as stated above has some kind of answer; but not the answer we started with two years ago.  What I am saying now is that the connections that human beings have with one another are not so much practical and material ones as moral ties.  We are inching our way into the domain of religion, of moral principles and the idea of The Good.  This notion is a turnaround for our blog.    Following the line of thinking stated above--that culture is a "violation" of nature--we may say, consistent with what we said before, that what has appeared as "society" is a ritual grouping of human beings held together by respect for The Good.  And The Good is a purely abstract conception that has come into being where culture and nature separate.  The Good in its majesty--in its absolute position in the world--rivets the human's attention to what holds the world together, rather than dispairing regarding whatever it is that separates humans from nature and from one another.  Society is now the issue before us.  We have said that humans by virtue of their culture have separated themselves from nature.  This could be physical nature, of course, of trees and rivers and such; but it is also the nature that binds humans to one another.  Culture intrudes in the human relationship.  It translates the biological family, for example, into a work group; and culture also translates that work group into a full industrial system.  Humans in industrialism are "alienated," to use Hegel's word, from nature; but they are also alienated from one another.  Alienation means here something other than what Engels meant.  In fact Engels actually applauded industrialism for disrupting the natural relations of parent to child, and among close familials.  The Good appears in the midst of such alienation.  In other words, now--in the age of technology what will hold human beings together as some kind of community is no longer instinct and "nature," rather this tie will be through the shared idea of The Good.  In other words, the relations within a group of people become so artificial and "material" that no concept of practical need for one another suggests itself.  The people really no longer believe that they actually "need" one another in any actual or useful way.  At this point--when all thought of a general usefulness or utility of relations has passed--there enters the very general thought that humans need one another "morally."  That is, they need one another for no reason at all.    The reason that is not a practical reason is the moral reason.  Humans need one another, in this viewpoint, bcause to live together is "morally" right.  I have hitherto neglected the issue of morality and ethical values in this blog; I have neglected the issue, but I have never denied the importance of The Good or of moral rightness that is derived from The Good.  We are interested in knowing its history so that we can understand The Good.

Is culture in some sense "cheating"?   Through culture the human can do what he is unable to do "naturally."    What the human being does, in using a stick to reach an object, is in effect to INVENT A PROBLEM that was not there before.  That is, the primal man aspired to reach a fruit hanging high in a tree; this fruit was previously "unreachable."    Not only was the fruit outside the man's immediate reach, it was in a tree that the human--who is not an ape--simply did not want to climb.  The man was weak, clumbsy and lazy.  The human's present accomplishments are intellectual; early man had no comparison of himself to other animals except through physical prowess.  In proposing that culture might be "cheating" we are undertaking an altogether strange and perhaps, in polite company, in appropriate train of thinking.   This in normal conversation would be an odd question; but it is one we can ask here.  The question is unusual and relegates Philosophical Anthropology to a remote corner of the human consciousness.   If we assume "nature" is some sort of game or sport played by rules, culture would be cheating.  Of course, nature in the raw is not a sport and there are no rules.  So, in this sense, culture does not mean breaking rules.  Culture would mean, rather, understanding nature from an oblique--Plessner would say, ex-centric--point of view.  The human being understands, first, the inadequacy of his own hands and physical strength to do a job.  He understands, too, that a mere stick or stone could solve his problem.  So, the human interposes the stick or stone into the problem he has; he interposes the stick between himself and this objective.  This seems to us now like a "natural" thing to do; by no means does this act, we think, "separate" this human being from so-called nature.  We are wrong in our assumption.  Culture in a sense is cheating.  That is, we were given arms and hands to solve a given problem that was at hand at the time of the evolution of these appendages.  Such a problem would be picking a fruit from a tree:  hands are adaptive for that puroose.  What the human being did, in using a stick, was to INVENT A PROBLEM.  That is, he aspired to reach a fruit hanging high in a tree; this fruit was previously "unreachable."    Not only was the fruit outside the man's immediate reach, it was in a tree that the human--who is not an ape--simply did not want to climb.   It was simply outside the reach of the forager.  In using the stick, the human had to "admit" that he is not as good a climber as an ape; nor is his neck as long as a giraffe's.    The problem that the human had was to reach the unreachable.  And to do so he "cheated" insofar as he "played the game" in a way that nature, so-called, never intended.  Of course, nature is not a sport or game with set rules.  We have already said that.  In speculating whether culture is cheating, we are engaging in a purely other-worldly kind of intellectual play.   From the vantage point of Philosophical Anthropology, however, where we stand for a moment outside ourselves, we can see a general sort of human error wherein short term benefits obscure long range consequences.  The human being has, as the post-Hegelians have observed, is an "alien" being of the humans own creation.  We may speak of culture as a kind of "rebuke" to human beings.  What we are saying is that, in using a stick, the human has admitted, sadly, that he is incapable of climbing that tree and reaching the fruit.   The human being made his appearance in the world, living as he does with technology that was simple but was the same in general concept as the technics of today, as one who understood himself to be a "cheater" and one deserving of criticism.  For thousands of years he looked to animals for inspiration; his religion--totemism--had the premise of the natural superiority of animals.  Modern man has not lost this admiration of the animal world.  Nor has he ceased to rebuke himself for his "cheating" of what was assumed to be a sort of game plan of nature.

Does "nature" have a "game plan" or "rules"?   We are inclined to assume that living nature, where "all is fair in love and war,"  has no rules or plan. But speculating idly, as we do here, and assuming that there is a broader plan to nature, one corresponding to the rules of football or basketball, is that plan "made known" to, and enforced within, the human psyhe?  These are questions we can ask--but are not normally asked by outsiders to Philosophical Anthropology.   Here we will ask them.   In raising the possibility of a broader organization of nature, which also assigns the individual human being a definite role--and enforces that role--we seem to enter the domain of religion.  We are at risk of seeming to propose that there is a plan laid down by a grand creator.  I am talking purely hypothetically, without any direct knowledge of any grand plan of nature.  I am proposing the mere possibility of such a thing, in which the human being is given--and here we say given at an "animal" stage of existence and before the advent of culture--a sort of book of rules.   This book contains the plan--essentially, the morality--of nature.   Assuming that nature has a plan, and one encoded or programmed into the human, then it follows that culture--which breaks with this plan and unilaterally announces its own rules--would be a sort of cheating.  That is, the human being "knows" or has some instinctive respect for the rules of nature, yet--like Prometheus--goes away-without-leave from nature.  In using technics rather than his own hands and physical strength, he refuses to play by the rules of the so-called game.  These are questions raised in Philosophical Anthropology which human beings do not normally ask.  Rather, the human being in his proverbial daily life is following--because he finally has no choice--the rules of culture.  The rules of culture are not those of nature.  We can put this conclusion differently, and qualify it--because in culture finally humans are indeed following very general rules of nature--with a difference.  What humans do is not so much violate nature, as re-arrange it in a way that broader forces never "intended."  But humans may still suffer from thoughts of guilt, unconsciously and instinctively, that they "violate" nature or the "rules of the game."  The physical facts of a man lifting a stone are set "by nature."  Using leverage is a circumvention of the stress "imposed" by the physical attributes of the man and the stone.  But there is more.  We may go on to suggest that in breaking the rules of nature, the human being brings to himself a certain guilt--and a guilt, moreover, that must be expatiated.  There is the possibility in culture that humans are separated from nature; a separation, that is, which is not only physical (the physical break is only too obvious), but is mosral and guilt-inducing as well.   We can easily point to the physical difference between the force of the human body, and on the other hand, the leverage of a stick or other tool.  These are all physical facts.  The human being as engineer and technician simply re-arranges nature to suit himself.  But I have raised the possibility that, assuming there are "rules to the game" of nature, and that the human being is aware of himself, if only by instinct, as breaking these rules.   Physically the human has separated himself from nature; but there is the further suggestion, raised here, that he is breaking some inbred "moral rule" as well.  This moral rule is established by nature, and is one in which the human being instinctively participates; so that to break it is a"violation" of some code.  This is not a code of God, really, but neither is the code of human making.  Again, I emphasize that these speculations are not the ordinary fare of philosophy let alone of everyday existence.  They are archane broodings of introverted minds, which is also the lot of the present writer.  Our purpose here is to set down a premise--here of the "rules of nature"--and to draw out the logical conclusions of that premise.  We may wait until a later time to ask further about this premise.  All along in this blog, stress has been laid on the oppositions of human existence.  We are simply strengthing or emphasizing the separation of man and nature by suggesting that this separation is not merely physical, but is in some sense "moral" as well.  Simple separation thereby turns, through this consideration, into outright categorical or logical opposition.  The human being feels he has morally challenged nature.  And he sets out, by certain intellectual and ritual acts, to expatiate this guilt.  We turn finally to questions of "moral reconciliation" that the human has.  We will propose that this moral reconciliation is between humans, rather than between the human and physical nature.  I want to be clear on this point.  The human being has over time come to understand his separation from nature as a separation of man from man.  Society, we are saying, is essentially religious and ritual rather than practical


(3 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

God not only is not dead, he exists--as a fact!  This I proclaim either in answer to, or as an explanation of, Nietzsche.   But frankly we are not interested now one way or another in God as fact.  Of course, assuming that God is one fact among others, he may exist.  By saying "fact," however, and not value, we have qualified our answer in extreme.  To show that God is a fact, and thus exists, we need only to follow the path of science, which is a trail of facts, as one fact leads to another. This would be an easy mental process; and we do not need to trouble ourselves about the arguments of atheists.   God would be in these terms some final fact.   We need only leave the issue in the competent of scientists, who will lead the way. [Through DNA???!!!]   God, his existence or non-existence, has been an issue ignored in this blog.  The irony, finally, is that priests and religious people do not care about the existence or non-existence of God, any more than we do, so that arguing with theologians and such on this issue would be a waste of time.  Religion cares not about God but about value.  Value is what would causes me, in the grip of priests and holy men and my colleagues at the university, not to be such a sexist and racist.   Had I simple values, I would be a different person.  I would become through this, notwithstanding any beliefs I had about the facticity of God, a moral person.  That is the real issue.  What priests and my colleagues are concerned with--in the extreme--is whether God is good.  They are most concerned that value exists in fact, even where it does not eminate from fact.  The answer we do not know, but it would interest us greatly to know this.  Or, more essentially, the whole question of God aside, we want to know if there is anything such as The Good--value in itself--that corresponds to the Platonic Form of the Good.  Bringing the issue back here to earth, if it is asserted that it is good for me (say) to love my fellow human, and love him even more if his skin is darker than mine, where is the source of this good?  Or is this value simply a tale made up like (the spirit of Good) Santa Claus?   Does good somehow eminate from God?  To even raise the question of the existence of God is a diversion.  It is a very common diversion and one people are willing to live with.  We still have to prove that, among the facts that there are of the universe God is one of them, which is still not certain.  The issue as I have outlined it, which is the descrepancy between fact and value, was, I suggest, the occasion of Kant's "awakening."  We try thusly to explain Kant's obsession with Hume.  I once, beginning with Philosophy 101 at Colgate or Ohio State, had a false idea that what Kant saw in Hume was a question of so-called reality--here, "fact--when the real issue was the source of value.  We may expand the problem to ask simply, in lieu of the question of the existence of God, about the very existence of something called value.  Hume proclaimed simply that a value cannot be derived from a fact:  this was the statement--which I aver could have brought down Western civilization, which is founded upon values not on fact--that riveted the attention of Kant and one that he tried through all his writings to answer.  He never did give a successful answer.    Again, as I said earlier, if this question were entirely in the domain of philosophy, it would have been decisively answered long ago.  As Nietzsche said, all these philosophical questions, when channeled through state institutions such as universities and churches, get confused with political questions of the day.  The State, as Nietzsche said, promotes first and foremost its own security and stability; and the State is founded not upon fact but on value--the idea of The Goods--as proclaimed in the sacred political documents of all time.   I point to the word "truth" in our own American Declaration of Independence. We have here already some hint of an answer to the question of the existence or non-existence of value.  That is, everyday use-value has become, in the complex evolution of civilization, a moral value that is detached--like God is said to be from simple factual reality--from any sort of Hume-ian fact.

Originally, use and value were the same thing.  An object (stone, branch, grass and so forth) was valuable because it was useful and vice versa.  I want to be entirely clear in what I'm talking about.    In the earliest period of human culture the use that the artifact--stick or stone--had was the value of that object.  A stone lying about, merely, had no value; used as a tool or made into a tool, it acquired value.  Use in this case means value; and value means use.  These early humans may not have had the symbolic or mental capacity to calculate and express worth; but they showed respect for their tools in the way they behaved towards them.  This unity of idea of value and use persisted through several millions of years of human biological and cultural evolution.  Then finally, at a certain time, humans began to talk about value and use as ideas that are separate from one another.   To precisely identify this time may be impossible.  For us and for Force Theory it is critical that we identify the circumstances that led to this separation.  In our own age it is common to speak of value as something separate from use; and use as something separate from value. This divergence of meaning between two concepts--that were once one concept--marks a turning point of human culture.  Thus when Kant speaks, finally, of his Categorical Imperative, he means something that is not use alone.  Kant's so-called "Duty" (Pflicht) is not only different than use, use and duty are in different spheres of being.  For us today the idea of value is expressed in the words "should" and "right".  I can give many examples.  In Marx's "labor theory of value" (this idea is attributed solely to Marx apart from his collegue Engels) is the notion that the value that a thing has is due to the labor invested in it.  We are not going to judge the true economic validity of this idea; only to say that such labor value has nothing to do with the use a thing is put to.  I labor daily over my paintings; and I am first to admit these paintings are worthless.  But that is not the point of what we are talking about.  What we allude to here is the fact that value and use no longer have anything to do with one another.  They are separate considerations.  In both Engels and Marx the word "fair" appears.  Decried is the fact that one person is rich, having done no work or labor, and another person is poor having worked throughout his life.  This unfairness constitues the moral premise of Das Kapital and other communist writings.  In fact, products on the market in a free enterprise society are designed for and consumed by the proletariate; and it is unfair, we may say, that there is nothing for the rich man to buy.  All these factors can be raised as issues regarding fairness and unfairness.  The word "fair" is a value judgement, not a delineation of fact.  Our own poinst of view, and Force Theory, derives from E.Duehring and Max Stirner.  We move on to the final consideration in this essay.  That is, if use and value were always the same thing, where and why did the separation come between them:  where and why do we need different words?  We have different words because these things are different ideas. 

The early human craftsman occupied himself in creating an object that was useful.  There is nothing further to say about him than that.  But this same created object could also be prized by him as a possession.  The reason that it was prized was primarily that it was useful.  Of course, his was a human activity.  I mention this because it has to be made clear that for an animal, there is no useful thing and therefore there is no thing of value.  An animal runs or eats, as the case may be, without engaging itself in its environment.  An animal has no sense of use of anything; and moreover, inasmuch as the human establishes the facticity of his world by his use of things in this world, the animal has no sense of true fact.   I want to be clear on this point.  The very knowledge that a human has of his world is formed by the delineation of objects used as, or useless as, tools and artifacts.  Use and value exist only for a human being, and, at that, primarily they inhere in the human's capacity as a user and maker of tools.  In this way the human engages himself in and with his world. Right away we have attributed two things--value and use--solely and uniquely to the human species.  If the human being did not use a thing, he also would not value that thing.  Again we must clearly define the word "use."  As Hegel said, a human life is both mediated and mediating.  I took up the issue of mediation in my book The Mediator:  A Study in Philosophical Anthropology.  (This book is still available from Amazon and elsewhere; I have a number of copies I would love to get rid of.)   I also wrote a book, offset copies of which are available occasionally:  The Pure Theory of Mediation .  We have focused our attention so far on the individual craftsman working long ago, in the Paleolithic Period, to produce this or that spear or arrow.  This would be a very narrow world, of personal concetration, that he lived in.  He was lost in the personal dreamworld that also distinguishes artists and writers.  His dream, in other words, did not primarily involve other people in relationships of collaboration.  Here we must be careful.  At some point in the history of culture his efforts were collaborative.  The craftsman worked with other persons.  New layers of mediation were added to his work:  tools were used to make tools, for instance.  But there was more.  Humans themselves had to be factored into his world as agents or, in effect, themselves tools.  I want to reflect back on Kant's "imperative" that human beings not be considered as tools.  But they were bound to be considered as tools.  Humans at this juncture were just a hair's breadth away from the idea of slavery.   Here I have to ponder a bit.   At this moment in the development of my argument I am inclined to say that the separation of value from use, and the separation also of value from fact, came about in these collaborative efforts, where humans did begin to use one another as tools among other tools; and moreover tools that were, like artifacts, subject to alteration according to the purposes of their "makers."  We might suggest that the break between use-value and value per se came at the time that one human being was forced to make a decision:  that is, whether another man would be more valuable as a coerced servant or as a free or voluntary collaborator.  A man having been used as an impersonal tool may have been afforded, at some point, with a sense of his independent "dignity."  I am offering this idea as a suggestion; I will continue this speculation shortly.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)


As I write I am bound to shift position on one topic or the other; this is one of those times.  Just how I have shifted may become a later topic.  For now it must suffice to raise an old issue--that of alienation--and here is where my stance seems to shift.  I have wanted always to stand by Ludwig Klages and the old German romantics.  The Hegelians have also contributed much on the subject "alientation from one's own self.". This is a state of being unique to humans among all animals; and the suspected cause of alienation is culture.  Culture, in Klages' words, is a wedge that divides the human being from nature and from his self.  Force Theory, on the other hand, as outlined by Eugen Duehring is non-commital on these basic issues and is certainly not radical.   We propose here to build upon Force Theory.  What we are saying--and what we contribute to Force Theory--is the idea that, indeed, as we stated above, culture actually engages human beings in nature; culture brings humans closer to nature. It would then not be correct to say that culture, on the contrary, alienates humans from nature.  The opposite is true.   But the agent of this engagement is mind.  We are confronted immediately with a paradox that demands our closest attention.  The animal has evolved, and the human being himself has evolved as an animal, precisely by separating itself or himself from nature, not by engaging himself in it.  The animal does not trouble itself over what nature is really like; nor does the human being care much, either, about nature.  (What we can call axiomatically) nature is simply taken for granted.  Such complacency would be expected, of course, or is itself "natural" because of the long association between animals and nature and the length of time allowed for such a relationship to become encoded in animal and human genetics.  So that, in other words, instinct rather than intellect is the basic relation humans have by virtue of their animal past.  The human being still has these instincts--they dictate the core self-concept of humans--and freezes the human, we are saying, in an attitude of certain indifference to nature. The human's as the animal's self-concept is set through the fact that the human being is not nature and vice versa.  This means that the human is already in a fundamental sense not-nature.  Not nature is what the human is.  Indeed, not-nature is what an animal is insofar as the animal is self-ishly assertive.  That the human being is at all is because he is, or through the fact that he is, not nature.  The human being sees himself for what he is as basically not nature.  The animal condition is one already of a certain separation from nature, even an opposition to nature.  In the movement of the animal--which distinguishes the animal from a plant--there is already a certain contrariness in relation to nature.  The human might bely this fact, not so much in what he does on behalf of himself but because of what he does to other humans.  I earlier discussed the issue of slavery, and that is relevant to what is presently discussed.  The slave is less than an animal; he has been deprived of the self-assertion allowed to the most humble animal.  This is his relation to his master--the slave is less, as I say, than the lowest creatures that there are, lower even than plants.  But this relationship is through slavery.  Once the slavery is ended, the slave again is an animal--and one dangerous to his former master.  For there to be a benign connection between former slave and former master a whole social conception is necessary, one that is far from any original "state of nature" in which animals or living beings co-exist with one another.  The former slave is now the most dangerous "animal" that the master confronts.  These and other considerations must be encorporated into force theory.  Our basic present issue is that of the correct interpretation of the notion of alienation.  The paradox of culture as stated by Force Theory is that in fact, in bringing humans closer to nature--engaging them in nature--culture actually separates humans from their own "natures."  The nature within humans, through which they are personally constituted, is the "real" nature; and yet precisely this inner nature is separated from, and would not be what it is were it not for this separation, the nature around the person.  Culture, in drawing humans into nature outside them, pulls them away from the nature within themselves.   Culture "externalizes" humans.

We qualify this statement by saying that, first and always, the human being never has been a creature of introspection and self knowledge.  Socrates said that an unexamined life is not worth living; he thereby dismissed as hopelessly stupid almost the whole of humanity.  Humans understand themselves in the same way that they once understood the nature around them, that is through instinct.  But they do not understand what is within themselves because understanding itself, construed as intellect and mind, came about originally as a power to engage oneself in the external world.  Mind is not for self knowledge.  Philosophical Anthropology, as refined introspection, is in these terms contrary to the whole purpose and function of human intelligence.  Finally we pass to questions that are ethical and moral; we ask where arises the idea of The Good.   Human ethical systems stress external engagement; and they discourage self-involvement.  This is seen in every ethical demand for unselfishness.  Culture on the one hand means engagement not only with nature but with "others."  But here these others, while they are humans, these others are construed in the same way that we know external nature.  Self understanding as self-assertion is not an issue here.  My writing methods are simple.  In my last paragraph there is, there, one sentence which stands out as strongest.  That is the one with which I start my next paragraph.  Often in this modus operandi I begin to drift in one way or another without much sense of direction.  We are saying here, now, that the involvement that a person has with "people" as they are seen by human intelligence itself--which has evolved as in order to engage the human with the external world--in that same "external" way.  In fact, to understand a human being at all is to understand him falsely.  What do I mean?  I suggest here that understanding itself has nothing to do with the self, whose existence is a consequence of an ancient line of evolution.  In this evolution a close relation has unfolded between the animal and nature, so close, in fact, that the relation is thoughtless.  We sense this lack of "external" engagement in primitive peoples.  Though we attribute to their ideas on "justice," for example, to differences in culture, these ideas in truth derive from the fact that they have no ideas of justice at all.  Such ideas are possible only through a general extrernal engagement with what is "outside" and "other" than the people themselves, whether this "other"is external nature or human beings themselves as an extension of external nature.  The selfishness of the individual, which is genetic, is the original way that humans have long existed in relation to nature.  But this was not a relationship of engagement but, on the contrary, a "bond of separation."  The identity of the human consisted in the fact that the person was "other" than nature.  This separation constitutes the animal or primitive person's notion of what it or he is.  The person sees himself as mirrored in nature at the same time, essentially, he understood the concept of "mirror" at all.  This required a higher intelligence.  But the selbstverstaendlichkeit (self-evidency) of the primitive human is what we are talking about.  The human was and still is "self-evident" to himself.  The idea of self-evidency might be a core idea of Force Theory and is one we certainly will emphasize.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)


As I write I am bound to shift position on one topic or the other; this is one of those times.  Just how I have shifted may become a later topic.  For now it must suffice to raise an old issue--that of alienation--and here is where my stance seems to shift.  I have wanted always to stand by Ludwig Klages and the old German romantics.  The Hegelians have also contributed much on the subject "alientation from one's own self.". This is a state of being unique to humans among all animals; and the suspected cause of alienation is culture.  Culture, in Klages' words, is a wedge that divides the human being from nature and from his self.  Force Theory, on the other hand, as outlined by Eugen Duehring is non-commital on these basic issues and is certainly not radical.   We propose here to build upon Force Theory.  What we are saying--and what we contribute to Force Theory--is the idea that, indeed, as we stated above, culture actually engages human beings in nature; culture brings humans closer to nature. It would then not be correct to say that culture, on the contrary, alienates humans from nature.  The opposite is true.   But the agent of this engagement is mind.  We are confronted immediately with a paradox that demands our closest attention.  The animal has evolved, and the human being himself has evolved as an animal, precisely by separating itself or himself from nature, not by engaging himself in it.  The animal does not trouble itself over what nature is really like; nor does the human being care much, either, about nature.  (What we can call axiomatically) nature is simply taken for granted.  Such complacency would be expected, of course, or is itself "natural" because of the long association between animals and nature and the length of time allowed for such a relationship to become encoded in animal and human genetics.  So that, in other words, instinct rather than intellect is the basic relation humans have by virtue of their animal past.  The human being still has these instincts--they dictate the core self-concept of humans--and freezes the human, we are saying, in an attitude of certain indifference to nature. The human's as the animal's self-concept is set through the fact that the human being is not nature and vice versa.  This means that the human is already in a fundamental sense not-nature.  Not nature is what the human is.  Indeed, not-nature is what an animal is insofar as the animal is self-ishly assertive.  That the human being is at all is because he is, or through the fact that he is, not nature.  The human being sees himself for what he is as basically not nature.  The animal condition is one already of a certain separation from nature, even an opposition to nature.  In the movement of the animal--which distinguishes the animal from a plant--there is already a certain contrariness in relation to nature.  The human might bely this fact, not so much in what he does on behalf of himself but because of what he does to other humans.  I earlier discussed the issue of slavery, and that is relevant to what is presently discussed.  The slave is less than an animal; he has been deprived of the self-assertion allowed to the most humble animal.  This is his relation to his master--the slave is less, as I say, than the lowest creatures that there are, lower even than plants.  But this relationship is through slavery.  Once the slavery is ended, the slave again is an animal--and one dangerous to his former master.  For there to be a benign connection between former slave and former master a whole social conception is necessary, one that is far from any original "state of nature" in which animals or living beings co-exist with one another.  The former slave is now the most dangerous "animal" that the master confronts.  These and other considerations must be encorporated into force theory.  Our basic present issue is that of the correct interpretation of the notion of alienation.  The paradox of culture as stated by Force Theory is that in fact, in bringing humans closer to nature--engaging them in nature--culture actually separates humans from their own "natures."  The nature within humans, through which they are personally constituted, is the "real" nature; and yet precisely this inner nature is separated from, and would not be what it is were it not for this separation, the nature around the person.  Culture, in drawing humans into nature outside them, pulls them away from the nature within themselves.   Culture "externalizes" humans.

We qualify this statement by saying that, first and always, the human being never has been a creature of introspection and self knowledge.  Socrates said that an unexamined life is not worth living; he thereby dismissed as hopelessly stupid almost the whole of humanity.  Humans understand themselves in the same way that they once understood the nature around them, that is through instinct.  But they do not understand what is within themselves because understanding itself, construed as intellect and mind, came about originally as a power to engage oneself in the external world.  Mind is not for self knowledge.  Philosophical Anthropology, as refined introspection, is in these terms contrary to the whole purpose and function of human intelligence.  Finally we pass to questions that are ethical and moral; we ask where arises the idea of The Good.   Human ethical systems stress external engagement; and they discourage self-involvement.  This is seen in every ethical demand for unselfishness.  Culture on the one hand means engagement not only with nature but with "others."  But here these others, while they are humans, these others are construed in the same way that we know external nature.  Self understanding as self-assertion is not an issue here.  My writing methods are simple.  In my last paragraph there is, there, one sentence which stands out as strongest.  That is the one with which I start my next paragraph.  Often in this modus operandi I begin to drift in one way or another without much sense of direction.  We are saying here, now, that the involvement that a person has with "people" as they are seen by human intelligence itself--which has evolved as in order to engage the human with the external world--in that same "external" way.  In fact, to understand a human being at all is to understand him falsely.  What do I mean?  I suggest here that understanding itself has nothing to do with the self, whose existence is a consequence of an ancient line of evolution.  In this evolution a close relation has unfolded between the animal and nature, so close, in fact, that the relation is thoughtless.  We sense this lack of "external" engagement in primitive peoples.  Though we attribute to their ideas on "justice," for example, to differences in culture, these ideas in truth derive from the fact that they have no ideas of justice at all.  Such ideas are possible only through a general extrernal engagement with what is "outside" and "other" than the people themselves, whether this "other"is external nature or human beings themselves as an extension of external nature.  The selfishness of the individual, which is genetic, is the original way that humans have long existed in relation to nature.  But this was not a relationship of engagement but, on the contrary, a "bond of separation."  The identity of the human consisted in the fact that the person was "other" than nature.  This separation constitutes the animal or primitive person's notion of what it or he is.  The person sees himself as mirrored in nature at the same time, essentially, he understood the concept of "mirror" at all.  This required a higher intelligence.  But the selbstverstaendlichkeit (self-evidency) of the primitive human is what we are talking about.  The human was and still is "self-evident" to himself.  The idea of self-evidency might be a core idea of Force Theory and is one we certainly will emphasize.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Positive Law and Natural Law are two topics of philosophy.  Thankfully we may easily understand these terms when they are defined narrowly and defined also in the only precise way that they can be defined.  (1)Positive Law--from "posit," or to put or make or create--means laws that are made through human agency.  Law says that I must drive on the left side of the street.  That law could be changed or disregarded or deleted from the statutes.  But as long as it is a statute the law, if the law is to mean anything at all, will be en-forced.  Breaking that law will be punished by human and social agency; so that a person stands advised not to transgress.   (2)Natural Law consists of principles that determine the form and movement of physical bodies.   These are laws such as gravitation or the temperature for boiling water.  These are physical laws; they were here before the advent of man.  Man must obey these laws, too, as one physical and chemical object among others; though the human being can also create ways that employ certain principles to overcome other principles.  For instance, gravitation holds the person to the earth; but knowledge of principles of flight allow him to create the appearance of overcoming gravitation; he does not negate gravitation, of course, so much as find a way around it in the short term.  All these things can easily be understood; they are recognized not only by non-scientist laypersons but by theologians (who are likely to glibly work them into sermons).  Natural Law and Positive Law are not neglected in any formal philosophical system, nor will we neglect them here.  But there is something more.  We still have not talked about a third meaning of the word law.  While Natural- and Positive Law can be straightforwardly defined there is also in the background of philosophy another sense of "law" which is not so readily defined; yet this sense of law is a veritable preoccupation or obsession of philosophy and religion alike.  (Science is less concerned.)  That is (3) Moral Law.  The source of Moral Law is unknown and its application is inconsistent.  I will take my own career as a college teacher as an example.  Here is one teacher's "confession."  It is that of unorthodoxy that violates a present-day code of teacher's ethics but an ethics, moreover, (alleged) to be based on a broader moral code regarding "humanity."   The law that binds and controls me as a college professor is not physical or Natural Law, by the definition given earlier; nor is it Positive Law.   I am obligated by Moral Law.  So it behoves me to understand Moral Law, even where I do not live in the university by physical or legal rules.  The term "professional code of ethics (for teachers) is a phrase that comes up; although the code is obviously derived from more general values.   The Moral Law is a broad and intangible--undefinable--mode of human relationship which has to be understood more by instinct than objective intelligence.  A teacher as a priest has to know of this law because, in proposing heterodoxy (heresy) he has  broken the moral law of his church or university.  Catholic priests, at least, that their tenure is conditional on a largely manufacted orthodoxy;  teachers in general do not have this clear understanding. The Moral Law of which I speak "law of humanity," which is a rule that is supposed to extend to limits of so-called humanity but, nevertheless, is not a physical or posited (made) law.  Clearly what I have said so far about the Moral Law is vague.  But that is precisely the point of Moral Law--it is vague and subjective.  But those humans who are charged with, or appoint themselves as, adjudicating the Moral Law are the last to concede this point.  Finally, it is clearly in the interests of the (so-called) Moral point of view that the source of morals--and human values in general--is left vague.  Bruno Bauer said that the "history of religion is the critique of religion."  This principle applies values as well:  an idea of the source of values evokes the clear idea that values, finally, are subjective and arbitrary.  In the Congo somewhere today there is a particularly gruesome massacre, so common there that it's not even mentioned in our newspapers.  This appears to be a "crime against humanity."  It might appear to be such a crime; but no so much so when the general or "big man" explains his purpose in commanding his troops.  He had a reason.   Here in this essay we are not going to reject the words "morality" and "value," which will always have a meaning that, although very vague.  We propose only to critque the words as having no solid and consistent application to specifically the university.  This is a way of asking for so-called "free speech" regarding issues of the day such as race.  And objective discussion of so-called sensitive and controversial issues (which I'll not name here on grounds that they would drag this essay off into another and unwelcome direction).  The university, I am saying, is grounded on moral moral principles; and, as such, the university is of ephemeral importance in the broad world of human events.


(2 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)



(2 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

19. Topics in Philosophical anthropology (INCORPORATE)


32. incorporate (32. ZUSAMMENHANG)



19. Topics in Philosophical anthropology


Kant stands vaguely midway between religion and science. (See below for qualification of the word "midway.")   Western civilization itself erratically and oportunistically waffles between the two; that is why Western civilization so loves Kant.  At this time we are taking up the question of values and morality.   Kant expresses values consistent with Liberal Democracy; but tries to ground these values in something like factual science.  Kant took up the age old question posed by Plato, how do we get from fact to value?  Kant better perhaps than anyone else understood the issue of fact and value.  But inasmuch as his fixation was on value, he was essentially religious to the core of his personality.   Kant lived in the awkward and adolescent age of transition from religion to science; in this time both leaders and laypeople were uncertain and lacked clear ideas of their identities.  Kant had in this period a rather convincing formula to make this transition. For one thing, Kant appeals to the West's idea that discretion is the better part of value when confronting science.   This is only to say that religion did not so much repent of its radical value-orientation so much as fear science.   Kant's philosophy is a lot of hide and seek; that is what we are saying.  Kant also reflects a new perspective that might be called "religion of nature."  This is a vague concept that, again oportunistically and politically, waffles between fact and value.     Naturalism is essentially a philosophy rather than a pracice of science.  Force Theory is essentially "natualistic," while it attempts to qualify its own conception of value.  Force Theory however borrows little or nothing from Kant.  Kant's "cateogories of thinking" are factual insofar as the human mind is a fact.  But we are saying here, in opposition to Kant, that a value cannot anymore be deduced from a fact of the mind than from a stone or tree as fact.   Kant proceeds thusly; but his whole point of view falls apart when he transitions from mind as fact to the values produced by mind. 

A value is not a fact.   R.Carnap said that values cannot be derived from facts.  We concur on this, and say that this reality--the neutrality of fact regarding value--is the problem that Kant saw but could not solve.  Our own views of Kant may be limited by our lack of diligent scholarship; the quotes and paraphrases entered here are from Google sources.  Kant is consistently the consumate self-righteous Liberal type in his ethical viewpoint; he is a "hmanitarian."  There should be no objection to our assessment here.  Having said these things about Kant--and that Kant is a moral philosopher whose real roots are in religion rather than science--we can define his relation to the naturalism of racialism.  Force Theory is a racialistic--naturalistic--philosophy and would oppose Kant on certain points.  But there is more.  Kant indeed, in his basic mentality, has given us insight into the so-called Liberal and anti-racist point of view.  It is simply true that value in the so-called "higher" human sense is cateogorical.  That is to say, if love is a categorical value, then love excludes hate as love's categorical opposite.  I quote from a Google source:

"The class of actions in accordance with duty must be distinguished from the class of actions performed for the sake of duty. ...Kant believes only actions performed for the sake of duty have moral worth. He seems to suggest that the greater one's disinclination to act for the sake of duty, the greater the moral worth of the action. ...If one performs an action by inclination, then that action, on Kant's view, has no moral worth. Thus, morality necessarily involves a struggle against our emotional inclinations. The natural love of a parent for a son or daughter has no moral worth in the Kantian sense of the term.  The choices necessary to live a good life could involve actions which entail results incompatible with happiness... "

Kant clearly states his ideas on the family--he called these speculations "philosophical anthropology"--and it is here we have a good shot at him.  Kant states that the love of a parent for a child is nothing (his kind) of a higher or transcendental moral order; in fact such parental love is for his purposes nothing at all.  We don't think it is anything either--except inevitable.  In Force Theory we respond to Kant's idea of transcendental love with the consideration that there is also a lower love.  That is the love we affirm here.   And with this lower love there comes a lower hate which, right or wrong, is ineivtalbe and "natural."  I repeat the idea that Force Theory is a version reminiscent of "nature philosophy" of the 18th century.    This--on the point of the family-- is where we can see Kant to be anti-naturalistic.  For the parent to love a child, we are saying, is simple love.  To this love Kant contrasts his love of a higher--categorical--kind.  This is the Categorical Imperative of Kant:  to love in the higher sense is an absolute, undeniable command that will not permit any other love, not to mention hate.  Where does this command to love in a moral or value-oriented sense eminate?  It derives from mind.  But this forgets that mind is a mere, homely fact among other facts; the Categorical Imperative might as well be a command of God.  As an absolute command, this call to duty excludes any call to do the opposite.  Force Theory is clear on this point.  There is something that Force Theory identifies as simple hate which is innocent and pure and is an expression of nature in all its ebbs and flows.  We are forced into the situation where we must choose, in other words, between Kant's Cateogorical love and our own simple, innocent hate.  Force Theory has made its choice.  We are saying that simple love and simple hate can co-exist spontaneously in the same person without contradicting one another.  This is "natural" in our sense of the word.  And simple love and simple hate are also inevitable.

I said earlier that Kant stands between religion and science.  This was a rather casual statement.  The word "between" contains, in the present context, a possibility for great confusion.  This must be cleared up.  Religion, we are saying, is based on value; science is based on fact.  Value and fact do not exist together on the same spectrum; each has its own spectrum.   Thus it would be impossible to be simply "between" value and fact, or, that is, between religion and science.  Kant is simply playing both sides of the fence.   Kant has to be, in other words, somewhere in the realm of value while also in the realm of fact.  He is back and forth.  This is a neat trick.  We have already exposed this trick by saying, simply, that value cannot be derived from fact even where the fact is the human mind.  The so-called categories of thinking--a concept that is refined and superceded by modern psychology--are mental facts, but no less factual on that account.  Kant lives on today as an academic philosopher amenable to the Liberal (and here I have narrowly defined this word) point of view--anti-naturalistic, anti-racialistic--of the churches and universities.   He is the core of their esoteric, as opposed to exoteric, ideology. He is the St.Thomas Aquinas of the so-called "secular" movement, the authority of last resorts on all inherently unanswerable questions; we can call him the place the proverbial political buck stops--in total confusion--where there is urgent challenge in ethical issues.   As the Liberal Acquinas, Kant constitutes a dark realm but also one of refuge when the priest or professor is challenged on the subject of the basis of value.  The universities, which exist through value rather than through fact, are themselves churches or temples of The Good.  The word "secular" is meaningless.   For the reason academia and formal religion both are based on value, any argument between them is friendly and mutually supportive.  They will never destroy one another but only re-enforce one another on the basic issues that confront them both.  The equality of all humans is a value, not a fact.  Force Theory is grounded in naturalism, a point of view that arose in England, France and Germany in the 18th and 19th centuries.  These philosophies, whether of Hegel or Rousseau or many others, unconsciously lapsed from time to time into value judgements.  The State of Nature was proclaimed "good"; this would be a departure from hard fact.  Where Force Theory enters the discussion much later, ideas such as "simple love" and "simple hate" are advanced.  That is, we admit the existence of value but place such value in its original setting, that of the family and, as an extension of the family, the race.  Finally we return to the statement by R.Carnap that a value cannot be derived from a fact.  If that is true, it is logically impossible to derive any so-called higher moral value from the categories of the mind, which themselves are fact.  We have already stated that simple value is real, but only in the context of what is natural, the family and race, or nature-in-general.  We have said that the seemingly opposite values of love and hate can exist, alternately, within the same person.  Categorical love, on the other hand, precludes hate of any kind, whether simple or complex.  Therefore categorical love (Kant's kind of love) exists alone in some so-called transcendental or other-worldly realm which not only is not of nature (or race) but contrary and contradictory to the real or natural world that people in fact live in. 

New terms may be useful to give the full impact of Kant's great mistake. The problem of deriving an idea of God from facts has no interest for us in Force Theory.   We are comfortable with the idea that God as a fact might be inferred or induced from some fact of reality--so there may be a real God after all.  Such a consideration is only scientific speculation, not religion.  Because to infer a God from existing facts does not mean that we pass necessarily from fact to value.   What we deny, however, that a factual God can Himself (or Herself) produce, somehow, any value whatsoever.  God may exist, we are saying, but He exists in a valueless world.  Jesus Christ might have come to the world, but He came here as a fact descending from another fact.  Because value cannot come from mere fact, Jesus' factual coming brought no value to the world.   From a factual God can come only other facts. The miracles of Jesus are alluded to solely to proclaim that The Good or new value came to the world; but if Jesus is only a fact, then what comes from him to the world can only be other fact.  Jesus's miracles would be only fact following other facts.  There is no real "good" or value in them.  We are speaking hypothetically, since Force Theory is rigorously agnostic.   God may have produced nature, we are saying, but this is still a nature with no inherent value.  (Except the value of mutual usefulness of things and beings, as we said earlier.)   The entire matter can be summarized briefly.  If I say that a thing is, I mean that it necessarily is.  The statement that a thing is means nothing more or less than that thing is.  If I say a thing is, I am also saying that it could be.  It has shown itself that it could be by actually being.  If I say a thing could be, I do not necessarily mean that it is. But I have not logically contradicted the "is-ness" of the thing by saying that it only could be.    Only I'm saying that it could be.  If, on the other hand, I say a thing should be, I do not mean that it necessarily is.  Of course, a thing that should be could, also, be. The should-ness of the thing is simply another quality that co-exists with the thing.  The fact that a thing should be does not exclude the idea that it also could be or even that it is.  What is morally right can actually exist.  This is all we are saying.  But there is more.  What should be might also not be.  And what is need not necessarily also be what should be.  There is no such logical connection between should be and could be.  By these and other games of logic we might demonstrate that the realms of should-be and could-be (and is) are entirely separate domains of reality.

1. We can now put Force Theory in the broad context of a familiar debate.  In the conflict between Liberalism and Conservatism--focus of the American news media--Liberalism has prevailed because its positions have been internally consistent, and above all consistent on the issue of race.  We assume that race is the America's most central and critical issue.   Liberalism has been consistently anti-racist.   Conservatism, on the other hand, as Liberalism's alleged adversary, has been only inconsistently and ambiguously racist.  We want to change this.  We agree that there is consciously or unconciously  a thread of racism running throughout rightist thinking.  The indecisiveness of rightist racial theory, and the internal incongruity among its own elements, consigns the whole Conservative movement to failure.  We can count this so-called movement a pathetic failure.  For one thing, Conservatives do not have the sinecures in universities and churches.  This--the mere question of jobs and money for our own people--is a question that must be addressed.   Force Theory emerges out of defeated Conservatism.  As developed in the present blog, Force Theory attempts not so much to lay down a doctrine as to sort out inconsistencies in older doctrines.  The problem, we are saying, has long been Conservatism's wanting to say too much about too many issues.  Conservatism, which has indeed seen no need to understand its own positions--to understand such concepts as nation and God and race--is intellectually incompetent to take a consistent ideological stand.  Therefore it is defeated by contradictions among its own notions.  The need to include nation and race in the same ideology has put Conservatism at a disadvantage in relation to the consistently anti-racist stand of Liberalism.  Nation and race as concepts are entirely different and incompatible.  This lack of understanding of the two concepts has mired Conservatism in a fatal self-contradiction.  Our prescription under auspices of Force Theory is to eject Nationalism and religion from the Conservative agenda, leaving only racialism. We propose finally to build a social theory around the idea of race.
2.  Since Duehring, and his admittedly embarassing defeat at the hands of his formidable communist, ultra-liberal adversary Friedrich Engels, Force Theory has languished from inattention.  In this blog Duehring's theory--which makes force the central issue in human relations--is re-examined and, hopefully, revitalized.  Ideas taken from German Philosophical Anthropology are brought to bear on the issues--the nature of man and technology--that are raised by Force Theory.  The modus operendi here is simple.  The strategy is followed of showing that human culture as itself internally contradictory, must end in something consistent and permanent.  The confusion in Duehring's theory, we are saying, is in his subject matter itself.  Culture, contrary to Duhring's idea, is nothing internally or logically consistent but is an ongoing process of reconciling oppositional and adversarial elements.  Engels' theory was closer to the mark.  Duehring misunderstood the nature of culture and therefore failed to grasp man's contradictory relation to culture.  To understand culture is no easy task.  Updated Force Theory turns to the material of paleo-anthropology (depiction of early or primal man) for some idea this relationship.  Contradictions in human culture are the result (we are saying) of what we call the "notness" of culture:  the fact that culture is not itself an organic or biological feature of man, and in the sense that culture is external or other than the human, it is, or can be, actively opposed to the human being. We see the human being as a creature logical oppositions (Homo contradictio [CHECK]).  The contradictions that there are in human life begin in the primal stage of first tool use, as the tool itself in effect "contradicts" the human user.  The tool is and is not the human himself.  There is nothing "straightforward" in human life.   In this the human being stands apart from all other creatures. But there is more, finally we will see that the highest aspiration of the human being--love--is never pure love but only complex love.  Human love (of the kind Kant talked about) is always bought at the expense of self-hatred.  This is the fate of the human speices and explains, we are saying the anti-racist stand of white people themselves:  love of humanity is simply the reverse side of white self-hatred.  But there is nothing strange about this so long as we are talking about human beings.  The human being is always in a situation of self-contradiction; that is what he is by virtue of the basic--technological--conditions of his success as a species.  Love of others and hatred of one's owns self is the condition of, above all others, sthe white race.  We say this at the risk of entering not only a highly sensitive but also a very obscure side of human existence.  This is the side of morality and ethics, where practical life transitions to the great collective life of whole peoples--in this realm nothing is clear.  We are admittedly at an early stage of presenting much of this material.   Much of writing in the area of Force Theory is a tortuous and unappologetically dull and laborious depiction of the evolution of human culture.  Force Theory has taken on the task to understand how, in his long evolution, the human being has come to become possessed by ideas that are contradictory. To depict such a history is a laborious task.   The largest part of this blog is to attempt to follow this thread of technological and cultural evolution.   Since this part of Force Theory is still work in progress, some order and coherence may presently be brought to the subject matter.

3. Force Theory can be counted as a so-called "back to nature" philosophy of the type popularized by Rousseau.   I say this at the risk of consigning our ideology to a discredited, old-fashioned philosophical backwater.  Yet, finally, out of the confused and contradictory  course of civilization emerges race as something permanent.  Culture ends in race simply because culture ends.  What is left when the contradictory elements of culture finally elude all resolution is race.  That is because race is reality.  And reality is race.   Upon this reality we may build a complete (gesamt) conception of the society of the future.   Race--an entire process wherein the human being transcends himself as a new and higher biological species--is the constant in human effort; and is the reality which will replace the confusion of culture.  In race--which Heidegger calls "heavy with Being-- there is certainty.   Force Theory proposes to defend "race" as a philosophical idea.  (Who, anyway, said anything about science?)  Having restricted our agenda and focus, we free ourselves to talk of concepts that are simply not scientific; they are moral, or in the realm of "should be" as opposed to "is."  This is a great vague mission but, then, that is what philosophy always is.  Our first point is that, as a being of contradictions--not of illogic so much as logical oppositions--the human being's moral code is likewise interally contradictory.  Love of one's fellow human being is bought, we are saying, only at the expense of self-disdain.  This principle--that of humanitarian love--is impossible without corresponding doubt and dislike of oneself.  In the animal realm this is not the case.  Animal love passes from simple love to simple hate--and back again.  We are left in Force Theory in a predicament.  We are faced with a hard choice between simple hate and, on the other hand, complex love.  The latter is calculating.  Simple hate, on the contrary, is pure and innocent--like everything else in nature.  Kant made the point that higher morality must be intellectual or cateogorical.  That is true.  We are saying, on the other hand, that within nature--and within humans themselves as a being finally grounded in nature--there is no such distinction.  Simple love does not contradict simple hate.  The conditio humana is of self-contradiction wherein love, if it is higher love, cannot exist without its corresponding hatred by the individual of himself.  This is not only a logical self-contradiction that the human "entertains," it is a self-defeating "essence" of the human being.  In these terms, "race" is a return to nature.  Within race are the concepts of simple love and simple hate together.  What is pure and innocent, as these feelings are, cannot contradict one another.  In these terms race is the final resolution to the categorical opposition of so-called higher love and its categorical opposite, higher hate.


(16 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

in any agreement, trust is necessary
trust is to proceed in the face of an unknown
broken trust
broken trust negates the agreement
a hiatus opens which is categorical and unknown to nature, just as the agreement is  unknown to nature.
no natural mending is possible of the breech of trust
hiatus must be bridged, likewise, by an unnatural idea--that of humanity
ergo, humanity is born out of a sort of inhumanity, a breech of trust. 
society is negative--serves no practical purpose--but protects men from an unnatural war where their unnatural agreements have failed.


(16 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Is humanity a social relationship?  I am now taking the position that humanity is indeed a social relation insofar as society is or becomes a moral concept.  But we are also saying that humanity does not exist for a society which is based, as it is in its beginnings, soley on simple practical agreements.   Advanced ociety has a moral, not a practical basis; although society originates through agreements that are practical. Society is the generality of all agreements; and is evoked in concept when trust in these agreements falters.  If our money fails, we still have society.   This is a state of our argument now;  there is a situation of minor confusion which I will attempt to sort out.   Two men in an agreement do not have to attribute to one another any sort of so-called humanity.  ....????   There is nothing in the taxonomic or scientific definition of the human species that includes society.  We include in such a definition a notion of interfertility; we also include certain physical and behavioral traits with which we are entirely familiar.  That is as far as science goes.  Regarding the collective life of humans, we might point out certain features.  These include war and peace; they include family and certain relations through language and agreement we call "business."  All these things can be included under the heading of the human species without invoking any sense of humanity as a whole.  These are traits that appear here and there, in this group but not that group, and so forth.  The scientific definition of Homo sapiens is entirely in the particulars of this species and the ways they are clustered.  Humanity, on the other hand, is an esoteric idea that contradicts everything we know of humans in their individual lives.  Humanity is a moral idea, and like other such ideas, is an ideal to aspire to rather than anything real.  But we will go on to say qualify this statement.  This moral idea is still capable of uniting vast numbers of human beings.  We move to the idea, finally, that society itself may be something moral, ultimately, rather than a simple business relation.   That is, simply because humans can interbreed--which fact makes them one taxonomic species--does not mean that they need be anything more than enemies.  To say that humans who can mate and produce viable offspring is itself a social relation would limit our concept of society.  Society is based upon human attributes--mind and language--that go beyond biology.  I want to suggest that society is more a statement of moral or ethical belonging--and mutual obligation--than it is of biological fact.  The family and its instincts of sharing and mutuality is an issue.  Clearly, though, since these instincts do not extend beyond the family, and certainly not to the whole of humanity, something other than an instinct is the basis of society and the kind of mutuality that ethical philosophers talk about.  The whole subject is vague.  The concept of humanity is fairly recent at any rate as some idea based on arcane science but also shared widely among non-biologist laypeople.   Among Australians all men are enemies to one another who are not of the same clan.  Of course the Australians have no concept of the human race; and so, without this concept, they cannot be social.  We are left with a confusing picture, if not of the whole of mankind, then of our own "responsibility" to others of our kind.  Here we have talked about society in terms of agreements or understood relations of reciprocity.  There is little more to society, we are saying, than that.  I used the word "moral."  Here we take the position that responsibility is based on a trust in a promise; and furthermore that this trust is the true source and ground of all higher morality and, if you will, "Christian love."  Our position is not, in other words, that Christian (or higher religious) morality is the basis of business ethics, but rather that the opposite is true.  Business ethics is the basis of all morality.  This is our provisional conclusion and one we can invoke as a certain "critique" of morality in general and, finally, of the idea of humanity as a purely moral--not a factual--fact.  How and where the idea of humanity appeared is still a mystery.  It appears in the idea that "...all men are created equal... and are entitled to..." such and such in our own Declaration of Independence, the central sacred document of our civilization.  The ideas of equality and entitlement are both moral ideas; they are ad hoc pronouncements without basis in anything real.  They are the application of business principles where there is essentially no business.  Again, as I said above, such a moral idea may unite people.  That is where we stand here.  We may have to conclude, finally, that humanity in fact is the ultimate social idea.  But we have also reduced society to something arbitrary and artificial in human life than to something necessary.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

The Declaration of Independence--America's most sacred document--begins with the statement:  "We hold these truths as self-evident, that all men are created equal..."  We could possibly, at the outset of this blog, just go ahead and concede that "all men are equal."  This compromise would not damage our cause nor advance it.  We simply are not interested here regarding whether humans are in fact equal or unequal, which is an issue of science and can be left to the scientists.  What concerns us is the word self-evident.  This word is much more interesting than whether or not humans are in some factual sense equal.  The Declaration says, most signficantly, that it is self-evident that such and such is true, what ever that truth may or may not be.  We could say but are not permitted to say, for instance, that this truth is not evident to us; still, the truth is self-evident to itself.  In denying the facticity of human equality we would contradict also the majesty--the self-truth--of the statement that men are equal.  This would not be a mistake simply, but a crime or sin.  In the self-evidency of human equality is the authority and magiesty of the idea of human equality.  How should this concern us?   We are concerned, rather, that American civilization was through one word--a word that proclaimed the self-truth of itself--set on a course that has held, consistently, these hundreds of years.  It is not too much to say that our culture was prefigured, predetermined and predestined in a short sentence.  It is our purpose here to look at that sentence, but only part of it.  The idea that all men are created equal has a certain place in the history of ideas of our Western culture;  and to overlook Rousseau and Locke would be a disservice to philosophy.  That much we can conclude.  Human beings can in fact be considered "equal" in certain terms and with certain assumptions.  Why argue the point?  Where I am focusing attention here, on the other hand, is on the provisiion--stated so clearly--that the idea that all men are created equal is self-evident.  So it is on the point of self-evidency (Selbstverstaendlickeit that needs analysis.  What is being said is that there is a quality of this idea that belongs to, inherently, this idea.  A ball is round; and roundness is a quality of the ball.  So, it is said, that just as redness or roundness is a quality of one object, the truth of a certain statement inheres in that statement, not dependent in any way on the human being who understands it to be true or not true.  Self-evidency in a statement belies the very idea of populist democracy.  This is the first contradiction in American civilization and one that was present the moment the first whitemen set foot on this continent.  The self-evidency of the truth of democracy is also the flat denial--categorical contradiction--of democracy.  That is, nothing is conceded to a knowing person regarding rights to know a thing.  The thing has already been proclaimed self-evident; it has proclaimed itself self-evident.  Not an authoritative statement (which needs an authority) is the problem, the issue rather is a statement that is by virtue of an inherent quality of auto-authority an authoritarian statement.  We are led to the paradox of an authoritarian democracy.  But consistently--the idea of forced equality--is what exists for Americans in practice.  The government is there, it is said, just to enforce the idea of a self-evident truth.  This idea--which ultimately is not so much self-evident as self-contradictory--festers today.  A civilization based on a self-contradiction cannot sustain itself.  It does not suffice one that one can control human beings; he must also know what they are thinking.  The thoughts of Americans and Westerners in general in this sprawling culture and society are drifting in one direction; the civilization is materially wealthy but going in another direction.  What are people like.  We see in them a certain inherent self-evidency, but that is their quality, not their culture's.  Of course, as always, there is some large or small priesthood with a stake in the question.  If truth is self-evident, their own role in culture is evident.  The idea that the truth is self-evident diverts attention away from their self-interest.  I call the statement of the Declaration of Independence the first and formative act of our civilization; as also it is the last and dissolving act.  Having a successful discussion (essentially, winning an argument) depends upon a narrow focus; that is what we've tried to foster.  We must not bother with the notion that some people, true, will want to treat others as so-called equals; this is usually just the patronizing behavior that humans are fond of.  They cannot be stopped.  Humans as citizens should understand, on the other hand, that a basis of authoritarian control was written into the first words of the Declaration, our seminal political document; and that government could rightly interpret its own role as enforcing that provision.  Our culture is basically simply force equality.  This is by no means a paradox or self-contradiction.  Where the contradiction lies, the one that will undermine our civilization, is between the self-evidency that motivates a person (essentially, self-interest) flatly contradicts the civilization that we have with no possibility of compromise.  The present blog has an anarchist assumption which affirms the absolute self-assertion of the ego at the expense of anything ephemeral that humans might contrive.

We have talked in post-Hegelian terms of how the human being, having made a cultural "other," faces this "other" not as a friend or helper but as an adversary.  Civilization itself, in certain terms and to a certain degree, is actually an enemy, if not to humanity collectively then to the individual.  This is the position of Feuerbach, Engels, Stirner and Bauer.  We have tried here furthermore in the capacity of Philosophical Anthropologists to reconcile the notion of alienation with certain facts of early man.  Our position has been that alienation was a feature of human life as soon as the human being first picked up and used a stick or stone as a tool.  Animals have no such tools.  In the case of human beings, on the other hand, this artificial extension of the person--essentially an arti-fact--is already an "other" to which the human stands in a certain relationship of opposition.  By stages the dialectic of culture and civilization ensues. This is a scenario we have repeated frequently throughout this blog--the general word for which is alienation.  By painstaking increments we have moved towards some understanding of human relations and human politics in the recent age.  At the crux of our considerations is a notion of truth.  We are not epitomologists, precisely, nor are we even in what The True is as a "reality" apart from human understanding.   This is not our concern.  What interests us, rather, is how truth is used.  Truth, we are saying, is a stand-in (default?) authority.  The trend throughout the history of humanity has been for humans to attribute authority less to human beings themselves, and more to the authority of some idea.  The question--which we have already attempted to answer--is how an idea can have authority.  Is there something in an idea, or in one idea as opposed to another, that constitutes authority.  Thus an idea is not simply "had" by a mind of a person, so much as imposes itself on persons.  Of course an idea is simply the product of an individual mind and, as such, is no more imposing or assertive than any other part of him.  We might qualify this statement by saying that, indeed, ideas--and the fact that ideas can be shared through language--have always appeared as something more or less mysterious.  Human beings passed by degrees, sometimes more than other times, into the sphere of religion and the sacred.  Ideas, as I say, were shared through language; and in that sense, now as collective entities, the ideas carried more weight with people in general than simply an idea buried in an individual brain.  The idea finally appeared as a being greater than any one human being.  Ideas--as opposed to arms, legs and even brains--could in fact be shared with great facility and, in this way, appear as greater than the individual.  The idea emerged out of the swarms of anonymous humans.  The idea in this sense was great while people themselves were small.  This was the result of language or a "shared reality."  What was the human role in this emergence of ideas as "great"?  The idea's wholeness and oneness could not be compromised by confusion:  to eliminate this confusion was the function of the priests.  The idea is still an arti-fact, an artificial reality in the same way tools were man-made things.  Finally, we are at the point of deciding how it can be that an idea--or so-called truth--can be its own authority.  That is, how can an idea be self-evident?   Refering as we have earlier of the Declaration of Independence, with its phrase "We hold these truths to be self-evident...," it becomes apparent that the idea that humans are "created equal" is true precisely on account of this idea being collective and not a matter of individual perception.  First, the idea about humans--that they are "equal"--is a grand idea.  It is majestic simply on account of being the idea of many persons.  And these are humans who, precisely, rather than to announce their own power and authority, attribute this authority to the idea itself.  The idea becomes majestic.  The idea also has the power to compel acquiescence among many people.  Humans themselves, then, as they group themselves into semi-cabalistic and conspiritorial power cliques, appoint themselves spokesmen for the idea.  The arguments about the idea are solely arguments within the power groups themselves, as to how the idea is to be "interpreted."  At the outset, when our Declaration was first drafted, there was no consistent idea, even, as to what constituted a "man" or "human being."  This was a period in the history of knowledge when it was still debated whether apes were in some sense human.  As a question of fact, apes certain have human traits.  Above all it was concluded--not at first but later on--that Africans are human.  But this was simply a dicussion of fact, which discussion did not compromise the majest and authority of the idea of the "equality of all men."


(5 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)


How a race is defined or what makes it distinct from other races is not going to be our problem.  Nor will we care, even, if a race can be defined at all.  Purusing the sections on race in Google (which for me now is a major tool of research), it appears that sociologists and anthropologists want to make race a social, rather than a biological, construct.  As a social construct, conceptions of race always change.  Likewise, if such concepts are inconsistent with the times within which they reside, they can be made to go away.  This position seems reasonable.   But there is a further consideration.  Where the concept race--more precisely the word race--goes away, it soon comes back.  That is the fact that we look at now.  Respect is due to anthropologists and what they have acomplished; they have been duly accorded the status of experts.   And, too, we do not deny the validity of their assertions within their appointed area.  It is simply not my job, I believe, to go head-to-head in an argument with these people, when, after all, I am already mired in science, in this blog, that I myself do not understand.  My family is one of lawyers who have no interest in facts that cannot be explained to a jury.    Actually, the matter is rather simple.  In the Old South race was a concept basic to the hierarchical and economic structure of the place.  Slavery was basic to the economy; and the concept "negro" was basic to slavery.  As anthropologists say, race changes in concept from place to place, culture to culture. 

[SECTION OFF FOR REVISION OR DELETION]These considerations have put me in a position where I cannot prove anything.    Some general considerations are in order here.  In proposing to talk about race, we deviate from the general plan of Philosophical Anthropology as laid down by Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen and others.  1965 I attended Otto F. Bullnow's course Philosophical Anthropology at Tuebingen Universitaet.  That was not perhaps my first knowledge of that field.  Or, at any rate, given my turn of mind, perhaps, I was so pre-adapted to Bullnow's way of thinking that it was, then in Germany, as though I had studied the subject all my life; or perhaps I had just, by virtue of some personality trait, always thought that way.[END SECTION-OFF]

The challenge of Philosophical Anthropology, and the discispline that comes of entering this mode of thinking, is to find the largest concepts in the smallest details of human life.   A large concept would be "the Good"; a small detail would be the first use of a stick to replace the hand.  The hand and the stick are the two "homely facts" where we start our research--or rather our speculation.  We are in Philosophical Anthropology, here, but we are not far away from Phenomenology.  I came away from that year in Germany set on a different course, which sustained me through my training as an anthropologist and my (many) years teaching anthropology.    I can talk about all the details of my life; and I feel these things are relevant.   It is said that one's random experiences are as important as his focused attention.  This is true.  In any case, when over the years of teaching and business I came out of my long "slumber"; my interest in the scientific side of race had declined, but my philosophical interested had increased.  Also there are just the issues of living as a member of a society, getting alone with one's community and colleagues.  It would be a totally fruitless and Quioxic mission to convince Americans of anything pertaining to race, inasmuch as, as front-and-center as race is in our civilization. The word race is of venerable family tradition. 

There is a general sense of the word race that is accepted, or seems to be accepted, in the English-speaking community.  Only a profound and pervasive use by a large community over much time could instill the intensity of meaning that the word race has.  Philology and etymology trace the word to the Latin radix,  meaning "source" or "root."  Words can have narrow meanings or broad meanings; they can have meanings that are precise or rather vague.  This depends on how and by whom the word is used.  "Race" is a very old word and one whose relatives are found throughout the Indo-European language family.  Even Arabic words have, whether by native use or adoption, some sense of rad and race.    This we know about the history of the word race.  "Radix"appears throughout the English language in such words as radius, radiate and so forth.  We have the sense here of a center or source from which lines radiate.  Radix is of such import to language that, if surpressed in one place or one context, it would resurface in another.  This is our opinion here.  We turn now to the "American Anthropological Association Statement on Race" [cite Google.com]; this proclaims the word race should be dropped from English on several grounds:  scientific meaninglessness, as causing immoral acts againt humanity and so forth.  (The anthropologists assume the word humanity has meaning but race does not.)  But words do not await approval of empirical scientists before they can be used; they come to us from ancient times.  This is not to bely the contributions of scientists and anthropologists in particular. 

We do not mean to deprecate anthropologists; we only ask them to stick to their fields.  (And of course I am not a philologist, either!)   Anthropology is an empirical science; think of potsherds and such, and carry this level of thinking to the cultures of Eskimos and Ibos; that is what we are talking about here.   We expect from anthropologists little bits and snatches of information now and then.  This is the use to which they are put; this is their apointed task.   Examples are not hard to find.  If for instance we want to know if a fragment of bone is human or animal, or if its owner was  male or female, and so forth, we consult an anthropologist.  This is a narrow field of knowledge and one in which special training and compentency is required.  But there is more.   In fact, anthropology, perhaps reacting to criticism of the social sciences that they are not hard science, has moved continually away from philosophical mode of thinking.  The sad truth is that the great accomplishments attributed to science do not come from science at all--if by science we mean empirical verification--but through broad speculation that is anarchist and undisciplined.  Much philosophy is that way:  it is the anarchism and lack of community discipline that subjects much philosophy to criticism.  Even originality itself is subject to the same criticism, by members of a group, directed at wayward members of this group.  Where then do anthropologists have legitimate authority?  A layman might attempt a coherent definition of the word race; and anthropologist might show how this definition contradicts empirical facts or is logically inconsistent.   The anthropologist has had special training, has undergone the scrutiny of his colleagues, and is entitled to his license of authority.  Where there is an argument at present is, however, is regarding the issue of whether we can dismiss a very old word with a very general--albeit vague--content; this dismissal based, that is, on the idea that a very specific and new meaning has been attached to it.  We cannot dismiss the word race on grounds of alleged political atrocities by this unpopular group or that.   

I have spoken earlier about the Philosophical Anthropological correction to anthropology (and likewise to traditional philosophy itself.  Philosophical Anthropology, like the society that (under Force Theory) advocates, is wildly speculative and in that sense anarchistic.  Anthropology has succumbed to a priestly concept of disciplined--ritualistic--thinking.  Meanwhile Philosophical Anthropology after a mere 50 years of existence is still relatively new, fresh and spontaneous.  But this is where originality and creativity take place:  away from the dead forms of priestly organization and ritual, and in the open air of  uninhibited generality.  We look at the history of anthropology's involvement in the great race controversy that, in fact, is at the very core of our present-day civilization.  That race is "controversial" is an understatement.   The anthropologist might say that there is nothing in his field, which is human biology, that corresponds to the definition of "race" that you or I give.  He is saying our definition of race, if we have one to offer, is not scientific.  He is pronouncing on the connection between a real phenomenon and a word; here he looks for consistency and verifiability.  But he is not in any position of authority to pronounce on the validity of a word purely and simply, just as a word.   His area of expertise is in human biology, not in language.  Thus when we say--as we are saying here--that race is a "good" word, we are within our rights to ignore the anthropologist.  He has authority in biological science but has no authority whatsoever in language of the realm.  He would be, and in this case is, intruding in an area he doesn't belong.   Even those who pronounce on language--teachers of English--have no authority, finally, when the will of an entire people as to which or what are valid words.  There is simply a disagreement on how the word should be defined.  THE VALIDITY IN THE WORD IS IN ITS CAPACITY SIMPLY TO SURVIVE IN A LANGUAGE.  Words of a language are in competition with one another.  A word may be dropped from a language on account of disuse.  This is a major argument for the existence of the word race, which by no means is unused.  The vehemence of some religious and academic leaders is in itself an argument for the existence of the word race--it will not go away on its own.  We have to concede that we are talking about one culture--our own--not all cultures and languages.  Humans, we say, not universally or in every culture--because in some cultures there is no word that corresponds to our word race--but in our own culture we do use the word race.  In fact--and this is now said frequently--race is a word for a phenomenon that is central to our culture.  Our culture of America is about race.  That is a categorical statement we will make here under the banner of Force Theory.  It is preposterous to suggest that we all just not use the word race; because we now use it all the time.  And we use it as though it means something.  People of our language family have always used closely related words that have meant something fundamental to life.  We suggest here that the word race means "source" or "root" of existence.  Force Theory will not abandon the word race simply on account of the sense we have of some "metaphysical" content:  we quote Heidegger as saying that a word (he did not specify race) may be "heavy with Being."  Race is one of those great words of venerable tradition. 

As I said earlier, I am not out to prove anything but make race a logically consistent point of view.  I want at this point to bring in my connection with David Duke.  He may well not remember me; I prophesy, however, that some day he will be asked about me and our conversation.  This occurred in Urbana, Illinois sometime in the 80's.  Since then I have perused his writtings such as there have been on the internet.  When I say I want to make racism a logicaly consistent viewpoint--while not necessarily "proving' this view--I mean, that is, to expunge from the race concept everything that has been brought one way or another into the discussion about race.  This would include nationalism, religion and all sorts of unnecessary and encumbering "baggage" that mires us in imponderables.  Thus, this will be a "pure" theory of race, a point of view distilled of everything extraneous.  If we have to cast out nationalism and jingoism--and I say we do--we simply will.  Nationalism and religion are just so much baggage that, along with racism, is rolled into the present day Conservative movement.  Here we are attempting to clean or proverbial house, removing every idea except race.  To us there is nothing worthwhile about the American nation, which like every other nation since 1500 AD is an abstraction.  Force Theory is not nationalistic; let the Japanese run this country for all Force Theory cares, so long as the white race prevails in the end.  That is what we are saying here.  The nation, as we say, has nothing to do with race.  Affirming the nation, as many do, it will always be at the expense of the race.  Nationalism is color blind; we are not, with Force Theory, color blind.   Race is closer to the idea of tribe; but race is tribe in a special purified sense.  Religion is likewise inherently color-blind.  Religion has nothing to do with race.  We must cast out that baggage, too, in order to present a purified and distilled race concept.  It would be possible to invent a religion of race; but the religion must be specifically about race, but not about Jesus or human love or anything like that.    Even then, the whole principle of religion--as a symbolic link in the sense of Latin religare--is inherently not only not racist, it is anti-racist.   As I said once before, liberalism has been consistently anti-race and anti-racist; conservativism for its part has been only inconsistently racist.  We want to change that here.

Were I to purport to have discovered or invented the white race, I would fail.  That would be to become mired in values and imponderables and also be knee-deep in science that is simply over my head.   No one would listen or believe me.  So, that is not what I'm going to do.  There is one other serious possiblity, however, which is the right one.  I'm not going to do anything, at all, only to follow a strategy of omission.  I omit to correct the assertions of the avowed enemies and adversaries of the white race.  Because these adversaries have the most consistent and definable idea of all regarding who is their enemy. They listen to their instincts.   It is these decriers of whiteness, not me or other whites, who have invented the white race.   Inuit or Ojibwa are Indian names that were invented by surrounding groups and enemies; Inuits and Ojibwa had entirely different names for themselves than the ones that have come down to us.  We could say, weakly but truthfully, that, oh, there are breeds of dogs; and, oh, these breeds are very different from one another in body and mind.  So are humans different in these ways.  This argument for racial differences--by comparison with dog and other species' breeds--is reasonable.  But that is not the way we argue here.  To argue is for us demeaning our point of view.  We do not need to argue anything:  let our enemies, the anti-racists, argue for us; let them define who we are.   There is no particular point in adding or denying any aspect of the world-wide opinion of my people, the white race. Whiteness is above biology, it is cosmic.  I said that before and will affirm it here.  That is where we must base our racial ideology--with the assertions of people who are not ourselves. 

My concept, for instance, of "German" and "Southerner" has been impressed upon me, in school and in church and information media, all my life.  There is where I form my opinions of these people.  Out of these opinions, by non-Germans and non-Southerners applied to people they do not know, I begin to build a philosophical system.  This is a common practice:  to invert the opinions of average people to arrive at new truths.  That is what is being done in this blog.  In this inverted, but not untrue, system the values represented of men of the Old South and of Germans of their great period--1900-1950--are core concepts.  The values and concepts that emerge here are simply representations, sometimes softened but often exaggerated, of an ideology called odious to mankind.  I should clear up a possible misunderstanding; I am bound to be accused of this serious offense.  I am not claiming here, anywhere, originality.  It would be arrogance on my part to claim I invented Force Theory; actually our enemies--people who have decried me and castigated me in my university--who have invented all these "awful" things that appear in this blog.   I have said all along that race and racism are simply politics of the day. I do not invent these politics; other people, who oppose me, invent them.  As the peace-abiding person that I am.  I only defend myself.   In places where humans cannot distinguish among themselves on the basis, say, of skin color they pick some other distinction.  The issue of skin color was not invented by white people but by black and brown people and their "white" friends.  Or we could even speculate that the issue of race was invented by anti-white white people.  Therefore we are not saying, in Force Theory, that race is an absolute in terms of empirical characteristics that are relevant to certain values.  I said earlier that Philosophical Anthropology tries to find large concepts--here race--in small details.  It is not difficult to find the whole race issue prefigured in the smallest details of human interaction.  Everything about the human being is race.  Race is pure becoming, as I said earlier.   Race is a term invented by humans; and which humans these are--whether they are the identified people or the people doing the identification--is irrelevant to our main purpose.   But there is more.   What is being done under the heading Force Theory is to understand the generic meaning of "race," as radix or root, and understood as a principle of life.  Race is essentially the time dimension of human biology.   We are not connected initially with the persons around us but with those who have engendered us.  We are a race in time.  Our race consists not so much, directly, of the bond we have with the people in our neighborhood, so much as the bond we share with our grandparents.  The race exists in time.  And through a common time span we constitute, together, as white people, the full bond of race.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Earlier we stressed tool use as the key to understanding so-called human nature.  Here we not so much change our point of view as our emphasis of one fact, change, over the earlier emphasis on tool use.  At this time we'll slightly shift our perspective, to, that is, this idea:  that the human being adapts--changes--his world to suit himself, rather than himself changing to suit the world.  This of course is already an idea well known to Philosophical Anthropology.  In this blog our strategy, however, is simply emphasis--repetition.  The idea must be made to sink in that humans alter the world around them, so that they do not have to change.  He changes his relationship to nature, first by extending himself through tools to that nature, then by bringing nature closer to himself.   It has been suggested that for the reason that because the human knows how to adapt his world to his needs that  his evolution is a dead end.  We don't think so, but we now entertain that idea briefly.  Examples are not hard to come by.  First the human picks up a stick, and uses it; this use alters his relation to some object from one of "hands on" to "mediation" by the stick.  The human has changed his relation to that objective by placing some other object between himself and that objective.  His existence, in Hegel's words, is "mediating and mediated."  A second phase follows.  The human alters the stick to sharpen it or in some other way and thereby improves its effectiveness.  Human culture thereby accelerates and even exhausts its own possibilities.  We are saying that the hunter, in particular, depletes his own food supply by killing too many animals.  The idea that culture will destroy itself does not have to wait for atomic weaponry; this destruction has already happened many times in the past.  The desolation happened through hunting and through primitive agriculture and herding.   At this point, the human intervenes again to change some feature of his world, in this case, beginning in the Neolithic period, he changes--domesticates--the animal and plant species upon which he depends.  I spoke earlier of "the stick."  Now the stick has been dropped as a main element of culture, unless this same stick becomes a hoe, say, or some other farming implement.  Nature in effect has been changed inasmuch as it, nature, has been adapted to human purposes.  But these human and humanoid purposes stay the same.  Even as the first task of humans was getting food, so that task has not changed.  What has changed is the world around the human which is now more amenable to him.  Throughout this long process one fact has remained a constant:  that is the human being himself.  He changes his relationship to nature, first by extending himself through tools to that nature, then by bringing nature closer to himself.  But his effort is expended precisely because he wants to remain as he always was, a bipedal primate sort of creature.  Humans have remained the same essentially throughout the history of culture.  Again, however, to avoid future confusion in our argument we must say exactly what we mean.  I have said that the man collectively does not want to change himself.  Likewise, he does not want to change himself individually or let himself be changed.  We have left one other possibility. That is, the individual man does entertain the idea that he might change other human beings to suit himself.  If these people are first not amenable to his purposes, then perhaps they can be made amenable.  The general term for this is "domestication," but we are not talking about domesticating animals, simply, but human beings themselves.  By amenable we do not mean more intelligent, necessarily, unless we mean the specialized intelligence that makes for a "good slave."  A certain brightness accompanied by a general lack of self-interest and common sense would make for a good servant.  This kind of possibility has not escaped the minds of most humans, in fact, with the word of caution that they themselves might be made slaves.  It is in this domain--where one man entertains the idea, like Robinson Crusoe and Friday, of making the other a servant or slave--that the idea of (what we are calling) duty appears.  Basically, duty is self-sacrifice.  It is an idea animals are incapable of precisely because they live in an unchanging world with no idea that they might change their world or themselves within that world.  The human being, who began using tools to change his relation with his world, turned to altering that world itself--and the other human beings within that world.  Since duty is not as such enforced by law--under compulsion of law, there is no idea of duty--that idea is partly wishful thinking.  One can only be asked to do one's duty.  Yet this idea--which may be your idea about me, but not my idea about myself--is the basis of Kantian ethics.  A good deal has been unsaid, however, about the evolution of this sentiment; we want to pursue the issue further.

Self-evident means that a thing makes itself evident to a human mind without any functioning, not even the smallest, of that mind. The word self-evident in our Declaration of Independence proclaims this an authoritarian document.  I will shortly explain.  Self -evident means auto-motively evident, a truth, in other words, whose truthfulness is self-propelled.  Acceptance of the truth is built into the truth itself rather than requiring an acceptance.  On the one hand we could say of a truth:  of course you will agree with it.  On the other hand, it would be equally possible to say, no, this is not a truth that you have to agree with:  it asserts itself independently of you as the truth that it is.   Assuming there is a person there who could exercise critical judgement and discretion, he still would understand this truth without having to think. Self-evidency takes all mind and thinking out of the issue of truth.  Self-evident truths exists by themselves as facits or expressions of The Good.  Thus the other and more subtle suggestion is that, whatever discretion and critical judgement he offered, the truth would still force itself upon him--even against his will.  This is what auto-evident would mean.  Since space and time (not to mention printing costs) are now not a factor in this writing, I will expound upon the last sentence repeating it if necessary. The German word is selbstverstaendlich .  The thing or principle talked about is understood by virtue of the abillity of the thing to compel or force understooding, or its "understandability."  I raise this issue which now seems trivial in order to later make a point about human beings who live entirely in a world of Selbstverstaendlickeit.  We must assume the existence of a mind that understands; we do not normally attribute understanding to a mere thing.  Basicaly what is being said here is that to understand such and such a thing or principle is effortless.  No special exertion is required by a person to understand such and such a thing. Thus even the person who is limited or stupid can understand something that "makes itself understood."   "These truths are self-evident, that all men...." is a phrase from our Constitution.  [check: might be Declaration]  What is said in this sacred document is that anyone who does not understand this is stupid.  This is what it means to be selbstverstaendlich, that "anyone whomsoever" can understand the thing because the thing is so simple. Now it is not a government or priesthood ordering a certain understanding, it is the so-called truth itself that commands this acceptance or "understanding."  That is what "self-evident" means.   More than that, as a proclamation from God or as derived from some sacred principle of The Good, the truth so stated would force itself upon the person without requiring from him any real scrutiny or decision.  Self-evident truths are "irresistable," which is what every government and priesthood wants to be.  They would lay their assertiveness and bullying off, not to their own interests, but to the truth itself as "self-evident."   We might propose that authoritarianism begins not in any force of arms but with certain statements about self-evident truth.  We may say that the thing so stated "reveals" itself in its entirety; so that the effort or energy necessary to be understood is already in that thing.  We may say that the thing "impresses itself" upon the person, despite any effort on his part to accept or reject that impression. Self-understanding is like auto-motive, self-propelled.  We may speak of ideas that are in this way self-propelled; that is what the word self-evident--or auto-evident-- would mean.   Citizenship is almost defined by such acquiescence.  Self-evidency of a thing or principle demands a passive subject and is the basis of religion and political dogma.  Indeed, most political discussion is mindless in this way, with only "self-evident" truths being proposed.  These truths do not so much pass themselves off as objective truths but simply bypass the whole issue of objectivity.  The truths are taken, in other words--they have to be taken--on the basis of trust.  Where the compelling reason comes from is a matter of speculation; but we can assume the presence of an active and engaged priestly human authority.  The word charisma comes to mind.  The issues confronting society may or may not be great.  America is a case in point.  Discussion of issues is encouraged.  Thus the public is enjoined to debate questions of health care and so forth.  But all issues that can be talked about, in America, rapidly become a question of race which is an issue that cannot be talked about.

At this point we lapse into metaphysical/epistomological issues that might well have come earlier.  These issues are not complex, as Heidegger would say, but they are deep.  How, that is, can an idea--which we've called a "truth"--be self-evident?  An idea might be evident by itself; but it also must be evident to some person. There is a deep, dark question here.  Can a fact be true in any sense without a human being present to see it as true.  We are not long left in the vague netherworld of mystical abstraction, however, but are transported immediately to the realm of hard political realities. The truths that are presented especially by democracy--we call this authoritarian populism--are regarded as "self-evident":  so it is in our own most sacred document, The Declaration of Independence.  This is the first major document of our Nation; and the word self-evident is the first word of that document.  It is the self-evidency of truth, in other words, that appears even before a human being has stepped forward to call himself leader.  The cornerstone of our Nation is this one word.  It speaks of a reality that is beyond any human agency.  The word truth was not enough, at that time, it seems:  the truth that there is must be a self-evident truth.  Philosophical Anthropology is first anthropology and then only secondarily metaphysics; PA proceeds from a few physical or biological facts to mental facts, and from there (and here is where perhaps the word phenomenology appears) to certain thoughts about the cosmos in general.  This is how we proceed here.  We are saying that as the human emerged from animals, he was self-evident to himself.   There was however no such truth around him--he had not yet learned to think abstractly--so he was the only truth that there was.  I hestitate to use the word "truth," which suggest something outside the person rather than within him. There would be no truth, precisely, for someone who takes himself entirely for granted.  The problems around one become problems only for one who is a problem, somehow, to himself.   Primitive man, so-called, is what we are talking about.  The word "primitive" was used loosely by Rousseau and his friends; we are not so much using the word loosely as causually.  The suggestion here is that everything for the primitive man is self-evident.  There is nothing at all, we are saying, whose significance is concealed.  A stone is a stone, it has no deep essence which eludes human grasp.  But this self-evidency extends to human problems, too, or issues of justice and injustice.  Matters are cut and dried.  Humans at a primitive level of culture do not have the luxury of any sort of doubtful pondering (German:  gruebel).  Survival depends upon straightforward and direct action, which must be successful at first--there are no second chances.  This is the way primitive people live.  This way is not better than the way modern humans live; it is only the requirement of their situation.  We want to come as close as possible to the mind of our (hypothetical) so-called primitive man.  He looks beyond himself, not at himself.  Thus what he does is selbstverstaendlich (self-evident).  Were he at all reflective, or where to look at himself from a certain distance outside himself, he would need mind; and that mind would be "open" to the humans around him.  We are suggesting that the human being can be introspective only momentarily; that, as soon as he opens himself to his mind, that mind is also open to the human beings around him.  Language makes this opening possible.  So that, normally--except in the case of isolated individuals here and there (we can use the word "introverted personalities")--what starts as individual self-knowledge ends in group knowledge.  Religion appears.  The self-evidency of the person is translated into a kind of group mentality which in turn produces the idea of a self-evident fact or truth.  The word that is oppositional to self-evident would appear to be "mysterious."  My own existence, to me, is mysterious.  It is a mystery how and why I am here; I have no clever solutions to this question of all questions.  The fact that I cannot think about my own existence--because I don't have the mental capacity for that--does not mean that my existence is self-evident.  On the contrary.  To primitive man, by contrast, then, there is no mystery.  For him, too, there is no sense of inadequacy of any kind.  His existence is self-evident, therefore there is no call for intellegence; and if there is no call, there is no sense of lacking intelligence.  Such people are not insulted by the word "stupid."  Theirs is a complacency that for an educated would be a longed-for luxury.  Likewise the problems that confront one, where the world and one's place in it are self-evident, are themselves self-evident--even though not solvable.  The lack of a solution for a given problem is no indication of a lacking in one's own self.  Finally, through language--and the expression of one's identity to other persons--one also becomes a "problem" to oneself.  A world appears that is shared among several or many persons.  What is evident at this point is no longer oneself.  But self-evidency is a concept of a complacent person projected into a group world.  There is a complacency--self-evidency--of the entire group.  Finally, if that group ever begins to reflect upon itself, and therefore begins to criticize or doubt itself, there is still the further possibility that so-call truth becomes "self-evident."  That is where we stand with the Declaration, the most sacred document--that which proclaims the independence of America--that that truth is "self-evident."  Truth stands, not as a passive or simply ascertainable fact but as an authrority--that of self-assertive facticity--over all humans whomsoever.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

We have already said that the use a thing is put to--and therefore the use-value of the thing--is not an original or inherent quality or attribute of that thing.  It's inherent attributes are those, among others, of color and form and so forth.  The use that the object--which could be a mere stone or stick--is put to is an attribute added to that thing by human agency.  If the use of a thing is so added, then the quality of usefulness, too, is added.  Use and usefulness are lacking in the thing until the human being seizes upon it.  Then the object has use, usefulness and "purpose."  The purpose of the object is also an intention or state of mind of the human user.  Both the object and the human have purpose; but this purpose in the thing is also the purpose in the human's mind.  There are not two purposes, then, but only one.  Purpose obviously emanates from the human being and is imparted, secondarily, to the object.  So it would be a mistake to say the object "has" purpose, if we mean by that a quality or attribute among others like color etc.  Purpose is a "living" quality that must come from some living being.  We proceed to the idea of value.  We are saying, with R. Carnap, that a value cannot be derived from a fact.  We have given our approval to this statement, qualifying it only by saying that, yes, if a purpose--and purpose is a condition of use--is added to that thing through human agency, then the object "has" value.  Value can be extracted from the thing simply insofar as the thing is put to use.  Carnap is not wrong, he is essentially right; he simply should have qualified himself in order to avoid obvious confusion.  Our problem at present will be different than Carnap's, who never raised the anthropological issue.  Our present problem is one of anthropology and mind.  How, in other words, does a use-value at one level of human behavior become a moral value or (Kantian) notion of unqualified "duty"?  (In truth, Kant's notion of "duty" has always repelled me; here at last I will give arguments for my dislike.)    In our earlier statement, the value of a thing is in its use.  Logically, as soon as that use is finished, the value of that thing ends; and our regard for that thing is no longer in terms of value.  In short, we no longer value it.  This is part of the ebb and flow or the "hormonal secretions" of life.  Ethics themselves on this level are simply hormonal secretions; when the secretions fade, so do the ethics.  This view is naturalistic and racialistic, in the ways we have defined these words.  But we are still faced with the fact of human ethics.  It is a fact that a man, somewhere right now, is being outraged over something he's read in the newspapers.  This moral outrage is a fact among other facts that we must presently confront, even though the value he expresses is not a value derived from any fact.  The fact of a crime, say, against a child is horrible does not belie that inherent ethical valuelessness of the crime.  The outrage comes from the newspaper reader, not from the crime itself.  The value that there is in the situation is what we appropriately call subjective.  ("Subjective" is a word I have not used before.)   We move on to our main point.  In the subjective or purposeful world of human beings, the object we are talking about--the stone or stick--may conflict with this intention or purpose.  For instance, the man has in mind a pointed stone when what he finds "naturally" is a round one.  There is a "conflict."  I must be careful on this issue.  Whether I use the word "conflict" (verb:  sich gegensetzt) or "contradicts" (widerspricht) is of major consequences.  Here we may say that the form of the object merely conflicts with that of the tool-makers design.  This seems like a minor point.  It is minor when we think of the earliest tool-maker, the proverbial naked man on the African plains.  The point is major when we repeat the point, as is the case, in every act that has gone into making an entire civilization.  Indeed, conflicts through repetition become vast contradictions that, finally, elude all resolution.

Our original problem--how to derive value from fact--has been conditionally solved.   We have now said that value can be derived from fact so long as the value we are talking about is use-value.  That is, a factual object "has" value if it is useful to some human being.  The present essay is written from an advantageous standpoint of Philosophical Anthropology.  The first tool-users, who may have been Australopithecenes, were technicians but they were not moral philosophers.  They had no idea that they "should" be using objects as tools; yet they considered their meagre stone artifacts as valuable and even precious; certainly indispensible for life.  The problem of the origin and nature of what Kant called the "moral order within" never came up until several million years of evolution, when Middle Age philosophy began to be dissolved by naturalism.   David Hume, it was, who perhaps first stated the issue.  He said, simply, normative (value) judgements cannot be made on the basis of empirical knowledge.  Emanuel Kant was the first to understand Hume in this way.  Kant applied himself to the problem of restoring value to the world.  In a way it is not too much to suggest that Kant thereby rescued the whole of Western civilization, which is based squarely on value--its sense of patriotism, humanitarianism, equalitarianism and so forth--but not on fact.  We are focused here, in this essay, on Kant's solution to the problem of value.  But we need to consider the wider context of Hume and Kant.  We suggest that Medieval man did not understand the world as, in the first place, fact but only as value.  This stone or tree was for him itself a mystical value, a kind of miracle from God who was Himself a value.  The laws of the universe were precisely moral laws.  There would be, then, no problem in deriving a value from the world, inasmuch as the world was itself a value.  Value can still be derived from value.  But there is more.   Medievalism gave way partially to naturalism and the refined vision of certain philosophers, among them Hume.   Hume said that the world is fact.  One condition of this world is that it is not value.  Simple examples suffice to show our point.  A stone falls because of gravity, not because it has a "duty" to fall.  There is no moral obligation--patriotism, humanitarianism and so forth--that causes an object to behave as it does.  Natural law was finally the concept that contradicted moral law.  We may suggest that, still, naturalistic philosophers conceded that there was something called moral law; and moral philosophers could show respect for natural law.  That is still the case.  The great issue that opened up in the new age was not the validity of natural laws or moral laws, either one, but was rather the question of the connection between the two realms.  In fact scientists and moral philosophers have always co-existed somehow.  They live together in suspicion but essential harmony.  We may speculate, on the side, as to what holds them together--aparently this is government and the state--which opportunistically sponsers both groups.  Their harmony may be forced rather than spontaneous.   On the other hand, we suggest that as naturalism and moralism live together they try, out of mutual respect, to bridge the distance between them.  It is not to much to say that the great part of Western philosophy consists of an attempt to overcome this hiatus.  Still, we may say from our vantage point, that the gap is unbridgable.  Naturalism and moral philosophy are in different realms that are separated from one another not merely as fact but as categorical logical principles.  There is no way, in other words, that we can say that a stone "should" fall, not without, anyway, considering the stone itself a value.  Nor can we say a natural fact has inherent value.  The only value that an object can have is, as we stated above, a use-value.  The real problem for Force Theory, then, as a science rooted in Philosophical Anthropology--and considering the "facts" of ancient man--is to drop the issue of the gap between a fact per se and a moral value (this gap can never be resolved) and turn instead to another hiatus.  That hiatus is the one between a use value on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a moral value.  The early human being did not find value in his tools because of some "moral obligation" to find value; his only interest in the tools, and the only value he placed in them, was because of their use.  On the other hand, at some point in history human beings conceived of their own "duty," apart from any idea of utility.  The real trick of philosophy is to make this connection.  So far, other than here, it has not attempted this.

To use or to be used, that is the question.  At the risk of appearing as simplistic or merely glib, we can reduce the issue to the use human beings put one another to.  In the tradition of Philosophical Anthropology we look first at early man, and particularly at man in his capacity of tool-maker and tool-user.  That humans make tools and use them seems to be a fact of primary importance as we trace the origins of the human sense of duty.  Even as men use tools, they use one another.  It is in this fact--the use humans put one another to--that we search for the origin of cateogorical morality or what Kant called "duty."  Kant said our duty is not to use other humans.   Kant, in response to Hume--who said that value cannot be derived from fact--resorted to a ploy.  That is, he evaded the difficulty of deriving a value from a simple and obvious fact by attributing value, rather, to an obscure and complex fact--mind.  This was a simple evasion of an issue that was basic to philosophy.  It is still an issue.  For purposes here we may dwell on the idea that humans both use one another and are used by one another.  Kant addresses the issue wherein one human being can use another, saying simply that this is morally--in violation of basic values--wrong.   Kant condemns any act by a human wherein he puts that human to a use involuntarily.  Kant also says that it is the duty--derived from the values inherent in mind, or categorical imperatives--of a person not to "use" another human being.    Every school child has heard that it is "wrong" for humans to "use" one another; the very word "use" in this context signifies wrongness [pejorative?].  We go over this idea carefully, restating it in every way so as not to miss any nuance of meaning.  But there is more. Even as human beings use one another, they are also used by one another.  The very idea of "duty" as advanced by Kant seems to suggest a corollary idea to the effect that, in allowing oneself to be used by other persons the individual has somehow sanctified oneself.  Self-sacrifice is universally regarded as a virtue; and in this sense it is a high value.  Such sacrifice is "valued."  The word for such selfless people in our society is "heroic."  That human beings could contradict themselves, and commonly do, is obvious:  so there is no problem in understanding how an entirely self-contradictory set of codes and laws could come about.  This is only human nature.  It would seem that the great philosopher Kant involves himself in a contradiction, inasmuch as one "is used" in a certain sense as soon as one does not "use" another person. Kant was not an everyday person; on the other hand his philosophy is merely clever and evasive.  Above all his writings are political (!)    A person, says Kant, is used, or allows himself to be used, in simply doing his duty.  Duty would seem to involve, or have as duty's corollary, self-sacrifice.  So Kant would say, although it is wrong to use another person, it is not wrong to be used.  To be used, on the contrary, would be one's duty.  Or so it would seem.  There is no way of saying the word "duty" without raising the idea, simultaneously, of self-sacrifice.  And self-sacrifice obviously is allowing oneself to be used.  Thus we may conclude that what Kant opposed as "immoral" was not the idea that one human would use another one, precisely, but that this use would be against the will of the man being used. The person who is sacrificed for is in effect using the person making the sacrifice.   But now we have dropped a considerable distance:  having been in the etherial realm of transcendental morality, we fall to the much lower level of practical and legal business ethics.  Kant clearly involved himself in a logical contradiction which can be resolved only by thinking on a very different level of man and society.  Kant of course never addresses his own contradiction; rather he plays hide and seek in a realm between psychology and moral philosophy.  Values are in the human mind, he says, and somehow value will make itself consistent regardless of the dictates of mere logic.  Here in Force Theory we take up the logic of Kantian philosophy, even as, as I said earlier, this Kantian morality stands today as the very cornerstone or key stone (of a romanesque arch) of Western civilization:  take it away and the whole edifice crumbles.  This is our most earnest consideration.  The issue here is not as complicated as it sounds.  We are starting to move in the direction of some sense of agreement or reciprocity or quid pro quo.  At issue, too, is the notion of contract as an enforcable and enforced agreement.  We talked about these things earlier in this blog.

What then is the origin of the idea of categorical (absolute) morality, or (Kantian) "duty"?
If I drop a stone, it will fall.    Not only could it fall, it will fall.  This is physical law.   If we say that the stone will fall, that is because we expect it to fall.  David Hume has exhaustively discussed the issues raised here.  But there is more.  The words "should fall" could mean either of two very different ideas:  that we expect it to fall, or that the stone has a "moral duty" to fall.  We could say that we expect that it will not fall, but it still has a moral duty to fall.  In saying this about a stone, merely,. we would not make much sense.  Such a statement would mean something if one were speaking of a person.  It is doubtful that this stone has a moral obligation to do anything.   But we could still say, before we drop it, that it "should" fall.   As I just said, that means we expect it to fall.  Usually the word "should" is not used in this context, for the reason that, in talking specifically about a dropped stone, we are certain that it will fall; and that to say merely that it "should" fall means, as the word "should" is normally used in this specific context, that we expect it to fall.  Yet it is not necessary to say we expect a mere stone to fall, because everyone listening to us knows that it will fall.  The reason the stone falls is something called gravity, a principle of nature humans are aware of not merely in theory but from simple observation.  I want to establish a proper and consistent context for the word "should."  We might use the expression "should fall" in the context of a dropped stone; but we do not need to use it in that connection. We can use some other word to say the same thing.  We could say merely that we expect the stone to fall.  There is a certain degree of confusion in ordinary conversation about words such as "expect to" and "should."  My bosses at this university expect me to treat all students--male and female, black and white--fairly.  I do.  It is my "duty" to treat students fairly.  Day to day there is no physical or biological or psychological principle that forces me to do so.  I have no instinct in that regard.  Still--and I understand this!--I have a moral duty to do so.  This moral duty is something different than the force acting upon a stone compelling it to fall.  Again, we move from Hume to Kant.  Hume would say this moral duty is not binding in any way whatsoever.  That is, I could treat students fairly or unfairly, either way; I am under no constraint whatsoever.  At this time it seems useful to interject a slightly different thought, but one that is becoming more apparent.  That is, there is and always has been a certain amount of confusion in the way the word "should" is used in ordinary conversation.  By not separating value and fact, we are saying, we allow a fog of uncertainty to take over which is the breeding ground, also, for manipulation of one person by another.  We leave in doubt in many cases the all-important issue as to whether, in saying that I "should" do something or other, my fellow human beings are offering me a choice.  They may be saying that I "should" be treating my students fairly, meaning, in other words, that I have a choice in the matter.  These people grant me personal discretion.  But they could also say that they "expect" me to do "the right thing."  Finally, they could say that, in the same sense that our aforesaid stone falls when dropped, I will do this thing.  They may--and do--hold out the threat here that something will happen to me, by their hand, if I do not do thus and so.  We can contribute this much certainty to the issue of moral duty as opposed to physical law, that this issue is a troublesome and vague issue.  We still are attempting to pass on to some sort of philosophical closure, of tracing Kant's high-and-mighty idea of the Categorical Imperative, no less auspicious than the Christian idea of God; we may say the CI is Western civilization's ersatz God.


(15 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)


1. A value cannot be derived from a fact.  (Hume, Carnap)

2. "Love of one's neighbor" is a value.  Therefore, such "love" is not derived from any fact.

3. A fact cannot be derived from a value, any more than vice versa.  What is can be derived from what is, but not from what merely should be.

4. If love is a value, it is capable of being expressed only as a value, not as a fact.   "Humanitarian practice" is a contradiction in terms. 

R Carnap said that a value cannot be derived from a fact.  David Hume gave this idea the best exposition:  (From Google:) "The fact-value distinction emerged in philosophy during the Enlightenment; in particular, David Hume argued that human beings are unable to ground normative arguments in positive arguments, that is, to derive "ought" from "is". Hume was a skeptic, and although he was a complex and dedicated philosopher, he shared a political viewpoint with previous Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Specifically, Hume, at least to some extent, argued that religious and national hostilities that divided European society were based on unfounded beliefs; in effect, he argued they were not found in nature, but a creation of a particular time and place, and thus unworthy of mortal conflict."   We accept this proposition--that value cannot be derived from fact--as true.  On the other hand it is also true that certain persons with special powers set forth and represent certain facts as producing value.   Humans call these "holy or sacred" facts.   Value-producing facts are not everyday facts, perhaps, and are more or less unique; also the values that these facts produce are not everyday values.  They are more than the good that a can opener has, say--that it opens cans.  The good of the special value is more than a use that a thing has.  These values are of a higher or transendental meaning; Kant called them categorical values. They are detached from all everyday utility and practical use.   Duty, higher love or love of humanity and so forth are among these values.  The subject of this book is these so-called great values, what they are in essence and how they came to be.  The values we are talking about come from small facts, so long as these are special facts; but the values can rivet together whole populations and their civilizations.  They are so-called core values.  Large worlds consisting of men, machines and everything else in culture grow up around them.  Yet like everything else they are anchored somehow in facts so small that they they existed, if inconspicuously and unnoticed, in the small worlds of ancient man.  Cultures turned into civilization and world history took its own direction. 

The facts such civilization were built upon were other than usual facts; and the values extracted from these unique facts were other than evceryday values.  We could call such culture "otherworldly."  And just as culture itself became otherworldly, the humans of these culture, who were defined by the culture, were other--specially chosen or annointed or appointed--persons.  A general contradiction appeared in human life, an opposition, that is, between value things and everyday or "natural" things.  On the one hand was what was holy and transcendental; on the other what is "merely" factual and everyday.  The whole conflict we are saying rests on the idea that, indeed, a value can be derived from a fact.  At the heart of Western civilization is a value that is illegitimately--contrary to laws of ordinary science--derived from some fact or other.   A look at the history of our civilization provides sufficient examples.  We may look at some of these now.  The earliest humans lived in a world of pure facts.  Whether these were hard facts or soft ones might be a topic for later in this essay.  We are non-commital regarding the hardness or softness of the facts.  What is true is that humans lived with these facts, such as they were, without reflecting upon them.  A fact was simply some entity or principle in the world that cold be understood without reflecting; so it was taken for granted.  Animals know "facts" in this sense.    All the word "natural" means here is that a thing is accepted without thinking.  As we turn to naturalism, then--and this viewpoint will be our own--we return to a sort of "naive" perspective.  On the other hand, for early men there were still certain "naive" values such as love and hate, not as so-called Categorical Imperatives, certainly, but just as that--simple love and simple hate.  Such basic values did not come through reflection but simply were secretions of the original human organism.  It is appropriate to say that the first love and hate were hormonal secretions.  Human culture began, as we never tire of saying, with the first use of a stick or stone as a tool.  The tool "reflected" some human purpose.  The tool in this sense mirrored some impulse that the human being had; the impulse realized itself through the mediative agent of the tool.  We are in a domain of philosophy, here, were a mere word can lead us, sometimes productively and other times erroneously, in different directions.  In looking at the practice of tool use of early man we may begin to understand, vaguely, the separation of value from fact.  A stone is a small fact from which some use can be derived.  This use to which a small stone can be put is certainly just a small use.  But is this use now a "value"?  Certainly we have created in this simple technical act an entire new order of reality.  The use of an object is not a necessary attribute of an object, as hardness is an attribute of the physical thing is an attribute of that thing.  A stick or stone is per se hard or round; but the use of the stick is not an attribute of the thing per se.  In creating use, the human being creates value.  But there is more.  We want to move on to pursue much bigger game, that is, the biggest prize of all--transcendental Good.  The good that inheres in a tool is instantly degraded in the use of that tool.  Culture has a way of disposing of value in the same way it casts off useless material of any kind.  In the good that arises from ordinary tool use, as soon as the tool is used, the usefulness that the tool has is dissolved in the practical activity that the tool accomplishes.  This everyday usefulness is not somethng humans want to keep; it is a momentary thing as ephemeral as the motion of a tool.  The transcendental Good, on the other hand--the value that Kant talked about--is something kept in a special place and free of contamination from any contact with the real world.  What The Good means is value that is beyond practical value.  If I do Good for some person, the Good that this person experiences is merely a practical good.  To practice the Good means for me personally only Good for the reason, precisely, that no practical good comes to me.  As soon as the Good is practiced for direct benefit to me, the majesty of The Good is lost; and also lost is the power of The Good to bind me to this other man.  There is much more we can say here.  An excursion into philosophy, as laborious and tiresome as this might be, seems to be our only course at this time.

In Carnap's words, a value cannot be extracted from a fact.   How, for example, would we derive a value from a stone that is simply lying about?  More precisely--and this finally is the real issue--how can we move from that stone to such ideas as humanitarian love or, ultimately, The Good?  There is no value in the stone, we are saying, unless we consider, additionally, the use--and here we specify human use--that the stone is put to.  Animals and humans are different.  The animal has no use for the stone and therefore sees no value in the stone.  But the animal does not "use" anything, precisely, since the animal is not a technician in the way humans use objects as tools.  The human, looking at the stone in question, may or may not see a use in this object; but if he does see one, that for him is the "value" of the stone.  So we can rephrase our question:  assuming that the object-fact has a use, is this use also "value"?  Because, if use is value, and value is use, then the stone either does have or could have value.  What the animal sees in the stone is this or that form, texture, color, weight and so forth--but no use.  We conclude that where "value" appears as an attribute of the stone, that value is in the use of the stone.  Asking again:  is use the same thing as value?  If use is value, is value then use?  Are the two terms identical.  We must say this:  the stone is valueless unless this object comes in some manner into the realm of human life.  The human being is a mediating agent, we are saying, between the object and the object's value.  For the factual object (or just fact) to have value, the human being must intrude himself into that object to become one more attribute of this fact.  Then, if use is value and vice versa, value appears out of the fact.  Facts can, then, produce value but only through the agency of the human being and his purposes.  The "purpose" of the fact is the fact's value.  The evolution of this new circumstance--new in that it is unique in the evolution of species--arose with human technology.  We said earlier, and will repeat here, that the human has engaged himself in his world in a "purposeful" way.  This is something no animal does.  In ordinary language and everyday conversation we do not make a distinction between the purpose of an object or fact, and, on the other hand, the purpose that the human being "has". Indeed, a human being can "have" a purpose.  Animals do not (we are saying) have them.   We do not ask whether a purpose is an attribute of an object-fact or is something in the mind or orientation of a human being.  Humans have purposes.  But these purposes are also attributed to objects themselves.  But it is clear that for an object to have a purpose, and hence a value, that object must conform to human purposes such as there are.  At the risk of seeming to repeat myself (which I do, necessarily), I have given serious thought to the proposition that values can be derived from facts.  Here we have gone the first mile in the company of religion which, for instance, would derive goodness (value) from fact.  Religion would agree that the usefulness of Jesus (in healing etc.) derived from Jesus who was also a good man, or a man of value.   But this goodness of Jesus was only in the usefulness of Jesus. It was a goodness of utility that Jesus happened to have.  This was like the ability of a football quarterback to dance and sing, irrelevant to Jesus' main significance on earth.  So, religion and Force Theory still live in separate worlds.   We would be left with some way of thinking or believing that good in the sense of value could come into the world, to be passed around and shared by the people of the world, through the mere fact of Jesus.  Actually, however, having walked this first mile with religion, we will part ways after that short walk.  We have only assumed that Jesus may have some use.  For instance, Jesus healed a sick person; that was His use.  So this use-value--of healing--came from Jesus.  But religion wants to go much further than we are willing to go.   In fact, religion would deprecate the mere usefulness of Jesus as simply one more fact of the world--that of organic healing--and as, furthermore, small in comparison with the "moral" good that Jesus brought.   In other words, Jesus is said to have brought to the world a Good that is not a practical good at all, but a Good in some other, higher sense.   Religion sees the problem if only unconsciously.  Religion already has an answer.  The Good of Jesus derives from the "fact" that Jesus is not a fact at all, but is Himself a value.  There is no issue in deriving a value from another value.  Religion admits, perhaps, that the gap between the facticity of the real world and, on the other hand, the value of value is an absolute and unbridgable one. All these important philosophical questions are not so much answered as they are simply brushed by in the bustle of everyday life.  Human beings simply do not care about such things.  Meanwhile their culture and civilization advance towards a final apocolyptic confrontation between value and fact, which not only differ, they contradict one another logically and absolutely.  They are different orders of reality that cannot co-exist.   Now, can a fact come from a value?  We have already said that a value cannot come from a fact?  Is the opposite true.  For instance, a man (Jesus, a saint, etc.), does an act that has use.  We have already conceded that point, that a man can act in a way that is useful to another man. 

But can this same act be called good.  We are taking the position here that a good man can do a good act, and in that sense impart value.  On the other hand, this is only to say that what is good can follow from what is good.  We have not said that what is fact and nothing but fact can result from what is good.  Our position will be this (!--I'm hesitant and tentaive!):  for a fact to derive from a value or a good, that good must lower itself to the level of fact.  In other words, in order to be of use to another human being, Jesus must lower himself to act in the capacity of a (mere) doctor of medicine (say) like any other doctor.  We are saying that no fact can come of a value.  The two realms are separate.   Finally (after this very long paragraphy) we come to the inescapable conclusion that the s-called great values of mankind--brotherly love, humanitarian virtue, equality, justice and so on and so forth--are in reality values that are extracted from values.  They do not derive from facts; and are uncomfortable and paranoid in the face of facts.  The value alluded to here as an axiom of Force Theory--small hatred--is to all these high values a deadly adversary.  From this point in our argument we proceed to this question.  We have fairly well documented the origin of values-in-general out of the usefulness of factual objects.  But these small use-value are in effect themselves facts, not animal facts, of course, but human facts.  These small value facts are related to the human capacity for technological engagement with the world; and in this sense these values are facts like any other facts.  Where and how, then, is the origin of value in the "higher" sense of pure and categorical human "goodness?" 

The Good,  Hegel says, does not appear at once but evolves by degrees.  We want to describe the stages that goodness, which is tied to usefulness, goes through before it, goodness, becomes The Good.   The useful is good; and the good of the useful is a particular good tied to that same use.   I began my interest at Colgate University in 1958 under Professor Dr. Ted Calhoon who mentored and tutored me individually in Plato; for that interest in me I thank him now.   What has happened to him since then I do not know; he went to work  for IBM and I cannot find him through Google.  My interest  in Hegel came much later.  That followed a dissatisfaction with both Greek and British philosophy, which seemed closed and leading always to the same dead end.  The Greeks were still primitive; the British limited themselves to empiricism.  German philosophy opened things up.  There was no need, it seems, to assume that the Platonic Good existed always and for all time; it could have had beginnings.  The secret to these beginnings and evolution could be understood through "dialectic," I thought, and the German conceptions in general which seemed much more radical and open-ended.  I knew the effort to know The Good would be long and tortuous; and the narrow little path taken by British was the wrong path.   The truth of German philosophy is in its possibilities.  Here we follow the Hegelian line opened by Engels, Max Stirner, Bruno Bauer and others.  Force Theory as first stated by Eugen Duhring is brought together with Hegelian dialectic and the ideologies of anarchism and racialism.  I have stated that triad earlier but here I will give it more precise expression.  There is something "good" that happens, we are saying, between white men when they come together.  Their reason for being together is primarily some enterprise;  spontaneously, they structure their relations around this enterprise.  The hierarchy that emerges in their relationships has to do directly with the enterprise at hand.  A man is judged "good" and his rank order is higher on account of his contribution to the enterprise.  We are assuming that the enterprise is "good"; that makes the hierarchical relations in accordance with this enterprise themselves "good."  I contrast the cooperative activities of black people with those of whites.  Even aside from native intelligence and so-called IQ, they are different.  If black men come together, it is not always for a mutual enterprise but simply in order to rank themselves hierarchically.  That is often the sole purpose of their being together.  If some enterprise is before them, as something that has to be done, the first act of a black man is to establish his own rank order in relation to another man.  Often this happens through violence.   This mutual bullying  is a purpose incidental to the task at hand and, furthermore, is one leads in distracting directions.  A man high in the higherarchy wants more wives, and here is one more distraction.  The original enterprise is forgotten.  And furthermore now there is no hope for anything to happen that is constructive.  The useful, rather, is the good; and this good that inheres in the utility of a simple tool or artifact extends to purposeful human relationships. 

This blog began with a consideration of the first act of technology, which was the event wherein a man picked up a stick and found that it was useful; the good of the stick was in its use.  We are left to ponder the question:   is an act of using one's hand in itself, apart from any consideration of the usefulness of the hand, "good"?  There is a certain complacency that human beings have regarding their own bodies that they do not have, relatively, towards the sticks and other tools that they acquire from around themselves.  I must invoke now a somewhat arbitrary and judgemental opinion about human beings, as about animals, that they do not think overly much about their own hands and bodies but take these things for granted.  Thus there is a clear distinction in the human mind between what is acquired from around the person and what constitutes the person himself, that is, his body.   I say clear distinction.  Actually, the body is simply forgotten; while attention is paid, rather, to the world of objects that lie here and there around the person and offer oportunities for technological use.  The mind of the human being is not designed, primarily, for instrospection.  This is the last function, rather, of the mind--that a person thinks about himself.  Philosophical Anthropology is just such introspection; that is why this field is relegated to the remotest corner of human consciousnes.  That is why--along with the racial ideology such a field could harbor--Philosophical Anthropology is bound to be unpopular.  We can therefore now lay down an apriori axiom of Force Theory that "use" is a quality of a tool but not of the hand; and that "good" is likewise a side of usefulness, but not a quality of the hand.    At the risk of sounding sarcastic, implying that human beings are largely just stupid, one does not ordinarily stare at his hands in awe.   Such excentric behavior (my own) is left to certain isolated and introverted individuals whom their follow humans want to keep isolated. 

If "use" is a condition limited to objects, but is not a condition of the body, then we can understand, too, how The Good has evolved.  What is used in the expectation of usefulness is not always useful.  What is intended to be of use, and is used with this in mind, turns out to be not useful.  An object used as a tool fails in its task.  This happens all too often.  But there is more.  A human being brought into society, who is nurtured in order that he may be "productive," may not in fact be productive.  He may even be a criminal.    We propose here that The Good is an inversion of the not-good.  Through The Good the not-good is preserved.   And why humans preserve the not-good as The Good is a pivotal consideration in Force Theory as a general conception of society.  We are left after all is said and done with a huge baggage, so to speak, of paradoxical human phenomena that is rolled into the conception of society.  This is something that though we may dercry it exists as fact.   Society, as it evolves, retains and protects within it all the badness that comes about under its general structure.  I use the word "guilt" in the hope that this word means something.  It was said by someone that capitalism is superior to socialism on account of its, capitalism's, failures not its successes.  This is true.  Failures are allowed by capitalism to fail.  The Good in these terms is sort of an ethical socialism; The Good may in fact be the core of this economic philosophy.  The bad cannot be called good, of course, and that fact remains always true.   The question remaining is still:  how can what is bad still be called The Good?  We cannot fully understand this idea, presently, except to see it--that the bad, while not good, is still The Good--in Christianity and in the philosophies of so-called Justice that have come down to us in the Western philosophical tradition.

A person takes his own hand for granted as something requiring no thought.  Use of the hand is like breathing; it is unconscious.  In this the hand poses for the human a different problem than does the tool or artifact.  Philosophical Anthropology deals with this issue and other issues of the human body.  Attention should be called here to the fact that earlier Philosophical Anthropologists--Gehlen, Plessner and Scheler to mention the most familiar of these--focus on different features of the body and also on different problems.  For instance, Plessner in Stufen dwells almost exclusively on the issue of life as it appears out of non-living matter; and looks only briefly at the rise (as an ex-centric being) of man out of life.  Gehlen's theme is more specifically that of human life, the idea, that is, that man is a mangelwesen, a "creature of deficiency."  I considered Gehlen earlier.  Again, Max Scheler's problem is almost entirely that of mind as weltoffen.  When we try to place Force Theory, which was the primarily economic theory of Eugen Duehring, within Philosophical Anthropology, we have a wide latitude of choices.  We almost cannot go wrong.  Indeed, the great philosophies of the world have been in basic areas philosophical-anthropological in conception, as deriving cosmology from features of the human being himself.   The known evokes of course the idea of a knowing mind, which is at the center of every great philosophy.  This is true even of religions.    In fact, Force Theory as it is presented here cannot but help itself in being philosophically anthropological.  So, resting assured that we are somewhere on track in our theory of "man" we may go on to talk about the point--critical for us now--where human life as an expression of life in general becomes, on the other hand, a unique expression of man.  That point is where the first technological thinking appears along with the first technological object, which was first (probably) just a stick.  The paradox of human thinking is that this "thought" was in the stick rather than in the mind.  In saying this we place ourselves in the general framework of Plessner's idea of ex-centricity and Scheler's notion of "weltoffenheit."   It is precisely the stick, or some simple tool, that set the human mind on its great adventure in thinking about a "world."  This stick is what actually engages, first and formost, the human being in the world around him and makes him, mentally, an integral part of the world.  The real problem that we have here, in Philosophical Anthropology and Force Theory, is not so much bringing the human together with his world as it is disconnecting him from it.  This can be said in several ways.  The human being, through the engagement that he has with the technics whereby he lives, has become so much a part of his world that his real difficulty is in distinguishing himself from the world.  In saying this I see I may have shifted position somewhat.  I need to square these considerations with the concept of alienation.  The phenomenon of alienation is precisely a separation from the world only after having been intimately connected with it.   

The human hand presents an oportune moment to discuss this alienation.  One cannot be alienated from one's own hand because one is not connected to that hand through mind.  Alienation is not a state of being, finally, as a way of thinking.


(7 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

An animal lives between rest and work.  He (we use "he" as more personal; my reasoning will shortly be clear) passes back and forth from one polar position to the other.    He is moving always toward rest and away from work; or he is moving toward work and away from rest.  Moving in the direction of rest, the animal is "becoming" what he is:  a being apart from the rest of nature.  His identity--apartness--is "safe."   And we can now say that at rest he has "become."   Whatever it was that he was becoming, he now has fulfilled himself as.   He is passing, in other words, to a position--here called "rest"--where he is unmoved and untroubled by anything around him.   He now is a being or thing unto himself, an identity apart from inert matter.  Not only does nothing change him, but nothing threatens to change him from the being that he is.  This is clear.   But there is more to the life of an animal.   Moving in the opposite direction, on the other hand, he is dis-integrating.  That is because "work," as I define the word, means in-corporating what is natural--"material"--into himself.  He is making something that was not a part of himself a part of himself.  This in-corporation is not only a physical but a psychological process.  Even to assimilate food is an uncertain and troubling act.  Food itself we are calling "nature."  And to eat is to put what was outside one's body inside his body.    While the animal preys upon other living beings, the animal himself may become prey, that is, die.  Pursuit of food exposes him to threat of death, from objects that lie here and there, from sharp things, from beings like himself only bigger and fiercer.  This struggle never stops so long as the animal must leave his safe haven.  The point where the animal feels at home and secure enough to rest is not nature, precisely, so much as a safe haven from nature.   A safe haven is sequestered away from nature; from the standpoint of nature, the safe haven is a vacuum.  But the animal--precisely by work--has protected himself.  But the animal also must pass, sooner or later, to a place where there is only work; this place is not secure or protected.  By "unprotected" we mean that the animal is in danger of becoming, himself, nature.  Threats surround him not only from without, as predators and climatic factors, but within as food grasped and assimilated only with difficulty.  Where the animal seeks food is a place in which he is threatened with dis-integration.  We say, in agreement with all the philosophers of the past, that work is basic to the animal--and to human beings.  Work on the other hand is not what the animal or man is.  Here we have a fundamental disagreement between Force Theory and the majority of philosophical systems.  We make no assumption that the human being is "made for" and "destined to" work.  It is still may be that the human or animal, either one, may have to work; but his objective is to "become" to be a being that is not engaged with nature.  Identity is apart-ness.  Work is engagement with nature in such a way as the person, on certain terms and in a special "safe" way, allows himself to approximate nature.  Mind itself is an organ or principle based on this assumption, that "compatibility" with nature is the answer to the inevitable necessity of getting food and fulfilling other needs.  Compatibity with nature, or closeness to nature, is an issue of expediency.  Thus, as a "value," Force Theory affirms rest and opposes work.  We look mostly in vain for predecessors:  Oscar Wilde saw that the human being is naturally not inclined to work.  He was correct.  Also, S.Freud postulated that the goal of human activity is sleep.  We concur that Freud was at least partly right.  Where we challenge existing philosophies is in the point that value in living derives from work; we say that the real goal of human effort is to free the human from nature, that is, in effect, from work.  Of course there are all sorts of psychological problems in freeing oneself of work, when, after all, we have evolved instinctively to accept work.  Schopenhauer points out the danger of boredom.  But communism for one thing, and the so-called Protestant work ethic, both stipulate work as the fulfillment of human life.  That is false.  Finally, the distinction between man and animal is that man enlists nature for "work," while the animal avoids nature to do the work he has to do.  Society must be understood as an arrangement of human beings for work.  I have said a number of things about the closeness of work to nature; the suggestion would be, logically, that society as a thing of work is like nature.  I have also said that nature is inert matter that animal and human alike assert themselves against; inasmuch as to counter nature is the essence of life itself.  Society in these terms would be a certain approximation of death, but a version of death (we are saying) that, paradoxically, allows a human to live.  That is the human, unlike the animal, "approximates" death in order to live.  We call this approximation "society."  Society envelops the person in a scenario reminiscent of inert matter.  Thus it would be false to say, as do even the most respected theories of democracy and so-called "freedom," that society is the source of value.  The opposite is true.  Force Theory, in accordinace with the premise that work is "a sort of death," proposes theefore to create a society that is not a society.  I will explain.

The person's idea that he should be "close to nature" is a neurotic fantasy; but it is also a statement in the political ideologies of our time.  By close to nature we do not mean a walk in the woods but a very arcane notion, and a premise of culture.  That premise is that the human does not depart from nature, as Rousseau would have it, but that he becomes more involved in nature through culture.  Culture is nature albeit an altered, human-friendly version of nature.  In this new nature the self is not freer--more independent or volitional--than was the original living being, plant or animal, but precisely the opposite.  The human being is closer to nature than before, if by nature we mean inert--dead--matter.  We may ask the question of the "self."  Every animal we have already said has a self or identity.  What is the relation of self and personal identity to what we commonly understand as nature?    The close-to-nature ideology that has come down to us, and is ordinarily understood by precisely these words--close to nature--is incorporated, subtly or overtly, in the most sacred and foundational writings of Western civilization.  This I have said earlier in this blog.   Rousseau I aver has been a major influence.   He has been important precisely because of, not in spite of, his obscurity on the point of Natural Law.  Not only the Enlightenment but Christian and Catholic doctrine made the same point, differing only in characterizing so-called "nature" as either divinely or "naturalistically" ruled.   The Rousseauian close-to-nature doctrine suggests just this, finally--and here we have the major underpinning of democratic as also communistic and catholic ideology--that the human being is closest to one's fellow human beings in being, so to say, close to nature.  A certain amount of exposition may be needed to explain this point.  My house is separate from my driveway because I have different concepts and words for these things.  Yet my house and driveway are also connected to one another by something-or-other, or what we call "nature in general."  This is clear. But when we talk about a living being, that being is not connected in the this "natural" way to what is around him. Animal existence, on the other hand, of which humans still are a part, rebells againt nature understood as a universal system.  The considerations presented here as Force Theory are by no means original; I would suggest, as part of a larger study of Philosophical Anthropology, to peruse the writings of Hans Driesch and other Vitalist writers.  But Plessner, too, goes into these basic factors although in a very obscure way.  My own writings now are simple and simplistic, with the objective of moving from vital forces to social factors.  Force Theory is avowedly ideological.  We are saying only some very elemental things about the overall principles involved.   Life is spontaneous, inwardly motivated, and anti-gravitational.  Life in general is anti-natural law if by that we mean physical and chemical law and so forth.  We may even say that life rebells against other life.  Living forms fight againt their incorporation into other living forms.   Life as a "separatist" principle means essentally moving away from, not toward, all that is not the living being himself.  This last consideration, that life is self-motivated, and that the individual living form separates himself from everything else in his universe, goes to the issue of society.  That is:  is the human being "socially" inclined.  If he were, then socialism would be an easy inference.  What socialism sees, on the other hand, as the "social" nature of the human being is in fact the economic-and technological nature of humans, their mental capacity to "identify" with inert objects and universal principles; and to thus, as I have already said, "bring nature closer to themselves."The distinction that defines a form as living is that it separates itself, or is apart-ist, in relation to all other forms living and dead.  The human being may be social, but life in general in its individual manifestations is unsocial and anti-social.   We may wonder, then, how the human being becomes social.  I have already discussed this.  To live at all, as I say, is to "be apart."  We are not talking about any "aparteid-ism," directly, but about "apartness" which is basic condition of all living beings.  These are not forms of nature, precisely, so much as they are manifestations of an inward "volition" or a cause of self-movement.  I am talking about very general issues, not about political systems--but inferences become very easy.   An inference on society comes very easy.  To submit to society or "the state," as Rousseau would have us do, is not to contradict humans as species beings so much as to contradict life.  Life fulfills itself in the indepence of its forms, even while society, on the contrary, subjects all forms to static or naturalistic principles.    There are broad issues at stake, many of which are discussed by sociologists and anthropologists.  There is however a certain "social bias" of sociologists and anthropologists which turns good science into bad ideology.  That is, sociologists do not concede that being apart and apartist is as much a human motive as being connected.  America, as I said earlier in my writing (now verschoben) on Philtalk.de:  American so-called democracy is founded upon the bad science of Europeans (much of the good science they kept for themselves in the form of Fascist ideology).  The auto- or self-motivation of the individual living form rebells againt society as it rebells against nature, and in so rebelling--pulling away or apart--defines itself as an identity.  Life defines itself through anti-nature and anti-social rebellion.  Rebellion is not revolution; revolution is only substituting something new, but the same, for something old.  Rebellion in the sense suggested in Force Theory is essentially self-definition, identity, in other words the practice of the theory of Philosophical Anthropology.  I propose that Philosophical Anthropology is the true and correct revolt-ist theory.


(7 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

Nihilisim is "nothing-ism."  That is where we now have arrived, inevitably, in a chain of logic.  We put ourselves in opposition to the beliefs of humanity which are also the basis of whole civilizations.  In opposition to these views we consign ourselves to the backwaters and desolate outregions of the world.  Force Theory in these terms will never be "accepted"; but what we talk about--the void or dark side of the universe--are nevertheless real.  What have we said so far about democracy and humanitarianism or secular liberalism?    As the Jesus story is soothing and uplifting, so also the ideals of humanity and democracy admonish only to accept and nurture the suffering peoples of the world.  Such ideals comfort not only those who are their object but those who hold them.  In this religion of humanity there is solice.  What democracy asks for is not equality.  The real goal of democracy is not  equality, as I say, as it is anonymity.  To disappear within the masses of people, where one is no longer challenged to do anything, is an aspiration of many human beings.  To lower oneself to the level of the unassuming masses is the point of religion and democratic theory alike.  It appears that democracy and humanitarianism are going to hold their ground as "positive," that is uplifiting and upstanding, viewpoints.  To hold such views is to ask for social acceptance.  We may subject these views to a theoretical criticism, as we have done in this blog as Force Theory; that will not change the public philosophy, which has endured over the many centuries.   To offer valid criticisms of hopeful and humanitarian views is not difficult.  To call humanitarianism what it is, optimistic and idealistic, does not dampen the enthusiasm of religionists, it may even encourage greater efforts to assuage the suffering of the world.  As I said before, to "do" The Good is only to degrade the goodness of The Good.  Conversely, to attack Evil--even while not dampening Evil--does no good; such attacks on so-called Evil are a ritual of religion.  These are ideas I have held for many decades and write them down here only to warm them up a bit.  They are ideas inspired originally by Nietzsche, if only in his phrase "beyond good and evil."  Nietzsche himself got his inspiration from Max Stirner, anecdotally; but in any case the ideas have percolated through a vast literature primarily in Germany.   I have read his essay several times; and have followed these ideas as they have coursed through Spengler and other German conservatives.  What we are left with in these philosophies is a hopeless confrontation with what people continue to believe, notwithstanding their real material and personal interests.  The ideas presented in the present blog could be characterized not simply as anarchistic and racialistic but as nihilistic as well.  I want to accept this point as I know it will be profered.   A word should be said about nihilism, or "nothing-ism."  Nihilism says essentially that, depending on the precise frame of reference (metaphysical or ethical) nothing is real; or that nothing is of value.   If we reject democracy and the values written in our most sacred documents, then there appears left--of course we are speaking only theoretically--only a great void or darkness.  I talked about the God is dead movement started, perhaps, by Nietzsche.  I assume that what Nietzsche was talking about was not the facticity of God but rather the value that God expressed, inasmuch as--since facts cannot yield values--there would have to be some Platonic Good or Christian God to account for value.  Nietzsche said in the modern world this value is gone.  We have to correct him; this value persists.  We do not mean to slay the beliefs of the people; our purpose here is only theory.  Also, we have, but without regret, wandered--again theoretically--into a cul de sac of logic.  That is, if we destroy the values of democracy and equality, what is there "beyond" these values?  We are left with a dark, valueless world.  We aver--and here there would be no disagreement from philosophers or everyday people--that nihilism is a "negative" philosophy in total contradiction to all the values--which are by definition "positive" ideas--that there are.  Force Theory has dug this grave for itself.  But is it really a grave or a new beginning?   The phrase God is dead! originated with Nietzsche but, ironically--since Nietzsche was philosophically conservativism--in the radicalism of pre-revolutionary Russia.  "God is dead; and anything is possible!" was the phrase attributed by Turgenev to one of his characters.  There is no work of serious philosophy that would espouse nihilism--which, as I say, means nothing-ism--nor is there a secondary work that would give credence to such a view.  My own view is that this bias began with the first human culture--with the first technics and, simultaneously, use of technics in social relations.  This makes the nihilism presented in this blog all the more radical:  that it turns itself against not only the civilization of today, so-called "capitalism" or "communism," but the whole of human culture.  This would be a thorough nothing-ism.  It would be the most radical philosophy of all, proposing as it does a theoretical return virtually to the state of animals.  That is precisely correct.  However, the view presented as Force Theory also flies in the face of the fact that my personal views as a writer, gained in a lifetime of normal experience, are not nihilistic.  There is nothing in my own life that would suggest this.  We turn to another possibility.  Nihilism offers no solution to any problem; it states categorically that there is no solution to any problem.   What nihilism does, on the other hand, is to pose a question.  That question is this:  It is not nihilism that contradicts culture, but that culture contradicts itself.  Culture in ex-pressing its own logic and agend ends, finally, in nothing.  Nihilism is simply the theoretical recognition of that fact.  On the other hand we may fully embrace the adage that "where there is life there is hope."  That may be our motton.  What that adage expresses is the idea that life, not culture--which is made of dead things--is what we value and cherish.  If there is value at all, it comes directly from life.  And the so-called values of culture, which in admonishing humans to return to an anonymous mass or essential inert matter of theoretical democracy, deny life.  Nihilism here means only to turn away from culture and embrace life, which--as the animal knows--is not matter.  Nihilism is not a theoretical position we need here to embrace, so much as it is one we have to face.  Ahead of us is a road where our decisions cannot be based on culture or reason; they must be provided by instinct, life and race.  If I accept the idea that this artifact is "good," I logically have to accept the idea that this or that person whom I do not care for is my "brother."   The only recourse I have from this fatal philosophy, begun already in the Paleolithic of humanity, is nihilism.  I accept that philosophy, only to propose a question and, as an answer to that question, a new living and racial society.

Traditonally since Plato the notion of value has been connected with a concept of freedom.  What--that being or principle--was regarded as free was more than useful-- good in the sense that a thing or action is useful--but good in some sense detached from anyting everyday and utilitarian.   There had to be, of course, some thing or principle to which humans were once subjugated to for freedom to be a meaningful concept.  Freedom is independence from something or someone.  Plato considered the senses themselves degrading and encumbering; he aspired to the pure regions of abstract thought.  In our present speculations we are not however so interested in the truth or untruth, correctness or incorrectness, of this (virutally) universal Platonism as we are in the political and social application of Platonism.   In general, this principle or thing from which man was to be free was called "nature."  In these terms, freedom as the source of value and ethical rightness was freedom from nature; and what made this freedom possible, or essentially was the freedom itself, was mind.  The so-called Good was "other" than nature.  The Good was regarded as free of nature in the same essential way that life is "opposed" to gravity.  A tree grows upward--in violation of the downward pull of nature.  This is a point I made earlier in this blog.   But the first assertion of Platonism regarding "freedom through mind" raised a new problem.  Assuming life and inert matter are different "substances" or principles, is what mind is to be free of life or is it nature? Again the concept of mind was vague depending on different traditions; in Hinduism this mind was less intellectual and more "spiritual."  Arguments among theologians and scholars hang around the questions about the precise definition of mind.  While the drift of these traditions is that mind constitutes an escape or freedom from nature, there is still an issue as to whether mind escapes from the realm of stones and such inert things, or from the principle of life.  Of course, throughout Western philosophy there has been a clear bias in favor of mind and opposed to, on the other hand, a reality--constituted essentially instinct and (we are saying) race--that we could identify as life.  For us there is no eluding this argument, as convoluted as the issues may seem.  I want to (try to) keep the issues simple for readers--and for myself!   There is an overwhelming vortex of speculation that makes up Western literature.  A connection not difficult to make, however, is that between a notion of value or The Good and, on the other hand, freedom from nature.  Philosophers only vaguely grasp mind as something real; but also nature as a concept remains vague in the many threads of argumentation that there have been over the centuries and in the different religious and scholarly traditions.  Again Plato has been the great influence in Western philosophy.  Finally, insofar as this ethical freedom carries over into political theory, the individual person becomes free through mind, although not so much the individual mind--such freedom would be anarchy--as through a collective mind.  This mind is established through culture and society.  Thus it is through the collective mind, finally, that true value is evoked or connected to actual human lives.  I mention Hegel in this connection.  Several thoughts have been presented; we must try to keep our argument simple, not only for the sake of the reader but for the writer.  Freedom is, or is through, the collective mind.   Hegel for instance establishes how, through dialectic, individual interaction is parlayed into a group mind or "Spirit," which is not only the focus of collective life but is the source of value or The Good.  Except for human collective life--whose highest expression is the State--there is no value.  This equasion is made in the great body of Western wisdom, not only of religion but of academia.   The idea is simple.  The point of view advocated here--in "violent" contradiction with the consensus sapientes of Western civilization--is that the sole freedom we can talk about is that of life from inert nature.  The plant and animal are already "free" insofar as they pull against the "gravitational" pull of matter.  Thus any special freedom that the human being claims for himself, that is apart from the freedom that living beings show in general, has to be viewed with suspicion.   Any so-called freedom of mind from nature is false where this is a "transcendental" freedom from life.  Mind, rather, because mind involves the human being in inert matter, actually contradicts the animal impulse to remove life from nature.  Mind which engages humans in inert matter contradicts the aspiration of life away from nature.   Mind provokes a rebellion of life which we perceive in new forms of human relationships through instincts that we know as race.

Society is a way human beings have of living together.  This is sociology 101.  Force Theory, as sociological counter-culture, wants to know if society has some provision wherein humans can live apart and separately.  It does.  This would be Force Theory 101.  But we have to clearly define our terms "together" and "separately."  Human beings come "together" for different reasons; and the reasons that they have of coming together determine, essentially, how they will exist together.  These reasons may be family and reproduction; I have talked about these motives in my book Utopia of the Instincts now available in as Instauration at Whitenewsnow.com.  But once humans come together, are they going to simply stay together forever?   Furthermore there are reasons to come together that are called business dealings.  We can understand these.  But having concluded business, are these partners going to simply settle down together and live as a happy family?  We don't think so.  There is the distinct possibility, all too real, that human beings may not like one another; they may want to part.  They may want to shut one another out of their lives?   Religion admonishes against this.  Nietzsche made the remark appropriate here:  "Society has lost the ability to excrete!"  This is precisely what we are talking about in this paragraph.  There can be an orderly or disorderly exist of humans from this or that particular society, or this or that particular relationship.  But there is a possiblity that we still have not yet talked about.  Humans may live closely together simply because they are forced to do so.  This is a condition best defined as slavery.  But here--because democratic theory is based precisely on the idea that, having consented to government, humans will be, by virtue of that government, forced to live together.  They cohabit in the same sense that humans, somewhere in a ghetto house, have to live together because there is no where else to go.   In an affluent soicety such coercion is more subtle; yet government and the state coerce this state of existence.  This fact is more difficult to comprehend if only because it is an everyday reality.    Human beings, we say, finally, are forced to come together.  Democracy, prompted by Rousseau, calls this state of being "freedom."  That humans are given no free choice to live together but must do so, rather, under command of the state, is stated clearly in the sacred documents of America and many other countries.     This is a idea that, first stated by Rousseau and later made an object of speculation and wonderment by scholars.   Rousseau said that in a State of Nature, the original condition of humanity, people instinctively and spontaneously subject one another to all sorts of coercion and misery.   That is a true idea, certainly.  But Rousseau goes on to say that such people decide, in some sort of awakening, to exit this State of Nature and enter, rather, a State of Society in which rights are conceded to the State.  In commiting themselves to the State or government, human could be free of the coercion inflicted upon them by their fellow humans.  The State of Nature is followed by a State of Laws.  We have to pause here, as scholars commonly do, to reflect upon Rousseau's imaginative but convoluted notion.   In Rousseau's arcane writings there is no unabivalent commitment to democracy; nor is there such a commitment by the American government, which acknowledges its theoretical roots in the Natural Law ideas of France and England.  "Forced co-existence,"  which idea is basic to American society, is accepted with dull, unthinking acquiesence as just normal reality.   The idea of "forced freedom" is clearly a paradox.   This is what we are left with, however, not only in modern sociology but in the actual practice of democracy.  As I stated earlier, what we attempt to do in this essay on Philosophical Anthropology is to get as much consistency as possible in social theory.   Force Theory, for one thing, tries to excise this sort of unresolved and unresolvable contradiction.


(7 replies, posted in Philosophical Anthropology)

These issues are not as difficult as they first appear.  Clarity is gained by drawing out the nuances of each word we say.   The law of nature is essentially this:   nature says, "if you want to live at all (be life, a living creature), remove yourself from me!"  Man, in recognition of nature's own proclamation, creates for himself culture; he pulls away from nature, as an airplane of human creation overcomes gravity.  Culture does create a certain distance of man from nature, but using the material of nature.  What this means--that man uses nature to remove himself from nature--that man comes closer to nature, not more distant;  culture essentially means bring nature closer to the man.  Nature, in this sense--as the pull or gravitational force drawing what is not nature, that is life, into it--now becomes more threatening than before.  An animal has an instinctive aversion to nature which the human being, comfortable in his culture as ersatz nature, lacks.  (The Philosophical Anthropologist Irwin Strauss, whom I met once in Kentucky, said that the human being is distinct from other beings in his effort to "overcome gravity"; i have long meant to find Google sources for Strauss.)   But this culture is simply an alteration of existing nature.  In respect of what I've called "deadness," culture remains the same as nature.  As I say, in the fundamental respect wherein culture pertains to the human being as a living being, this new cultural nature remains, as before, inert (dead) matter.  However, culture says to man:  come live within me comfortably.  This we may regard as a trap.  This is the same gravitational pull that nature exerts upon life, that draws itself into its "natural laws" of physics and inertia.  Culture exhorts the human in effect to die.  The Jesus story illustrates this point.  Jesus is the exemplary moral example of culture.  If we examine the medical and healing consequences of Jesus' stay on earth, they are very quite inconsequential.  Jesus' effect as a practical doctor was piddling.  We note, as the Bible says, Jesus cured one man of leprosy; a blind man's vision was restored; and the guests at a wedding had wine (or some such story).  In the total scope of human misery, this is little "good" to have done.  The true significance of Jesus is in his descent from heaven where there is "eternal life" to the place--of human making--where there is death.  In effect he effaced his (eternally living) character to merge with mortal humans.  At this point we may raise the issue of human society, or, in other words, the human being's relationships with other humans.  Jesus' main message was one of self-effacement.  The human being through Jesus' example would merge with the nature around him, which was now one of human culture--including religion and the morality of humanism--as an ersatz nature, but one whose basis is essentially dead matter.  In a broader sense we may say Jesus advocated a sort of materialism like Fourier and Engels.  This is a "worship" of "matter," that might be called commercialism.  Communism in this context would mean a "moral" co-existence with one's fellow human beings.  It is important to consider that human beings themselves take part in culture; as such they themselves become in principle "matter."   Society--appropriate to the main moral message of Jesus--translates the issue of life, here living human beings, into one of inert or dead matter.  A factory consists of machines--and human beings.  Considered thusly, the merging of the individual person into a mass of so-called workers is tantamount to absorbtion into the lifelessness of culture as ersatz nature.  But society in this regard is no different than a factory:  society is a creation of general culture and the essential mode of relationship within this structure is impersonal and self- (life-) effacing.  Society as a factory of sorts absorbs human into itself and effaces him as an individual person.   It is in this context--of culture as a (inherently hostile) second nature--that we form the basic ideology of Force Theory.  This is not an anarchist view, really, so much as a superficially nihilistic view.   The nihilism of Force Theory consists of a recognition of what culture and society and civilization essentially are.  We temper this nihilisim, here, however, by stating a problem--the adversarial relation between nature and life--as a problem to be solved in the future.  Force Theory speculates on a compromise or resolution to the contradiction that the human being faces in relation to the culture of his creation.  Force Theory on the other hand still remains as the seriously revolutionary philosophy.

The identity of an animal is formed through its, the animal's, separation--is being "other" than and "opposed to"--(what we are calling, hypothetically) nature.  To become "one with nature" is to die, essentially.  Thus when we are told that it is good to be "one with nature," or "together with nature," we might reasonably assume that we are being admonished to die.  An animal, if it could understand such things, would ahbore closeness to nature as nature abhores a proverbial vacuum.  But there is more.  Human ethical systems, whether secular or sacred, tend strongly to advocate a "closeness to nature."  Hinduism, Christianity, Bhuddism are major examples of this.  There are strong threads running through German philosophy which, in fact, have long been the inspiration for my own viewpoint.  There is a certain "back to nature" ideology which dominates American sacred writings, such as the Declaration of Independence.  Reference to humans as having all been "created equal" contains this same naturalistic premise.  Democracy advocates a certain resting place for humans in their natural condition, which was one of equality.  The attempt of ideologists of the founding fathers, in France and America, was to connect the principles of society with those of nature; and to assert that humans, in closing together with nature, would come together among themselves.  This is what Franklin and Jefferson said, much in the spirit of Rousseau and primitivistic ideology (the "nature people" such as Indians), were proposing possibly in reaction to the friviolity of French aristocrats.  At this time we could attempt an exposition of the term State of Nature as used by Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes.  Their accounts of the State of Nature differed one from the other; we might be at loss to understand these ideologies in any terms.  It must suffice to say that in the term State of Nature a certain sentiment is expressed that, what is original and ab-original is "right" and "just."  "Nature shows the way," is an apt expression.  The point of view expressed is, as I have already said, that humans through their artifice have departed, slowly or rapidly, from an "ideal state" in which all humans were originally comfortable.  It is finally difficult to distinguish the sentiment of the Garden of Eden story to Rousseau's philosophy.  This primitivism has been enhanced by certain class distinctions that begin to appear, more and more, in evolved civilizations.  Already in the West there had been minor revolts against materialism of the upper classes.   There is not sufficient space here to examine the nuances and see how they all point in the same direction.   In general what we are saying that, from the perspective of a lowly animal, who already lives "close to nature" but whose main purpose in life is to free itself from nature, such "nature-ism" would seem suicidal.  We now examine the problem of culture from a general viewpoint.  While nature is assumed to be "natural," culture is assumed to be artificial. Force Theory, as we present this ideology as derived from Eugen Duehring, culture is falsely cateogorized as artificial.   The words artificial and natural are assumed to be oppositional.  We are denying that culture is artificial, other than in the point that culture is man-made.  Culture is not strictly speaking artificial, other than in that one point--that it is man-made.  Culture is assembled from naturally existing objects and put together--again in a way in accordance with natural principles--in an arrangement that is amenable to so-called human nature.  This, we repeat, does not substitute artifice for nature so much as present to human beings a nature that is amenable to human needs.  Nature as culture is also culture as nature.  To be close to culture--which humans are willing to do, even when separating themselves from raw nature--takes us back to the issue faced by animals.  That is, to be close to culture is to be close to nature in the sense of closer to absorption in, or dissolution in, the cosmos out of which life first appeared.  We are saying that to be cultural is to be close to nature.   This is a process or direction that began as soon as the earliest humans first raised a stick for some purpose.  The purpose was a human or animal one; but the stick itself became a "new nature," but one more amenable to human lives.   I have already stressed, elsewhere in this blog, that as part of this ersatz nature, here called culture, has come the comforts of modern human life.  But there is more.  We see, too, that by merging with nature, now called culture, humans lose the identity which, even as animals, they had striven to achieve.  Earlier they had defined themselves through acts wherein they separated their selves from nature.  Now, at this time, by re-connecting to nature through culture, they lose that identity.  I have defined Philosophical Anthropology and Force Theory as a sort of identity quest.  That is true.  The future mission of human beings must be to free themselves from culture as they once freed themselves from nature.   This means in essence to free themselves from most if not all human attachments that exist only through culture.  Through culture humans are connected to nature; through culture, also, they dissolve their identities as individual persons.  They are deracinated.  In connecting to the world through culture, human beings connect with one another, not as ("racial") individuals, however, but as degraded objects of nature.  It must be noted that a primary human instinct that co-exists with any social instinct is an impulse to stay separate from other humans.  Society brings humans together; instinct, as an extension of life generally as an impulse to freedom from nature, compels humans to separate themselves from one another.  Culture is absolutely social.  Instinct is essentially anti-social.